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Foreword
It is amazing now to recall that when Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
announced in June 2014 that he intended to commission a review of 
peace operations, it came as a surprise—indeed, so far as the Secretariat’s 
Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs were con-
cerned, as an unwelcome shock. In retrospect, as this book shows, it is 
clear that the radical changes in context that had taken place in the four-
teen years since the Brahimi report made a further review if anything 
overdue.
Yet the timing of the review by the High-Level Independent Panel on 
Peace Operations (HIPPO) posed a problem. (When its Chairperson, 
José Ramos-Horta, said that he did not want our report to follow the 
Brahimi report in being named after him, he did not envisage that it 
would forever be dubbed HIPPO.) By the time the report was pub-
lished, the end of Ban’s term would be fast approaching; while some 
changes could be hoped for, major reform would inevitably have to await 
the leadership of the next Secretary-General and new department heads. 
Yet a new Secretary-General might not want to be associated with a pre-
decessor’s initiative, and the initial impact of a review on member states 
is not easily sustained.
Nearly four years on, however, the analysis and recommendations of 
the HIPPO report have continued to be valued as the framework for 
developments and debate regarding UN peace operations. Its recom-
mendations having been largely accepted by Ban, modest reforms were 
set in motion in 2015–2016 before his term came to an end. Member 
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state reactions to the report were generally positive, inevitably with some 
cherry-picking; and its analysis narrowed—while it did not resolve—the 
tension between traditional peacekeeping espoused by many troop-con-
tributing countries and the trend towards more robust mandates 
adopted by the Security Council. The HIPPO’s thinking, along with 
that of the other two major reviews published in 2015—regarding peace-
building architecture, and women, peace and security—featured promi-
nently in the public exchanges between member states and candidates to 
be the next Secretary-General. The early initiatives of Secretary-General 
António Guterres manifested his intention to improve strategic analysis 
and planning by the Secretariat, and to restructure its peace and secu-
rity departments—described by the HIPPO as “hampering the effective 
assessment, design and conduct of peace operations”—as well as to fur-
ther strengthen measures to address sexual exploitation and abuse, which 
have so damaged the reputation of UN peacekeeping.
The HIPPO’s insistence on the primacy of politics—that “last-
ing peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, 
but through political solutions”, and therefore “politics must drive the 
design and implementation of peace operations”—is now widely empha-
sised, including in the Security Council itself. In this, the HIPPO was 
giving necessary reinforcement to the Brahimi report’s critique of the 
strategic weaknesses of the Secretariat and the Security Council. But it is 
not always noted that in another respect, the HIPPO report went in the 
opposite direction from the Brahimi report: while the latter gave strong 
endorsement to the model of the large multidimensional peacekeeping 
operation with extensive peacebuilding functions, HIPPO’s keywords are 
prioritisation and sequencing, which together with its emphasis on con-
flict prevention may point to smaller missions.
When Ban decided to launch the review, the most recent new missions 
were MINUSMA in Mali (April 2013) and MINUSCA in the Central 
African Republic (April 2014)—and Mali in particular had displayed 
the failures of UN planning, mandating and deployment at their most 
acute, for which peacekeepers have paid with their lives. Worsening con-
flicts in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo have shown 
how difficult it is to adapt the established configuration of large peace 
operations to changed circumstances, as the Secretariat and the Security 
Council are now trying to do more systematically through a series of 
strategic reviews. The HIPPO’s emphasis on context-specific mission 
FOREWORD   vii
design, avoiding templates and its recommendation for a two-stage man-
dating process at the outset of a mission, have been widely supported in 
principle; but the ability to plan better in the future remains untested, as 
no new peacekeeping operation has been mandated since 2014.
The one new peace operation, launched in the positive context of 
a peace agreement at the request of both parties, has been the special 
political mission in Colombia, the design of which was most strongly 
influenced by its predecessor in Nepal. The HIPPO urged the abandon-
ment of a binary distinction between peacekeeping operations and spe-
cial political missions—it has become a cliché to note that peacekeeping 
operations often now have “no peace to keep”, and (as I once entitled 
an article) “all missions are political”. We advocated thinking instead 
in terms of a flexible spectrum of peace operations, the logic of which 
was accepted by Ban and is reflected in Guterres’ proposals for a restruc-
tured Department of Peace Operations. But resistance to this termino-
logical and conceptual shift remains strong in the Security Council and 
the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations; and the permanent 
members of the Council cling to the irrational funding of large special 
political missions from the UN’s regular budget, rather than moving to 
a single assessment for all UN peace operations, open too to the funding 
of peace operations of regional organisations authorised by the Security 
Council.
The HIPPO’s strong emphasis on partnerships with regional organi-
sations was an endorsement of a trend already under way, and has found 
overwhelming acceptance—except when it comes to funding arrange-
ments. It is now enshrined in the Joint United Nations-African Union 
Framework for Enhancing Partnership in Peace and Security, but the 
warm collaboration at the top of the organisations has yet to be consist-
ently reflected in country contexts. It is at the country level, too, that 
the rhetorical embrace of the call for a people-centred approach in peace 
operations must be implemented and assessed.
The first year of new leadership in the Secretariat and a new admin-
istration in Washington saw a welcome thrust for strategic reviews of 
individual operations—but a completely non-strategic approach to the 
peacekeeping budget. The deep difficulties of the UN’s largest missions, 
in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African 
Republic and South Sudan, compelled further introspection. Thus, 
in early 2018, the Department of Peace Operations drew up an action 
plan on improving the security of peacekeepers, and Secretary-General 
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Guterres announced a new initiative he dubbed “Action for 
Peacekeeping”. His call for streamlined mandates, political solutions, 
partnership with regional organisations, improved training and prepared-
ness of peacekeepers, alignment of human and financial resources with 
mandates, and member state influence to sustain the consent of host 
countries, should see further momentum for implementation of key 
HIPPO recommendations.
The Secretary-General’s ambition to bring together all partners and 
stakeholders to develop a new set of mutually agreed principles and com-
mitments requires recognition of trends well analysed in these chapters, 
both as regards conflict challenges and the geopolitics of multilateralism. 
The rise of China as an increasingly important peacekeeping actor and 
funder, and (in the words of the editors), “the rebalancing of relations 
between states of the global North and the global South”, mean that the 
latter will not meekly accept decisions dominated by the former. In the 
Security Council, what Guterres has called the return of the Cold War 
is making consensus on issues of intervention and sovereignty harder to 
find. Yet if there is one common interest which cuts across these divides, 
it is surely how to be effective in a world of violent extremism and funda-
mentalist non-state actors.
The process of consultation carried out in 2014–2015 by the HIPPO 
was notable for the way in which it brought closer together peace oper-
ation practitioners and researchers, including the authors in this volume, 
and this valuable interaction has continued through subsequent debate 
and implementation. It is a landmark feature of this book, which is thus a 
major contribution to continuing efforts to adapt the UN’s peace opera-
tions to a changing and increasingly challenging context.
London, UK  Ian Martin
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CHAPTER 1
UN Peace Operations: Adapting  
to a New Global Order?
Mateja Peter
A new globAl order?
In early March 2015, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) made 
a stop in Cairo, Egypt as part of its regional consultations on reform of 
UN peace operations. One of the discussion questions for the first ses-
sion asked, whether current UN peace operations in the Middle East are 
the right fit for today’s security environment and, if not, what kind of 
UN presence makes the most sense now and in the future. Very soon 
into the session a young diplomat from one of the regional states chal-
lenged the premise of this question, arguing that the only role for the 
UN is in supporting regional approaches. His passionate intervention 
opened a floodgate, with speaker after speaker depicting the UN with 
deep suspicion. The message was clear: UN peace operations were seen 
to be a Western intervention into regional matters; the League of Arab 
States (LAS) should deal with Arab problems, same as the African Union 
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(AU) should deal with African ones. The primacy of the UN was under 
challenge. Two years later, with the number of crises in the world not 
subsiding, the United States (US), as not only the leader of the Western 
world but also the biggest funder of UN peacekeeping, sought to cut 
$1 billion from the UN peacekeeping budget (Lynch 2017). Moments 
after the budget was adopted, the US ambassador to the UN exclaimed 
on twitter: “Just 5 months into our time here, we’ve cut over half 
a billion $$$ from the UN peacekeeping budget & we’re only get-
ting started” (Green 2017). All this is happening at a time, when UN 
peace operations are marred in sexual abuse scandals (UN 2015a; Essa 
2017; Naraghi Anderlini 2017), hence losing legitimacy in the eyes of 
the global public and, more consequentially, the local population, which 
they are supposed to be serving. Local and global non-state actors are 
demanding accountability and the UN is increasingly forced to react. For 
example, in June 2017, after a non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
Aids Free World leaked internal UN documents detailing alleged sex-
ual abuse and misconduct, the UN announced the withdrawal of 600 
Congo-Brazzaville peacekeepers from the UN Mission in the Central 
African Republic (CAR) (UN 2017). Challenges are coming from all 
sides and the core dilemma addressed by this volume is whether and how 
UN peace operations are adapting to this new global order.
Since the turn of the century both conflicts and interventions have 
changed dramatically. Self-perpetuating cross-border conflicts fuelled by 
both greed and grievances (Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and Hoffler 
2004)—a key feature of the post-Cold War security environment—, 
have gained new dimensions with the rise of illegitimate non-state actors. 
Groups such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qa-
eda−affiliated groups in northern Mali, Boko Haram from Nigeria, the 
Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda or the M23 militia in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are rewriting the rules of war. 
These groups are not just spoilers of peace agreements (Stedman 1997), 
they are seen as antithetical to peace agreements: neither they nor the 
broader international community are interested in peace agreements that 
would include them (Peter 2015, p. 358). The scale and nature of their 
atrocities in their regions of origin and the fact that many of them have 
a global reach through terrorist activities, makes the international com-
munity, as a whole, and members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), 
more specifically, unlikely to allow them any legitimate claims. Despite 
this wide agreement, the UNSC is often at odds about the kind of action 
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that should be taken to address their rise, something we have best seen 
in Syria. In other regions, where the permanent members of the UNSC 
have less polarising positions, UNSC responses indicate a new trend in 
interventions. Whether conducted through UN peacekeeping oper-
ations, such as in Mali, the DRC and the CAR, or through regional 
organisations, such as in Somalia or through the Multinational Joint 
Task Force against Boko Haram (de Coning et al. 2016), international 
responses are increasingly robust.
These new types of conflicts and interventions are happening at a time 
of dramatic shifts in the global order. For much of the twentieth cen-
tury, the discourse on peace and security took place between the East 
and the West, tempering the UN’s ability to get involved in intra-state 
conflicts. With the end of the Cold War and the newly found agreement 
in the UNSC, peacekeepers began addressing fallouts from civil wars and 
assisting post-conflict states in their reconstruction. But the much-hailed 
‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992) resulting in the liberal ‘peacebuilding 
consensus’ (Richmond 2004), did not transpire in ways anticipated. This 
new century is one of North–South rebalancing. From bipolar, via uni-
polar, we have now entered a truly multipolar world (de Coning et al. 
2014; Narlikar 2010). States from the global South have long been 
active participants in peacekeeping as troop and police contributors. This 
has not changed. At the time of writing, the top ten troop and police 
contributing countries are all from the global South, with Ethiopia, 
Bangladesh, India, Rwanda and Pakistan topping the list.1 Throughout 
the history of UN peace operations, the role of these states in the field 
has not been matched by their participation in decision and policy mak-
ing, with experts calling this division of work between the North and 
the South “a blue helmet caste system,” (Lynch 2013) “apartheid,” 
(Chesterman 2004, p. 11), and “imperial multilateralism” (Cunliffe 
2013, p. 20). This is changing. States of the global South are not mere 
recipients and implementers of international interventions anymore, but 
are increasingly vocal about how these should take shape.
This rise of the global South is accompanied through and aided by 
the emergence of regional organisations as providers of security. During 
the second half of the twentieth century, the UN peacekeeping mis-
sions were often considered as the only viable and legitimate actor in 
1 The only OECD country among the top 20 contributors in February 2018 was Italy in 
the 20th place (UN 2018).
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managing conflicts. This idea of an objective and unbiased respondent 
is enshrined in one of the key principles of UN peacekeeping: impar-
tiality (UN 2008). Over the last two decades, due to both stalemates in 
the UN Security Council and the changing nature of conflicts, regional 
organisations, both from the global North and South, frequently became 
the first responders. The most striking of these is still the 1999 interven-
tion in Kosovo, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
responded to an escalating humanitarian crisis despite objections from 
Russia and China (Holzgrefe and Keohane 2008). Unlike the Kosovo 
intervention, other regional organisations’ missions, from Somalia to the 
CAR and Mali, as a rule, received prior authorisation from the UNSC. 
With a notable exception of Libya, the UNSC authorisation now tends 
to follow a host state invitation to a regional organisation. The host 
states are often not seeking an impartial actor, but one that can deal with 
their internal problems efficiently. Responses to contemporary conflicts 
are increasingly robust and regional organisations are better equipped 
than the UN to execute them. But more and more it is not just the effi-
ciency but also the legitimacy of the regional organisation over the UN 
that plays the role in the determination of an intervening actor. Sudan, 
for example, refused a deployment of a pure UN peacekeeping opera-
tion to Darfur and instead asked for a joint United Nations–African 
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Burkeman and Rice 2006). 
In other cases, the fact that regional organisations responded first 
as peace enforcers brought them the legitimacy in the peacekeeping 
phase. Even when the UN deploys to the same area, regional organisa-
tions remain important players on the ground. In Mali and the CAR, 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and AU 
troops, respectively, who were on the ground first, simply got re-hat-
ted into UN troops (Williams and Boutellis 2014). Responses to con-
flicts today are more multifaceted than they were two decades ago. What 
this means for the primacy of the UN, as enshrined in the UN Charter, 
remains to be seen.
This rebalancing of relations is not only happening between the 
member states or the inter-governmental organisations, increasingly 
it is the non-state actors that put pressures on the international com-
munity to respond to atrocities. The plight of human populations half 
across the world and the inaction or inappropriate responses of states 
are not merely televised as they were directly after the Cold War, but are 
shared immediately and unfiltered on social media. These technological 
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advances, combined with the post-Cold War spread of human rights 
ideas, mean that—at least in the eyes of non-state actors—the standards 
for what peace operations are supposed to achieve are higher than ever. 
The message from global and local non-state actors is clear: the main 
objective of peace operations should be improving security and well-be-
ing of people affected by conflicts. Interventions should not focus only 
on state security, but also improve human security (Suhrke 1999; Stoett 
1999; Paris 2001). When peacekeepers get embroiled in abuse and mis-
conduct scandals, their legitimacy is tainted from the start. While new 
technology has changed how the UN is responding to conflicts, it has 
also facilitated greater transparency over what peace operations are 
achieving and when they are failing.
In sum, global order is facing four key transformations, collectively 
presenting unique challenges to UN peace operations: (1) the rebalanc-
ing of relations between states of the global North and the global South; 
(2) the rise of regional organisations as providers of peace; (3) the rise of 
violent extremism and fundamentalist non-state actors; and (4) increas-
ing demands from non-state actors for greater emphasis on human 
security.
united nAtions resPonses
The challenges the above transformations present are in many ways new 
for the UN, demanding a rethinking of some of the core assumptions of 
what peace operations can achieve and what they should be aiming to 
do. However, this is not the first time that the UN and the international 
community have had to rethink their approaches to peace and security. 
Throughout the 1990s and in the early 2000s, the UN was rethinking 
what role its peace operations should serve in the post-Cold War envi-
ronment, culminating in the debates around the Brahimi report (UN 
2000). The findings in the Brahimi report have shaped our understand-
ing of modern multidimensional peace operations and led to institutional 
changes within the UN that continue today. Arguing for clear, credible 
and achievable peacekeeping mandates, the report also cemented the 
idea of longer-term peacebuilding approaches as part of effective peace-
keeping. But the Brahimi report and debates around it were to a large 
extent a response to the challenges the UN was experiencing in the 
1990s—from the disastrous international intervention in Somalia and the 
failure to prevent genocides in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda, to 
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the then relatively novel emphasis on institution- and state-building as 
a method to build peace. Brahimi precedes the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
the US, the intervention in Afghanistan, and the international rift over 
Iraq; it also precedes the idea of the BRICS2 and even the formation of 
the AU, as well as the global financial crisis of 2008 and the emergence 
of fundamentalist non-state actors and violent extremism as one of the 
biggest perceived threats to the international peace and security. It is evi-
dent that much has changed in both the nature of conflict and interna-
tional responses to it since the turn of the century.
Contemporary peace operations and the UN are faced with a challeng-
ing task of having to reconcile the post-Brahimi development of policies 
and thinking about human security, protection of civilians, local owner-
ship, gender inclusivity, and longer-term institution-building, with the 
new realities of conflict and intervention. There are pressures to achieve 
more to assist states and people embroiled in or emerging from conflicts. 
At the same time, the UN is under pressure to include an increasing array 
of voices from within its membership. Each of these voices is advancing 
their own vision of interventions and with that also their own vision of 
UN peace operations. How do peace operations ensure legitimacy in 
the eyes of the local populations and the global public, while at the same 
time serving the interests of member states? Are the interests of mem-
ber states compatible with the interests of the international community 
as a whole? How to balance between state and human security; between 
short-term solutions and long-term approaches? These questions arise in 
an era where regional organisations are emerging as possible alternatives 
to the UN, further pushing the UN to justify the relevance of its own 
peace operations. That previously advanced approaches linking peace-
keeping with peace- and state- building have not had the desired effects 
on peace consolidation, is putting an additional pressure on the UN to 
reform (Heathershaw 2008; Campbell et al. 2011; Mac Ginty 2012).
In October 2014, aware of the implications all these developments 
are having on UN peace operations, the former Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon appointed the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace 
Operations (HIPPO) (UN 2014). The expert panel was to produce a 
report akin to the Brahimi report and was encouraged by the Secretary-
General and other senior figures in the UN to be bold and creative in 
2 BRICS acronym is used for emerging powers Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa and was coined by the chief economist for Goldman Sachs (O’Neill 2001).
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its recommendations. While members of the panel were appointed 
in their personal capacity, the composition of the panel showed that 
the Secretary-General had regional balance and the changing global 
order in mind. All five permanent members of the Security Council 
were represented. In addition, there were three representatives from 
Africa (Tunisia, Ghana, Burundi), three South Asian members (India, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka), three key financial contributors (Norway, 
Canada, Australia), as well as representatives from Latin America (Brazil) 
and the Middle East (Jordan). The panel—working under the leadership 
of the Nobel Laureate and former President of Timor-Leste Jose Ramos-
Horta— delivered its report in June 2015 (UN 2015b).
The HIPPO report reviews past engagements and maps out future 
directions for UN peace operations by proposing four “fundamen-
tal shifts” that the UN needs to undertake to remain relevant: (1) pri-
macy of politics: peace operations should be underpinned by political 
solutions, and not military and technical engagements; (2) a spectrum 
of peace operations: the UN should deliver more tailored ‘right fit’ and 
not ‘template’ missions that better take into account specificities of the 
situation; (3) a global and regional partnership for peace and security: 
the UN should embrace the era of partnership with regional organisa-
tions and national capacities and use their comparative advantages; and 
(4) more field-focused UN Secretariat and more people-centred UN 
peace operations (UN 2015b).
These four core recommendations reflect the changing nature of 
conflict as well as a global re-ordering. The first two recommendations 
can to a large extent be interpreted as a response to the rise of violent 
extremism; they reflect the reality that peace operations are now often 
deployed to areas where there is no peace to keep. Technical solutions 
and bureaucratic approaches have a limited scope in such situations. 
These two recommendations are undoubtedly also a reaction to the cri-
tiques in both scholarly and policy literature, which have long argued 
against one-size-fits-all approaches and encouraged conflict sensitivity. 
The third fundamental shift proposed by the HIPPO panel reflects the 
changing role of the UN in the world. Calling for an era of partnership 
with regional organisation—and singling out Africa in the remainder of 
the report—is a good indication that the panel was aware that the UN 
is not necessarily the most effective or legitimate actor in many areas of 
the world. The last and in many ways the most ambitious shift reminds 
both the UN and member states that in the end, the UN and its peace 
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operations will only remain relevant to the extent that they successfully 
respond to the expectations of people. The preface of the document is 
couched in the language of peace operations serving people, not just 
states, showing that the panel tried to reconcile the aspirational with 
what is feasible. As the panel was carefully selected to reflect the current 
global order, its report and responses to it are a good indication of what 
the international community could agree upon at the aspirational end 
of the spectrum. Whether that is enough for the UN to respond to the 
pressures emanating from changes in the global order to retain its rele-
vance for the twenty-first century is another question altogether.
Four trAnsFormAtions in globAl order And their 
imPlicAtions on un PeAce oPerAtions
This edited volume generates a discussion about UN approaches to 
peace by studying challenges and opportunities that the organisation is 
facing in the twenty-first century. We use some of the findings from the 
HIPPO report as an inspiration and put both its recommendations and 
broader UN actions in a wider context. We identify four transformations 
in the global order and study what implications these have on UN peace 
operations. The first two transformations emanate from the changing 
relations between states and reflect the increasingly multipolar charac-
ter of contemporary global governance. The latter two transformations 
reflect the changing relations between state and non-state actors. These 
two broad groups of non-state actors are fundamentally incompatible in 
their outlook on how and whether the international community should 
be intervening. That notwithstanding, both groups of non-state actors 
also force the UN and its member states to rethink the centrality of state-
based approaches to security and intervention.
In this volume, we identify four transformations in the global order and 
study their implications on the United Nations peace operations. We ask:
• How is the rebalancing of relations between states of the global North 
and the global South impacting the UN’s decision-making, financing 
and ability to design operations that go beyond the minimum com-
mon denominator;
• How is the rise of regional organisations as providers of peace impact-
ing the primacy of UN peace operations and how and whether the 
UN can remain relevant in this era of partnership and competition;
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• How have violent extremism and fundamentalist non-state actors 
changed the nature of international responses and what does this 
mean for previously advanced longer-term approaches to conflict 
resolution;
• How are demands from non-state actors for greater emphasis on 
human security impacting the UN’s credibility, and whether, in light 
of the first three transformations, the UN is even able to prioritise 
people-centred approaches over state-centred ones.
Our core finding is that with the entry of new actors from the global 
South as important players in the peace arena, we seem to be entering 
a more pragmatic era of UN peace operations. As contributions to this 
volume show, there is a greater willingness to innovate and experiment 
with new forms of conflict management, including more robust interpre-
tations of UN peacekeeping and an increasing reliance on regional actors 
as providers of peace. At the same time, the UN is facing a classic struggle 
between the promotion of liberal international norms and realist security 
concerns. The resolution of this struggle is less clear. The contributors 
to this volume emphasise the importance of people-centred approaches, 
conflict sensitivity and longer-term thinking as key aspects to continued 
relevance of the UN, but their conclusions as to how achievable these are 
by the UN are not as clear cut.
new VocAbulAry For A new erA
The terminology of (post-)conflict intervention is confusing and con-
fused. Even experts in international relations would be hard pressed to 
explain the difference or the similarity between peacekeeping and peace-
building and often equate the two without much thought.3 Similarly, 
in UN hallways, many would find it difficult to articulate any difference 
between peace operations and peacekeeping. As international inter-
ventions diversify, new terms emerge. The following paragraphs won’t 
resolve this confusion; their intention is to operationalise terms used in 
this volume as well as to indicate why the UN vocabulary is changing. 
3 As a rule, the more problem-solving approaches will tend to refer to an activity as 
peacekeeping to focus on the more time-defined engagement and on the missions, them-
selves, with critical approaches referring to the same activity as peacebuilding to capture the 
broader context (Cox 1981; Pugh 2004).
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In line with the broader argument of the book, we see these adaptations 
in UN language as a manifestation of the more pragmatic approach the 
UN has taken in recent years. This pragmatism is paradoxically address-
ing many of the critiques about rigidity of UN peacekeeping coming 
both from policy circles and critical literature.
Contemporary lexicon of UN operations can be found in the 
Capstone doctrine (UN 2008). This document situates peacekeep-
ing—an activity it aims to operationalise—on the spectrum of peace 
and security activities. Peacekeeping is defined as “a technique designed 
to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, 
and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers” 
(ibid., p. 18). Peacekeeping is to follow and to some extent overlap any 
peacemaking and peace enforcement activities. Peacemaking involves dip-
lomatic activities to bring hostile parties to the negotiated agreement and 
can be conducted by either the UN itself, regional organisations, states 
or non-governmental actors. Such activities would fall under Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter. Peace enforcement involves the use of a range of 
coercive measures, such as sanctions or the military force, intended to 
halt the conflict and bring warring parties to the negotiating table. These 
are the so-called Chapter VII actions authorised by the UN Security 
Council. Both peacemaking and peace enforcement are striving for the 
same outcome: a ceasefire. As peacekeeping sits in-between and succeeds 
both peacemaking and peace enforcement, it is often referred to as a 
‘Chapter VI and a half’ tool. The UN sees peacekeeping as one element 
of post-conflict peacebuilding activities, which constitute “a complex, 
long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable 
peace” (ibid.). These peace and security activities seldom occur in a linear 
or sequential manner, showing linkages not only between different inter-
national actors but also between different parts of the UN.
In addition to peacekeeping operations, special political missions (SPM) 
have come to play an important role in how the UN engages in its peace 
activities. In February 2018, the UN had 25 SPM operations deployed 
across Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East.4 This was in addition 
to the 15 peacekeeping ones.5 The Capstone doctrine doesn’t list special 
4 For a full list of current SPMs see http://www.un.org/undpa/en/in-the-field/overview.
5 For a full list of current peacekeeping operations see https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/
where-we-operate.
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political missions as part of UN peace and security activities, but considers 
them as a type of operation that may precede or be deployed alongside 
a peacekeeping operation (ibid., p. 87). These missions engage in con-
flict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding and therefore do not 
fit neatly on the spectrum of peace and security activities. Unlike peace-
keeping operations, which necessarily include a military component, SPM 
operations are smaller. Some of them have regional mandates—for exam-
ple, the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) or the UN 
Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA). 
Others may be deployed to conflict-ridden countries, where it would be 
difficult to obtain consent of the host state or the UN Security Council 
for a deployment of a UN military mission. The clearest examples of these 
today are the missions to Yemen and Syria.
While often taking on many of the same tasks, peacekeeping operations 
and special political missions are managed by two separate departments 
within the UN Secretariat, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), respectively. 
Peacekeeping operations have their own separate budget (the so-called 
assessed contributions) and have therefore somewhat more predictable 
funding and planning cycles (Diehl and PharaohKhan 2000). In contrast, 
SPMs are funded through the regular UN budget. To rapidly respond to 
crises unanticipated in the regular budget, SPMs are increasingly reliant 
on extra-budgetary resources. These voluntary contributions fund about 
40% of DPA’s work today.6 Funding and management disparities were one 
of the main reasons why the most recent review of peace operations rec-
ommended to make away with the sharp distinction between peacekeep-
ing operations and special political missions. The HIPPO report strongly 
urges the UN to embrace the term peace operations to signify the full spec-
trum of responses required (UN 2015b, p. viii). Such change in think-
ing would bring peacekeeping and SPMs under one label, a move that 
could eventually pave the way for the reform in financing and manage-
ment of UN responses. It would also allow for more fundamental changes 
to the structure of individual missions over time, including more clearly 
sequenced mandates.
More importantly for the argument of this book, the term peace 
operations also better denotes changes that UN responses to conflicts 
6 For an overview of voluntary contributions see http://www.un.org/undpa/en/funding.
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have undergone, as well as changes the UN would need to implement 
if it wants to remain relevant in responding to contemporary conflicts. 
Both policy and scholarship have long been critical of the rigidity of UN 
peacekeeping, calling for a greater local sensitivity and development of 
tailor-made approaches. Not all conflict responses require a large mili-
tary component to keep peace. Others might be best addressed through 
a deployment of a military component to a whole region, not just a sin-
gle state. Some peace operations are closer in their activities to peace 
enforcement, others to peacebuilding. Their mandates and composition 
need to reflect this reality and not follow bureaucratic templates. A com-
prehensive reform of UN financing is highly unlikely in the current polit-
ical climate. As a result, the UN Security Council will almost certainly 
continue privileging peacekeeping operations, when it wants to provide 
a comprehensive UN response. Recognising this political reality, authors 
in this volume nonetheless emphasise the increasing diversity of existing 
approaches and the need for a greater context-sensitivity of international 
responses to conflicts. Both critical and policy-oriented contributions 
share this sentiment. Terms and categories used by both policymakers 
and scientists serve as political tools. Although individual authors high-
light particular processes through their own terminology, the volume as a 
whole embraces the broader analytical category of peace operations. We 
chose to use it in the title of the volume to highlight the diversity of 
international approaches to conflicts and the need to go beyond techno-
cratic solutions.
Aims oF the book
This edited volume offers a comprehensive review of challenges and 
opportunities the UN peace operations are facing in the twenty-first cen-
tury. It serves as a conversation between scholars and practitioners, with 
an intent to capture experiences of both. Despite an increasingly active 
interest in UN peace operations and third-party interventions in pub-
lic and scholarly discourse, much of these discussions operate in paral-
lel to policy discussions. Public debates focus on sensational stories and 
failures of the UN, ascribing these to organisational inadequacies. On 
the other hand, much of the scholarly literature operates with an insuf-
ficient understanding of the dramatic changes in the global context, 
nature of conflicts, and international responses that have occurred over 
the past decade. Many of the policy developments and debates do not 
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reach the ivory towers. This volume uniquely tries to bring recent devel-
opments in policy as well as practitioners’ debates on the future of the 
UN peace tools to the scholarly community. We have invited two for-
mer Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and members of 
the HIPPO panel to reflect on areas of peace operations they are pas-
sionate about—people-centred approaches and protection of civilians. 
At the same time, the volume provides for a reflexive engagement on 
recent policy developments from academic authorities from both the 
global North and South. It situates policy debates in the global reorder-
ing and provides an idea of where the UN and the broader international 
responses to conflicts are heading in the medium-term future. Through 
this conversation, the edited volume will be of interest to both practi-
tioners and scholars.
Stressing different aspects of peace operations and partnerships, con-
tributors to this volume collectively query the relevance and ambition 
of the UN and its peace operations. By examining the four shifts in the 
global order, the volume’s ambition is to:
• Map recent developments in UN peace operations and assess where 
UN approaches to peace are heading;
• Analyse what kind of pressures the changing nature of conflicts 
is putting on UN peace operations and what alternatives to UN 
responses are emerging;
• Assess how changes in the global order are affecting UN peace 
operations and the role of the United Nations as a whole;
• Examine how the state of the art understanding about protection of 
civilians, local ownership, gender inclusivity and institution-build-
ing, can be accommodated in increasingly robust UN peace 
operations;
• Inform future debates in both scholarship and practice by providing 
innovative ideas for rethinking of UN approaches to peace.
structure oF the book
This volume is divided into three parts, each combining voices of prac-
titioners and scholars. The first part of the volume looks at the political 
and strategic context, situating current debates within a longer trajec-
tory of UN interventions. It highlights major shifts in UN approaches 
to peace, emphasising pressures on peace operations coming from both 
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state (emerging powers and regional organisations) and non-state actors. 
In the second part, authors examine mandates and strategy, highlighting 
some of the key changes UN peace operations have undergone in recent 
years as well as weighing in on the challenges that remain. While other 
equally important issues have been introduced to the agenda of UN 
peace operations in recent years (for example, women, peace and secu-
rity or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration), we prioritised 
developments that are putting major strain on the functioning of peace 
operations and are potentially changing the nature of UN approaches to 
peace. In the third part, contributors explore new and old partners to 
UN peace operations, querying how the UN relates to some other key 
players in contemporary interventions. While necessarily selective, this 
section’s choice of UN partners (China, African Union, European Union 
and religious humanitarians) aims to underscore the complexity of UN 
partnerships with both state and non-state actors in the twenty-first 
century.
Part 1—Political and Strategic Context: Past, Present, Future—consists 
of four contributions. In Chapter 2, Mateja Peter examines the evolu-
tion of the idea of UN peacekeeping, asking how an instrument devel-
oped in the late 1940s managed to not only survive but also respond 
to the changing geopolitical and conflict landscape over the last seventy 
years. Through an overview of major doctrinal developments and institu-
tional adaptations, she analyses how the peacekeeping tool was adapted 
from a bipolar world, via a unipolar one to today’s multipolar world. The 
label of peacekeeping has encompassed very different activities over this 
period and peacekeeping today bears only casual resemblance to peace-
keeping from decades ago. In her contribution, Peter argues that peace-
keeping started as a conflict management instrument, which was adapted 
to a conflict resolution mechanism after the end of the Cold War, but has 
now come full circle and is again increasingly used to manage and con-
tain, not resolve conflicts. And in this ability to adapt to the needs of the 
states and the changing global relations lies the resilience of the idea of 
peacekeeping itself.
In Chapter 3, Adriana Erthal Abdenur asks how the changing global 
order is impacting UN peace operations. She contends that the multipo-
larisation of the world order is accelerating, due to both the decline of 
Western powers and the increasing contestation of Western dominance 
by several rising powers. Throughout the chapter, Abdenur exam-
ines two inter-related implications of multipolarisation for UN peace 
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operations: norms-setting and role expectations. Uncertainties about 
global leadership and constraints on resources prompt changing expec-
tations of, and concern about, rising powers, especially those viewed as 
playing a pivotal role in UN security governance. She highlights China as 
a potential leader in UN peacekeeping, but contends that Beijing’s will-
ingness and ability to quickly expand its influence should not be taken 
for granted.
In Chapter 4, Adam Day turns his attention to UN’s conflict preven-
tion work, where politically-driven solutions have become more elusive. 
He traces how good offices have evolved from early Secretaries-General 
through the expansion of UN peace operations in recent decades. This 
lays the groundwork for a comparative analysis of modern applica-
tions of good offices in more recent conflicts, examining how the UN 
has attempted to reshape its political engagement to accommodate the 
changing nature of armed conflict. Based on a comparative assessment 
of the UN’s political engagement across different settings and eras, Day 
lists four key elements for successful use of good offices: (1) in-depth 
understanding of the conflict based on sustained contact and relation-
ships on the ground; (2) timing of the intervention; (3) leverage over 
the key conflict actors; and (4) credibility of the mediator. He contends 
that a light, nimble presence on the ground—rather than multidimen-
sional peace operations—appear best placed to achieve these elements of 
success.
In Chapter 5, Youssef Mahmoud provides an impassionate argument 
for why UN peace operations should shift towards and prioritise peo-
ple-centred approaches. Drawing on his experience as a former Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General and a HIPPO panel member, he 
contends there is a growing and wide recognition that peace, like a tree, 
grows from the bottom up, but that many challenges still stand in the 
way of realising this shift on the ground. In his contribution, Mahmoud 
provides a cursory review of the factors underpinning these challenges 
and explains the rationale of the Panel’s renewed focus on people-cen-
tred approaches. He continues by reflecting on the conundrums faced by 
the UN Security Council in its attempts to embrace such an approach in 
a changing security landscape, providing concrete recommendations to 
the Security Council and member states.
Part 2—Mandates and Strategy—is composed of five chapters explor-
ing recent developments in UN peace operations, all potentially chang-
ing the nature of UN approaches to peace. In Chapter 6, Mats Berdal 
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explores the outer limits of the use of force by UN peacekeepers. He 
traces the thinking and the practices surrounding the use of force from 
the conceptual foundations laid in the era of classical peacekeeping to 
the contemporary focus on the protection of civilians and more “robust” 
operations. He contends that at the tactical level, a properly equipped 
and properly commanded force has on occasion been used with decisive 
effect in response to immediate crises or emergencies. In contrast to that, 
Berdal sees the larger and more critical strategic lesson from the history 
of robust peacekeeping since 1999 as a cautionary one; one that high-
lights the need for the activities of UN “blue helmets” to be much more 
closely aligned than they have become over the past decade and a half, to 
the search for viable political solutions to conflict.
In Chapter 7, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, a former Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General and a HIPPO panel member, shares her expe-
rience on a topic at the centre of UN peace operations: protection of 
civilians. Reflecting on the fact that today a vast majority of UN mili-
tary and police personnel have a mandate to protect civilians, she queries 
whether UN operations are provided with the necessary means to fulfil 
this mandate. Drawing on her experience from the UN Mission in South 
Sudan (UNMISS), Fraf jord Johnson reveals systemic weaknesses in the 
way the UN deploys, resources, and supports missions. A major problem 
is lack of guidance in cases where host governments prove to be the main 
perpetrator. Fraf jord Johnson maintains that the primary responsibility 
to protect civilians rests with host governments, but that the UN sys-
tem also needs to train its forces in protection of civilians operations and 
security reform, which has not been a priority so far. She concludes that 
protection will remain an illusion for many civilians at risk unless these 
challenges are addressed.
In Chapter 8, John Karlsrud looks at how UN peace operations have 
been responding to violent extremism and terrorism. He argues that 
there are practical and financial reasons to give UN peace operations 
more robust mandates to mitigate and respond to new threats. But the 
idea of UN peacekeepers conducting counter-terrorism operations is not 
without challenges. Karlsrud contends that UN peace operations neither 
are, nor will be ready operationally, doctrinally or politically to take on 
counter-terrorism tasks. Such a development could jeopardize the legal 
protection of UN staff; remove the ability of the UN to be an impar-
tial arbiter of the conflict; and strongly undermine the ability for other 
parts of the UN family to carry out humanitarian work. However, UN 
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peace operations should, in cooperation with the UN Country Team, 
strengthen their conflict prevention and early peacebuilding agenda, to 
remove root causes for radicalisation.
Chapter 9, co-authored by Arthur Boutellis and Stephanie Tiélès, 
examines how peace operations have responded to organised crime. 
While scholars have increasingly recognised the importance of crimi-
nal agendas in post-conflict politics, organised crime is still a relatively 
understudied and misunderstood issue in the field of peace operations. 
With their contribution, Boutellis and Tiélès examine how transnational 
organised crime has increasingly become recognised by the UN Security 
Council as a threat to international peace and security. They provide a 
thorough analysis of the limitations of the dominant law enforcement 
and capacity building approaches adopted by UN missions to date. 
Building on recent examples, they provide lessons on how UN peace 
operations could deal more effectively with the issue of organised crime, 
contending that missions need to engage more strategically with both 
the host state and local communities as well as identify strategic partners 
to take longer-term preventive approaches.
In Chapter 10, Kari M. Osland examines the role of police in UN 
peace operations. She observes that the increasing demand for UN police 
comes from the recognition that functioning local police is a central 
element of the UN exit strategy. However, reaching that point is very 
challenging. In her contribution, Osland contends that UN policing was 
never easy, but that the combination of an increasing deployment of UN 
operations in the midst of on-going wars and the steady increase of UN 
police tasks without adequate increases in resources or training, has made 
UN policing even more complicated in recent years. Examining both the 
security and trust role of police in society, she argues that the main chal-
lenge for UN police in post-conflict situations is to close the security–
trust gap. So far, most of the focus of UN operations has been on the 
security part of the equation. In this chapter, Osland asks whether the 
UN is even set up to achieve both.
Part 3—New and Old Partnerships—is composed of four chapters 
reflecting on the role of other actors in peace operations and the impact 
they have on the UN. In Chapter 11, Cedric de Coning examines Africa’s 
increasing peace operations capacity. African states have deployed opera-
tions of their own and they now contribute half of all UN peacekeepers. 
De Coning argues that the AU and the UN have developed a stra-
tegic partnership that plays out at the political, policy, and operational 
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levels, and reflects the reality that neither will deploy peace operations 
in Africa without close consultations and some form of cooperation with 
the other. While the UN peacekeeping model is not found to be well-
suited to enforcement, counter-terrorism or trans-national operations, 
de Coning argues that, the AU, sub-regional organisations and ad hoc 
regional coalitions have developed capabilities designed to address these 
challenges. These African capabilities help relieve the pressure on the UN 
to conduct such operations.
Chapter 12, authored by Thierry Tardy, looks at the evolving relation-
ship between the European Union (EU) and UN peace operations. Tardy 
argues that over the last twenty years, the EU has become a prominent 
crisis management actor alongside and sometimes together with the UN 
within the field of peacekeeping. He locates the EU’s crisis management 
role in the UN’s general mandate of “maintaining international peace and 
security”. Throughout the chapter, he grapples with questions such as: 
What is the EU’s approach to managing crises? To what extent does the 
EU’s approach converge with and support the UN peacekeeping agenda? 
And what do EU member states’ own institutional choices tell us about the 
UN–EU global–regional peace and security partnerships? Tardy provides 
a comprehensive overview of EU crisis management operations, compares 
EU and UN operations, and sheds light on the causes of this coopera-
tion and its consequences for their relationship. Finally, he assesses the 
European participation in the UN operation in Mali and suggests how EU 
member states’ institutional preferences may evolve in the coming years.
In Chapter 13, Yin He turns attention to China’s rising prominence 
in UN peace operations. He contends that China’s UN peacekeeping 
policy can to a large extent be explained by changes in China’s national 
identity. Since China’s return to the UN in 1971, China’s national iden-
tity has undergone a considerable transformation, from a semi-revolu-
tionary state in the 1970s and an integrated member of the international 
community in the 1980s and 1990s, to a rising power in the twen-
ty-first century. The country’s policy on UN peacekeeping has reflected 
these transformations. The Chinese position on UN peace operations 
has changed from opposition in the 1970s, to gradually expanded and 
reactive participation in the 1980s and 1990s, and finally to an increas-
ingly active involvement in the new millennium. Yin argues that China’s 
ambition is to contribute more than personnel and finances to UN peace 
operations, with this rising power also wanting to shape governance of 
UN operations.
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In Chapter 14, Jonathan C. Agensky turns to non-state actors and their 
relation to UN peace operations. He highlights practices that seek simi-
lar outcomes as UN peace operations or otherwise affect the background 
conditions necessary for their success. Treating South Sudan as an illustra-
tive case study, Agensky demonstrates how the incorporation of religious 
institutions into global and regional aid-based governance networks ena-
bles church-based actors to pursue political, social, and structural inter-
ventions critical to UN peace operations. In doing so, he emphasises the 
impact of religion, aid, and governance on longer-term peacebuilding in 
Africa, with a view toward contributing to discussions about holistic, inte-
grated, and people-centred approaches to sustainable peace.
In the concluding chapter, Cedric de Coning synthesises several major 
findings of the volume and advances the argument that we are now 
entering a more pragmatic era of UN peace operations. He sees peace 
operations as likely becoming less intrusive and more supportive of local-
ly-led solutions. Looking forward, de Coning identifies three overarch-
ing themes. First, the degree to which a peace operation contributes to 
the strategic political coherence of the larger national and international 
effort is likely to become a key measure of its effectiveness. Second, the 
principle of minimum use of force is likely to remain a defining feature 
of peace operations. And third, the scope of peace operations mandates 
may be trimmed down to focus on protection, stability, and politics. 
He argues that peace operations have shown a remarkable capacity to 
continuously adapt to new challenges, but at the same time remained 
resiliently identifiable by the enduring principles of peacekeeping.
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Peacekeeping: Resilience of an Idea
Mateja Peter
introduction
Peacekeeping is not only one of the activities that the United Nations 
(UN) does, it is in many ways what the UN is. In countries emerging 
from the scourge of war, the acronym UN is customarily used as a syn-
onym for the deployed peacekeeping operation. When member states, 
the public or the academics criticise the UN for not resolving conflicts, 
they not only talk of the political stalemates in the UN Security Council 
(UNSC, Council), but also invoke the failures of its peacekeeping mis-
sions. The significance of peacekeeping to member states is evident in 
financial terms: while the UN General Assembly agreed on a $5.4 billion 
for the regular budget for the 2016–2017 biennium,1 the approved 
budget for UN peacekeeping operations for the fiscal year 1 July 
2016–30 June 2017 was $7.87 billion (UN 2016). Although UN peace-
keeping still constitutes less than 0.5% of world military expenditures,2 it 
is the activity that the UN is most visibly associated with.
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UN peacekeeping is almost as old as the organisation itself. This 
 chapter looks at the evolution of the idea of peacekeeping, asking how 
an instrument developed in the late 1940s managed to not only survive 
but also respond to the changing geopolitical and conflict landscape over 
the last seventy years. I do not plan to examine whether UN peacekeep-
ing is the most appropriate response to conflicts emerging out of global 
fault lines. This would not only require an in-depth analysis of different 
conflicts, but I would even argue that in many respect the persistent reli-
ance on UN peacekeeping is a result of a cognitive bias known as the law 
of the instrument: ‘if the only tool you have is a hammer, you will treat 
everything as if it were a nail.’ The UN Security Council has used this 
tool in 71 conflict situations, with 16 peacekeeping operations deployed 
at the time of writing. Evidently, member states have found peacekeep-
ing useful. What I am primarily interested in here is the adaptation of 
the tool, examining for what purposes it has been used and why. I argue 
that peacekeeping started as a conflict management instrument, which 
was adapted to a conflict resolution mechanism after the end of the Cold 
War, but has now come full circle and is again increasingly used to man-
age and contain, not resolve conflicts. The strength of the idea comes 
from this resilience.
PeAcekeePing And the cold wAr
Despite their rapid importance for the identity of the organisation, the 
UN founders did not envisage peacekeeping operations as a tool for 
addressing conflicts. Peacekeeping is therefore not mentioned in the 
UN Charter (1945). According to the organisation’s constitutive doc-
ument, the UN Security Council, as the organ primarily responsible for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, could either take 
note of the threat to peace and security and recommend to conflict par-
ties to resolve their dispute peacefully (Chapter VI) or it could take bind-
ing action to enforce measures to address the conflict by itself (Chapter 
VII). The Charter was devised to prevent the eruption of another world 
war. It ensured that great powers had a vested interest in the system 
designed to collectively punish a wrongdoer and set it on the right path 
(Kelsen 1948). In stark contrast to this, most conflicts in the subsequent 
years were tied to the processes of decolonialisation, where identifying 
the wrongdoer was not as clear cut. Throughout the Cold War, decolo-
nialisation-related conflicts were also the only ones that the UNSC was 
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willing to take up. As the Council was gridlocked, the only measures that 
could be adopted were in areas of secondary significance to the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States (US). But 
even in these conflicts, enforcement measures were off the table. This 
was partly as these conflicts were mostly not as unambiguous to warrant 
clear enforcement measures, but primarily because great powers did not 
want to sanction an actor they could not entirely control—the UN—to 
use force. When coercive measures were deemed to be needed in their 
allied or client states, the two blocks employed them unilaterally. The 
core characteristics and principles of UN peacekeeping developed as a 
direct result of this Cold War schism. Peacekeeping emerged as a tool of 
necessity, sitting between Chapter VI and Chapter VII mandates.
The first UN peacekeeping missions were established already in 1948 
and 1949. They signalled what kind of conflicts the UN would be pre-
occupied with in its first decades. The 1948 mission, the United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was established following the 
conclusion of the first Arab-Israeli War (UN 1948). With it the UNSC 
sent a small number of unarmed military observers to monitor the cease-
fire and report to the Council any violations. The mission had a simi-
lar mandate to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established a year later and tasked with monitor-
ing the ceasefire of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948 (UN 1949). 
Both missions and conflicts share several characteristics. The conflicts 
erupted following recent declarations of independence. Israel declared 
statehood in 1947, as did both India and Pakistan. In the case of Israel, 
Arab states contested its statehood. India and Pakistan fought over a 
large border area of Kashmir and Jammu, both claiming it belonged to 
them. In both conflicts, the two Cold War rivals supported the opposing 
sides.3 To ensure that the clash would not escalate and involve the US 
and the Soviet Union directly, a mechanism was devised to keep the sides 
separated. UN peacekeeping troops were tasked to monitor whether all 
sides were complying with the ceasefire and thus created a buffer zone 
between them. Peacekeepers had clear instructions not to get involved 
in internal affairs of the states and not to attempt to resolve conflicts. 
They were sent to manage these conflicts, not resolve them. Attempts 
3 India started openly cultivating strategic and military relations with the Soviet Union in 
the mid-1950s, after the US made Pakistan a Central Treaty Organisation ally. However, 
the split could be anticipated already in the late 1940s.
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at their resolution were taken up in other fora, both within and outside 
the UN. Indicating the intractability of both the Middle East and the 
Indo-Pakistani conflict, both missions are still in existence seven decades 
after. Compared to the post-Cold War operations, these are small enter-
prises (UNTSO is staffed by around 400 peacekeepers, including local 
staff; around 100 peacekeepers serve in UNMOGIP). Their continued 
presence speaks to the variety of conflicts that UN peacekeepers play a 
role in, as well as the coexistence of various peacekeeping models in the 
twenty-first century.
The first ‘real’ UN peacekeeping operation, which included armed 
military personnel, was sent to Egypt in 1956 following the Suez Crisis. 
The crisis erupted as Egypt was getting increasingly closer to the Soviet 
Union, which led to the withdrawal of US and UK support for the con-
struction of the Aswan Dam. In turn, Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal. 
To regain Western control of this strategic trade route, Israeli, British, 
and French forces invaded Egypt. While the crisis was linked both to the 
decolonialisation and the Cold War power politics, it was also a clear act 
of aggression against a sovereign state. UK and French occupancy of the 
UNSC permanent seats meant that any proposed enforcement meas-
ures would have been immediately vetoed. But this time, the US and the 
Soviet Union had an interest in quickly resolving the crisis and through 
that also protect the collective security arrangements of the UN Charter. 
As political pressure from the two superpowers grew, all parties agreed 
that foreign forces should withdraw from the Egyptian territory and that 
their withdrawal should be overseen by a neutral force. This peacekeep-
ing mission would then also serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and 
Israeli forces and provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire. The First 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was in large measure a result 
of efforts by the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who cob-
bled the mission together and obtained Egypt’s consent for deployment 
of military personnel in its territory. The mission mandate was approved, 
not by the UNSC, but by the UN General Assembly (UN 1956). 
Importantly, peacekeepers were explicitly forbidden to interfere in inter-
nal matters of Egypt or undertake any activities that could influence the 
balance of power between conflicting parties.4 Again, the mission was to 
manage, not resolve, the conflict.
4 For more on the mission, see Rosner (1964).
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Two years after the deployment of UNEF I, the Secretary-General 
published an extensive report summarising lessons learned from this first 
proper experience with UN peacekeeping, recommending a set of basic 
principles that should guide any future deployments. This was the first 
of the many times that initiatives in peacekeeping were developed and 
proposed by the central organ of the UN and not by the member states. 
The key principles of UN peacekeeping became consent, limited use of 
force, and non-interference in internal affairs of host states (UN 1958, 
pp. 154–193). The report stressed that for these missions to comply 
with international law and the UN Charter, “the United Nations can-
not undertake to implement them by stationing units on the territory 
of a Member State without the consent of the Government concerned” 
(ibid., p. 155). Not limiting the authority of the UN to decide on the 
composition of the mission, the host government should also consent to 
the nationality of military troops deployed. Hammarskjöld envisaged this 
would not include contingents from permanent members of the UNSC 
or regional countries that might have a special interest in the situation, 
thus ensuring impartiality of the operation (ibid., p. 160).5 The report 
also underlined that authority granted to a UN mission could not be 
exercised in competition with the host government or in cooperation 
with it through a joint deployment. It concluded that “a United Nations 
operation must be separate and distinct from activities by national 
authorities” (ibid., p. 165) and “cannot be permitted in any sense to be 
a party to internal conflicts” (ibid., p. 166). Any intervention in internal 
affairs of a host state would not only make the peacekeeping mandate 
more difficult to achieve but could also negatively impact relations 
between the UN and its member state.
Consent, limited use of force, and non-interference in internal affairs 
of host states became the bedrock for UN peacekeeping interven-
tions throughout the Cold War. While proposed by the UN Secretary-
General, his ambition was limited by what the two great powers allowed 
the UN to develop. For the first forty years, UN peacekeeping essen-
tially meant observation of ceasefires in inter-state disputes. That not-
withstanding, the organisation launched two operations that signalled 
where UN peacekeeping would develop after the bipolar order had 
5 In the case of UNEF I, contingents came from ten countries: Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.
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collapsed. These missions also indicate that the type of conflicts we tend 
to associate with the post-Cold War order, predate its collapse.
The first operation to stray from the typical Cold War peacekeeping 
model was deployed in 1960 to the former Belgian colony of Congo, the 
modern day Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo).6 The United 
Nations Operation in Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, 
ONUC) is to this day one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations to 
be deployed and at its height counted almost 20,000 armed troops.7  
It is also the first peacekeeping mission, which due to developments on 
the ground, ended up intervening into a civil war. The original mandate 
of the operation was in line with Hammarskjöld’s vision as the mission 
was supposed to supervise the withdrawal of Belgian colonial forces from 
the Congolese territory (UN 1960). ONUC was set up to help the newly 
independent country stabilise the situation on the ground and pave the 
way for the new government. Instead, peacekeepers became caught up in 
an armed conflict between two groups of warring factions supported by 
the USSR and the US. While the UNSC agreed to a strengthened man-
date in 1961 (UN 1961), ONUC could not resolve the crisis which grew 
into a series of civil wars. But the mission was influential for the develop-
ment of UN peacekeeping. Besides being the first operation to inter-
vene in an intra-state conflict, it was also the first mission where the 
UNSC authorised the use of force for purposes beyond self-defence. 
At the time, there were disagreements over what that meant in practice. 
The issue was far from resolved, but the debate itself foreshadowed the 
difficulties with strict adherence to the peacekeeping principles that peace-
keeping missions face today in intra-state conflicts (Gibbs 2000; Spooner 
2010).
The second atypical peacekeeping operation during the Cold War was 
the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF). UNSF 
was authorised by the UN General Assembly to administer the territory 
of West New Guinea between October 1962 and April 1963 (UN 1962). 
After that period this former Dutch colony became part of Indonesia. 
6 In 1960, the former colony declared independence as the Republic of Congo. The country 
changed its name to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1964.
7 The current operation in the DRC (MONUSCO) is also the largest peacekeeping 
operation at the time of writing. Its strength in October 2017 was over 21,000 uniformed 
and civilian personnel. See: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/peacekeeping-fact-sheet-
oct-2017. More on MONUSCO below.
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In the context of the Cold War any administration of the territory by a 
peacekeeping force was almost unimaginable, but UNSF represented a 
viable compromise for a resolution of a long-standing dispute between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands. As Indonesia grew increasingly close 
to the USSR, the US obtained the Dutch agreement to the Indonesian 
claim in exchange for Indonesian support of the Western bloc. To pre-
serve the Dutch dignity, the territory was not to be handed over to the 
Indonesians directly, but to the UN peacekeepers, who ended up man-
aging it for over half a year.8 While both ONUC and UNSF sowed the 
seeds for what UN peacekeeping would look like after the end of the 
Cold War, for the first forty years peacekeeping was largely contained to 
supervising ceasefires. It was only with dramatic global changes that these 
missions could develop into what they are known for today.
end oF the cold wAr And the new un PeAcekeePing
The fall of the Berlin Wall presented a tectonic change in how the UNSC 
and member states of the UN responded to conflicts. Not only was there 
more cooperation between the Cold War rivals on the Security Council, 
but many states came under increasing pressure from their constituen-
cies to address human plight in far-flung places. Globalisation and the 
24-hour news cycles brought these conflicts to the attention of audi-
ences in the global North. During the last years of the Cold War, the 
two superpowers also showed much less interest in directly addressing 
problems of and within their allied and client states. They relinquished 
a bulk of this task to international organisations, most notably the 
United Nations. This lead to a boom in international peacekeeping, with 
58 out of a total of 71 UN missions established after 1988.9 But the 
change was not only quantitative. These new missions, often referred to 
as second generation peacekeeping (Mackinlay and Chopra 1993), also 
changed qualitatively. A small number of post-1988 missions—for exam-
ple, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(UNGOMAP), which supervised the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (UN 1988)—retained their traditional man-
dates, but most operations substantially gained in complexity receiving 
8 More on the background of the mission at https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/
past/unsf.htm.
9 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations.
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mandates addressing internal matters of sovereign states. This was a 
brand-new experience for the UN.
The first group of these multi-dimensional missions, established 
between 1988 and 1992, preserved some of the characteristics of the 
Cold War monitoring missions. The main difference was that these new 
missions were primarily tasked with monitoring non-military activities. 
The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was man-
dated to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and 
fair elections (UN 1989). Its police component was tasked with mon-
itoring and reporting on the actions of local police and security forces. 
UNTAG also helped with monitoring and assisting in the return of ref-
ugees. UN peacekeeping operations in El Salvador, Angola, Western 
Sahara, Cambodia, and Mozambique were similarly tasked with observ-
ing elections, reporting on human rights violations and the establishment 
of a basic post-war rule of law. While these tasks are a common feature 
of any UN mission deployed in the twenty-first century, at the time, they 
were nothing less but revolutionary. Peacekeepers were no longer being 
sent into troubled territories to monitor inter-state disputes, but primar-
ily dealt with intra-state conflicts. Moreover, peacekeeping now meant 
not only the deployment of military troops, but also of a civilian and a 
police component, leading eventually to the establishment of the United 
Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI).
These early multidimensional peacekeeping attempts have been judged 
as largely successful by both the UN and outside experts (Howard 2007). 
They did nonetheless present a challenge for the peacekeeping principles 
proposed by Hammarskjöld as the UN had to adapt to the new geopolit-
ical and conflict environment. The 1992 document An Agenda for Peace, 
prepared by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, fore-
shadowed some of these challenges but maintained that “the established 
principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded flexibly to new 
demands of recent years” and that “the basic conditions for success remain 
unchanged” (UN 1992, para. 50). Highlighting the increasing number of 
tasks given to UN peacekeepers by the Security Council, the report none-
theless drew sharp lines between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and 
peacebuilding.10 As early as 1992, the Secretary-General and his advis-
ers were acutely aware of complications that could emerge if the concept 
10 See the introduction of this volume for distinctions between the three.
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of peacekeeping was stretched into peace enforcement. The document 
therefore urged the UNSC that when fighting resumed and ceasefires 
were broken, peace enforcement units should be utilised. Such units 
would be more heavily armed than peacekeepers and would be mandated 
to use force beyond self-defence (UN 1992, para. 44).
While distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
were drawn sharp on paper, in practice, the UNSC increasingly deployed 
peacekeeping missions into situations where peace was extremely frag-
ile. The two most notorious of these missions were based in Rwanda 
(United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UNAMIR) and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR), 
where peacekeepers were deployed amid genocidal wars. The ongoing 
fighting and ethnic cleansing created substantial confusion among UN 
troops, who were worried not just about overstepping their mandates 
but also about getting involved in civil wars. They interpreted peace-
keeping principles narrowly and as a result failed to use force to protect 
civilian population. Srebrenica and Rwanda to this day serve as poign-
ant reminders of the failures of UN peacekeeping and the UN system to 
act on evolving genocides. The UNSC became more willing to deploy 
peacekeepers to civil wars, but these early post-Cold War mistakes high-
lighted that willingness to deploy is not enough; peacekeeping would 
need to adapt if it was to remain a useful tool.
rethinking un PeAcekeePing For the Post-cold wAr erA
The gravity of these failures created an opportunity for a deeper reflec-
tion on the role of the organisation in the post-Cold War order (Barnett 
2002; Malone and Thakur 2001; Western 2002). In 1999, the Secretary-
General Kofi Annan appointed an independent Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations, asking it to address the shortcomings of existing 
peace operations system and to make realistic recommendations for 
their future. Notwithstanding the recent crises, the Brahimi report (UN 
2000), named after the chair of the panel, called for a renewed politi-
cal commitment to UN peace operations. Most of the report deals with 
the increasing complexity of conflicts that peacekeeping operations have 
been mandated to address since the end of the Cold War. Many of its 
core findings remain relevant to this day, despite it being created at the 
time of undisputed Western hegemony.
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UN peacekeeping operations had only a limited experience in 
 peacebuilding when the report was written, but the trend towards longer-
term peacebuilding mandates was already visible. The Brahimi report 
therefore aptly noted that as peacekeeping operations took on more peace-
building tasks, their mandates would become more difficult to accom-
plish (UN 2000, paras. 19–20). Unlike early experiences of peacekeeping, 
where operations had been deployed to manage conflicts, the post-1995 
operations were being deployed with an objective to help countries resolve 
their conflicts. Mandates of missions from Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
Haiti and Sierra Leone asked peacekeepers to help with reforms of the rule 
of law and security sector in addition to the more traditional monitoring 
tasks of earlier missions. Such peacekeeping missions were becoming pieces 
of a broader (liberal) statebuilding agenda (Fukuyama 2004; Paris 2004; 
Richmond 2004). UN peacekeepers, together with regional organisations 
and international financial institutions, which focused more on the eco-
nomic aspects, were asked to build basic institutional structures and assist 
states in establishing post-conflict functionality and legitimacy. More sta-
ble institutions were seen as a precondition for peace. In the most extreme 
cases—in Kosovo and in Timor-Leste—UN peacekeepers were even given 
a temporary executive law enforcement and administrative authority over 
a territory (UN 1999a, b; Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2005). Such conflict 
resolution mandates were undeniably a more ambitious task than conflict 
management undertakings of earlier missions.
Peacekeeping operations started growing, and complexity necessitated 
a discussion on the coherence of international approaches to conflicts. 
If different parts were acting at cross-purposes, less could be achieved. 
The Brahimi report asked for establishment of Integrated Mission Task 
Forces at the level of UN headquarters. These entities would substitute 
the ad hoc coordination activities and would mirror the various functions 
of the missions themselves. They would be responsible for mission-spe-
cific planning and would act as a coordination group for all UN depart-
ments involved (UN 2000, paras. 198–217). Over the next decade, the 
UN launched a series of initiatives expanding on this thinking. These 
initiatives aimed to ensure more coherence of UN action. Most notable 
of these were the introduction of UN Integrated Missions in 2006 (UN 
2006), which then developed into a broader UN Integrated Approach in 
2008, which is still in place today (UN 2008a). Yet despite these innova-
tions, many of these new multi-dimensional operations saw less success 
in the implementation of their mandates than the early-era peacekeeping.
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The Brahimi report also reiterated the stark distinction between 
peace enforcement and peacekeeping found in earlier documents. The 
panel recognised that “the United Nations does not wage war” (UN 
2000, para. 53) and urged the UNSC to entrust enforcement actions 
to coalitions of willing states. It maintained that “consent of the local 
parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence should remain 
the bedrock principles of peacekeeping” (UN 2000, para. 48). But 
despite this strong and unambiguous language, strict adherence to these 
principles was virtually impossible to maintain (de Coning et al. 2017). 
This became even more pronounced from mid-2000s on, when 
the UNSC started deploying operations with explicit mandates to 
protect civilians (Holt and Taylor 2009). The Capstone doctrine from 
2008, which to this day provides guidance for modern UN-led peace-
keeping operations, tried to clarify some of the ambiguity over how 
peacekeeping principles should be interpreted. Its guidance explained 
that “impartiality … should not be confused with neutrality or inactiv-
ity,” and that “a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions 
by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the 
international norms and principles” (UN 2008b, p. 33). But in practice 
things were murkier as troop contributing countries and mission leader-
ship were often reluctant to use force robustly, worrying about casualties 
and about getting involved in civil wars.11
The experience with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of 
South Sudan (UNMISS) demonstrates how swiftly missions need to 
adapt in contemporary conflicts and what challenges they face when pro-
tecting civilians. UNMISS was established in 2011 (UN 2011) and was 
simultaneously mandated to support the government of South Sudan in 
establishing the institutions necessary to govern a new country and to 
hold it accountable to international norms and standards (da Costa and 
Peter 2017). Reconciling the two was difficult from the beginning, but 
as political wrangling between President Kiir and Vice-President Machar 
escalated, the newly independent country descendent into a civil war. 
UNMISS was now caught between a rock and a hard place, mandated to 
help the government which was swiftly becoming the biggest threat to its 
own population. While the UNSC changed the mandate to a protection 
of civilians one (UN 2014a), and the mission became more proactive in 
11 For more on the use of force in UN peacekeeping see Mats Berdal in this volume.
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protecting civilians, including by opening the gates of its compounds,12 
problems remained. The mission was not perceived as impartial by the 
warring parties, which repeatedly threatened to withdraw their consent 
to UN presence. At the same time “a de facto dual line of command 
involving mission leadership and troop-contributing countries that reg-
ulates the use of force by missions” (UN 2014b), meant that peacekeep-
ing contingents were not intervening when civilians were under attack.
The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Report 
(HIPPO report) identified protection of civilians as “a core obligation of 
the United Nations” (UN 2015b, p. ix). This requirement is also explic-
itly included in the great majority of mandates of current missions. While 
this emphasis is not revolutionary—UN reports dating back to the early 
2000s have been stressing protection of civilians as a core function of 
UN peacekeeping—the need for protecting vulnerable populations has 
never been so high. Protecting civilians, as imperfectly as it is imple-
mented, is what both the local population and the international commu-
nity expect of UN peacekeeping today. But while this normative change 
is essential for the credibility of the UN, it also means that the nature 
of peacekeeping is changing. As more mandates switch from peacebuild-
ing/statebuilding ones to what is essentially an emergency humanitarian 
peacekeeping, newly deployed peacekeeping operations are increasingly 
moving away from a conflict resolution to a conflict management tool.
A new erA oF enForcement PeAcekeePing?
Peacekeeping has undergone substantial changes over the last decade and 
these operations are now firmly moving away from conflict resolution to 
conflict management. Protection of civilians is and will remain the core 
challenge if the UN as an institution wants to retain its credibility in 
the twenty-first century. At the same time, we are seeing a new trend 
in the kind of operations the Council is mandating. After a short period 
of seeming decline in large-scale operations, the UNSC has since 2013 
become more comfortable authorising larger operations. In addition 
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) mission, which was 
strengthened with additional forces and amounts to over 22,000 troops, 
the Council authorised a deployment of 12,000 troops and police to 
12 See Hilde Fraf jord Johnson in this volume for more on how the mission was adapting 
to include the protection of civilians mandate.
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Mali and 10,000 to the Central African Republic (CAR) (UN 2013a, 
2014c). More importantly for the idea of peacekeeping itself, the types 
of activities that these new missions and the newly enhanced missions 
are mandated to perform substantially expand and change the nature of 
UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations deployed to the DRC, Mali, 
and the CAR operate in midst of open conflicts, in the first two cases 
no comprehensive peace agreement had been negotiated before mis-
sions were deployed. In the past, both the Secretariat and the UNSC 
were reluctant to deploy under such circumstances, but that seems to be 
changing. As a result, these operations actively borrow elements from 
peace enforcement missions, walking the line between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement. After traditional and multidimensional peacekeep-
ing, we are on the cusp of a new era of enforcement peacekeeping. This 
introduces a possible new type of peacekeeping operations, which will 
end up coexisting with previous types of peacekeeping.
Enforcement peacekeeping manifests itself through two inter-related 
developments: (a) in enforcement of political solutions through support 
of a government’s state-building ambitions in its attempts to extend 
state authority amid an ongoing conflict, and (b) in enforcement of mil-
itary victories through offensive use of force.13 As targets of peacekeep-
ing actions are non-state actors that enjoy little international legitimacy 
due to their appalling human rights and war crimes records, no com-
prehensive peace agreements with them are sought before peacekeepers 
are deployed, something that is in stark contrast with multidimensional 
peacekeeping developed after the end of the Cold War.
The most noticeable and talked about mission in this regard has been 
the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUSCO). To MONUSCO, the Security Council author-
ised the inclusion of a force intervention brigade (FIB) within an existing 
mission structure (UN 2013b). This is the “first-ever ‘offensive’ combat 
force” in UN peacekeeping (UN 2013c), which was set-up to “neutral-
ize and disarm”—a euphemism used by the military when engaging in 
offensive operations—the Tutsi March 23 (M23) militia in the eastern 
parts of the DRC. FIB is mandated to assist Congolese forces in fight-
ing all armed groups in the Eastern Congo, with a few of them explic-
itly listed in the UNSC resolution. This was the first time in the history 
13 For more details on enforcement peacekeeping discussed in this section, see Peter 
(2015).
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of UN peacekeeping that the Council created a list of enemies that UN 
peacekeepers were supposed to engage with, making some researchers 
wonder whether the UN now wages war (Karlsrud 2015).
Although the Congolese experience has not been entirely replicated in 
other missions so far, it does indicate a wider trend towards more robust 
UN operations, opening doors for offensive use of force. For example, 
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (MINUSMA) (UN 2013a) assimilated an extant Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission named AFISMA, 
which was previously mandated to support the government of Mali, 
an ECOWAS member nation, in its fight against Islamist rebels in the 
northern Mali conflict. The resolution establishing MINUSMA also 
authorised French troops conducting Operation Serval to use all neces-
sary means to intervene within the limits of their capacities and areas of 
deployment in support of elements of MINUSMA, essentially mandating 
an intervention brigade just outside the UN command structures. UN 
missions are, as these examples indicate, increasingly more robust.
One good indication of increasing involvement of UN peacekeep-
ers in enforcement of political and military solutions can be found in 
the types of capabilities that these missions are relying on. The UN has 
advocated for the use of surveillance drones in the eastern DRC, on 
the border between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, in South Sudan, and in 
Mali. In Somalia, the UN is engaged in strategic communication cam-
paigning and has hired a consultancy firm that, according to its state-
ments, “runs a fully integrated campaign to counter the radicalising effect 
of Al-Shabaab and engage Somalis in building a positive future for their 
country” (Albany Associates 2017). In Mali, peacekeepers have been 
openly relying on strategic intelligence in their engagement with Islamic 
rebels. In 2000, when the Brahimi report suggested incorporation of 
field intelligence in peace operations so that they could better respond to 
complex situations (UN 2000, para. 51), member states flat out rejected 
the proposals. A good decade later their outlooks have changed. Drones, 
intelligence, and strategic communication all evoke ideas of stabilisa-
tion missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The major difference is that the 
UN peacekeeping activities are conducted on request of governments in 
 target states.
As mandates change, we are also seeing a change in the composition of 
troops in UN peacekeeping. UN operations increasingly rely on regional 
contributions, as only highly interested states are willing to risk the lives 
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of their citizens in increasingly robust operations. When Hammarskjöld 
penned the peacekeeping principles in the 1950s, this would have 
been unheard of. A prime example of this development is MINUSMA, 
which by incorporating AFISMA became ostensibly a mission com-
posed of regional troops. Among the top five troop contributors to the 
Mali mission in October 2017 were Burkina Faso, Chad, Senegal, and 
Togo, all regional states.14 In the DRC, the primary contributors to 
the intervention brigade are South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, while 
the rest of the MONUSCO mission is composed mainly of South Asian 
troops. Inclusion of regional forces has already flagged up some prob-
lems in the CAR, where Chadian forces needed to be redeployed due to 
Chad’s perceived backing of the Muslim rebel group Séléka, which led 
the coup against the CAR government (Al Jazeera 2013).
The switch towards more robust operations has several implications 
on peacekeeping principles and broader UN peacebuilding attempts 
(Peter 2015; Hunt 2017; de Coning et al. 2017). Most important for 
the argument in this chapter, is that these missions are abandoning their 
conflict resolution ambitions, focusing only on the management and 
containment of these conflicts. But unlike the Cold War peacekeeping 
operations, which similarly focused on conflict management, the new 
missions are actively siding with the often-contested governments. When 
UN peacekeepers side with one party in a conflict, whether by helping 
it extend state authority or defeat enemy combatants, this substantially 
affects the conflict and political dynamics at that time. As political rein-
carnations of these same armed groups will in many cases need to be 
included in peace settlements for these to become sustainable, this will 
have far-reaching consequences for the UN’s ability to act as an impartial 
broker in peace processes.
These new UN attempts to manage conflicts could have negative 
implications on UN’s ability to contribute to conflict resolution. It is 
therefore unsurprising that UN reports, including the report of the 
HIPPO panel, convey discomfort with the idea of robust enforcement 
peacekeeping. The big question for the future is whether the UN as 
an institution will be able to resist the pressures from member states to 
morph peacekeeping with peace enforcement.
14 See: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.
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conclusions
The history of UN peacekeeping almost serves as a history of the types 
of conflicts that the international community has been dealing with since 
the end of the Second World War. It also reminds us how the peace-
keeping tool was adapted from a bipolar world, via a unipolar one to 
today’s multipolar world. In many ways, it is remarkable that an instru-
ment developed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War 
managed to survive so long. Blue helmets are a poignant symbol of 
conflict interventions over the last seventy years. But we should also be 
cognisant that the label of peacekeeping has encompassed very different 
activities over this period. While the UN maintains that the core princi-
ples—consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force—developed in the 
1950s remain relevant today, these principles have changed substantially 
as missions evolved. Peacekeeping today bears only casual resemblance to 
peacekeeping from decades ago.
In one respect, however, the UN is returning to its roots. Peacekeeping 
started as a conflict management tool, aiming to keep warring states at 
bay. It was an instrument designed to facilitate de-escalation of conflicts, 
or at minimum to curb their escalation. With the end of the Cold War, the 
UN and its member states adapted this tool for conflict resolution pur-
poses, aiming to help states deal with their internal struggles. This was pri-
marily a reflection of the newly found consensus within the UNSC that 
came with the Western hegemony in global institutions. Peacebuilding 
through statebuilding became the agenda. The scholarly community is 
split over how successful these attempts have been and whether it is even 
desirable for the UN to get involved in the domestic affairs of post-con-
flict states. But these debates seem somehow outdated at the time when 
most new UN missions are either tasked with the protection of civilians 
or are adopting peace enforcement elements. While such operations are 
designed to respond to contemporary conflicts, they have all but aban-
doned any conflict resolution ambitions. Contemporary operations are 
deployed to manage and contain the conflicts they are addressing, coun-
tering pressures from non-state actors on the state system. With that, UN 
peacekeeping has come full circle as it is again used as a tool to curb esca-
lation of local and regional conflicts into bigger problems for the interna-
tional system. And in this ability to adapt to the needs of the states lies the 
resilience of the idea of peacekeeping itself.
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Shortly after Donald Trump was elected President, in November 
2016, US government representatives announced that the US 
would significantly cut back on its financial contributions to the UN. 
In addition, the new administration pledged to pressure the UN to reduce 
its peacekeeping budget, for instance by closing a number of missions and 
undertaking a comprehensive review of peace operations (Lynch 2017). 
The announcements provoked alarm due not only to the financial and 
political implications, but also because of the repercussions to the inter-
nal politics of the US. In mid-2017, this foreshadowing became concrete 
when, under pressure from the US, the General Assembly agreed to signif-
icant cuts to the peacekeeping budget. American Ambassador Nikki Haley 
gloated that the US, in seeking “more bang for its buck,” was trimming 
the “fat around the edges” of the UN security budget (Haynes 2017). 
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Although the cuts remained below what the Trump administration had 
sought, the reduction in both resources and US interest have created 
more pressure to scrutinise and improve peacekeeping effectiveness.
Yet the perception of tectonic shifts within the world’s most impor-
tant global governance body predated these budget cuts and even 
Trump’s election. US hegemonic power has not only been cast into 
doubt, but in fact has been actively contested, especially by “rising pow-
ers” whose leaders decry the injustices and resulting challenges of key 
mechanisms—including the asymmetries built into UN peace operations. 
Moreover, the US is not the only Western power in apparent decline. 
The European Union (EU) has delved into an identity crisis since the 
June 2016 Brexit referendum, and other member states have seen the 
rise of Euroscepticism. Against this backdrop, Trump’s cavalier detach-
ment from UN security issues has added further urgency for structural 
changes in global governance.
The UN itself has long acknowledged the need to revamp its peace-
keeping norms and practices. The UN High-Level Independent Panel on 
Peace Operations (HIPPO), launched in 2014 by Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon, deepened this discussion and produced concrete recommenda-
tion for enhancing effectiveness. Although the panel report concentrated 
on the nuts and bolts (and norms) of UN peacekeeping rather than the 
geopolitical underpinnings of those challenges, the effort was undertaken 
within broader debates about systemic change in global governance. 
As the first major external review of UN peacekeeping since the Report 
of the Panel on UN Peace Operations chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi in 
2000 (UN 2000), the HIPPO (henceforth the Panel) opened up a 
window of opportunity to reflect not only upon the reforms imple-
mented over the past fifteen years, but also upon the unmet and emerg-
ing demands. Change in top leadership seemed to further expand this 
perceived window. At the end of 2016, António Guterres became UN 
Secretary-General. Guterres has held up the banner of conflict preven-
tion since his campaign, also indicating that more effort would be placed 
on political strategies to avoid and resolve conflict. Discussion of con-
flict prevention, however, remains thus far rather abstract, disperse, and 
all-encompassing, especially since Guterres has had to devote considera-
ble energy to addressing the tensions and uncertainties triggered by the 
Trump administration.
These tectonic shifts, emerging uncertainties, and shifting leaderships 
are not the only source of change in the peacekeeping field. Scholars 
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of armed conflict have long noted structural changes in the nature 
of conflicts, such as the proliferation of so-called “new” or “hybrid” 
wars—the growing incidence of intra-state violence associated with 
 fundamentalist non-state groups, ethno-political tensions, rebel separa-
tism, armed resistance to authoritarian regimes, and non-state criminal 
groups, all of which are often associated with new dynamics in the con-
duct of war as well as increasingly fragmented battlefields. In the post-
Cold War, as Kaldor (2013) has noted, there is increasingly a “blurring 
of war and crime.” Combined, these factors point to serious challenges 
ahead for a peacekeeping system that originated in the rigid and predom-
inantly state-centric order of the Cold War and that remains generally ill- 
prepared to deal with the particularities of post-Clausewitzean conflicts.
Given this changing context, what are the main implications of the 
multipolarisation of the world order for UN peacekeeping? This chapter 
explores two interrelated dimensions of security global governance and 
conflict management: norms-setting and role expectations. New uncer-
tainties about leadership and emerging resources on constraints prompt 
changing expectations of, and concern about, rising powers. China, in 
particular, emerges as a potential leader, but Beijing’s willingness and 
ability to quickly expand its influence over UN security architecture 
should not be taken for granted.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first part briefly explores 
the concept of multipolarity and the new (if highly variable) salience of 
 rising powers in international affairs. Next, the paper looks at how these 
phenomena have affected UN peacekeeping with reference to normative 
debates and role expectations. The conclusion highlights some of the key 
takeaway points and notes directions for future research.
multiPolArisAtion oF the world order
Working to decipher the interactions among world leaders in the 2017 
G-20 meeting, held in Hamburg, political scientists and pundits grasped 
for new expressions to describe the apparent end of the US-dominated 
world order; one recurring term was “G-Zero world,” where no single 
country or bloc is able to shape or direct global events. “The era of the 
cacophony is upon us,” proclaimed the Economist (2017). Chaos became 
the leitmotif within the mainstream media coverage of the event.
Major summits like the G-20 underscored a trend that has been 
hotly debated in international relations discussions, both theoretical and 
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empirical. Some international relations scholars argue that the system 
is already undergoing a transition towards a more multipolar system,1 
with new engines of economic growth and political agency challenging 
the presumed hegemony of global powers, especially the United States. 
Indeed, more than in any other period of modern history, rising powers 
have become more vocal in their revisionist stances and increasingly work 
together in pressing for change, including at the UN (Acharya 2014). 
In 2009, for instance, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva titled 
his opening speech at the UN General Assembly “The Multipolar World 
and the Revitalisation of the United Nations” (da Silva 2009).
Here the expression “rising powers” refers to states that exert a 
considerable degree of influence within their respective regions, and 
whose leaderships nurture broader ambitions at a global level yet 
face constraints on their ability to project both soft and hard power. 
In some cases, this ambition to expand power is partially motivated by a 
desire to recover a perceived lost status of global power, as in the cases 
of Russia and China. It is also rooted in the idea that there are alterna-
tives to “Western” ideals and principles. As a result, while China, India, 
and Brazil, among others, remained open to cooperation with Western 
powers, they also found themselves at odds with certain established 
governance systems and norms. In general, they also became more scep-
tical of the Western strategy of incorporating the rest of the world into 
a value system presented as being universal. Under Putin, for instance, 
Russia—particularly since the 2014 annexation of Crimea—has stead-
fastly refused to “follow the West” (Lukin 2016).
In addition to contesting the status quo individually, these coun-
tries began to pool together their voices and, to some extent, their 
resources in pressing for a more representative global governance sys-
tem—one that would not only better reflect the current distribution of 
power, but that would also expand their own influence in international 
relations. The formation of the G20, in 1999, brought together major 
powers and rising ones and represented an attempt to expand the “inner 
circle” of global leadership (previously firmly entrenched in the G-7) 
while foment dialogue outside the confines of established institutions 
like the UN. The importance of these fora, however, have varied in the 
eyes of rising powers Their primary collective strategy has entailed loose, 
1 For an overview of the debate until the turn of the millennium, see Lynn-Jones (2008). 
For more recent discussions, see Haass (2008) and Laidi (2014).
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transregional groupings of rising powers—not only the BRICS, but also 
the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, where the absence of Western powers allows 
member states to promote a contestation discourse far more openly.
These coalitions vary in both composition and agenda, but they have 
adopted openly revisionist (if often rather vague) official discourses. 
Although these coalitions bring together economically, politically, and 
geographically diverse countries, they share the perception of having 
stood outside the international core group of the West (and Japan) that 
has dominated the world system for the past decades (de Carvalho and 
de Coning 2013; Wiharta et al. 2012). In 2013, at the annual BRICS 
Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the BRICS coalition 
formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa “a key element 
of the emerging multipolar world” (RT 2013).
The shift towards a more multipolar order has been highly  variable, 
both across different arenas of international affairs and over time. 
In international security, the multipolarisation process has been more 
incremental and uncertain. Here the status quo in international security 
has rested on two pillars. The first pillar is the continuing military 
supremacy of the United States: despite the recent expansion of Chinese 
military power, US hard power outpaces that of any other state by a wide 
margin, along all key measures. The second pillar is the failure to reform 
the UN Security Council (UNSC), which means that major decisions 
regarding the use of force are still taken by the Permanent Five (P5).
Despite these elements of continuity, there are growing challenges 
to Western dominance. The number of states possessing nuclear weap-
ons has expanded, especially among non-Western states. Although US 
hard power exceeds that of other states by a wide margin, the robust-
ness of US military power is cast into doubt as the United States finds 
itself embroiled in complex conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa, 
and Central Asia—as well as rising inter-state tensions in the Pacific. 
In addition, attempts by previous administrations to expand US soft 
power through mega-agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) have been reversed by the Trump administration and opened up 
windows of opportunity that China and Russia, in particular, have been 
quick to seize, including through multilateral initiatives like the Belt and 
Road Initiative.
Far from uniform, multipolarisation of the world order has also var-
ied over time, even within the relatively short span of time since the 
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turn of the millennium. For some rising powers, the bravado exhibited 
by  rising power leaderships in the 2000s has given way to a more dis-
creet participation in world affairs. This is especially the case for states 
undergoing significant economic slowdown or political turmoil, as in 
the cases of Brazil and South Africa. Others, such as Russia and Turkey, 
have become more combative of perceived Western pressures due to a 
combination of domestic politics and geopolitical interests. While the 
word “chaos” may overestimate the fragmentation of the current world 
order, rising powers certainly find more space in which to manoeuvre, 
certainly within their own regions and, in some cases, even beyond them. 
Although it remains to be seen what type of scenario will emerge out of 
these changes in world leadership and realignments among rising pow-
ers, the reconfiguration of the system has deep repercussions for the UN 
security architecture, including its peace operations.
imPAct oF multiPolArisAtion on un PeAce oPerAtions
Multipolarisation has already generated new demands and changing 
expectations about UN peacekeeping. From the perspective of rising 
powers, although they have long been contributors (especially of troops 
and police) to UN peacekeeping operations, a systemic transition offers 
a chance to boost their normative influence as well as operational role 
in international security and governance. UN peacekeeping has thus 
become part of a broader “rising power strategy” that combines inten-
sifying engagement even as those states remain dissatisfied with the con-
centration of decision-making at the hands of Western states. However, 
not all rising powers are alike; those that are part of the P5 states (China 
and Russia) assume a more pivotal role than non-P5 rising powers. 
Broadly put, however, the resulting tension between engagement and 
contestation of the UN security architecture becomes apparent across 
both norms-setting and roles expectations.
Norms-Setting
UN peace operations are characterised by some glaring asymmetries in 
terms of which countries mandate, fund, and implement peacekeeping—
an imbalance that has sharpened since the 1990s, when Western coun-
tries decreased uniformed personnel from UN operations and as UN 
peacekeeping underwent a dramatic surge in the 2000s (Bellamy and 
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Williams 2013). Industrialised states and P5 member states, bolstered 
by financial resources, political leadership, and accumulated institutional 
learning, lead the process of setting rules but do not all contribute signif-
icant numbers of troops and police to peace operations. There have been 
some efforts to redress this asymmetry. The “New Horizon” initiative, 
launched in 2009 by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) and Field Support (DFS), sought to expand the pool of Troop 
Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries 
(PCCs). The 2015 report issued by the HIPPO addresses the norma-
tive imbalances in peacekeeping timidly and indirectly, through general 
 recommendations on partnerships and effectiveness yet without address-
ing the geopolitical underpinnings of this divide (UN 2015).
Thus far, however, this picture has not been reverted. In 2016, the 
top providers of assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping  operations 
were the United States (28.57%), China (10.29%), Japan (9.68%), 
Germany (6.39%), France (6.31%), the United Kingdom (5.80%), Russia 
(4.01%), Italy (3.75%), Canada (2.92%), and Spain (2.44%) (UN 2017a). 
In other words, aside from China and Russia (both P5 countries and 
states that are sometimes classified as rising powers), all top contributors 
are Western states and Japan.
Developing countries, on the other hand, provide the bulk of  military 
and police staff, who are deployed to the field often without proper 
equipment and training (especially when compared with their Western 
counterparts) and are exposed to direct risks and suffer the majority 
of casualties. In 2016, the top peacekeeper contributors (military and 
police combined) were all African and Asian: Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Egypt 
(UN 2016a). These states have little voice in the formulation and adop-
tion of peacekeeping mandates. China—the top contributor among the 
members of the UNSC since 2004—has moved up the ranks consistently 
and will probably continue to do so, but it has not yet broken into the 
top ten (China was listed as number 12 in early 2017).
This uneven distribution of decision-making power and risk can 
directly influence the operations of a UN peacekeeping mission. 
For instance, Western powers can override the authority of commanding 
officers of peacekeeping forces, including where geopolitical interests are 
at stake (Khan 2006). The Indian representative to the UN has recently 
complained about the lack of consultation between the Council and 
Member States contributing troops to peacekeeping missions, adding 
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that “the current structure and working methods of the 15-member 
body were divorced from reality and represented a bygone era …” and 
hoped that “a cataclysmic crisis would not be needed to foster such a 
fundamental change” (UN 2016b).
The imbalance also appears increasingly sharp in the changing division 
of labour between the UN and the African Union, as well as African 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Although African states 
and organisations stress the importance of local and regional agency in 
dealing with conflicts around the continent—to the extent permitted 
by its evolving capabilities—these partnerships face significant coordi-
nation challenges in terms of strategic, operational, and funding issues. 
Some African state complain that particularly the Security Council does 
not adequately take into consideration the region’s views (Williams and 
Boutellis 2014). The asymmetries built into UN peace operations—
some of which UN officials have referred to as “peacekeeping apart-
heid”2—thus undermine both the legitimacy and effectiveness of peace 
operations.
These asymmetries are a direct consequence not only of disparities in 
the ability to make financial contributions, but also of the anachronis-
tic way in which the UN still reflects the distribution of power at the 
end of World War II.3 Non-P5 rising powers have been more vocal about 
contesting global governance, including norms of peacekeeping, and are 
bound to continue to challenge them in two ways. First, rising powers 
seek to influence global governance mechanisms and to participate more 
directly in rules-making (rather than to be mere “rules-takers”) in inter-
national security. As the Indonesian ambassador to the UN spelled out it 
in a 2016 Security Council debate, “Responsibility should be shared by 
giving emerging powers responsibilities commensurate to their respective 
capacity and competence to contribute to regional and global peace.” 
(UN 2016c)
As such, rising powers have been critical of the power structures, 
both formal and informal, that underpin decision-making. Second, they 
contest more specific elements of the normative framework, including 
2 The phrase was used by Jean-Marie Guéhenno (2005), then Under-Secretary-General 
for Peacekeeping Operations, in a statement made to the Challenges Project on 2 March 
2005 in London. See also Sidhu (2007).
3 The only significant changes have been the replacement of Taiwan by the PRC and that 
of the Soviet Union by Russia.
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aspects of peacekeeping. For instance, many such countries have 
 contested the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm and, more recently, 
the intersection between peacekeeping and anti-terrorism initiatives. 
Rising powers, in other words, want a greater say in deciding under what 
circumstances to undertake such operations, when to allow the use of 
force, and what the rules of engagement should be. This helps to explain 
why reform of the UNSC is such a central element in these countries’ 
multilateral agendas.
Three trends can be discerned in non-P5 rising powers’ recent 
 participation in normative debates about UN peacekeeping. First, 
 reflecting their aspirations to influence conceptual developments more 
closely, these states have stressed that peacekeeping operations should 
only take place with the permission of, and/or in partnership with, the 
UN. While this may remain true, with multipolarisation, rising powers 
may find more manoeuvre space for pursuing their regional ambitions, 
as well as deepening rivalries in areas where regional cooperation fails to 
take off or is undertaken in a lopsided manner.
For instance, regional dynamics in Eurasia have already begun to 
change dramatically not only due to the rise of China, but also due to 
the implementation of the Beijing-led Belt and Road Initiative. Although 
it remains largely a vision rather than a concrete project, the platform 
has already begun to change geopolitical and geo-economic relations 
between major regional players in Asia, promoting new configura-
tions in cooperation but also potentially triggering new tensions in an 
area where rising powers have already resisted the presence of the UN 
security mechanisms (The Indian government, for instance, has called 
for an end to the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
(UNMOGIP), which supervises the ceasefire line between the two coun-
tries). In June 2017, for instance, just as India grew more resistant to 
participating in the OBOR, India and China experienced another border 
flare-up when Indian troops halted a Chinese road-building project in 
the Himalayas (Barry and Huang 2017). Multipolarisation of the world 
order may heighten the regional geopolitical concerns and interests of 
some rising powers, hence weakening the position of the UN as the lead-
ing conflict management actor.
Second, rising powers have upheld the principle of respect for 
national sovereignty, for instance questioning the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) on the grounds that it can lead to violations of national 
sovereignty, that the norm is invoked in a highly selective manner 
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that serves narrow Western interests, and that it has tended to lead to 
(at best) highly uncertain outcomes (Laskaris and Kreutz 2015). This 
scepticism was in full view when the BRICS countries criticised the 
UNSC Resolution 1973 in 2011, which permitted the establishment of 
a no-fly zone over Libya. The resulting intervention was presented by 
critics as an abuse of the UN mandate; as de Carvalho and de Coning 
put it, “The representatives of the BRICS in the Security Council argued 
that they will not make the mistake again of trusting the West with the 
authority to undertake ‘limited action,’ which can then be used as a jus-
tification to launch an intervention that amounts to regime change” 
(de Carvalho and de Coning 2013). In a Security Council meeting in 
February 2016, the Egyptian ambassador stressed that “the Council 
must remain objective and it must adopt the ‘natural path’ to address 
issues according to the Charter, giving priority to peaceful means of 
 conflict resolution and respecting the sovereignty of States” (UN 2016c).
The Russian annexation of Crimea and, more recently, its role in the 
Syrian conflict have cast doubt on Russia’s commitment to the princi-
ple of non-intervention, at least as understood from a Western perspec-
tive. Although China has historically adopted a cautious stance in UN 
security discussions (most notably by exercising its veto power very infre-
quently), its economic and defence interests have rapidly globalised, not 
only in Asia but increasingly in Africa and Latin America. Some analysts 
argue that China is beginning to be flexible in its stance on non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of other states, for instance by offering 
to carry out some mediation of international conflicts, by carrying out 
large-scale evacuations of Chinese citizens when conflict breaks out, or 
even through its increasingly bold peacekeeping engagement, for exam-
ple deploying peacekeepers in South Sudan starting 2017 (The State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China 2017). Within the UNSC, 
however, China has generally remained more engaged in tempering the 
use of force than in proposing new norms for peacekeeping altogether 
(International Crisis Group 2009, pp. 2–3).
Third, rising powers have often opposed what they consider to be the 
sometimes premature mobilisation of peacekeepers to address outbreaks 
of conflict, arguing that instances of escalating violence must be analysed 
on a case-by-case basis. The trend towards more robust peacekeeping 
mandates notwithstanding, in their view, UN mechanisms such as eco-
nomic sanctions and especially the use of military force is to be used only 
as a last resort, when peaceful means to conflict resolution have been 
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exhausted. In this perspective, despite the UN Charter’s emphasis on 
early warning, preventive diplomacy, good offices, and mediation, the 
UN sometimes exhibits a knee-jerk reaction in deploying peacekeepers.
Within a more multipolar world order, there may be room for fur-
ther convergence between rising powers and Western states as scepticism 
of nation- and state-building, based on the assumption that societies 
can be (re)engineered through a top-down approach to “fixing” “failed 
states,” also spreads in Western countries and institutions. As more peo-
ple recognise that, rather than invariably benevolent and objective, the 
liberal peace paradigm of democracy and market economy can lead to 
unexpected results, including exacerbated instability (Zambakari 2017), 
rising powers are bound to feel less isolated in their positions at the UN. 
This convergence, however, will depend heavily on Secretary General 
Guterres’ ability to push forward an agenda for reform of peace opera-
tions that not only ensures the implementation of the HIPPO recom-
mendations but, in fact, goes well beyond those.
Rising powers have at times been accused of acting more as 
norms-blockers—setting up obstacles to the implementation of proposed 
norms—than as norms-entrepreneurs who bring to the table new ideas 
and invest politically so as to back up innovative proposals (Abdenur 
2016). Brazil’s proposal of the Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) 
concept was an important contribution to the ongoing debate over the 
use of force and the protection of civilians, but the proposal was ham-
pered in part by a lack of political commitment to advancing the dis-
cussion (Almeida 2013). South Africa’s introduction of the concept 
of non-indifference has been influential in other states’ foreign poli-
cies (including that of Brazil’s) and within the discourse of the African 
Union, but the concept has remained rather vague and is applied in a 
highly uneven fashion. In a context of declining US leadership within the 
UN, rising powers (both those within and outside the Security Council) 
may find more space for proposing normative innovation, but gathering 
the political momentum required to enact change will require creating a 
critical mass around new proposals.
Role Expectations
Most discussions around role expectations and UN peacekeeping  
revolve around missions’ ability to carry out their mandates, or the man-
dates themselves. Here I refer more specifically to expectations on the 
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part of the international community, especially at the UN and partner 
organisations, regarding the official and unofficial division of labour that 
emerges in defining, structuring, and implementing peacekeeping. With 
multipolarisation, expectations have begun to shift, especially around 
“pivotal states”—countries that could help fill the space left behind by a 
declining US leadership.
This idea was reinforced during a June 2017 news conference in New 
York, when Secretary-General Guterres warned that an American retreat 
from the world meant serious risks: “When someone leaves space, that 
space is always occupied by others” (UN 2017b). In May, during a talk 
at New York University, Guterres had given concrete examples: “It’s not 
only the Russias and the Chinas that are occupying the ground; if you 
look at Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, the regional powers in many parts 
of the world—when the big powers leave some space, they will occupy 
it” (Nichols 2017). In addition to voicing concerns about the Trump 
administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, 
new US migration policies, and deep cuts to the UN budget, Guterres 
was raising the issue of what leadership at the UN will look like in a 
multipolar world order.
Many of these changing expectations concern the responsibilities that 
different sets of actors should assume within a world order in which 
conflict-related demands seem to grow more complex even as availa-
ble resources shrink. As suggested by Guterres’ comments, leadership 
roles are up for grabs, with expectations of the European Union (EU) 
stepping in dashed by the uncertainties and identity crisis unleashed by 
the UK Brexit referendum in 2016. The 2017 G-20 meeting, held in 
Hamburg, was widely interpreted as reflecting a divided world  leadership 
and signalling a rapid decline in expectations of the US. Many G20 
countries, including traditional partners like France and Canada, have 
opted to circumvent the Trump administration rather than band-
wagon with the new foreign policy decisions implemented by the US; 
at the same time, Russia and Turkey have stepped up their defiant tones. 
In as much as UN politics mirror broad shifts in geopolitics, these shift-
ing alignments generate further uncertainty for UN peacekeeping.
Another set of expectations subject to change involves the North/
South split in UN peacekeeping decision-making and implementation. 
Budget cuts means there will be even fewer resources with which to level 
the playing field in terms of equipment, training, intelligence, and coor-
dination, increasing risks to the TCCs and PCCs. These problems are 
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of particular concern in robust peacekeeping operations like the United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), in which troops, 
police, and other personnel are subject to complex conflicts. In Mali, for 
instance, MINUSMA peacekeepers are increasingly targeted by impro-
vised explosive devices and car bombs; a total of 146 peacekeepers there 
have been killed since 2013 (UN 2017c). Although including counter-
terrorism operations in peacekeeping mandates is controversial, as the 
commander of the MINUSMA intelligence unit has put it, those risks 
are unlikely to abate in peacekeeping settings: “This is not the end of this 
type of mission. It’s the beginning” (Sieff 2017). Coupled with grow-
ing scepticism of UN peacekeeping effectiveness, these risks, as well as 
more traditional ones from state and non-state armed groups, are likely 
to magnify the perception of unfair burdens assumed by Global South 
contributors to UN peacekeeping.
Regarding rising powers like the BRICS states, there are increas-
ing expectations (by global powers as well as lower-income states) that 
they will expand and diversify their contributions to international secu-
rity. This applies to both the Security Council permanent seat holders 
and to the other three countries, but unevenly. Among the P5, China in 
particular is called upon to expand its contributions, not only in terms 
of financing and personnel deployment, but also with respect to defin-
ing mandates and the appropriateness of the use of force. Even before 
Guterres was selected as Secretary General, China had been diversify-
ing and intensifying its commitments to UN peacekeeping, contribut-
ing thousands more troops, making major investments in peacekeeper 
training, and placing 8000 troops at the disposal of a UN standby force. 
By 2016, China was the second-largest contributor to the UN 
peacekeeping budget and deployed more peacekeepers than the four 
other P5 countries combined (Lynch 2017).
China’s increased interest in, and engagement with, UN peacekeeping— 
especially at a time when the Trump administration voiced open disdain 
for the United Nations—triggered alarm bells among some Western spe-
cialists. In October 2016, a Foreign Policy article warned that China had 
set “its sights on the United Nations’ top peacekeeping job,” adding 
that Chinese leadership in this area would have serious normative impli-
cations, especially for human rights. The article cited a senior UN official 
stating Russia was also “making a play for DPA” and an expert saying that 
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“We’re seeing the first phase of a Chinese bid to, firstly, assert itself over 
UN peacekeeping and, secondly, to rewrite the rules of UN peacekeeping” 
(Lynch 2017). The Diplomat asked, “Is the UN About to Enter the Era 
of Chinese and Russian Dominance?” (Witthoeft 2016). New York-based 
think tanks viewed the bid as a potential turning point; the International 
Peace Institute (IPI) opined that “China heading up the United Nations 
Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) would represent one 
of its most significant overtures toward leading, rather than merely partici-
pating in, the post-1945 global order” (Bowen 2016). Although Guterres 
ended up appointing France’s Jean-Pierre Lacroix as Under-Secretary for 
Peacekeeping Operations, the breathless tone of the debate about expand-
ing non-Western influence at the UN—especially the concerns over an 
ambitious China and a revisionist Russia—reflects the changing expecta-
tions for rising powers in UN peacekeeping.
While the recent increases in China’s contributions to UN 
peacekeeping signal a clear uptick in its commitment to peace operations, 
it is not yet clear whether Beijing would be willing to assume a clear-cut 
leading role—or, even if it is, whether it is capable of doing so in the near 
future. Xi Jinping is attempting to lead a difficult (albeit not insurmount-
able) structural transition, and the relative deceleration of the Chinese 
economy—down from double-digit rates to a “mere” 6.5% annual GDP 
growth per year—translates into fewer resources. Abroad, aside from 
the UN, China has many other areas of diplomacy and cooperation it 
is trying to build up, both regionally and globally. Alongside China’s 
engagement with the UN, its multilateral diplomacy (and its engagement 
with international security) also encompasses a variety of non-UN initi-
atives, including emerging regional or trans-regional cooperation con-
figurations such as the two-pronged OBOR, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, and the new financial institutions it has helped to launch, 
especially the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the 
BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). In addition, China deals with a 
large number of domestic security issues, including separatist groups, as 
well as territorial disputes and reawakened historical rivalries in the South 
China Sea and recurring instability in the Korean peninsula. Chinese 
scholars have warned that, even within the context of a rapidly changing 
world order and the emergence of new opportunities, “China mustn’t 
spread too thin” (Yinhong 2016).
Thus far, even as China openly competes with the US for power, lead-
ing both countries to reappraise their positions vis-à-vis one another 
3 UN PEACEKEEPING IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER …  59
as well as in global governance, Beijing has generally opted for a 
cautious projection rather than brash power-grabbing. Deng Xiaoping’s 
exhortation to “keep a low profile, never take the lead, and make a 
difference” may have been toned down, but it has not been altogether 
discarded.4 A China-dominated UN peacekeeping field is possible, but 
unlikely to materialise in a just a few years.
To expand global peacekeeping engagement, the three rising power 
aspirants to a permanent seat at the Security Council—Brazil, India, and 
South Africa—have been called upon to assume greater responsibilities 
both within and beyond their immediate regions. The rationale is that, if 
these countries aspire to global power status, for instance as reflected in 
their bids for a permanent seat at the UNSC, then they should demon-
strate deeper long-term commitment (political, financial, and otherwise) 
to hands-on engagement in UN peace operations, both at the norma-
tive and at the operational levels. However, particularly during economic 
downturns, these states resist committing further resources by invoking 
their status as developing countries, with important challenges to tackle 
internally that constrain their capacity to contribute (particularly finan-
cially) to UN peacekeeping. At the time of this writing, this is particu-
larly true of Brazil and South Africa, both of which have experienced a 
combination of economic deceleration and political turmoil at home—in 
both cases, fuelled by allegations of extensive corruption. Just how “piv-
otal” these rising powers will be in a multipolar order will depend not 
only on their ability to restore stability and inclusive growth at home, 
but also in their capacity to take advantage of the rapidly changing inter-
national order.
Finally, multipolarisation also changes expectations regarding the role 
of regional organisations. The UN has retained primacy in peacekeep-
ing, handling the largest number of peacekeeping operations (includ-
ing robust missions) and serving as the main normative platform for 
debating and discussing when and how peacekeeping should be carried 
out. Nonetheless, in some places, regional organisations have assumed 
increasing protagonism, not only due to the limits of UN capacity but 
also because of the growing belief in the legitimacy and efficacy of more 
regional, sub-regional, or even localised solutions.
Because the bulk of peacekeeping takes place in Africa—it is esti-
mated that 87% of uniformed UN personnel are deployed around the 
4 For more on this debate, see People’s Daily (2012).
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continent—this growing complexity is particularly relevant to the region 
(de Carvalho 2015). As de Coning explains in this volume, the AU’s 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has expanded considera-
bly in the past decade. Recent innovations, such as a mediation unit and 
gender-specific policies, have lent momentum to some areas. However, 
the organisation’s capacity is still highly uneven, with considerable weak-
nesses due to financing and capabilities. As multipolarisation accelerates, 
so do pressures for the AU and other regional organisations to take on 
an even bigger role in tackling conflicts within its geographic space. In 
addition, as regional powers like Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South 
Africa find more room for manoeuvring within a multipolar context, 
geopolitics will continue to shape AU politics as those countries jockey 
for influence at a regional level.
conclusion
The multipolarisation of the world order is well under way. Some of the 
notable changes in leadership and alignments observed over the past 
decade include the emergence of new economic growth nodes, more vocal 
contestation of the current global governance system by rising powers, and 
emerging “parallel” institutions of the Global South. Since 2016 especially, 
these trends have dovetailed more clearly with the decline of Western pow-
ers, especially the retraction of US power under Trump and the identity 
crisis besetting the European Union since the Brexit vote. Yet some rising 
powers are bound to play a more pivotal role than others.
The shift towards a multipolar configuration has significant implications 
for UN peacekeeping, and some of the effects are already becoming appar-
ent. At a political level, the perceived leadership vacuum creates pressure for 
new sources of leadership in global governance, and it raises concern among 
some circles with the possibility of non-Western states, namely China, occu-
pying this space, with important normative repercussions. While China 
has shown growing interest in assuming a more proactive role at the UN, 
taking up leadership will require concerted effort, investment of resources 
and diplomacy, and time.
Russia stands to gain influence, but will likely retain its predomi-
nantly legalistic views at the UN, including with respect to peacekeep-
ing. Unlike China, it has no intentions of making a leap in contributions 
so as to expand influence on peace operations from outside the UNSC. 
Its military attention is more focused on countering NATO in Eastern 
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Europe and in maintaining its footholds in Central Asia and the Middle 
east.
The role of other rising powers is more variable. Countries that expe-
rience considerable turbulence at home, Brazil and South Africa, may 
lack the resources of the pivotal states, but their long tradition of mul-
tilateral diplomacy will allow them to retain relevance in a multipolar 
world, including at the regional level. Rising powers that are directly 
embroiled in geopolitical hotspots, such as Turkey and Iran, may assume 
increasingly contestatory stances, at least with respect to their immediate 
vicinities.
At an operational level, the impending budget cuts provoked by US 
pressure lead to the closing of a number of missions and are bound to 
reinforce some of the asymmetries seen in the field. Although other 
Western states have begun signalling that they will not bandwagon with 
the US on major foreign policy decisions, the Trump administration’s 
dismissive attitude towards the UN may promote a more hands-off 
approach to conflict management on the part of longstanding allies such 
as Canada, even if they diverge on other issues, such as the Paris climate 
agreement.
Multipolarity increases uncertainty and provokes realignments, but it 
is not equivalent to chaos. New nodes of decision-making emerge and 
upend normative engines of previous eras. At the same time, multipolari-
sation is not uniform or unidirectional; it may web and flow and manifest 
itself differently in different areas and spaces. Just as the fortunes of ris-
ing powers are subject to oscillations and even, in some cases, reversals, 
so is the decline of Western powers. It remains to be seen whether the 
world is experiencing a Tump Era or merely a Trump Interregnum, but 
analysis over time shows that the policies implemented by the US gov-
ernments in 2017 are not the only driver of systemic change. This means 
that UN peacekeeping will undergo geopolitical pressures and changes 
not foreseen in organisational initiatives such as the HIPPO process.
Further research on the impact of multipolarisation on UN peace-
keeping should thus ratchet down the level of analysis to look more 
specifically at how macro–level changes in inter-state and intra-state 
dynamics create new challenges for the UN architecture. Secondly, 
future research should investigate the ways that emerging regional 
cooperation arrangements like OBOR affect conflict prevention and 
management, whether within the realm of peacekeeping or in parallel 
to it. Finally, special attention should be paid to how multipolarisation 
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affects the behaviour, choices, and expectations of other member states, 
whether individually or through groupings like the G7+.
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Politics in the Driving Seat: Good Offices, 
UN Peace Operations, and Modern Conflict
Adam Day
PoliticAl solutions to intrActAble conFlicts
“Today’s conflicts are more intractable and less conducive to  political 
 resolution” (UN 2015, p. 2). This finding of the High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) recognises that 
 modern conflict is increasingly complicated by the rising prominence 
of non-state actors, especially the growing influence of global terrorist 
groups and transnational criminal networks. Similarly, increasing involve-
ment of regional players in intra-state wars and expanding illicit flows of 
money and materiel across national boundaries in places like the Sahel, 
the Great Lakes and the Middle East have contributed to an entrench-
ment of conflict and have complicated the search for sustainable  peaceful 
outcomes (Bosetti and Einsiedel 2015). This evolution in conflict raises 
difficult questions about the traditionally state-centric approach of the 
UN, and how to effectively engage with a broader cast of characters 
at the local, national, regional, and international levels (Griffiths and 
Whitfield 2010).
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Modern conflict presents a particularly complicated terrain for the 
UN’s political work, which the HIPPO places at the centre of conflict 
prevention and management. Today, the UN is called upon to engage 
politically in a far broader range of conflict settings and with a much 
more diverse set of interlocutors, with good offices mandates now specif-
ically included special political missions in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Haiti, 
and Iraq, and peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali.1 These cases 
have given rise to a new set of questions about the application of good 
offices in modern conflict. How can UN representatives—from the 
Secretary-General’s level down to the deep field—employ good offices 
in situations where key players are resistant to traditional diplomatic tools 
of persuasion and pressure? How has the UN adapted good offices to 
address sub-national conflict dynamics and the lines of regional influ-
ence that cross state boundaries? To what extent is the UN well-placed 
to drive modern conflict situations towards sustainable peace, and what 
kinds of partnerships would help it meet new challenges?
The new Secretary General is calling for “surge in diplomacy for 
peace,” (UN 2017) placing good offices centre stage. But have we 
learned our lines, and who is the audience?
In this chapter, I briefly trace how good offices has evolved from 
early Secretaries-General through the expansion of UN peace  operations 
in the 1990s. This lays the groundwork for a comparative analysis of 
modern applications of good offices in more recent conflicts, examin-
ing how the UN has attempted to reshape its political engagement to 
accommodate the changing nature of armed conflict. I argue that the 
inherently vague definition of the term “good offices” has helpfully 
allowed for entrepreneurial approaches to political engagement, and that 
in many cases this has aided the UN in effectively preventing and de- 
escalating violent conflict.
From these cases, I identify some of the key elements for the success 
of good offices, including: a sustained political presence on the ground; 
the ability to respond quickly to changing circumstances; a broad set 
of relationships; the effective use of both local and regional leverage; 
and often the personal credibility of the UN representative. But these 
1 See Security Council resolutions 2277 (UN 2016a), 2299 (UN 2016b), 2274 (UN 
2016c), 2039 (UN 2012). As discussed below, there is a school of thought which holds 
that all UN missions inherently possess a good offices mandate.
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rarely come together, especially in large peace operations. In fact, I 
find a tendency for larger multi-dimensional missions to bifurcate their 
work into the operational and the political—often due to the enormous 
burdens of deploying and maintaining a large field presence—with the 
political work sometimes dropping in priority. This can result in incoher-
ent, often contradictory approaches and missed opportunities to leverage 
the UN towards its political objectives. On this basis, I argue that the 
political shift encouraged by the HIPPO is best achieved by moving away 
from larger peace operations to focus on leaner, more nimble approaches 
for the future, with good offices more deeply embedded in regional and 
sub-national networks.
whAt Are good oFFices? An old Question  
worth rePeAting
“Good offices” is a widely-used term outside of armed conflict, present 
in a variety of international bodies (World Trade Organization 1994, 
art. 5; Vienna Convention 1985, art. 11), and in multilateral treaties 
preceding the formation of the United Nations (Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1899, 1907). Traditionally, 
the term described the role played by a state in mediating international 
disputes, such as Switzerland in a range of inter-state crises from the Suez 
to Afghanistan (Fischer 2002), or the Security Council’s establishment of 
a Good Offices Committee to help resolve a dispute between Dutch and 
nationalist forces in Indonesia in 1947 (Wainhouse 1966).
The Preparatory Commission for the UN Charter envisaged that the 
Secretary-General would have a “role to play as a mediator and as an 
informal advisor of many governments … to take decisions which may 
be justly called political” (UN 1945, pp. 86–87). However, the UN 
Charter itself contains no direct reference to good offices or even this 
advisory role. The most relevant provision is Article 99, which allows 
the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Council any 
threats to international peace and security, and considered a basis for 
much of the Secretary-General’s authority.2 As Kofi Annan has pointed 
2 See Chesterman (2011); see also Johnstone (2003) arguing that Article 99 was 
expanded under Resolution 1366 to allow the SG to also act in cases of serious violations 
of international law.
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out, Secretaries-General have invoked this article “very sparingly,”3 but 
the provision does open the door for direct engagement with  disputing 
parties. And the fact that the earliest General Assembly resolutions 
overtly called on the Secretary-General to employ his good offices to 
help Member States resolve disputes (UN 1988a, para. 20; UN 1982) 
affirms that they were seen from the outset as inherent to the job.4
The more difficult task is defining good offices. The UN Handbook 
offers a very restrictive and state-centric definition,5 but that is rarely, 
if ever, invoked in practice. Javier Pérez De Cuéllar simply referred to 
good offices as “quiet diplomacy” (Adams and Kingsbury 1994, p. 133). 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali more pragmatically described the term as “any 
diplomatic action taken to prevent disputes from arising between parties, 
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit 
the spread of the latter when they occur” (UN 1992a). In a similar vein, 
Teresa Whitfield (2010a) has noted that good offices can mean “almost 
anything – from a well-timed telephone call by the Secretary-General, 
to exploratory conversations, or a full-fledged mediation effort con-
ducted in his or her name.” In my view, Ian Johnstone’s (2010) concise 
but expansive definition captures modern usage nicely: “everything the 
UN can do of a diplomatic nature to help prevent, manage or resolve 
conflicts.” This is particularly convenient because it covers pre-conflict, 
conflict, and post-conflict settings, and includes mediation without being 
limited to it. However, good offices have not always been thought of so 
broadly, and a brief look at the evolution of the term from its early days 
is instructive in understanding how to implement the HIPPO’s poli-
tics-first agenda.
3 Annan (2001); see also Chesterman (2011) (noting that the Secretary-General has only 
invoked Article 99 explicitly twice).
4 Furthermore, the so-called “implied powers doctrine” would strongly indicate that 
good offices are inherent to the office. This doctrine is articulated in the International 
Court of Justice: “under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those 
powers which, though not expressly provided by the Charter, are conferred upon it by nec-
essary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties” (International Court 
of Justice 1949).
5 “When States party to a dispute are unable to settle it directly, a third party, may offer 
his [or her] good offices as a means of preventing further deterioration of the dispute and 
as a method of facilitating efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the dispute” (United 
Nations 1988b).
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the eVolution And exPAnsion oF good oFFices
The first recorded uses of the Secretary-General’s good offices underscore 
two facets of the role: initiative and independence. In response to the 
1946 Soviet invasion of the northern Azeri region of Iran, the Security 
Council tasked the parties to report to Secretary-General Trygve Lie on 
troop withdrawal, placing the UN at the centre of inter-state conflict res-
olution (UN 1946). Perhaps more notable, however, was the fact that Lie 
had already begun talks with the parties prior to the resolution, indicat-
ing his willingness to employ good offices on his own authority. When 
Lie was again asked to provide good offices and report on the North 
Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, he took a personal line in his 
reports, often at significant variance with the parties and members of the 
Council (Franck 1995, pp. 360, 384). In these early uses of good offices, 
Lie began to carve out an important space for the Secretary-General to 
manoeuvre independently.
Under the dynamic Dag Hammarskjöld, good offices  arguably 
expanded more quickly than at any other time in the history of the UN. 
In the 1956 Suez crisis, for example, he took on the role of  guarantor, 
restoring the parties’ confidence through direct talks with them, 
and working to ensure the armistice arrangements were effective.6 
Hammarskjöld was also willing to stretch his own terms of reference, as 
in 1960 when he invoked Article 99 of the Charter to recommend the 
deployment of peacekeepers to the DRC. The resulting Security Council 
resolution granted Hammarskjöld unprecedented breadth to engage with 
the parties and command UN assets in the DRC (O’Donoghue 2014).
Perhaps the most important element of Hammarskjöld’s use of good 
offices was his willingness to contradict other UN organs. In the con-
text of a crisis involving US aircrew hostages held in China, the General 
Assembly presented Hammarskjöld with a deeply biased resolution, con-
demning the Chinese action as the basis for the Secretary-General’s good 
offices mandate (UN 1954). Hammarskjöld openly distanced himself 
from this resolution and reassured the Chinese government that he had 
an independent basis for negotiating the issue. This so-called “Peking 
Formula” rests on Hammarskjöld’s vision that the Secretary-General 
6 See UNSC Resolution 118 (UN 1956a) on a complaint by France and the United 
Kingdom against Egypt, and Resolution 119 (UN 1956b) on a complaint by Egypt against 
France and the United Kingdom.
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should foremost follow “the principles and purposes of the Charter 
which are fundamental law and accepted by and binding on all States” 
(Jacobson 1979, p. 137). Drawing authority directly from the Charter, 
the Secretary-General is able to act nimbly, to initiate political engage-
ment and take positions at odds with other UN organs.7
The intractable Cyprus conflict—which has required a UN operation 
from 1964 to this day—captures key points along the trajectory of good 
offices over roughly the next 40-year period. U Thant’s involvement with 
Cyprus in 1964 followed directly from a request by the Council, and was 
initially limited to his appointment of a mediator to work with the parties 
(UN 1964). In 1974, after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Kurt Waldheim 
adopted a more intrusive approach and proposed a common framework for 
negotiation between the parties (Waldheim 1980, pp. 70–71). Boutros-
Ghali took it a step further, initiating intensive direct talks with the parties 
to generate proposals, rather than simply focusing on the forum and frame-
work for negotiations (Michael 2009, p. 132). Annan went further still by 
proposing a final settlement to the parties, and attaching an ultimatum that 
failure to agree would put the plan to a referendum for Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot populations. As Annan (UN 2004) himself stated, this “enlarged 
the role foreseen for me, from completing any unfinished parts of the plan 
… to resolving any continuing and persistent deadlocks in the negotiation.” 
It was also the first time the Secretary-General’s plan for conflict resolution 
would directly involve affected populations, rather than solely state-level 
representatives.
Cyprus is but one example of a broader trend over the development 
of the UN’s good offices role: Secretaries-General increasingly saw them-
selves as active participants in conflict resolution with the ability to prof-
fer substantive proposals, push the parties with external tools, and even 
engage outside the state-to-state framework by communicating with 
populations.8
8 The 1983 decision of Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to partner with the 
Secretary-General of the Organization of American States and a broader Contact Group to 
resolve several entrenched disputes in Latin America is another example of increasing use of 
points of leverage outside of the UN. See O’Donoghue (2014).
7 This formula has been used since, including by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to get around 
problematic General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan in 1980, see UN (1980).
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key shiFts: delegAtion, regionAlisAtion, exPAnsion
Immediately after the Cold War, the rates of negotiated settlements of 
international conflict increased, and by the end of the 1990s the num-
ber and intensity of armed conflicts globally had dropped significantly, 
continuing to do so into the early 2000s despite major exceptions like 
Afghanistan and Darfur (Griffiths and Whitfield 2010). Renowned experts 
might have been justified in assuming that the need for good offices would 
eventually dry up.9
However, while armed conflict dropped during this period, the use of 
good offices did not in fact dissipate. Instead, there was a rapid increase 
in the establishment of peace operations through the 1990s, with 21 
UN operations established between 1991 and 1995 alone.10 Unlike the 
Cold War period, where the Secretary-General tended to address conflicts 
personally with Member States, the good offices function quickly began 
to spread across operational contexts and various representatives of the 
Secretary-General, requiring engagement with a broader range of non-
state actors.11 This reflected the post-Cold War optimism that the UN 
9 Thomas Franck (1997, p. 180) predicted that the good offices function would “stagnate” 
in the light of these conflict trends.
10 The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (1991); United Nations 
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (1991); United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission II (1991); United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1991); United 
Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (1991); United Nations Protection Force (1992); 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992); United Nations Operation 
in Somalia I (1992); United Nations Operation in Mozambique (1992); United Nations 
Operation in Somalia II (1993); United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda 
1(1993); United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (1993); United Nations Observer 
Mission in Liberia (1993); United Nations Mission in Haiti (1993); United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (1993); United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group 
(1994); United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (1994); United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission III (1995); United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in 
Croatia (1994); United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (1995); United Nations 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); United Nations Transitional Administration 
for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (1995); United Nations Mission of 
Observers in Prevlaka (1995).
11 See, e.g. the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador which was mandated to use good 
offices to resolve a conflict between the Government and the liberation movement FMLN 
(UN 1993); see also the UN Mission in Mozambique, mandated to oversee implementation 
of a peace agreement between the Government and the resistance movement (UN 1992b).
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could work more constructively with Member States to resolve  conflicts, 
but also the growth of complex intra-state conflicts that required UN 
intervention to prevent spill-over into the surrounding regions. The 
 delegation and expansion of good offices—implicit in the appointment 
of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or Special 
Envoy—was a dominant story of the 1990s.
A second development in the 1990s was the dramatic growth of the 
so-called “groups of friends,” established by Member States to sup-
port or work in parallel with UN peacemaking efforts. Between 1990 
and 2009 the number of groups of friends ballooned from only four to 
more than 30.12 While these groups were not mandated by the Security 
Council to provide good offices (in fact they have operated almost 
entirely outside Security Council mandates), their functions were largely 
to facilitate political agreements between conflicting parties, and to sup-
port the UN operations when a unified effort of particular Member 
States was necessary. Similar to the growth of UN operations, the rise of 
groups of friends resulted from post-Cold War global dynamics, but also 
from a recognition that the UN alone was often not capable of resolving 
the more complex conflicts of the day.13 As such, the good offices work 
of the UN was not only delegated to more UN actors, but it was more 
entwined with these support groups and increasingly reliant on tailored 
constellations of Member States.
Following the downturn in violent conflict in the 1990s and early 
2000s, there was a tripling of intra-state conflicts between 2004 and 
2014, a parallel tripling of battle-related deaths, and a strong tendency 
for relapse into conflict by countries that had recently emerged from war 
(Einsiedel 2014). This trend was driven by significant changes in the 
nature of armed conflict, including a rise in the influence of non-state 
actors, the growing impact of transnational organised crime on state fra-
gility and conflict, increased impact of global jihadi networks, and deep-
ening linkages between regional conflicts and sub-national ones (Bosetti 
and Einsiedel 2015; Einsiedel 2014). The Arab Spring and US interven-
tions in Afghanistan and Iraq were major watershed moments that fed 
into these conflict dynamics, particularly the tendency of regional play-
ers to become involved in conflicts within states. Other factors, such as 
12 Whitfield (2010b). For a comprehensive study of groups of friends, see also Whitfield 
(2007).
13 Whitfield (2016), providing a history of the groups of friends following the Cold War.
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food prices, climate change, demographic shifts and water scarcity have 
combined to create new drivers of conflict and a complex terrain for 
international mediators.
These changes in the nature of armed conflict have contributed to fur-
ther shifts in how good offices are employed today. Firstly, the increas-
ing regionalisation of intra-state conflict—by which I mean the role 
of regional states in affecting the trajectory of conflict within a given 
country—has led the UN to rely more heavily on regional partnerships 
and structures to resolve conflict. Examples of innovative partnerships 
include the AU/UN/Humanitarian Dialogue mediation support to Kofi 
Annan in Kenya in 2008; the joint mediation for Madagascar in 2009 
bringing together the AU, SADC, the UN, and the Organisation de la 
Francophonie (Whitfield 2010c); and UN support to AU-led mediations 
in countries like the DRC where a more direct UN role may be counter-
productive (UN 2016d). Another form of partnership with a lower like-
lihood of repetition is the so-called “hybrid” operation, such as the AU/
UN operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
The UN’s regional focus and partnerships have become more insti-
tutional as well, most significantly with the 2002 establishment of the 
UN Office for West Africa (expanded in 2016 to include the Sahel), the 
2007 creation of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy 
for Central Asia, the 2010 establishment of a UN/AU office in Addis 
Ababa, and the 2012 UN Regional Office for Central Africa. With each 
of these offices granted a clear political mandate, good offices have been 
spread more broadly, and linked more closely with regional actors.
Perhaps the most important shift, however, has been the growth 
of large, multidimensional peacekeeping operations between the mid- 
1990s and today. Whereas traditional peacekeeping tended to be con-
fined to monitoring and reporting on ceasefires and troop withdraw-
als across international boundaries, multi-dimensional operations are far 
more intrusive and complex. Sometimes, though not always, deployed 
to support the implementation of a peace agreement, large operations, 
such as those currently deployed in the Central African Republic, the 
DRC, South Sudan, Mali and Darfur, have sprawling mandates covering 
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, security sector reform, 
justice sector reform, extension of state authority, support to institu-
tional development, protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, 
policing, support to humanitarian operations, local conflict resolution, 
technical support to democratic processes, and also a political/good 
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offices function. With mandates that are based in whole or in part on 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the largest of these missions typically 
have thousands of soldiers and police, dozens of field offices in remote 
locations, military aviation and ground assets, and annual budgets of 
over one billion dollars.14 They are often deployed into situations of 
ongoing hostilities, where civilians are actively at risk of further violence, 
and where states are frequently the source of political intransigence and 
insecurity. At the same time, the missions often have extremely ambi-
tious political objectives, such as to facilitate credible elections, help 
to resolve longstanding national-level disputes, support the establish-
ment of accountable institutions, or implement complex regional peace 
agreements with little local buy-in.15
These shifts—proliferation of UN entities with a good offices func-
tion, increasing reliance on regional approaches, and the growth of mul-
ti-dimensional peacekeeping—combine with serious ramifications for the 
good offices of the UN. On the one hand, the UN has far more points 
of contact across the globe than it had forty years ago. With regional 
offices and large missions employing thousands of national staff in often 
conflict-prone areas, the UN is in principle able to keep its finger directly 
on the pulse of societies. And there is evidence that this has made the 
UN better at identifying the early tremors of conflict, if not necessarily 
acting immediately upon them.16 Deepened partnerships and more sus-
tained presence has also improved the UN’s knowledge and relationships 
with key actors involved in preventing and managing armed conflict. 
As the next section will describe, this has resulted in some successes for 
UN good offices in high-risk situations.
But there are strong downsides to these shifts as well, particularly 
in the growth of the multidimensional peacekeeping mission. Heads 
of these missions are not only the chief political actor empowered to 
14 UNMISS’ budget for 2016–2017 is roughly USD 1.1 billion (UN 2016e); UNAMID’s 
is just over USD 1 billion (UN 2016f); and MONUSCO’s is USD 1.2 billion (UN 2016g).
15 See, e.g. Security Council Resolution 2277 (UN 2016a) and 2295 (UN 2016h).
16 See International Crisis Group (2016); see also Zenko and Friedman (2011), arguing 
that there are a huge number of points of contact for gathering information, but criticizing 
the UN for failing to have a comprehensive method of bringing it together.
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employ the good offices of the UN in country,17 they are also managers 
of complex, expensive operations with troops, police, and civilians often 
spread out over huge territories. As a result, heads of large peacekeep-
ing missions tend to be faced with two fairly bad options. Either they 
can immerse themselves in management, diving deep into the budget-
ary, human resources, asset deployment, and structural configuration of 
the mission. This may make for well-managed operations, but it often 
leaves very little bandwidth for engagement with domestic political 
actors. Alternatively, an SRSG can leave the mission management to a 
deputy and focus instead on the political activities required by the man-
date, splitting the mission into essentially a special political office of the 
SRSG and a peacekeeping operation. The first option leaves the politi-
cal mandate unattended; the second tends to bifurcate the mission into 
a political and an operational component. There are of course ways to 
tie these two elements of peacekeeping together, but there are few clear 
success stories in recent history where a large mission was able to achieve 
meaningful political traction. Instead, there is some evidence arising from 
the cases considered below that good offices may be best provided by 
smaller, more agile configurations, embedded in regional structures, 
rather than large peacekeeping operations.
essentiAl elements For success: where modern good 
oFFices work, And don’t
If good offices are successful, violent conflict is averted before it 
 escalates, or active violence is reduced rather than perpetuated. It is 
difficult to measure success in this counterfactual situation: how much 
worse would the violence have been in the absence of an intervention, 
or how good would the election have been without the UN’s engage-
ment? Nonetheless, by comparing a variety of recent cases, it is possi-
ble to identify key elements for successful political engagement, and 
some of the outcomes when these elements are not present. The essen-
tial elements are: (1) an in-depth understanding of the conflict based 
on sustained contact and relationships on the ground; (2) timing of the 
17 By definition, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General are empowered to 
represent him, and thus provide his good offices.
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intervention; (3) leverage over the key conflict actors; and (4) credibility 
of the mediator.18
Knowledge and Relationships
In-depth understanding of the situation, and relationships with the 
conflict actors are critical to any successful political engagement, and 
are often the result of a sustained presence on the ground. During the 
2009–2010 crisis in Guinea following a military coup, the UN’s Special 
Representative, Said Djinnit, conducted 45 missions to the region, meet-
ing with all actors, including the military junta. His ground game and 
clear commitment to engaging with a broad array of stakeholders were 
viewed as crucial for the success of the mediation effort.19 Similarly, the 
UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) SRSG Ibn Chambas was pres-
ent in country ahead of, and frequently during, the electoral crisis that 
gripped the Gambia in 2016,20 and Special Envoy Jamal Benomar was 
lauded for having spent time in different locales in Yemen to better 
understand the players and dynamics during the 2011 crisis (Day and 
Fong 2017). Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo’s success as 
a UN envoy in brokering a ceasefire in eastern DRC in 2008 was in part 
due to his deep experience in the region and broad set of relationships 
(Bright 2011).
Where there are limited relationships, diplomatic efforts are often sty-
mied. The UN’s experience in Darfur is one such example where, from 
2007–2010 the Government’s reluctance to engage on a meaningful 
18 The configuration of elements used here is drawn from Day and Pichler (2017). More 
broadly, the elements are included in a wide range of analysis of UN political engagement. 
See Babbitt (2012), focused on leverage and access as key elements; Chesterman (2017, 
p. 100), describing cases where leverage and legitimacy were key elements; Gowan et al. 
(2010), arguing that elements for success of diplomacy include anticipatory relationships, 
good understanding of elite actors, ability to anticipate political inflection points, and suf-
ficient leverage; Lund (1996), identifying several factors for successful preventive diplo-
macy, including timing, support from major players, multifaceted action, and moderate 
leadership.
19 United Nations (2011, para. 55); UN Department of Political Affairs internal report 
on Guinea intervention, on file with author.
20 UNOWAS (2016); UN Department of Political Affairs internal report on Gambia 
intervention, on file with author.
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political process with the rebel groups resulted in limited access for the 
AU/UN mediation with key state actors.21 The fact that the joint AU/
UN mediation was structurally separate from the peacekeeping operation 
and based almost entirely out of country with infrequent visits to Darfur 
also curtailed the day-to-day knowledge of the situation and the possi-
ble range of relationships. This is a typical shortcoming when the good 
offices function is located out of country: the Geneva-based Syria media-
tion, for example, has suffered since 2011 with a lack of granular knowl-
edge, limited access to key players, and little credibility on the ground.22
The establishment of regional offices like UNOWA and the United 
Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia 
(UNRCCA) has boosted the UN’s ability to maintain strong relation-
ships and deep knowledge of conflict-prone areas.23 The use of well-re-
spected envoys with an established track record in the region has also 
bolstered the UN’s relationships in conflict settings.
Timing
It is particularly helpful for timing if the key parties to the conflict are 
ready for the UN to play a role. There are several examples where this 
has led to relatively successful outcomes, including the request by the 
Government and opposition for UN mediation support in Sierra Leone 
in 2009; the willingness on the part of the Maoists and the Nepalese 
Government for the UN to play a good offices role from 2003 (Einsiedel 
2012); a request by the Malawian Government in 2011 for the UN to 
broker a deal with the opposition; and the willingness of both the DRC 
and Rwanda for the UN to broker a ceasefire with the CNDP— National 
Congress for the Defence of the People, a rebel group active in both 
countries—in 2008 due to the very poor relationship between the coun-
tries at the time.
The ability of the UN to respond quickly when there is an oppor-
tunity to engage diplomatically is essential to the success of its good 
offices (International Crisis Group 2016). Again, regional presence and 
21 Guéhenno (2015), Chapter 8 on UNAMID.
22 Hinnenbusch and Zartman (2016), noting that the UN mediation for Syria suffered 
from a lack of access, consent on the ground, and credibility with key actors.
23 See United Nations (2011), describing the successful interventions based out of the 
UN’s regional offices.
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partnerships have played an increasingly central role in recent years. 
For example, UN/ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African 
States) joint missions to Guinea in 2008 and to Burkina Faso in 2014 
produced a clear and forceful reports on the likely deterioration of the 
situation in the period to follow and positioned the UN to be ready to 
act when the crisis struck.24 Similarly, in responding to the 2010 crisis 
in Kyrgyzstan, the proximity of the UNRCCA facilitated early contacts 
as the situation developed, quick establishment of a new in-country 
office, and the rapid deployment of a senior reconciliation adviser 
(UN 2011, para. 23). Being present in the neighbourhood does not 
guarantee timely response by the UN, but it appears to help.
Leverage
Leverage is the most important of the factors, and perhaps the most 
 elusive given that the UN “often appear[s] unable to do more than 
encourage contacts to behave responsibly” (International Crisis Group 
2016, p. 18). Instead, the UN must rely more upon soft-power 
 techniques, corralling international actors around common messages, 
finding pressure points via bilateral relations, and offering hesitant 
leaders discreet ladders to climb down from conflict (Wallensteen 2015; 
Ramsbotham et al. 2016, pp. 199–212).
However, often even the most well-coordinated messaging can fail 
to gain leverage by itself. In Gambia, SRSG Chambas was working to 
pressure incumbent President Jammeh to accept the results of the 2016 
election, and during a single month Jammeh was made to receive sim-
ilar messages from the King of Morocco, the presidents of Liberia, 
Mauritania, Chad and Nigeria, as well as from the Organization of 
Islamic Conference, the UN, and the AU.25 But even this exception-
ally well-coordinated approach did not appear to change Jammeh’s 
calculations, and it was only when ECOWAS demonstrated its willing-
ness to use force to back up its message that he agreed to step aside 
(Al Jazeera 2017). In terms of preventing major escalation, sometimes 
diplomacy backed by threat of force is necessary (Johnstone 2003).
24 UN Department of Political Affairs internal report on Burkina Faso intervention, on 
file with author.
25 UN DPA internal assessment of Gambia intervention, on file with author.
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Short of use of force, other sticks can generate leverage when 
combined with diplomacy. In Burkina Faso, the threat of sanctions by 
the AU, along with suspension of AU membership and united messaging 
from the Security Council (Reuters 2015), together contributed to the 
leader’s decision to step down and avoid further violence. In contrast, 
the AU’s imposition of sanctions on the military junta in Guinea in 2009 
appeared to have no impact; in fact, the incumbent head of state reportedly 
entrenched his position immediately following the sanctions.26 There 
is no magic formula to gain leverage, but the combination of sustained 
international messaging, combined with something more coercive, has 
shown some success.
Often, a major bilateral actor or combination of actors can dra-
matically increase the leverage over a reluctant principal. In 2015, US 
Secretary of State John Kerry broke protocol and flew to see incum-
bent Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, urging him to respect the 
outcome of the elections (Shapiro 2015). There is anecdotal evidence 
that this may have played a role in Jonathan’s decision to stand down. 
Richard Holbrooke’s famous role in pushing Slobodan Milošević to 
accept the 1995 Dayton Accords is another such example, which also 
demonstrates the importance of threat of force behind diplomatic action 
(Holbrooke 1998). The growth of groups of friends described above 
in fact reflects the efficacy of getting the right constellation of Member 
States around a particular conflict setting, one of whom often possesses 
outsize leverage (Whitfield 2007).
A united Security Council is one of the most authoritative sources of 
leverage and, when it speaks with one voice, there is a far higher chance 
of success. But even a united Council cannot necessarily deliver. Strong, 
well-coordinated messaging on the need for both Presidents Kabila and 
Nkurunziza to step down in DRC and Burundi, respectively, have fallen 
on deaf ears, even in the face of widespread violence. And the Council 
has become increasingly notorious for its paralysis on key conflicts, most 
importantly Syria, but also arguably in its failure to place Myanmar, 
Ukraine, and Zimbabwe meaningfully on its agenda in recent years, 
thwarted by the use of a Permanent Member’s veto. A united Security 
Council is often necessary, but seldom sufficient, to achieving leverage 
(Gowan 2017).
26 UN DPA internal assessment of Gambia intervention (Day and Pichler 2018).
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Finally, it is worth considering the potential leverage provided by 
the presence of large peacekeeping operations, which often deliver sig-
nificant programmatic funds, deploy troops, and engage with a range 
of actors on the ground. While this kind of presence should ostensibly 
generate leverage for the UN, experience has if anything underscored 
the extremely limited political sway of even the biggest peacekeeping 
operation. The 2008 deployment of nearly 20,000 AU/UN troops 
into Darfur had no apparent impact on the Government’s or rebels’ 
positions with respect to the peace negotiations (which are unresolved 
nine years later). Nor did UNMISS’ very large presence in South Sudan 
in 2013 appear to give it much influence over the protagonists of the 
civil war, and the 2016 relapse into open conflict there has shown 
the lack of leverage of the UN in brokering a political solution there. 
Likewise, MONUSCO’s sprawling presence across the DRC and signif-
icant state-building support programs have not positioned the UN as a 
central player in the ongoing negotiations over the electoral process.27  
As the former Chief of the Department of Peacekeeping lamented, large 
missions like those in Darfur and the DRC frequently fail to use their 
presence as a fulcrum for gaining influence in country, due to “a lack of 
understanding of the political nature of peacekeeping, as if the conduct 
of military operations and the military posture could be divorced from 
the politics of the situation” (Guéhenno 2015).
Credibility
There is no formula for achieving credibility in a diplomatic process, 
and frequently it is highly personality-based. In some cases, the respect 
afforded to a seasoned official with a history of success in the region 
bestows credibility on a process. Here, the particular status of Djinnit 
in Guinea, Obasanjo in eastern DRC, and Ibn Chambas in Gambia and 
Nigeria have been cited as critical to the success of the diplomatic effort 
(Hara 2011). But even the most seasoned and respected officials are not 
always capable of delivering if the conditions are not right. Kofi Annan 
was highly successful in Kenya in 2008, but made very little progress 
as the Syria Envoy in 2012. Lakhdar Brahimi brokered major break-
throughs in Afghanistan, but he too was stymied by Syria. What is clear 
27 In fact, the SRSG of MONUSCO has been largely limited to a supportive role to the 
AU-led mediation on the elections crisis.
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is that a lack of credibility will undermine the process, particularly if the 
mediator is seen as an unwanted intervention or too dependent upon 
biased actors. Here again, as described above, embedding mediation pro-
cesses in regional structures like UNOWA and the UNRCCA may have 
had a salubrious effect on the UN’s credibility to address recent conflicts.
too big, mAy FAil: recommendAtions towArd nimble, 
eFFectiVe good oFFices
The nature of violent conflict has radically changed since the inception 
of the UN in 1945, and the UN’s role in preventing and resolving it 
has had to evolve as well. As the UN has become more deeply involved 
in intransigent civil wars, increasingly reliant on a broad range of inter-
national, regional, and local actors, and heavily invested in large peace 
operations, good offices have become only one of several tools available 
to peacemakers. In many ways, the waters of diplomacy have been mud-
died. But, as the HIPPO points out, the political work of the UN is pri-
mus inter pares, and political solutions must be at the heart of modern 
conflict prevention and management.
A crucial step in this regard is to build strategies based on the success-
ful elements of past efforts, looking to deepen knowledge and key rela-
tionships, identify ripe moments when diplomatic intervention will have 
the most impact, and connect all the points of leverage into a coherent 
approach. The cases described above have demonstrated that the vaguely 
defined notion of good offices has allowed for innovative, entrepreneurial 
approaches and some tangible stories of success. The establishment of lean, 
relatively responsive regional offices has especially helped deliver diplomatic 
interventions in a flexible and bespoke fashion, and could be usefully repli-
cated in regions including North Africa and potentially the Middle East.28
At the same time, it appears that the growth of multidimen-
sional peacekeeping has not contributed substantially to politics-first 
approaches. In fact, the heavy administrative burdens and competing 
tasks of large missions may well have had a deleterious effect on SRSGs’ 
capacity to focus on the political work of the mission. With much to lose 
and little demonstrable leverage, large missions appear to tend to become 
28 See Gowan et al. (2010), noting that the UN Secretariat had proposed the establishment 
of additional regional political offices for East Asia and Latin America, which had not been 
approved by Member States.
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practical hostages of the host government, often sacrificing leverage 
and independence when the time comes to press for political outcomes. 
Perhaps ironically, it seems that missions mandated to build state institu-
tions and capacity—such as in the DRC, South Sudan, and Mali—may 
have had the least success in gaining political traction in country. Further 
down the size scale, and considering missions such as those in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Mozambique, East Timor, and El Salvador, there may be 
instances where missions were able to employ their good offices more 
effectively. But there is little evidence that size matters when it comes to 
achieving political solutions in peace operations.
All of this leads to the conclusion that the UN’s good offices appear 
best employed in a flexible, nimble fashion, unencumbered by overly 
ambitious peacekeeping mandates, and able to find leverage points 
outside of the UN, especially via regional players. In an era of paraly-
sis within the Security Council and deepening divisions in many of the 
most fragile regions in the world, independent, entrepreneurial diplo-
mats in the vein of Dag Hammarskjöld are sorely needed to carry out 
the demanding political work of the United Nations. In order to do so, 
protecting the good offices functions as “almost anything” (Whitfield 
2010a) is perhaps more important than ever.
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People-Centred Approaches to Peace:  
At Cross Roads Between Geopolitics, 
Norms, and Practice
Youssef Mahmoud
“we the PeoPles” And the Act oF creAtion1
On the eve of the 2015 world leaders’ summit that would unanimously 
adopt the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, “We the peoples,” 
the emblematic first three words of the UN Charter, were on full dis-
play during an art exhibit at the United Nations. In 1953, the American 
painter, Norman Rockwell, had been so hopeful about the creation 
of the United Nations that he sketched a drawing entitled the United 
Nations after the newly formed organisation (Husain 2015). The sketch 
features in the foreground the representatives of the Governments of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the now-defunct Soviet Union. 
In the background, people of all ages and from different cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds looked over the shoulders of these representatives, 
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with anxious but hopeful eyes. Rockwell never finished this sketch. 
Instead, in 1961, he drew from it to complete his now famous  painting 
“the Golden Rule” (Norman Rockwell Museum 2014), currently on 
permanent display at the UN headquarters, featuring the same figures 
of the people in the background but without the Government repre-
sentatives in the front. A likely interpretation is that, after his original 
drawing eight years earlier, he had decided to de-emphasise governments 
(Reimers 2015): By giving “We the Peoples” centre stage, he wanted to 
convey the message that when people in their immense diversity and col-
lective wisdom stand together in dignity and mutual respect, they can 
achieve the common goals enshrined in the Charter.
No one could have predicted that Rockwell’s decision to remove 
 government representative from the “Golden Rule” rendition of the 
“United Nations” would be a harbinger of the complex and, at times, tense 
state-society relations we are witnessing today in many parts of the world.
Many of the 50 founding states that had signed the Charter in June 
1945 were undemocratic. Yet no one contested their right to speak for the 
people, who were admittedly exhausted from the ravages of World War II. 
Things are different today. While most governments are democratically 
elected, their remit to speak for “we the peoples” is regularly challenged 
(van Tongeren 2005). Aided by the democratisation of information, edu-
cation, and the forces of globalisation, ordinary citizens and networks of 
interconnected people have become aware of the performance of their 
governments and thus do not shy away from vociferously making known 
their views about the quality of the services they expect from these gov-
ernments. As attested by the wave of protest movements that swept over 
parts of Africa, the Middle East and several countries in Latin America, 
citizens are no longer content with the proposition that their right to 
change non-performing governments can only be exercised during election 
periods.
Global challenges such as development deficits, health pandemics, 
drug trafficking, food security, water, climate change, poverty reduction, 
criminal networks, and terrorism are no longer transnational problems 
for governments alone to worry about, echoing the conclusions of the 
Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations 
(UN 2004). This shift was in full display during the UN’s 70th anniver-
sary celebration where foreign policy discourse was not so much about 
augmenting the power of the state as about serving the people (Center 
for Strategic and International Studies 2015).
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“we the PeoPles” in deVeloPment And PeAce And security
People-centred approaches are not a novelty for the UN system. In the 
early nineties, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) struck a bal-
ance between state-centric and people-centred approaches, most notably 
in its Human Development Report (HDR). Now its flagship publica-
tion, the HDR, was first launched in 1990 with the Pakistani economist 
Mahbub ul Haq as a key instigator. The aspiration was to put peo-
ple centre stage in debates on development, which goal was to provide 
people with opportunities and choices (United Nations Development 
Programme 2017). “People are the real wealth of a nation,” Haq wrote 
in the opening lines of the first HDR (United Nations Development 
Programme 1990). “The basic objective of development is to create 
an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative 
lives.” It is no surprise, therefore, that the UNDP’s core mission is to 
empower people and build the resilience of nations.
The unanimous adoption in 2015 by the UN General Assembly of 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change have been hailed as much as state achievements as 
a “peoples’” achievement. The first was touted as a global social con-
tract between the peoples’ world and their states, and the second a trilat-
eral compact, a covenant between states, peoples, and the planet. Both 
constitute a remarkable proclamation of hope at a time when the world 
is torn by much strife and violent conflict. The intense engagement and 
mobilisation of grass root movements throughout the consultation pro-
cess and the relentless pressure they exercised on world leaders account 
for the sense of collective ownership by all stakeholders of these two 
universal agendas (Leiva-Roesch et al. 2014). As the Panel of Eminent 
Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations concluded (UN 
2004, p. 3), “constructively engaging with civil society is a necessity for 
the United Nations, not an option.”
“we the PeoPles” in PeAce And security
In the area of peace and security, integrating people- or communi-
ty-centred approaches to manage conflict has been a slow process met 
with occasional pushback. Despite the pervasive awareness that con-
temporary conflicts are largely occurring within states and tend to 
be driven from below—often by non-state actors and citizens with 
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unanswered grievances—the UN Security Council, designed to prevent 
and arbitrate interstate conflicts, has been struggling to adapt its state- 
centric approaches to these new realities. Its mandate design is still dom-
inated by the assumption that fixing imperfect or weak states, securing 
their juridical legitimacy through elections, and extending their remit 
throughout a particular territory would yield peace dividends for cit-
izens and communities. This dominant paradigm equates state-build-
ing with peacebuilding, impervious to the empirical evidence indicating 
otherwise (Call 2012). This point was not lost on the g7+ Group of 
countries, composed of mostly fragile and conflict affected states, when 
they agreed in 2011 together with their international development part-
ners on the five peacebuilding and state building goals that should guide 
their collective action out of fragility (G7plus 2017). Thus it comes as no 
surprise that the first goal gave primacy to legitimate politics over state 
building. Their firm view was that no state authority is viable without 
inclusive, participatory governance and equitable delivery of basic ser-
vices to the people.
hiPPo And the chAllenges oF PeoPle-centred 
APProAches
It is against this background that the High Level Independent Panel 
on Peace Operations (HIPPO) set out to fulfil the mandate entrusted 
to it by the UN Secretary-Secretary in October 2014 (UN 2014). 
The High-Level Panel (henceforth the Panel) devoted considerable time 
in developing a shared and practical understanding of what was meant by 
people-centred approaches to peace operations before advocating these 
approaches as one of the essential shifts (UN 2015a, pp. viii and 16) that 
had to be embraced in the future in the design and delivery of UN peace 
operations. As a panel, we argued for a “renewed resolve on the part of 
United Nations peace operations personnel to engage with, serve and 
protect the people they have been mandated to assist.” The Panel, not 
unlike the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding 
Architecture and the High Level Advisory Group on the implementation 
of Security Council Resolution 1325, considered sustaining peace (UN 
2015a, p. 34) as the ultimate objective of UN post conflict engagements 
in which inclusive politics and people in their plurality, particularly women 
and youth, played a central role.
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Panel members were keenly aware that reaching out to people and 
engaging with local communities and ordinary citizens are common 
practices in many peace operations, notwithstanding the Council’s half-
hearted acceptance of the concept as outlined above. These field prac-
tices ranged from local perception surveys on mission performance, to 
communication and sensitisation outreach programs through UN radios.
However, the Panel felt that these practices tended to take the form of 
discrete activities, without sufficient strategic focus on their connections 
to self-sustainable peace. Whether stemming from Security Council man-
dates or conceived by field missions, community engagement activities 
appeared as mission-centric (e.g. winning hearts and minds of local pop-
ulations) or as appendices to various state-centric goals that were judged 
to be far more critical to stability, such as sustaining a fragile peace 
agreement, holding elections, or restoring and extending state author-
ity. The latter activity tended to be carried out in a way that emphasised 
control by the centre rather than empowerment of the peripheries and 
their forms of self-government, especially in areas that had escaped gov-
ernment control in the past and where invariably the state suffers from 
a trust deficit. The Panel was also aware that in peacekeeping missions, 
operating in hostile environments where much of the military assets are 
mobilised to prevent or counter asymmetric threats, the space for mean-
ingful community outreach tends to be limited or compromised, at times 
even securitised.
In pointing out the above shortcomings and operational constraints, 
HIPPO members were equally aware that people-centred approaches, 
are not without dilemmas, challenges, or risks, particularly in complex 
conflict environments and notwithstanding normative advances, policy 
prescriptions, good practices, and guidance notes (UN 2015a, p. 66).
The central challenge for a state-centric instrument such as 
 peacekeeping is to what extent it should have its own mechanisms for 
engaging and consulting directly with “we the peoples” without making 
government officials feel that their unique prerogative, as elected represent-
atives to engage with their own people, has been usurped (van Tongeren 
2005) and thus would insist on being involved. The flip-side of this 
dilemma is how to partner with the government in this endeavour with-
out the latter capturing UN devised people-focused processes for narrow 
political gains, including using them to shore up any perceived lack of 
performance legitimacy.
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Another challenge is that it is not easy to identify, outside elite circles, 
civil society representatives who genuinely speak on behalf of local peo-
ple. Therefore, questions of who and when and how to engage become 
central. Reaching out to communities associated with insurgent move-
ments or terrorist groups that UN peace operations are expected to 
keep at arms-length, or even neutralise, could put UN personnel at risk 
(de Coning et al. 2015).
An additional challenge is the lack of capacity for rigorous analysis of 
local realities. This would require among other things a shift from focus-
ing only on the drivers of conflict and fragility to identifying the com-
munities’ endogenous capacities for peace and resilience. These usually 
include local norms, physical structures, traditional governance institu-
tions, and networks through which information is collected and dissem-
inated and mutual assistance is provided (UN 2015a, p. 35). It is these 
informal coping mechanisms that people turn to in times of national or 
local stresses, whether they are man-made or nature-induced (Interpeace 
2016). And it is these very capacities that peace operations need to 
strengthen so as to help lay the foundation for less reversible and, hope-
fully, self-sustaining peace. In the absence of such analyses, missions 
tend to resort to ad-hoc programmatic interventions that are not well 
thought-out or that unwittingly may do more harm than good.
Another factor that has been found to contribute to unintended 
consequences is the tendency of the UN to value thematic expertise 
(DDR, SSR, electoral processes) over local knowledge. This legitimises 
the deployment of people to missions who do not speak any of the local 
languages, nor are fully versed or interested in the custom, norms, and 
behaviours of the host country. They tend to look at complex local prob-
lems through the lens of their expertise with supply-driven solution at 
the ready.
A further challenge that was brought to the attention of Panel mem-
bers is that because of concerns for staff security and safety, particularly 
in hostile environments, there was and still is a tendency to gather infor-
mation on local peace and conflict dynamics from expatriates living in 
fortified compounds (Autesserre 2015). Attempts to address this defi-
cit by relying on information provided by national Community Liaison 
Officers or Assistants in the employment of the mission have sometimes 
backfired or endangered their lives. This is particularly the case when local 
communities that are hostile to the mission or the government start sus-
pecting these local employees (particularly those attached to UN military 
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compounds) of using their privileged access to their communities to spy 
on them. The increasingly explicit emphasis on enhanced human intelli-
gence capabilities as a force multiplier or for security and effective mandate 
implementation has fuelled these suspicions.
hiPPo sPeciFic recommendAtions, un sg’s Follow-on 
rePort, And member stAtes’ reActions
In order to overcome the above dilemmas and challenges, the Panel 
called for a number of shifts in mindset and operational practices and 
made several specific recommendations. The most salient of these are 
discussed below.
For the Panel, countries emerging from conflict “are not blank pages 
and their people are not ‘projects’” (UN 2015a, p. 34). As outlined 
above, these people possess knowledge, expertise, and resilient mech-
anisms that help withstand the stresses of conflict. Therefore, the Panel 
called for a shift from merely consulting with these people in order to 
validate pre-conceived ideas and solutions, to actively engaging with 
them so as to hear their perspectives and monitor and respond to how 
they experience the impact of the peace operation and ensure that the 
mission does no harm (UN 2015a, p. 24). In this connection, the Panel 
stressed the need to allocate the appropriate resources to, on a regular 
basis, conduct “independent surveys of local perceptions of the mission 
and progress towards mission objectives” (UN 2015a, p. 39). They also 
called on missions “to develop strategies for community engagement at 
various stages of the mission cycle—from assessment, analysis, planning, 
implementation, review and evaluation—and make increased and judi-
cious use of national staff in designing and implementing these strategies” 
(UN 2015a, p. 66).
With respect to analysis, the Panel recommends that missions should 
focus inter-alia on identifying the local structures for managing and mit-
igating conflict, resource flows, and revenue or illicit power networks 
(UN 2015a, p. 46). Missions should also engage in differentiated and 
gender sensitive conflict analysis to better understand the specific expe-
rience, rights, needs, perspectives, and roles of women and girls in con-
flict situations (UN 2015a, p. 67). This would in turn “inform strategies 
for their protection and participation,” and enable missions to draw 
on the expertise of local women leaders, and women’s organisations 
(UN 2015a, p. 67).
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With respect to community dynamics in zones of conflict, the Panel 
recommended that peace operations “should maintain the closest pos-
sible interaction with the communities and support national initiatives 
regarding rural and local development. Missions should lend their assis-
tance to the resolution of local conflicts, and support community efforts 
to move toward reconciliation” (UN 2015a, p. 39).
In his follow-up report “The Future of UN Peace Operations” (UN 
2015b), Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon endorsed the strategic shift for 
a people-centred approach to peace operations and highlighted the spe-
cific, practical initiatives the Secretariat was already engaged in to imple-
ment many of the recommendations outlined in the Panel’s report under 
this rubric. These include public opinion surveys undertaken by many 
missions to regularly assess progress and evolving community priorities, 
to recruiting national staff and community liaison officers to help the 
missions foster public support for their mandates (UN 2015b, p. 27), to 
guidance notes on how to understand local perceptions.
In its 2016 substantive session report (UN 2016a), the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (UN 2016a, p. 34) expressed 
its support for more people-centred approaches in peacekeeping, 
“including through local level analysis that draws on more strategic 
engagement with communities and an understanding of local percep-
tions and priorities” (UN 2016a, para. 131). It also noted that “effective 
mission-wide communication strategies can enable peacekeeping opera-
tions to build trust with local communities, manage expectations…and 
improve awareness of the work and contributions of UN personnel in 
complex and challenging environments” (UN 2016a, para. 133).
The Security Council has held several thematic debates on the con-
tents and recommendations of the HIPPO report and the SG follow-on 
report, the most important of which took place on 20 November 2015 
(UN 2015c). The ensuing Presidential Statement (UN 2015d), issued 
five days after intense negotiations among Council members, was rather 
bland and made no reference to people-centred approaches in peace-
keeping. The Resolution (UN 2016b) the Council unanimously adopted 
on 27 April 2016 jointly with the GA on sustaining peace was, how-
ever, hailed a significant conceptual and policy shift on the part of the 
Council (Mahmoud 2016). It argues that sustaining peace be “broadly 
understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a soci-
ety ensuring that the needs of all the segments of the population are 
taken into account.” The joint resolution also emphasises that sustaining 
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peace is “a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by the 
government and all other national stakeholders.” Throughout the reso-
lution, civil society organisations, women’s groups, youth organisations, 
and, where relevant, the private sectors were often mentioned as key stra-
tegic and operational partners in moving the sustaining peace agenda 
forward.
On 10–11 May 2016, the President of the General Assembly convened 
a High Level thematic debate on the synergies between the three peace 
and security global policy reviews mentioned in the first part of this paper 
and issued a Chair summary containing a series of conclusions and obser-
vations. In this summary, it is stated that “the two-day debate made it 
clear that civilians are the main stakeholders of peace operations with the 
most to gain from their successes and the most to lose from their failures. 
Communities should be front and centre in decision-making. Placing 
people at the centre means also that peace operations are accountable to 
the people they are meant to serve” (UN 2016c).
Notwithstanding the above conceptual convergence and policy con-
sensus on the importance for people-centred approaches to peace and 
security and on its constituent elements such as inclusive ownership, the 
Council in its legislative work continues to shy away from using the exact 
“people-oriented” phrase, preferring instead to the generic terms “civil 
society, including women and youth.” Where it appears under various 
guises, it tends to be confined to the preamble part of resolutions rather 
than in the operational one which has more binding power, with the 
exception of gender as a cross-cutting theme. A happy exception is the 
Security Council Resolution 2301 of 26 July 2016 renewing the peace-
keeping operation in the Central African Republic (UN 2016d) in which 
local people’s participation and consultations were welcomed. On the 
contrary, in the one extending the mandate of the peace mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) (UN 2016e), people-centred approaches or variations of 
the phrase are nowhere to be found.
whAt would A PeoPle-centred APProAch look like on 
the ground?
The purpose of the following paragraphs is to articulate, in light of 
what was outlined above, how best HIPPO recommendations and 
the emerging policy consensus on people-centred approaches can be 
best implemented on the ground. In doing so, the author draws on 
100  y. mAhmoud
personal field experience, including a recent visit to the UN mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA), on current best practices by seasoned practitioners, 
guidance notes for community engagement and insights garnered from 
scholarly research conducted by de Coning et al. (2015) and Karlsrud 
(2015) among others. Outlined below are some strategic and pro-
grammatic considerations, as well leadership skills and attitudinal shifts 
which, if heeded, may help achieve this objective, bearing in mind they 
may need adaptation depending on a mission’s political and operational 
environment.
A starting point for creating a propitious environment for people- 
centred approaches in peace operations is to secure the explicit accept-
ance and adherence of national authorities to the strategic importance of 
the policy of inclusive ownership that creates space for all national stake-
holders to contribute to self-sustainable peace. This adherence could 
be a part of the development of a shared understanding of the specific 
mandate authorised by the Security Council for UN engagement in a 
particular country, both at the incipient and renewal stages. Where feasi-
ble, such a broad understanding of the principles of inclusivity and some 
of its practical modalities should be part of any agreement that may be 
drawn between the UN peace mission or the Security Council and the 
government regarding the practical modalities of implementing the mis-
sion’s mandate. This contract would provide a measure of transparency 
in the mission’s activities and avoid any misunderstanding with respect to 
the government’s sense of ownership and legitimacy, however tenuous the 
latter may be. More importantly, it will foster trust and strengthen the 
initial consent given by host country for the deployment of the mission.
Secondly, and as the High-Level Panel recommended, one should 
develop a strategy for community engagement at various stages of the mis-
sion cycle, that is not only guided by the overall strategic objective of sus-
taining peace and the principle of doing no harm but also contains elements 
that address and mitigate some of the dilemmas, challenges, and risks 
 outlined above. To be viable, such a strategy should contain the following:
1.  A participatory context analysis that takes peace, and not conflict, 
as a principal referent that seeks to identify not only the factors that 
drive and sustain communal violence and the related dynamics, but 
also the resilience capacities touched upon earlier that communities 
resort to in times of stress, including local dispute management and 
reconciliation mechanisms and processes. The analysis, if properly 
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designed and conducted, could serve as a barometer for assessing 
the quality of state-society relations in a particular region or com-
munity and thus help guide the implementation of the state-centric 
provisions of the mission mandate in a context-sensitive manner. 
In addition, the analysis should include an assessment of risks that 
community engagement may unwittingly engender. Programmatic 
interventions, however well designed and intentioned, can be cap-
tured by governing elites, create new structures, challenge existing 
power relations and vested interest, and may even reinforce exclu-
sionary practices. Such an assessment should also evaluate, as the 
Panel recommended, the impact on the mission mandate and staff 
security, particularly when local outreach involves engaging with 
communities targeted by aggressors or judged to be sympathisers 
of groups that are deemed spoilers or extremists. In other words, 
inclusivity, noble as it may be, is neither necessarily politically neutral 
nor always peace-friendly and may therefore cause harm to the mis-
sion or the people it is meant to serve.
2.  Programmatic interventions devised on the basis of this analysis, 
including economic recovery and quick impact projects, should 
build on what people know and where they are, and must contain 
a self-sustainability clause at the design stage, to enhance owner-
ship and prevent a dependency syndrome. Integrating these inter-
ventions within the overall UN Country Team-led reconstruction 
and development priorities may help achieve this self-sustainability 
objective, particularly if it is coordinated with other development 
actors. In this connection, people-centric approaches should be a 
UN system-wide endeavour. They should also be compatible with 
and reinforce other mandated mission priorities, such as the res-
toration and extension of state authority and other state-centric 
activities. They should serve as a means for enhancing the outreach 
capacity and legitimacy of the government vis-a-vis its people, 
and ideally contribute to better state-society relations, particu-
larly in marginalised communities (de Coning et al. 2015). The 
MINUSMA stabilisation and recovery program has integrated 
some of the above programmatic considerations and safeguards 
in its design and implementation modalities, despite the high-risk 
security environment in which the mission has been deployed.
3.  A communication strategy both within and outside the mission is 
critical. The strategy should be informed by listening sessions and 
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regular perception surveys of people who are at the receiving end 
of mission activities, as recommended by HIPPO and the UN 
Secretary General.
4.  Another critical component of the strategy is a benchmarking 
component for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of 
community engagement activities and their impact on mission 
effectiveness.
5.  Peace and conflict are gendered, both at the national and the grass 
roots levels. It is therefore imperative that a gender lens be sys-
tematically applied in the design and implementation of the above 
steps.
Thirdly, to implement a people-centred approach, one should estab-
lish, at mission Headquarters and in regional field offices, standing civil 
society advisory groups. These would include religious, academic lead-
ers, women, and youth representatives, judged to be credible voices for 
their respective communities. Such groups, as de Coning and colleagues 
proposed, can provide inputs and/or feedback on the peace and conflict 
analysis outlined above, “contribute to the mission’s self-evaluation of 
its programmes and initiatives … [and] enable [it] to stop and re-direct 
those actions that have harmful effects…” (de Coning et al. 2015, p. 6). 
“Involving the community,” de Coning, Karlsrud, and Troost (Ibid.) 
add, “not only ensures that the mission’s work is relevant to the soci-
ety it serves, but can also help the peace operation to become a learning 
organization…”. The analysis, as outlined above, if conducted properly, 
should help overcome the inclusivity and representativeness challenges 
inherent in the selection of the members of these advisory groups.
The above three prescriptions are not novel and certainly not exhaus-
tive. But if they have a fighting chance of succeeding, they require lead-
ership and attitudinal shifts.
Leadership Shifts
With respect to leadership, senior mission leaders should invest time 
and energy early on in their tenure to encourage the government and 
other national stakeholders to develop a medium to long-term vision of 
what sustaining peace and development would look like for the coun-
try, including some indications on the part to be played by local com-
munities in crafting and achieving that vision. It is not uncommon for 
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post conflict countries to devise such a vision. Liberia’s and East Timor’s 
2020 vision are but two examples. Mission leaders should also be seen as 
engaging meaningfully and on a regular basis with these people-oriented 
processes both at the strategic and programmatic levels. People-centred 
activities must be treated as a UN system-wide priority. These activities 
should not be seen as ancillary, or ad-hoc technical exercises best left to 
less senior staff, usually under pressure to spend post-haste the funds 
allocated to these activities. Senior leaders should hold program man-
ager accountable for the sustainability of the peace dividends they are 
purported to yield, in addition to the immediate goodwill and well-be-
ing effects they may generate. Some senior mission leaders tend to treat 
Security Council mandates as a ceiling and are therefore not inclined to 
engage in initiatives that are not contained in that mandate even when 
realities on the ground dictate otherwise. It is hoped that the emerging 
international consensus around the concepts of sustaining peace, inclu-
sive ownership, and the primacy of politics will encourage these leaders 
to do what is right for the people they are deployed to serve, without 
prejudice to the primary responsibilities of the host government, how-
ever weak it may be.
Attitudinal Shifts
With respect to the attitudinal changes that need to take place, I will 
mention just two. First, there is a pressing need to forego the illusion 
that the UN builds national ownership by simply consulting people on 
the ground. The reality is that such consultations tend to be perfunctory, 
largely dictated by the pressing need to validate situational analyses and 
assessment that have been made in a hurry or seek the acquiescence for 
pre-conceived solutions. Not unlike genuine communication, consulta-
tion is a two-way street. And in order for that to happen, UN staff need 
to suspend the certainty that comes from thematic knowledge and exper-
tise and let go of the comfort that past remedies provide. What the UN 
should do is to start investing in the business of listening—listening with 
the intent to understand, and not with the intent to solve, advise, or jus-
tify. Listening with intent might even help us understand what the UN is 
not good at and come to the inescapable realisation that building peace 
is what the local people do, not what outsiders do. A cursory look at any 
contemporary Security Council resolution should dispel the notion that 
the burden of building peace rests on outsiders’ shoulders. Almost every 
104  y. mAhmoud
single operative paragraph of these resolutions starts with the key word 
“support.” This is plainly the case of the most recent resolution extend-
ing the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (UNSC 2018). 
The critical message is that the primary responsibility for building peace 
rests with national actors.
Second, there is an equally urgent need to forego the prescriptive 
biases of liberal peace (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2014), including the 
notion that the solution to state imperfections or failures is state building 
and institutional building. The common assumption informing the state 
building enterprise where the focus is on technical expertise, and where 
the emphasis is on juridical legitimacy through elections rather than on 
performance legitimacy earned through the equitable provision of basic 
services to “we the peoples,” without exclusion. Extending state author-
ity without some degree of performance legitimacy is hardly the best rec-
ipe for sustaining peace which is a relational goal, and an integral part of 
rebuilding the social contract. It looks at the quality of the relationship 
between the state and the citizen. Context and gender sensitive as well as 
people-centred approaches to peace and development can help promote 
a different understanding of legitimacy and ownership and thus may 
prove more effective for achieving some measure of sustainable peace. In 
other words, we need to strike a balance between top-down, externally 
prescribed peace and popular, locally prescribed peace (Roberts 2010).
conclusion And recommendAtion  
to the security council
The world we live in is clearly no longer ordered by states alone, and 
the monopoly of violence is escaping the grasp of states. As mentioned 
above, many of the new and emerging threats to international peace and 
security such as terrorism, organised crime, and violent extremism tend 
to be driven from below by non-state actors, some with state aspirations. 
These threats, in addition to their tragic humanitarian consequences, 
are perceived to constitute a clear and present danger to states and to 
the state-based multilateral governance system. This partly explains why 
the UN Security Council tends to resort to state-centric approaches, 
often militarised, as default responses to counter these threats. These 
responses, invariably prescribed under Chapter 7, tend to populate the 
mandates of contemporary peacekeeping operations. Many of these man-
dates are guided by the illusory proposition that the best way to repair 
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failing states is to build strong state institutions and extend their remit at 
all cost, without credible checks and balance mechanisms and a reform 
agenda to address the governance and leadership deficits at the origin of 
their failures. I am not suggesting that people-oriented peace approaches 
within a peacekeeping context constitute magic silver bullets. What I am 
advocating is that these approaches, if properly designed and carried out, 
can facilitate the capacity of fragile societies to self-organise (de Coning 
et al. 2015), help repair frayed social contracts and thus make fragile 
peace less reversible, while the country embarks on the long-term pro-
cess of building capable, inclusive, and accountable state institutions.
For reasons outlined in this paper and given the resurgence of 
unhealthy geopolitics within the Council as well as the visceral mistrust 
of the Council by a majority of the rest of UN members, I do not expect 
the Council to have a change of heart and fully embrace a people-centred 
approach to peace operations. What I am encouraging the Council to do 
is to muster the residual political will and request, as a standard practice, 
under Chapter 6, nations that are hosts to a peace operation to develop 
with the support of the UN system on the ground and the Peacebuilding 
Commission, a compact for sustaining peace that would articulate the pri-
mary responsibilities of the host government, the contributions of civil 
society, and the supportive role to be played by international partners on 
the ground. All of which will be assorted with an exit strategy under-
girded by performance benchmarks and timelines to ensure accountabil-
ity and facilitate reporting to the Council upon mandate renewal. This 
will be a strategic framework, not unlike compacts facilitated by the 
Peacebuilding Commission for certain situations, and not unlike the type 
of compact proposed by the Panel (UN 2015a, pp. 38–39). It is through 
this contract, I hasten to add that all the three foundational pillars of UN 
engagement will flow in an integrated manner, as advocated by Security 
Council Resolution 2282 (UN 2016c) on sustaining peace, and that 
people-centred approaches will find a natural and uncontested home.
In the absence of such a framework for mutual accountability, peace 
operations, particularly in environments of asymmetric threats, will find 
themselves pressured to make up for the deficits of imperfect states, 
captured by the political elites, however well-elected they may be, and 
be far more concerned with power and the next elections than gov-
ernance. Some of these governing elites might even use the pretext of 
fighting terrorism and organised violence to escape scrutiny and resist 
the implementation of the requisite reforms for effective governance 
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and sustainable peace. And as a result, and as several ongoing situations 
attest, the Council will find itself caught between the hammer and the 
anvil, damned if it withdraws prematurely and doubly damned if it has 
no other choice but to extend the peace operation ad-infinitum, and 
observing rising costs and mounting risks to “We the peoples.”
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The use and utility of military force have been central, if sometimes 
underlying and unarticulated, themes in discussions about the purposes, 
practices, and, indeed, the very identity of United Nations peacekeep-
ing since its inception. The precise historical and normative context 
within which those discussions have taken place has necessarily evolved 
over time. And yet, as the 2015 report of the High-Level Independent 
Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) makes clear, many of the key ques-
tions raised by the use of force in peacekeeping—be they of a practical or 
conceptual kind—are not fundamentally new (UN 2015). Chief among 
these is an overarching question that also frames and animates the pres-
ent chapter, to wit, what are the limits to the use of force in UN peace-
keeping? In approaching this question, the chapter and the arguments it 
advances have been divided into three closely connected parts.1
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The first of these seeks to locate current preoccupations regarding 
the use of force within a wider historical context. To this end, it briefly 
traces both the thinking and practice around the use of force by UN 
blue helmets from the conceptual foundations laid in the era of “classi-
cal peacekeeping” to the focus on the protection of civilians (POC) and 
“robust peacekeeping” that have come to define the period since the 
Brahimi Panel Report of 2000 (UN 2000). It highlights how changes 
in geopolitical context and normative expectations have shaped and 
broadened the scope and aims of UN peacekeeping in important ways, 
with direct implications for the use of force. It also notes, however, that 
third-party involvement in civil war-like situations—as in South Sudan, 
the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Darfur, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), where more than 80,000 peacekeepers 
are currently deployed—have brought to the fore cross-cutting challenges 
and policy dilemmas of a more fundamental kind when it comes to the 
application of military force by UN peacekeepers.
Developing the argument further, part two dwells on two sets of 
limitations to the effective use of force in UN operations. The first of 
these may be viewed as structural barriers to military effectiveness in UN 
operations, that is, limitations built in, as it were, to the very machinery 
and system for mounting, conducting, and sustaining UN peacekeeping 
operations. While some of the constraints thus imposed can be mitigated 
through reform of practices and procedures, to the extent that they are 
rooted in the intergovernmental and political character of the UN as an 
institution, they can never be fully overcome. This is an oft-neglected 
reality that will continue to place significant constraints on the  effective 
use of force by blue helmets in the future. Indeed, as will be argued 
more fully, with UN missions now routinely deployed in conditions of 
actual or latent civil war, entrusted with POC responsibilities and given 
mandates that allow for the robust use of force, the debilitating impact of 
inbuilt capability constraints on force cohesion and military effectiveness 
has become ever more acute.
Added to these structural, seemingly quasi-organic impediments to 
effectiveness in UN peacekeeping is a second set of limitations. These are 
the political and practical challenges that inevitably present themselves 
to a peacekeeping force deployed as an impartial third party in condi-
tions of on-going or unfinished civil war, that is, in conditions of persis-
tent insecurity and violence fuelled by power struggles among political 
elites for control of territory, populations, and governmental authority. 
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Over time, and indeed wherever the UN has deployed, such  conditions 
have also given rise to distinctive, complex, and frequently mutating 
political economies of conflict, the dynamics of which the UN, with its 
limited analytical capacities both at its headquarters in New York and 
in the field, has struggled to grasp, let alone factor into policy. Any 
assessment of the prospects for the effective use of force by UN peace-
keepers, nearly all of which are now deployed in situations of internal 
conflict, must take these realities into account.
The third and final section of the chapter looks in greater detail at 
the record of “robust peacekeeping” and the kind of lessons that can 
reasonably be drawn from operations since the late 1990s. In brief, it 
argues that the use of force in Sierra Leone (2000), Haiti (2006–2007) 
and the DRC (2003) all suggest that, at the tactical level, a properly 
equipped and properly commanded force can be used with decisive, 
albeit short-term, effect in response to immediate crises or emergen-
cies. The larger strategic lesson from the history of robust peacekeeping 
since 1999, however, is, fundamentally, a far more cautionary one; one 
that highlights the need for the activities of peacekeepers to be much 
more closely aligned than they have become over the past decade and 
half to the search for durable and inclusive political settlements to dis-
putes. As such, it is a conclusion that echoes one of the central messages 
of the HIPPO, and which has also emerged as an early theme of Antonio 
Guterres’ tenure as the ninth Secretary-General of UN.
From the sinAi to the kiVus
In a concise and intellectually compelling effort to distil from the UN’s 
early forays into peacekeeping “certain basic principles and rules” that 
might “provide an adaptable framework for later operations,” the then 
Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, identified the “prohibition 
against any initiative in the use of force” as one of UN peacekeeping’s 
defining characteristics (Hammarskjold 1958). Alongside the principles 
of consent and impartiality, this commitment to minimum use of force 
except in self-defence came to constitute one of the core principles of 
so-called classical peacekeeping, defining its character as a distinctive 
form of third-party intervention involving the deployment of lightly 
equipped troops drawn from different member states and placed under 
UN command. Although the UN’s peacekeeping experience during 
the Cold War was richer and more varied than is often assumed, that 
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experience did not lead to a fundamental questioning or re-examination 
of those principles. Indeed, even some of the most “painful peacekeep-
ing” of the Cold War era—in the Congo in the early 1960s and South 
Lebanon between 1978 and 1982—were seen, in the final analysis, as a 
vindication of their importance (James 1983).
It was only with the changes in political climate spawned by the end 
of the Cold War that more radical ideas began to be floated about the 
future directions of UN operations and the sanctity of the principles on 
which these had traditionally been based. Between 1987 and 1992, the 
liberating impact of improvements in the international political land-
scape was demonstrated in a series of successful UN field operations from 
the Middle East and Asia to Central America and sub-Saharan Africa.2 
Although these operations were all, with one exception, comparatively 
modest in aim and small-scale in scope, they nonetheless contributed to 
a growing, if inchoate, sense that the long-established practices and func-
tions of UN peacekeeping might now be developed in new and far more 
ambitious directions.3 Thus, in An Agenda for Peace, released in June 
1992 when the hopes and normative aspirations of international society 
were still closely aligned with the optimism of the early post-Cold War 
period, the newly appointed Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali 
urged the Security Council to “consider the utilization of peace-enforce-
ment units in clearly defined circumstances” (UN 1992b). More sugges-
tive still, he defined peacekeeping as involving the deployment of a UN 
presence “hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned,” (ibid., 
para. 20, my emphasis) thus hinting that the self-denying ordinance 
 governing the use of force was ripe for re-examination.
Such optimism as could be gleaned from An Agenda for Peace proved, 
however, to be short-lived. Between 1992 and 1995, the horrors of 
Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia—all places where UN 
peacekeepers had been deployed yet conspicuously failed to halt mass 
2 These included the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), active from 
1988 to 1991; the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) 
between 1988 and 1990; the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) from 1988 to 
1991; the United Nations Observer Group (ONUCA) established in 1989 and successfully 
terminated in 1992; as well as the larger, more complex and, ultimately, successful, UN 
Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) between 1989 and March 1990.
3 For a revealing sense of the climate of optimism at the time, see the various presenta-
tions made by member states at the Security Council summit, the first of its kind, held in 
late January 1992 (UN 1992a).
6 WHAT ARE THE LIMITS TO THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACEKEEPING?  117
atrocities—ushered in a profound crisis of UN peacekeeping. Taking 
stock in early 1995, Boutros Ghali issued a Supplement to An Agenda 
for Peace; a document markedly different in tone from the optimism of 
three years earlier and, more significantly, gloomy in its conclusions 
regarding the prospects for the use of force in peacekeeping operations. 
In essence, Boutros-Ghali called for a return to “basic principles,” argu-
ing that “peacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) 
had to be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a 
continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other” (UN 1995, 
para. 36). Both more rigorous and cogent in its analysis of the real-world 
challenges of post-Cold War peacekeeping than its precursor document, 
the Supplement rightly emphasised the limits of UN-led operations in 
civil war-like situations, especially so when member states were only pre-
pared, as they had repeatedly demonstrated over the previous three years, 
to will the ends and not the means. Even so, the Secretary-General’s 
intervention in early 1995 did not settle the discussion about the use 
of force by UN peacekeepers. The nature and the scale of UN’s peace-
keeping failures between 1992 and 1995 meant that, at one level, there 
simply could be no “return to basics.” This would become even clearer 
some six months after the release of the Supplement, when the UN “safe 
area” of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia was overrun by Bosnian Serb forces. 
The bloody and horrific aftermath of Srebrenica’s capture, just one year 
on from the genocide in Rwanda, inevitably and quite understandably 
influenced the subsequent evolution of UN peacekeeping and the discus-
sion about its purposes.4 As the spate of new operations since 1999 has 
shown, the apparent determination to ensure that the horrors of Rwanda 
and former Yugoslavia would never again be repeated on the UN’s watch 
has emphatically not resolved the deeper tension between ends and 
means highlighted by the Supplement, tensions which, if anything, have 
become more acute. What it plainly has done, however, is to influence 
the mandate and change the operational focus of UN peacekeepers, with 
important implications for the question of the use of force.
The single most important manifestation of this change is the grow-
ing centrality of the “Protection of Civilians” (POC) as a task formally 
4 Contributing powerfully to this, were two detailed and damning inquires into UN’s 
role in Rwanda and Srebrenica, both of them published in 1999. See “The Fall of 
Srebrenica” (UN 1999a) and “Report of the Independent Inquiry in UN actions During 
the Rwanda Genocide” (UN 1999b).
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entrusted to UN peacekeepers. The Security Council first expressed 
“its willingness to consider how peacekeeping mandates might better 
address the negative impact of armed conflict on civilians” in September 
1999 (UN 1999c, para. 11). Since then, POC has become the subject of 
regular debates by the Council and, more significantly, beginning with 
the establishment of the UN operation in Sierra Leone in October 1999, 
missions have routinely and expressly been mandated under Chapter VII 
of the Charter “to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat 
of physical violence” (UN 1999d, para. 14). The growing focus on civil-
ian protection is also a key factor behind the calls for more muscular, or 
robust, peacekeeping that have become such a notable feature of contem-
porary UN peacekeeping practice and discourse (UN 2009). Since 1999 
the Council has given peacekeepers authority under Chapter VII of the 
Charter to “use all necessary means,” or “take the necessary action,” to 
accomplish their mission. In a number of individual operations, notably in 
Sierra Leone, Haiti, and the Congo, that authority has in turn provided 
the basis for taking the initiative in the use of force. The trend culminated 
in March 2013 when the Council decided that the UN’s troubled Congo 
mission should be strengthened with the creation of a Force Intervention 
Brigade (FIB)—a “milestone” in the evolution of UN peacekeep-
ing, according to the Secretary General at the time (UN 2014)—whose 
mandate would be “to carry out targeted offensive operations … in a 
robust, highly mobile and versatile manner” (UN 2013, para. 12b).
When the Secretary-General authorised his review of peace opera-
tions in 2014, five of the UN’s largest missions—in Darfur, the DRC, 
the CAR, Mali, and South Sudan—were all operating under Chapter 
VII, and all were centrally focused on the protection of civilians. The 
distinctly uneven record of civilian protection in these operations, along 
with the absence of political progress towards lasting stability in each 
case, provided the immediate backdrop to the HIPPO and to the con-
tinuing discussions about the precise role of force, its limitations, and 
 possibilities in UN peacekeeping.
limitAtions to the use oF Force by un PeAcekeePers
Structural Barriers to Military Effectiveness
In a written submission to the HIPPO in March 2015, some twenty for-
mer UN Force Commanders offered a series of detailed recommendations 
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whose implementation would, in their view, help ensure “success in future 
peace operations.” Penned by Robert Mood, a respected officer with 
extensive UN experience, the letter stressed the need for “strengthened 
command and control, improved preparedness and mission design, use 
of modern technology, enhanced capabilities, improved mission informa-
tion, and strengthened logistics and support” (Mood 2015). Designed to 
address long-standing capacity gaps and impediments to operational effec-
tiveness, the proposals ranged widely. Unsurprisingly, given the breath of 
experiences shared by the signatories to the letter, the recommendations 
also made good operational sense.
To any long-time observer of UN field operations, however, very few 
of the deficiencies that the letter sought to address were fundamentally 
new. The haphazard and unreliable provision of key capacities and force 
enablers, notably in logistics, intelligence, engineering, aviation support, 
and reserves; the persistence of complex and cumbersome regulations 
governing finance, procurement, and human resources; the challenges of 
force generation and speed of deployment; and the “dysfunctional” nature 
of relations between the UN in New York and field headquarters, have all 
long plagued UN peacekeeping.5 They have also proved remarkably resist-
ant, if not entirely impervious, to substantive reform. The UN’s system 
of human resources management—a distinctly unglamorous but nonethe-
less critically important area if one is genuinely concerned about improv-
ing the effectiveness of UN field operations—illustrates the nature of the 
problem.
The system was originally set up to cater for a largely static and head-
quarters-oriented organisation, employing career civil servants primarily 
engaged in providing administrative support for conferences and meet-
ings among member states. In short, it was emphatically not designed 
for an organisation where, at present, more than 50 percent of secre-
tariat staff is deployed on operations, many of which require a diverse 
and complex mix of technical expertise. And yet, the original model 
and the rules and regulations that go with it, have “never been funda-
mentally overhauled” (Chandran and von Einsiedel 2016, p. 3). In the 
words of Chandran and von Einsiedel, seasoned observers of the UN 
5 With regard to challenge of rapid deployment the HIPPO notes in passing that “since a 
UN standing capacity was first proposed, by the Secretary-General in 1948, no significant 
progress has been made” (UN 2015, para. 188). For an instructive illustration of the persis-
tence of similar kinds of weaknesses and challenges in UN operations, see Goulding (1997).
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scene, “it has proven impossible, again and again, to design a recruit-
ment system that can both satisfy the process requirements for UN 
headquarters recruitment, while also supporting large, fast-moving field 
operations.”6 The failure to address these challenges, then, is not new, 
nor is there a shortage of ideas about how best to tackle them. The prob-
lem lies elsewhere: the bureaucratic and, above all, political obstacles to 
meaningful reform have simply proved too powerful. Indeed, according 
to the HIPPO, “in operating environments that demand more tailored 
and flexible UN peace operations it appears that human resources poli-
cies may be moving in the opposite direction” (UN 2015, para. 296).
None of this is to suggest that practical efforts to improve the machin-
ery and the effective functioning of UN peacekeeping should be aban-
doned, nor is it to suggest that previous reform initiatives have all come 
to naught. Following the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel in 
2000, for example, the Secretariat was given greater authority to spend 
money early in the planning stages of a mission, and important steps 
were taken to pre-position strategic stocks to ensure more rapid deploy-
ment of peacekeepers to the field (Durch et al. 2003). Both were gen-
uinely valuable steps aimed at improving the day-to-day running and 
conduct of operations. Even so, there remains a natural limit—insuffi-
ciently recognised in much of literature on UN reform, including that 
generated by the Secretariat itself7—to which the weaknesses and defi-
ciencies that have historically characterised UN field operations can ever 
be more than partially mitigated, let alone overcome. The reason for this 
lies, as noted above, with the intergovernmental and intensely political 
nature of the organisation, which will always limit the degree to which a 
UN Force can work as a truly integrated, cohesive, and effective military 
force. The implications for the conduct of operations are best illustrated 
by the perennial challenge of command and control in UN operations.
In their submission to the HIPPO, the former Force Commanders 
stressed the importance of “One mandate – one mission – one concept,” 
7 See, for example, “Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilian 
mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations,” UN Office of Internal Oversight 
(UNOIO 2014). While this report usefully collates and catalogues poor and inconsistent 
implementation of mandates by various missions, it proposes solutions that underplay, if 
not entirely disregard, the political character of peacekeeping and political sources of TCCs 
behaviour.
6 Ibid.
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noting that the key to mandate implementation lay in “unity of com-
mand under the authority of the SRSG/Head of Mission” (Mood 
2015). This insistence on a single chain of command and on maintaining 
the international character of any UN Force, is not new; indeed, it has 
been presented as a sine qua non of effective UN peacekeeping since its 
beginning in the 1950s. And yet, it has always come up against the real-
ity of conflicting national priorities, risk-aversion among troop-contrib-
uting countries (TCCs), and uncertain loyalty from contingents, factors 
that have translated into the adoption, spoken or unspoken, of national 
caveats and a penchant for interfering in the UN chain of command. 
This has been the case especially when the perceived risks to peacekeep-
ers have been high, and when questions regarding the use of force have 
been involved. Even so, as long as the peacekeeping environment has 
proved generally benign, and support from a united Security Council has 
been in place, UN missions have historically been able to function (with 
greater of lesser degree of effectiveness) notwithstanding continuing 
capacity gaps and weaknesses in command and control. Managing such 
inherent tensions has been a major role of Force Commanders and heads 
of mission. Indeed, their ability—through improvisation, ingenuity, and 
flexibility in mandate interpretation—to surmount and work around 
challenges thrown up by limited resources and a less than optimal system 
of administrative, managerial, and political support, is among the most 
important (and under-appreciated) qualities of mission leadership in UN 
operations.8
Developments over the past decade and a half, however, have placed 
altogether new strains on UN peacekeeping, posing challenges not 
only for mission leadership but to the very viability of missions them-
selves. A cursory survey of the five largest UN missions underway in 
early 2017—accounting for more than 80,000 out of a total of some 
115,000 peacekeepers deployed on 16 missions worldwide—shows that 
operating environments are now, as a general rule, anything but stable 
and benign.9 Instead, they typically include a combination or all of the 
8 For an example of how mission leadership helped shepherd an operation through to 
success in spite of the UN machinery designed to assist the mission, see Berdal (2015, pp. 
416–429).
9 These are the missions to South Sudan (UNMISS), Darfur (UNAMID), Mali 
(MINUSMA), CAR (MINUSCA) and the DRC (MONUSCO), see United Nations 
(2017). “Peacekeeping operations fact sheet.” Accessed 9 November 2017. https://peace-
keeping.un.org/en/peacekeeping-fact-sheet-oct-2017.
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following characteristics: the absence of clear front lines; vast geograph-
ical distances amidst war-ravaged, even non-existent, infrastructure; 
the presence of large numbers of internally displaced; numerous armed 
groups, often poorly controlled and prone to preying on civilians; and 
persistent insecurity and on-going violence fuelled by both predatory 
political economies and power struggles among political elites. Now, the 
deployment of peacekeepers with a mandate to protect civilians and the 
authority to engage in robust peacekeeping in these conditions, have had 
two, partly conflicting, consequences.
First, these conditions have plainly heightened the operational impor-
tance of ensuring that UN missions actually do function as cohesive and 
integrated formations, properly resourced and with the most critical weak-
nesses—in the areas of tactical mobility, logistics support, and intelligence 
capacity—addressed. Of these weaknesses, arguably the most urgent 
requirement, given the non-permissive and volatile nature of contem-
porary peacekeeping environments, has proved to be the need for more 
systematic intelligence collection, assessment, and conflict analysis capac-
ities by UN missions, the lack of which in zones of conflict has critically 
undermined attempts to grapple with underlying political economies of 
conflict and the way in which these often drive violence and encourage 
predation against civilian populations.10 As noted above, however, plug-
ging such capacity gaps has proved difficult to achieve even in the best of 
circumstances. The result when it comes to POC, as the Brahimi Panel 
Report perceptively foresaw back in 2000, has been to create a very “large 
mismatch between desired objective and resources available to meet it,” 
as well as to guarantee “continuing disappointment with United Nations 
follow through in this area [of civilian protection]” (UN 2000, para. 63).
Second, these very conditions have also heightened differences among 
TCCs about how mandates should be interpreted and, specifically, over 
attitudes to the use of force. This, again, has further undermined efforts 
to achieve Force cohesion and unity of purpose, in many cases pushing 
the mission beyond the “outer limits for UN peacekeeping [as] defined 
by their composition, character and inherent capability limitations” 
(UN 2015, p. x). Significantly, TCCs that now provide the bulk of 
10 For this, see Kristof Titeca and Daniel Fahey’s (2016) study of MONUSCO’s failure 
to comprehend the character and dynamics driving the actions of the rebel group known as 
the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the DRC between 2014 and 2016. For the conse-
quences of relying on flawed intelligence, see also Fahey (2016, pp. 91–100).
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peacekeepers, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, as well as many contribu-
tors from Latin America, remain deeply sceptical of the trend in favour of 
more robust use of force by UN peacekeepers (Modi 2015).
Limitations to the Third-Party Use of Force in Conditions  
of Civil War and Internal Conflict
The second set of limitations to the use of force connects still more 
directly to the context of internal conflict. A UN peacekeeping force that 
is deployed within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state where the host 
government is faced with internal challenges to its authority will, over 
time, find it increasingly difficult to remain above the domestic political 
fray, however much it may formally aspire to do so. Alan James, writing 
about the UN’s involvement in Congo in the early 1960s, pinpointed 
the elemental reason for this: “On an internal scene a government is but 
one of the actors; in one degree or another the political balance is likely 
to be in constant movement; and the way in which a UN force responds 
may well have some impact on the balance, or – which in effect comes to 
the same thing – be seen as shifting the balance” (James 1994, p. 46). 
For UN peacekeepers to take the initiative in the use of force—especially, 
but not merely, when force is used in support of the host government—
cannot but have an impact on that political balance, and will also affect 
the military and political calculations of other conflict actors. As such, 
it runs the risk of undermining the UN’s chief asset as an interlocutor 
in internal conflicts and the search for political solutions: its perceived 
impartiality in relation to major disputants. In the words of Jean Marie 
Guéhenno, reflecting on the UN’s post-Cold War experience in Congo:
…if the UN becomes the auxiliary of a government whose legitimacy and 
representativeness is still questioned, it may lose not only its military but its 
political legitimacy, putting at risk what is potentially it most valuable con-
tribution: the capacity to foster compromise among various groups as the 
indispensable base of lasting peace. (Guéhenno 2015, p. 147)
The UN’s Congo experience highlights another inescapable risk associ-
ated with the enforced and prolonged proximity of UN missions to host 
governments in situations of on-going internal conflict. In all such cases, 
even if consent for the UN’s presence remains formally in place, rela-
tions between missions and host governments have tended to deteriorate 
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as host governments—often weak and beset by internal challenges, sus-
picious of outside meddling and protective of their sovereign rights—
become ever more resentful of obstacles to their unfettered control over 
internal affairs. When, as is now overwhelmingly the case, the mandates 
given to UN missions are themselves politically intrusive and include 
potentially conflicting objectives, tensions have only been further height-
ened, with the result that both the credibility and leverage of UN mis-
sions have dwindled over time. Perhaps nowhere has this dynamic been 
more evident than in the DRC and South Sudan where the UN has been 
charged with protecting civilians as well as with monitoring government 
observance with human rights obligations and supporting security sector 
reform, and yet where, in both cases, government security forces have 
proved to be major sources of violence against civilians. Indeed, accord-
ing to the UN’s own reporting “the Congolese state was responsible 
for roughly 65% of the human rights violations [in 2016], and in many 
parts of the country the army is seen by local communities as the most 
dangerous armed group” (Day 2017, p. 2). Reviewing the period before 
the eruption of full-scale civil war in South Sudan in December 2013, 
an assessment of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) concluded 
that “intractable problems, near-impossible dilemmas and difficult trade-
offs will be a constant, especially given its decision to take on multiple, at 
times, conflicting roles” (Hemmer 2013, p. 8; da Costa and de Coning 
2015). It is a finding equally applicable to other operations where the 
UN is deployed in intrastate settings in the absence of a viable political 
process.
lessons in robustness: the use oF Force  
From hAiti to the drc
Mindful of these structural and political limitations to the use force by 
UN peacekeepers, what lessons for future operations should one draw 
from the experience of robust peacekeeping over the past decade and 
a half? The answer to that question needs to start with the recogni-
tion, or reaffirmation, of the importance of upholding the basic, albeit 
broad, distinction between what is essentially a peacekeeping operation 
and one that is premised on the logic of war-fighting and enforcement. 
It is equally important, however, to be clear about what exactly this 
means in practise, and what implications flow from it. The meaning of 
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“essentially” in this context has little to do with whether or not a mis-
sion has been formally authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; 
by now, almost all are as a matter of routine. The key to the distinction 
lies in whether or not achieving mission objectives—including the larger 
and key strategic objective of reaching a political settlement to end vio-
lence—is fundamentally dependent, in the final analysis, on building 
consent and support for the activities of peacekeepers among the par-
ties. The history of peacekeeping since 1999 shows just how fragmentary 
and incomplete such consent can be, nowhere more so than when peace-
keepers operate in conditions of civil war. Combining activities that rely 
on consent, cooperation, and access with offensive military operations, 
all within the same mission, have historically proved highly destabilising, 
politically as well as in humanitarian terms. For all its finely balanced and 
properly justified criticism of UN actions in Bosnia, that conclusion was 
also at the heart of the Srebrenica Report issued in 1999: “peacekeeping 
and war fighting are distinct activities and should not be mixed” (UN 
1999a, 107). An inescapable corollary of this is that there will also be 
circumstances when the instrument of peacekeeping is not appropriate. 
The history of UN operations over the past decade and a half does not 
fundamentally alter these lessons.
Now, while the qualitative distinction between peacekeeping and 
enforcement must be reaffirmed, it does not follow from the above that 
the UN can or should only operate in environments where distinctions 
are clear-cut and simple, or that the use of force cannot, at the margins 
and in the right circumstances, be used with, potentially, decisive effect. 
There are instances since 1999 when properly equipped and properly 
commanded forces have scored tactical victories in response to immedi-
ate crises and emergencies: preventing the collapse of the UN mission 
Sierra Leone in 2000; dismantling the gang-structures Haiti in 2006–
2007; securing Bunia in eastern DRC in 2003 and in defeating Laurent 
Gbabgo’s violent challenge to the outcome of elections in Cote d’Ivoire 
in 2011. In evaluating these tactical successes, however, it is vital not to 
lose sight of the wider, and more critical, lessons offered by each case.
For one, all of these involved well-equipped, competently led and 
highly capable forces (drawn from the UK in the case of Sierra Leone, 
Brazil in the case of Haiti and France in the case of Bunia and Cote 
d’Ivoire), precisely what UN missions have tended to lack. Moreover, 
the military challenge faced in each case, though real enough, was 
mounted by marginal and, ultimately, militarily unimpressive actors. Still 
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more important than these qualifications, however, is the fact that the 
long-term strategic outcome of these and similar actions depends criti-
cally on whether or not the use of force has been properly calibrated to 
support an overall strategy aimed at reducing violence, mitigating con-
flict, and fostering a political solution to the conflict at hand. Whether 
the actions of UN peacekeepers, including the use of military force, 
serve to advance these kinds of strategic objectives is, ultimately, the 
true measure of their effectiveness. And yet, with the partial exception of 
Sierra Leone, the all-important link between military action and political 
purpose has been weak to non-existent in UN operations since 1999.
In Sierra Leone, the UK military intervention in 2000 was able 
to check, at a critical moment, advances by the RUF and other armed 
groups in the country. Crucially, however, this short, sharp, and limited 
action was followed by concerted diplomatic moves aimed at shoring up 
the post-war political dispensation in the country; moves that included 
a sustained effort to galvanise others to contribute to a beefed up and 
reconfigured UN mission, as well as a serious and long-term commit-
ment to reforming and professionalising the country’s armed forces 
(Riley 2006, 2). As one detailed study of the use of force by British 
forces in Sierra Leone makes clear, even though the “use of force was 
critical in creating an opportunity for political progress, it was not in 
itself decisive or even that strategically significant”—long-term success 
was contingent on political follow-up at the UN and regionally, under-
pinned by a plausibly effective programme of security sector reform 
(Ucko 2016).
In Haiti, by contrast, “tactical success through the use of force led 
to only limited strategic payoffs in the larger state consolidation mission, 
with MINUSTAH struggling to integrate the use of force into a larger 
project for Haitian political and economic transformation.”11 A simi-
lar picture emerges from the various applications of robust force in the 
DRC, including Operation Artemis in 2003 and the Ituri campaign of 
2005.12 The record of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade since 
2013—the most ambitious attempt to conduct offensive operations 
11 Cockayne (2014, p. 738). Echoing these conclusions, see also Guéhenno (2015, pp. 
261–262).
12 Discussed more fully in Berdal (2016, pp. 11–17).
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within a peacekeeping setting—has proved even more troubling, with 
mounting evidence in 2016 that the force through its actions has, if 
anything, contributed to a worsening of the security situation in east-
ern DRC.13 In the words of one Senior Political Advisor working for in 
MONUSCO throughout 2016: “Not only has it failed to degrade the 
militias it was tasked to fight, but the FIB has potentially increased risks 
to civilians and diverted resources away from activities that might well 
serve them better.”14
Taken together, what all of these cases do is to underline a basic les-
son from the UN’s experience of “robust peacekeeping”: UN peacekeep-
ing missions are structurally ill-equipped and politically ill-suited to use 
force effectively in support of strategic objectives, and when they have 
attempted to do so in a political vacuum without proper resources, the 
medium to long-term consequence of their actions have been, more often 
than not, to destabilise the operating environment and complicate the 
search for political solutions.15 Even so, it is worth stressing again that 
none of this is to rule out the use of force by peacekeepers in all circum-
stances. The operations discussed here have all shown that in fluid and 
complex internal settings with multiple conflict actors, it will sometimes 
be possible and, indeed, necessary to differentiate between major dis-
putants, loosely defined as political and militarily significant actors, and 
more marginal spoilers, distinguished by their predatory agendas and, 
crucially, their lack of local legitimacy. Decisive military action against the 
latter may have a stabilising effect in the short term. Any lasting effect or 
achievement resulting from the use of force, however, will always, in the 
final analysis, depend on whether or not military action is “framed as an 
enabling component of a political strategy” (Doss 2014, p. 730).
14 Day (2017, p. 2). This article provides an excellent assessment of the FIB’s failure in 
the DRC.
15 Although beyond the scope of the present chapter, it is worth noting that the 
war-fighting role given to the FIB in the DRC has also raised legal issues relating to the 
use of force that ought properly to be considered in any wider discussion of challenges and 
limitations to the use of force in UN peacekeeping. For an excellent discussion see Sheeran 
and Case (2014).
13 Congo Research Group (2017). Since late 2016, there have been frequent clashes 
between the Congolese Army and the M-23, the Rwanda-backed rebel group which the 
FIB was initially credited with having successfully having defeated back in 2013.
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concluding thoughts: re-estAblishing the link between 
militAry Force And PoliticAl PurPose
When Jean-Marie Guéhenno, then head of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), visited the DRC in March 2006 to 
take stock of the challenges facing MONUC on the eve of the first elec-
tions in the country for 41 years, he used the occasion also to assess the 
impact of “the robust and unprecedented manner” in which UN mili-
tary forces, operating alongside and in support of the Congolese army 
(FARDC), had sought out and engaged armed groups over the previous 
year. The results, he found, were decidedly mixed, with the “negative 
consequences” of UN military operations—including reprisals against 
civilians by armed groups targeted by the UN, new “waves” of internally 
displaced and uncontrolled looting, pillaging and abuses committed by 
the elements of MONUC’s ally, the Congolese army—all suggesting the 
need to shift away from aggressive pursuit and “to start taking a longer-
view.” As he perceptively reported back to New York, “the reality is that 
foreign armed groups will need to be dealt with in the longer-term, in 
tandem with an economic and political strategy, and in a way that does 
not threaten civilian populations” (UN 2006). More than a decade on 
from Guéhenno’s visit, with the DRC still faced with political stasis, vio-
lence and humanitarian crisis, his recommendations remain, sadly, just as 
appropriate as they were back in 2006 (Gowan 2016). They also point to 
wider lessons for UN peacekeeping that transcend the particular circum-
stances of the DRC.
In the end, perhaps the single most important implication to flow 
from the analysis above is that UN peacekeeping in and of itself—and 
most certainly robust peacekeeping of the kind attempted over the past 
decade and a half—can only ever play a very limited part in helping to 
address the deeper sources of violent conflict in fragile and conflict-rid-
den states. UN peacekeepers can undertake a range of ancillary tasks 
aimed at strengthening and helping in the search for lasting political set-
tlement to conflicts. That range is now longer and more complex than 
it was in the era of “classical” peacekeeping and includes security sec-
tor reform, support for humanitarian relief operations, complex mon-
itoring, and confidence-building tasks. When conditions require and 
resources permit—as operations in Sierra Leone, Haiti and even at times 
the DRC have shown—UN forces may also be in a position to respond 
locally to obstructionist violence or immediate emergencies and defeat 
6 WHAT ARE THE LIMITS TO THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACEKEEPING?  129
“marginal actors” (Guéhenno 2015, p. 262). These are all important 
tasks and the scope for improving the quality of delivery in each is cer-
tainly there, especially in the vital area of security sector reform, which, 
too often, has been under-funded, overly technocratic in approach and 
ignorant of the political economies of conflict on the ground. But they 
are ancillary tasks in the sense that their lasting contribution to address-
ing conflict depends not only on how effectively they are delivered in a 
technical sense but, crucially, on whether they are aligned to and help 
advance the overriding objective of arriving at political agreements to 
end violence. A key and concluding implication to flow from this is that 
UN mission leaderships in the field, aided by the secretariat and backed 
by the Security Council, must—through improved political engagement, 
effective use of good offices, and enhanced analytical capacities—priori-
tise the search for political avenues and opportunities that promise ways 
out of conflict and protracted violence.
reFerences
Berdal, Mats. 2015. The UN Operation in Mozambique, 1992–1994. In The 
Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops, Norrie 
Macqueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul Williams. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Berdal, Mats. 2016. The State of UN Peacekeeping—Lessons from Congo. 
Journal of Strategic Studies 39 (2016): 1–30.
Chandran, Rahul, and Sebastian von Einsiedel. 2016. New Ideas for a New 
Secretary-General: Fixing the UN’s Human Resources System, November 2. 
Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research.
Cockayne, James. 2014. The Futility of Force? Strategic Lessons from Dealing 
with Unconventional Armed Groups from the UN’s War on Haiti’s Gangs. 
Journal of Strategic Studies 37 (5): 736–769.
Congo Research Group. 2017. As Violence Escalates Across the Congo, Who 
Is to Blame? Congo Research Group, March 2. http://congoresearchgroup.
org/6209/. Accessed 9 Nov 2017.
da Costa, Diana Felix, and Cedric de Coning. 2015. UNMISS. In The Oxford 
Handbook on UN Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, 
Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Day, Adam. 2017. The Best Defence is No Offense: Why Cuts to the UN 
Troops in Congo Could Be a Good Thing. Small Wars Journal, April 8. 
http://smallwarsjournal/rpint/66367. Accessed 9 Nov 2017.
130  m. berdAl
Doss, Alan. 2014. In the Footsteps of Dr. Bunche: The Congo, UN Peacekeeping 
and the Use of Force. Journal of Strategic Studies 37 (5): 703–735.
Durch, William, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan. 
2003. The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations. 
Washington, DC: The Henry Stimson Center.
Fahey, Daniel. 2016. Congo’s ‘Mr.X’: The Man Who Fooled the UN. World 
Policy Journal 23 (2): 91–100.
Goulding, Marrack. 1997. Practical Measures to Enhance the UN Effectiveness 
in the Field of Peace and Security: A report submitted to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, June 30.
Gowan, Richard. 2016. The UN Is Caught in a Trap as Kabila Angles for Third 
Term in DRC. World Politics Review, May 2. https://www.worldpoliticsre-
view.com/articles/18650/the-u-n-is-caught-in-a-trap-as-kabila-angles-for-
third-term-in-drc. Accessed 4 Dec 2017.
Guéhenno, Jean-Marie. 2015. The Fog of Peace—A Memoir of International 
Peacekeeping in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press.
Hammarskjold, Dag. 1958. Report of the Secretary-General: Summary Study of 
the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force. New 
York: United Nations.
Hemmer, Jort. 2013. The UN Mission in South Sudan and Its Civilian 
Protection Strategy: An Early Assessment. CRU Policy Brief, No. 25, January, 
Clingendael Institute, The Hague.
James, Alan. 1983. Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon, 
1978–1982. International Journal 38 (4): 613–634.
James, Alan. 1994. The Congo Controversies. International Peacekeeping 1 (1): 
44–58.
Modi, Narendra. 2015. PM Narendra Modi’s Statement at the UN Peacekeeping 
Summit, September 29. http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/state-
ment-by-prime-minister-narendra-modi-at-the-un-summit-on-peace-opera-
tions/article7699430.ece. Accessed 9 Nov 2017.
Mood, Robert. 2015. Force Commanders’ Advice to the High-Level Independent 
Panel on UN Peace Operations. Washington, DC: United Nations.
Riley, Jonathon. 2006. The UK in Sierra Leone: A Post-conflict Operation 
Success? Heritage Foundation Lecture 958, June 15.
Sheeran, Scott, and Stephanie Case. 2014. The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues 
for the UN in the DRC. New York: International Peace Institute.
Titeca, Kristof, and Daniel Fahey. 2016. The Many Faces of a Rebel Group: The 
Allied Democratic Forces in the DRC. International Affairs 92 (5): 1201–1205.
Ucko, David H. 2016. Can Limited Interventions Work? Lessons from the 
British Success-Story in Sierra Leone. Journal of Strategic Studies 39 (3): 
26–61.
6 WHAT ARE THE LIMITS TO THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACEKEEPING?  131
United Nations. 1992a. Provisional Verbatim Record, Security Council Summit, 
January 31. New York: United Nations Security Council.
United Nations. 1992b. An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant 
to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 
January. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 1995. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position paper of the 
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 
Nations. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 1999a. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 1999b. Report of the Independent Inquiry in UN Actions 
During the Rwanda Genocide, December 16. New York: United Nations 
Security Council.
United Nations. 1999c. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1265. New 
York: United Nations.
United Nations. 1999d. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270. New 
York: United Nations.
United Nations. 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. 
New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 2006. DRC: Report on Visit 6–15 March 2006. New York. 
United Nations DPKO.
United Nations. 2009. DPKO-DFS Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping. New 
York: UN DPKO.
United Nations. 2013. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098. New 
York: United Nations.
United Nations. 2014. Secretary-General’s Remarks at Security Council Debate, 
June 11. New York: United Nations Security Council
United Nations. 2015. Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace 
Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and 
People. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 2017. Peacekeeping Fact Sheet. www.un.org/en/peacekeep-
ing/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml. Accessed 9 Nov 2017.
United Nations Office of Internal Oversight. 2014. Evaluation of the 
Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilian Mandates in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, March 7. New York: UNOIO.
132  m. berdAl
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 




Protection of Civilians in the United 
Nations: A Peacekeeping Illusion?
Hilde Frafjord Johnson
introduction
After the experiences of Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s, and the 
United Nations’ (UN) failure to act, the protection of civilians (POC) 
has taken an increasingly prominent role in international peace opera-
tions. The first mission to be mandated with an explicit POC-mandate 
was the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999. While the 
emphasis on POC may initially have been met with reluctance, both 
from traditional troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs) and 
from within the system, the concept has increasingly taken a central role 
in UN peace operations after the Brahimi Report (UN 2000). More 
than 98% of military and police personnel currently deployed in peace 
operations have a mandate to protect civilians, as part of integrated mis-
sion-wide efforts.
Although the Security Council (UNSC) has recognised the progres-
sive consideration of POC in armed conflict as a thematic issue since 
1999 (UN 1999), for a number of years there was limited guidance on 
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how such mandates should be implemented. In an independent report 
on the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations, it was 
made clear that missions largely lacked a clear definition of POC, and 
suffered from poor planning and implementation of protection mandates 
(Holt and Taylor 2009). That same year, the Security Council adopted 
a resolution that requested all UN missions with protection mandates 
to incorporate comprehensive protection strategies into overall mission 
implementation and contingency plans (UN 2009). This, together with 
other developments, led to an increased focus on guidance to the field, 
trying to improve the understanding and application of POC mandates. 
In 2010, an operational concept on POC was published by the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support 
(DPKO/DFS), and the following year a Framework for Drafting 
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations (UN 2010, 2011).1
Following this guidance framework and additional focus on POC by 
the Security Council, a POC Policy has been developed by DPKO/DFS 
(UN 2015a). The intention was to strengthen POC implementation in 
the field, making sure that there will be a common standard across the 
system, and that the capacities both on the civilian and military side are 
fit for purpose. In all these guidelines and policy documents, as well as in 
most Security Council Resolutions mandating missions with POC man-
dates, it is emphasised that the primary responsibility for the protection 
of civilians rests with the respective governments. The presence of a UN 
mission or other protection actors does not diminish the obligation of 
host governments to make every effort to protect their own civilians. 
However, the responsibility of the host government does not dilute the 
obligation of UN missions to act within their capabilities when the host 
governments are not willing or able to protect its citizens. There are 
many situations when governments do not take on their POC respon-
sibility or lacks the capacity to do so. This poses significant challenges to 
UN missions.
This chapter provides an overview of the implementation of POC 
mandates in UN peace operations, drawing on my experience from 
the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) between 2011 and 2014 
as Special Representative and Head of Mission. UNMISS had a broad 
1 See UN (2010, 2011), which sets out the full range of activities that fall within this 
mandated task.
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POC-mandate, covering both military, police and civilian components. 
I will start with a focus on the capacity to protect through non-military 
means, and then move on to the capacity to provide physical protection. 
Third, I will address the responsibility of the host government. To con-
clude, I will offer a few recommendations for strengthening the protec-
tion of civilians in UN peace operations.
Protection oF ciViliAns: Policy And PrActice
Protection of civilians has for many years primarily been understood in 
military terms, and the ultimate test confronting peace operations has 
been to which extent they were able to physically protect civilians under 
imminent threat. It is important, however, to emphasise that the UN 
framework provides guidance on several aspects of POC, and include 
prevention through political action, as well as other civilian protection 
measures. This is also linked to capacity- and institution-building and is 
included in the following three tiers:
• Tier I: Protection through dialogue and engagement: Activities 
include dialogue with a perpetrator or potential perpetrator,2 con-
flict resolution, and mediation between parties to the conflict, per-
suading the government and other relevant actors to intervene to 
protect civilians.
• Tier II: Provision of physical protection: Activities by police and mil-
itary components involving the show or use of force to prevent, 
deter, pre-empt, and respond to situations in which civilians are 
under threat of physical violence.
• Tier III: Establishment of a protective environment: Activities to 
help create a protective environment for civilians, for example 
through the rule of law, human rights, and protection cluster activ-
ities, as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Many of these activities 
are undertaken alongside or in coordination with programmes by 
the United Nations Country Team or Humanitarian Country Team 
(UN 2015a).
2 This may be a state actor, non-state actor, groups of actors or individuals, or all of the 
above.
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While UN policy and guidance frameworks on the protection of  civilians 
have been strengthened, no specific policy has been developed for UN 
Police, which is quite surprising given the focus on POC in almost all 
peace operations. Nevertheless, as the UN High-Level Independent 
Panel (HIPPO) observes in its Report (UN 2015b), significant progress 
has been made in promoting norms and frameworks for the protection 
of civilians.
Furthermore, the new 2015 POC Policy represents a more compre-
hensive approach and advises POC operations to be implemented along 
four operational phases: (i) prevention, (ii) pre-emption, (iii) response, 
and (iv) consolidation (UN 2015a, p. 9). This should be reflected in a 
comprehensive POC Action Plan, including all relevant components of 
missions.
Despite conceptual progress, results on the ground are at best mixed. 
The gap between what is asked for and what peace operations can deliver 
has widened, especially in the more difficult environments (UN 2015b, 
p. ix). In the following, I will analyse some of the reasons.
Protection Through Non-military Means
In South Sudan, UNMISS developed a POC strategy with interventions 
along all three tiers outlined above in consultation with the UNHQ and 
the Humanitarian Country Team, and every state office was obliged to 
do the same. The POC strategies at the state level helped the mission 
have a more systematic approach to threat assessments and a more coher-
ent approach to the extensive protection work the mission engaged in.3
UNMISS tried to reduce the threat to civilians by engaging actively 
on multiple fronts to prevent inter-communal conflict; it supported 
mediation to end such conflicts, and, to prevent the communities 
from relapsing into violent conflict, it supported peace consolidation 
efforts where agreements were reached. The mission supported sev-
eral institutions relevant to the POC Policy’s 1st Tier, such as the 
Peace Commission of South Sudan and the National Reconciliation 
Committee, as well as peace advisors at different administrative levels. 
3 UNMISS Protection of Civilian Strategy, final draft approved by SRSG, 4 June 2012, 
since then replaced by the UNMISS Protection of Civilians Strategy, approved by SRSG, 
15 September 2014.
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However, it proved difficult to build the capacity of the host nation 
 institutions to take responsibility for Tier 1 protection tasks.
Although some progress was made, the best results were not achieved 
in the formal institutions of Juba, but locally. It was most rewarding to 
work with leaders at state and county level, community leaders and also 
with religious leaders where conflicts were brewing, emerging, and in 
some cases escalating. The UN’s collective efforts in trying to prevent 
or resolve inter-communal conflict bore fruit in several instances, for 
example in the Equatorian States and the Tri-State Area between Unity, 
Warrap and Lakes States. In one instance in the latter area a large-scale 
attack of thousands of armed youth was prevented. In another, signif-
icant efforts were invested in the peace process in Jonglei on multiple 
fronts. But despite signed peace agreements, the cycle of violence proved 
intractable and extraordinarily challenging to resolve. This frustration 
resulted in heavy-handed disarmament campaigns and military opera-
tions by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (UN 2012a, b). 
They were not successful, and only led to more tensions, unrest and 
eventually, conflict, in particular in the Pibor area. Only when an 
UNMISS-supported Church-led peace process succeeded was it pos-
sible to achieve some stability.4 Later, however, also this peace process 
imploded, impacted by the ongoing civil war.
Creating a protective environment, an objective in Tier 3 of the POC 
Policy, was another major challenge in a country awash with weapons, 
and with significant security challenges including inter-communal vio-
lence and ill-disciplined and at times violent and abusive security services. 
Some training in international humanitarian law and POC was provided 
to the SPLA and police, but the scale in terms of numbers receiving 
courses was too limited to have any real impact. Similarly, such courses 
are less effective when the illiteracy levels of the participants are very high 
(UN 2015c).
While UNMISS was from the outset mandated to support the police 
and rule of law institutions, strengthening them and their protection role 
was necessarily a long-term effort. The current timelines and methodol-
ogies of military and police personnel in peace operations are not con-
ducive for such capacity-building processes. The rotation of personnel is 
but one of the impediments in this regard. The supply-driven blue-print 
4 See Jonathan Agensky’s chapter in this volume.
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approaches usually applied in UN peace operations seldom deliver good 
and sustainable results in reforming and building the capacity of national 
police. Only through fundamental reforms in the way the UN Police 
operates can better outcomes be achieved. These points are reflected in 
the HIPPO report recommendations (UN 2015b, pp. 41–43) and in the 
UN Police review from end-May 2016.5
Despite these challenges, the mission found new ways of using exist-
ing UN Police mechanisms to provide capacity-building in some 
areas. Through unique, pre-negotiated arrangements with Uganda 
and Rwanda, training teams were deployed as UN Police to the Police 
College in Juba, providing training modules in key policing areas. We also 
used specialized teams from Kenya to help develop livestock police.
Throughout its first years, UNMISS worked on multiple fronts to cre-
ate a more protective environment for people, amongst others by work-
ing to increase respect for human rights, and through partnerships with, 
for example, the Protection Cluster that brought together the humani-
tarian agencies working on protection as well as some NGOs. However, 
UN capacity-building efforts of government institutions delivered lim-
ited results. The human rights and humanitarian institutions of the coun-
try faced great challenges in making a real impact, despite the best efforts 
of the entire UN family in building their capacity. It would primarily be 
through Security Sector Reform and a transformation of both the SPLA 
and the Police Service that one could hope to see an improvement.
Tier 1 steps range from the local to the national, from dealing with 
inter-communal conflicts to national-level tensions. For instance, in 
UNMISS, the mission leadership took Tier 1-type preventive steps con-
cerning the SPLM-leadership, starting already 18 months before the 
political crisis escalated in the country. The Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM)-leaders and regional leaders also tried to prevent such 
an escalation. However, none of these attempts succeeded, and the coun-
try exploded into violent conflict on 15 December 2013 (UN 2014a).
5 An independent review team was appointed on 28 December 2015 to follow up on 
many of these HIPPO recommendations. The Independent Core Review Team was tasked 
with assessing the UN’s Police Division and its operations and delivered its report External 
Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police Division on 31 May 2016. 
The report confirmed these systemic deficiencies in how UN Police operates, hence recom-
mending capacity building and police reform. Hilde F. Johnson and Abdallah Wafy were 
co-chairs of the UN Police review.
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Although the UN Security Council, UNMISS, and the international 
partners must shoulder some responsibility for failing to prevent the 
outbreak of violence in South Sudan, in the final instance, the lapse into 
conflict and then civil war was primarily caused by the high-risk behav-
iour of the South Sudanese leaders on all sides, across the core of the 
SPLM-leadership. It was the decisions of the two leaders, President Salva 
Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar and their supporters, how-
ever, that led to the loss of thousands of lives, to the rape and torture of 
thousands more, to the disruption of the livelihoods of thousands, and 
later millions of civilians, who had to flee their homes in search of safety 
in UN compounds, or flee South Sudan all together to towards Ethiopia, 
Uganda, or Sudan.
The government and the warring parties in South Sudan completely 
failed to protect non-combatants, as required under International 
Humanitarian Law, and instead engaged in systematic targeting of civil-
ians, as also documented by the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan in 
their Final Report (UN 2016). As we shall see, when the fighting started 
in 2013 in Juba, the physical protection challenges were far beyond the 
capacity of UNMISS.
Opening the Gates: A Last Resort
As the fighting within the security forces spread into neighbourhoods, 
civilians of Nuer origin were in danger. For UNMISS to have intervened 
in the conflict by using force in a situation of active combat between two 
belligerent forces, would have required a new mandate from the Security 
Council. Even if we did get such a mandate, our resources were too lim-
ited given the scale of violence raging in Juba, to intervene militarily.6 
Almost all our UN forces had been deployed elsewhere in the country, 
not least to Jonglei, where, until then, civilians had been under greatest 
threat. Although our planning exercises had included worst-case scenar-
ios for Juba in the event of a crisis, our forces located there were few and 
lightly armed—they were mainly soldiers guarding UN assets and staff, 
as well as engineering, aviation, logistics, and transport units and had 
6 Redeployment from Jonglei, of for example one battalion of 850 troops, would take 
7–9 days. Adrian Foster from New York Headquarters remained at the Mission and made 
three recommendations: (i) political engagement, (ii) documentation of human rights vio-
lations, and (iii) protection of people seeking refuge.
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limited capacity and equipment. We had only about 120 infantry soldiers 
who could engage in military operations outside the two UNMISS bases 
in Juba.7
It was my firm decision that leaving civilians to their fate where they 
were likely to be killed, was out of the question. In the early morning 
hours, thousands had flocked to us at the UN House in Tonyping, an 
area in Juba and outside the other UN compound in the Jebel area. 
They were screened for weapons, and let in. During the morning of 16 
December, approximately eight thousand sought refuge at Tonyping, 
and at UN House in Jebel five-to-six thousand poured in. During the 
afternoon, the total number approached 14,000, and increased the fol-
lowing day.8 Two days later, we realized that people would not return 
home soon, and we established a unique partnership with the humanitar-
ian actors. Soon, they administered the Protection of Civilian-sites within 
our bases, providing lifesaving humanitarian aid.
Within four to five months, 85,000 civilians had sought protection in 
eight UNMISS compounds around the country (UN 2014a). Internally 
Displaced People (IDP) seeking refuge in UNMISS POC sites during 
times of violent surged, and reached 100,000 before my departure from 
the Mission in July 2014  (UN 2015c; UNMISS 2015). At the end of 
2015, the number had doubled.
Protection within UNMISS-bases were never meant to be a long-
term solution. Despite the establishment of additional POC-sites within 
and adjacent to these bases, the camps were unbearably over-crowded. 
Conditions were very bad, in particular during the rainy season, and peo-
ple were suffering. Given the fighting and insecurity, they were too afraid 
to leave the bases. This put the Mission in a very difficult situation.
It has become clear that the civilians will not leave the POC-cites 
in the UN-bases unless they have a sense of peace and protection out-
side the bases. Cessation of hostilities has been promised repeatedly. 
Yet, these have been empty promises, as was a peace agreement signed in 
2015, which later collapsed. Indeed, peace still seems to be far away.
7 Some 250 Rwandan soldiers protected UN Headquarters and the two large bases and 
another company (150 soldiers) had guard and commando-post functions, transport, logis-
tics and administrative tasks.
8 The neighbourhoods of New Site, Manga, Mangaten, Mia Saba and Eden were all 
attacked by government forces (UNMISS 2014; Human Rights Watch 2014).
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People will not return home until there is a new and credible peace 
agreement which appears to last. Civilians need to feel reassured that a 
lapse into violent conflict is unlikely. They will also need to see a protec-
tive environment, to be able to trust the peace. This implies that building 
a new police service will be critical for people to be willing to return to 
their communities.
In summary, and to relate to civilian protection strategies, active 
engagement under Tier 1 and 3 is critical and usually more effective than 
other protection work. Yet, the traditional focus of peacekeeping opera-
tions has been to rely on the deployment of uniformed personnel, often 
with mixed results. As was pointed out in the HIPPO-report, there are 
serious deficiencies in the assessment, analysis, and planning of missions 
to enable political primacy and to make sure that the right resources are 
deployed at the right time. This has serious consequences for the capac-
ity of mission leadership to engage in the protection of civilians under 
Tier 1 and Tier 3. This also negatively impacts the implementation of 
POC-strategies. As the local capacity to protect civilians is very low at all 
levels, a lot of responsibility rests with UN peace operations. It is even 
more important, therefore, that missions have the capacity to act along 
all three Tiers.
Before reverting to these issues, I will analyse the possibilities to provide 
physical protection of civilians under threat through the use of force.
PhysicAl Protection: A PeAcekeePing illusion?
Both prior to the crisis and during the civil war, the mismatch between 
the UNMISS’ mandate and its resources were glaring, making it close to 
impossible for the mission to deliver on its mandate to provide physical 
protection to civilians under threat. However, as the HIPPO points out 
(UN  2015b, para. 93–94), UNMISS is not the only peace operation to 
face this problem. It is, therefore, imperative to address these challenges.
While a blanket protection of civilians mandate in military terms is not 
possible for any UN-mission—resources will never be adequate—there 
is still a strong expectation that military contingents act robustly and 
pro-actively when civilians are under threat. An evaluation conducted 
by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS 2014) 
has shown that these expectations are often not met, and that far too 
many missions are viewed as not acting to protect civilians quickly and 
robustly enough. While I have some methodological concerns with the 
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evaluation, its findings still warrant attention and discussion: many UN 
missions are perceived to fail in the implementation of their physical pro-
tection-mandates. Whether this is the reason for the revised definition of 
the protection of civilians mandate in the new POC policy, is not known. 
The definition now contains the additional “and including the use of 
deadly force” (UN 2015a, para. 12–13). It reads as follows:
In light of the above, the protection of civilians mandate for civilian, mili-
tary and police components in United Nations peacekeeping is defined as 
follows: all necessary means, up to and including the use of deadly force, 
aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against 
civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without preju-
dice to the responsibility of the host government. (UN 2015a, para. 13) 
(underscored by author)
The impact that this revised definition will have on the performance of 
the contingents, will largely depend on capabilities and the contingents’ 
own willingness to take risk.
Physical protection is about resources, including the numbers of 
troops compared to the challenge and the military capabilities availa-
ble, as well as ensuring that these are fit for purpose and with adequate 
mobility in difficult terrain. In classic military thinking, one would 
need two to three times the number of forces as the enemy to success-
fully counter the threat. One can compensate for the lack of numbers 
of troops with force multipliers such as attack helicopters and more 
advanced weaponry or high-performance mobile and technologically 
advanced military units. In most cases peace operations have neither; 
both troops and force multipliers are lacking.
It is not without reason, therefore, that larger peace operations 
deployed to small countries are more likely to succeed than those 
deployed to large countries, where the protection needs in many cases 
are in remote areas. As the HIPPO also pointed out, the resource con-
straints of many UN missions are dire, particularly in countries that 
are vast, with a difficult topography, poor infrastructure, and difficult 
climatic conditions, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Mali, and South Sudan (UN 2015b, paras. 93 and 210). All 
these missions are struggling to deliver.
UNMISS, for one, suffered major deficits on all of the abovementioned 
fronts. The challenges in South Sudan were grossly underestimated from 
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the outset, despite the previous six-year UN-mission—UNMIS from 
2005 to 2011. The number of troops in UNMISS were wholly inade-
quate for the task. The mission had one soldier per 100 km, almost three 
times fewer peacekeepers compared to other comparable UN missions.9 
Some would say that this is not a relevant comparison; it all depends on 
where one positions the troops and their mobility. In the case of South 
Sudan, however, the mobility constraints were even worse than in many 
comparable missions, constituting a major impediment to a timely 
response.
Sixty percent of the country’s territory is inaccessible for six to eight 
months per year during the rainy season. The mission therefore needed 
a much more diverse set of mobility assets to have a chance to deliver 
on its mandate. Without means of river transport and without all- 
terrain vehicles that could move in the mud and the swamps, the  mission 
was largely dependent on aviation. We were literally stuck in the mud. 
The lack of proper airstrips implied that the only realistic means of trans-
port was helicopters.10 This limited the numbers of troops that could 
be deployed and retained in remote locations significantly. The mission 
often suffered from a mobility crisis due to these aviation constraints. 
UNMISS saw columns of 5–8000 armed youth in military formation 
attack particular communities. The maximum number of troops the 
mission could deploy over time to face such a threat was 300–400. The 
resource deficits were particularly exposed in Jonglei, but the mission 
continued to have major challenges all over the country.
In April 2013, during a military capability review, UNMISS had prob-
lems convincing visiting colleagues of the urgent need for strengthening 
9 Johnson (2016, p. 326, footnote 75): UNMISS’ ratio was 98:1 in late 2012. In 2011–
2012, the figure was even lower. As the comparator for UN Stabilization Mission in the 
DRC (MONUSCO), the Eastern DRC was used as this is the primary area of operations 
for this mission, and the ratio of territory to soldier in 2012 was 17:1. For The UN-African 
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), it was 29:1, and for UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire 
UNOCI) it was 35:1. These comparators also do not account for the fact that UNMISS had 
less infantry and more engineering companies than most other missions. Even if all forces 
were moved to Jonglei state, UNMISS would have had a ratio of 1:19, which was worse 
than what MONUSCO already had as its presence in Eastern DRC.
10 Constructing air-strips was high on the mission’s agenda, but the engineering compa-
nies were delayed in their deployment to the mission, and had to concentrate on building 
military bases, which also were lacking. This implied that the construction of new airstrips 
were delayed.
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the capabilities of the mission on several fronts, despite the threats to 
thousands of civilians. Only after the crisis hit in December 2013 was it 
possible to obtain the approval for a significant strengthening of the mis-
sion’s capabilities, although the surge then took unacceptably long, an 
equally important obstacle in the UN deployment system.
The HIPPO makes strong recommendations that would, if imple-
mented, enable missions to deliver better on their POC mandate. For 
example, the proposal to change the mandating process to a two-step 
process, in which any mandate would be revisited six months after the 
mission onset, would make it possible to tailor mandates to the needs on 
the ground. It is critical to make sure that the resources and capabilities 
match the mandates. If the necessary resources will not arrive, the man-
dates should change accordingly (UN 2015b, pp. 47–48).
Beyond lacking resources, another challenge is the performance of the 
contingents and their willingness to engage pro-actively in confronting 
threats to civilians with force. While some UNMISS contingents were 
more risk averse, with mission leadership at times having to directly 
instruct a more robust response, others delivered on the mandate pro-ac-
tively and effectively. When the crisis hit in December 2013, these dif-
ferences became even more evident. The national caveats that had been 
applied by some contingents were later expanded and amplified, with 
new constraints, for example on mobility, positioning of assets and pos-
ture. Other contingents were on the other hand undeterred and engaged 
in protecting civilians through impressive and courageous efforts.
One example of the latter were the efforts of the UN forces in Bentiu, 
Unity State, where civilians were hiding in hospitals, churches, and 
mosques. More than 400 civilians were rescued from these locations 
by the Mongolian contingent whilst under fire. A safe corridor was also 
established to bring an additional 1000 or more people into safety. In 
Bentiu, this happened several times while the fighting was raging, in 
addition to the protection of 40,000 civilians within the UN-base. This 
shows that results on POC can be achieved, even by an overstretched 
and under-resourced mission and under dire circumstances. The degree 
to which troops are willing to engage robustly and proactively within 
their means when they are seeing civilians under threat, can thus make a 
huge difference.
The HIPPO panel also used strong language on the performance of 
peacekeepers, stating that national constraints imposed on contingents 
from their own capital or military headquarters were not acceptable 
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and should be treated as disobedience of lawful command (UN 2015b, 
p. 28). It is incumbent upon the UN-leadership in New York to make 
sure that Troop and Police Contributing Countries do not get away with 
mediocre performance and the introduction of new caveats when the 
contingents are deployed to UN missions.
Resources and performance are key to the implementation of a POC-
mandate. While expectations are often unrealistic, experience from both 
UNMISS and other peacekeeping operations shows that it is at times 
possible to deliver on POC-mandates even with such shortcomings.
Another aspect that has become of increasing concern, however, is the 
many cases where host governments are blocking access for UN peace-
keepers to areas where civilians are at risk, preventing them from fulfill-
ing their POC-mandate. Even worse are situations when security forces 
of host government themselves are the primary perpetrators of violence 
against civilians, or when they support non-state actors constituting 
similar threats. In South Sudan, for example, UNMISS has been barred 
access from a number of locations. Numerous UN-reports have also 
documented that the government’s security forces have been a major 
 perpetrator against civilians.
While the protection mandate is the same whoever the perpetrator 
is, UN guidelines are not clear on which actions a mission should take 
in situations when the host government is the primary perpetrator of vio-
lence against civilians. References are often made to the Status of Forces 
Agreement, which the UN signs with the host government to facilitate 
the presence and operations of the relevant UN Mission. If a peace oper-
ation were to confront the armed forces of the host government militar-
ily, there is fear that the mission may find itself without a SOFA and be 
asked to leave the country. Most Troop Contributing Countries will have 
major problems with confronting host governments in such situations. 
In many cases they would be instructed by their respective governments 
to refrain from engaging with the security forces of the host government.
To many civilians subject to such threats, the UN peacekeepers’ abil-
ity to protect them from threats to their lives will therefore remain an 
illusion. This dilemma is not being discussed openly in the UN system. 
The Security Council has also avoided this sensitive issue. With the 
increased complexity of conflicts in a number of countries, often involv-
ing host government forces, it is likely that more UN missions will be 
faced with this dilemma. In the case of UNMISS, for example, the lives 
peacekeepers could save through direct protection in situations where 
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civilians are under threat by SPLA-forces (or non-state actors supported 
by them) would have to be weighed against the risks to the lives of more 
than 200,000 civilians under UNMISS’ protection in the event that the 
Mission would be forced to leave.
This is also related to the interpretation of the Security Council 
mandate of peace operations. It is not made clear to missions what is 
expected of them in situations where host governments are the primary 
perpetrators of violence against civilians. It appears that direct engage-
ment with government security forces would normally imply a peace 
enforcement mandate from the Security Council. Rather than leaving 
such difficult assessments to mission leadership, guidance should be 
developed which provides clarity to people in the field.
Poc by the host goVernment: rhetoric or reAlity?
As stated in the introduction, and despite what is stated above, the main 
responsibility for the protection of civilians rests unequivocally with 
the host government. When a civil war is raging, one must respect the 
Geneva Conventions; to clearly distinguish combatants from non-com-
batants (i.e. civilians). This is currently not the case in South Sudan, 
where violations of these conventions appear to be the rule and not the 
exception. In more stable settings, one should expect the uniformed 
forces of a host government to do their utmost to actively protect civil-
ians. This, however, is not the case in most countries where the UN is 
deployed with a POC mandate. Here lies one of the greatest paradoxes 
in the UN’s approach to POC in its peace operations.
Most peace operations deploy into countries emerging from conflict 
where the UN is faced with state and non-state armed actors. One can 
hardly talk about a professional army. Nevertheless, the principle is clear; 
any government has the primary responsibility to protect its own popula-
tion. But very few government armies, whether professional conventional 
armies or those that have originated from liberation movements, militia, 
or guerrilla warfare, have experience in operations that involve the protec-
tion of civilians. Military operations are usually focusing on gaining control 
over territory and dominating it and protecting territory when this control 
is threatened. And in doing so, armed forces of all categories have often 
been the predators of the civilian population and not their protectors.
The more static modus operandi of traditional military operations is 
also different from protecting civilians. Hardly any traditional military unit 
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has been trained in these types of mobile operations. Most armies see this 
typically as a job for police forces, formed police units, or gendarmerie. 
The tactics and operations of protecting civilians usually involve highly 
mobile units much more similar to the more robust armed police units, 
such as those conducting crowd control and riot control in highly profes-
sional police forces. Although there are differences, it is mostly this type of 
mobility—and that of counter insurgency units—that have certain similar-
ities. Military contingents of peacekeepers are therefore not used to such 
operations, either. This has not been a topic of much discussion, however.
What is even more surprising is that there is no systematic investment 
enabling host governments to take civilian protection seriously. Hardly 
any efforts are being made to train forces of host governments to ena-
ble them to better conduct operations to protect civilians. Very limited 
investment is being made in developing the numbers of formed police 
units that more effectively could take on such tasks. Not even UN 
formed police units are being properly trained in a systematic manner for 
such operations according to agreed standards. Few have experience in 
POC related operations from their home countries.
That training of uniformed forces in the specifics of POC operations, 
whether military or police, is not given higher priority is surprising. But 
more importantly, it is a great paradox that host governments are not 
assisted with such training programmes to enable their police and mil-
itary units to develop and build the type of capacities and institutions 
that are needed to better protect civilians. This is a serious concern. After 
all, host governments are supposed to have the primary responsibility for 
the protection of civilians. But without such support, the principle will 
remain an empty slogan.
Such POC training programmes can only succeed when they are 
developed as part of an overall SSR process, where fundamental issues 
such as professionalisation, command and control, competence and per-
formance, and discipline and accountability are mainstreamed through 
the uniformed forces. It is also necessary to apply the UN’s Human 
Rights Due Diligence Policy and other instruments (UN 2013). Civilians 
will not be protected by forces and institutions that are dysfunctional and 
of questionable quality and where behaviour will depend on the individ-
ual commander’s whims. POC training, which would be a natural area 
for the UN to invest in, will therefore never work as a stand alone-meas-
ure, but will have to be imbedded in the strengthening of the institutions 
of the armed forces and the police.
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To consolidate and sustain peace in a country, SSR may be the most 
critical intervention. As the HIPPO panel has highlighted, the security 
sector can be the greatest spoiler of peace (UN 2015b, p. 40). Yet, this 
is maybe one of the largest gaps in international peace efforts. While 
bilaterals engage in Defense Sector Reform (DSR), often in accordance 
with their own strategic interests, and with minimal transparency, hardly 
anyone, including the UN, supports overall SSR effectively, making sure 
there is a holistic approach, with coherence and coordination between 
the reform efforts in the different security sectors.
The HIPPO panel identified this as a major gap. While the more tech-
nical aspects of DSR is not an area where the UN is well positioned to 
engage, the UN can support aspects related to oversight and account-
ability. It is one of the biggest actors in police development and DDR. 
The HIPPO panel therefore stated that more efforts should be made to 
support SSR in a more effective and coordinated way. The UN can and 
should play a convening and coordinating role in SSR, if so requested by 
the government (UN 2015b, p. 40). This implies making sure coherent 
reform efforts take place in all security sectors.11 This is also affirmed in a 
recent Security Council Resolution on this issue (UN 2014b).
A lot will have to be done to change the way UN peace operations 
work, if such efforts are to succeed. Fundamental reforms are needed 
(UN 2015b, p. 41, para. 156–157, recommendations 1, 2, 5, and 6). 
Moreover, in order to develop advisory functions in the SSR area there 
is a need to change the way that UN peace operations support institu-
tion-building. This is about capacity-building in one of the most diffi-
cult, yet most critical sectors.
The lack of reform in the SPLA in South Sudan was one of the main 
contributing factors to the escalation of violence in December 2013. 
While the origin of the crisis was political, it spun out of control largely 
due to the implosion in the security forces, and its rapid escalation was 
in no doubt caused by an institutionally weak and ethnically fragmented 
army. The responsibility for this rests squarely with the SPLM leadership, 
but it also illustrates how fundamental security sector reform is.
One of the core issues for any peace process in South Sudan going 
forward will be the total transformation of the country’s security 
11 For such reform efforts in SSR to succeed, local ownership is critical. A convening and 
coordinating role for the UN should therefore not substitute such ownership and should 
be at the national authorities’ request.
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forces, integrating units and elements from all sides. The engagement of 
third party actors, across all security organs, whether army or police, will 
be imperative, such as the UN, the AU and regional actors. If such a 
transformation of the security sector is not implemented and coordinated 
effectively, it will have an immediate impact on the prospects for peace. 
The security sector is the lynchpin in these countries, not only for the 
protection of civilians, but also for peace itself.
conclusion
UN peace operations must be significantly reformed in order to more 
effectively protect civilians. As reflected in HIPPO, this is related both to 
the selection of mission leadership, the way the mandate is formed, the 
capacities involved and not least, the emphasis on the primacy of poli-
tics. When the political dynamics are at the centre, capacity on the polit-
ical and civilian side, preventive diplomacy and Tier 1-efforts must be 
given much higher priority. This is critical and usually a far more effective 
way to protect civilians than protective actions in the field through Tier 
2-operations.
To be able to do the latter, however, we also need to see major 
reforms on the military and police side. For the military to act more 
robustly, a series of measures need to be undertaken, both with regard to 
appropriate resources and the strengthening of capacities, systemic defi-
ciencies and the willingness of TCCs to act. On the police side, a series 
of necessary reforms are listed in the UN police review that was under-
taken in 2016 (UN 2016). In order to deliver on protection mandates 
UN peace operations must have both the necessary means and the will 
to act. The Security Council should also contribute to further clarity on 
what a POC-mandate implies in situations when host governments are 
the primary perpetrators of violence against civilians.
Given the scale of the challenge, and the fact that there are limits to 
what UN peace operations can do to physically protect civilians, invest-
ment in security sector reform and providing training in POC operations 
to uniformed forces of host governments is critical. It can help make 
protection a reality for civilians in many countries. And it can help pre-
vent these forces from becoming perpetrators.
The security sector is too important for achieving and sustaining peace 
to be left to random arrangements, depending on the situation in each 
country. At the very least, a significant effort must be made to make 
150  h. F. Johnson
sure that there is coherence in reforming the different security actors by 
competent third parties. The current status of affairs cannot continue. 
If invested in, the UN is well positioned to engage in a convening and 
coordinating role in this area. The Security Council needs to take this 
concern seriously.
With the UN in such a role, one would kill two birds with one stone, 
both for the efforts to consolidate peace and in relation to strengthening 
the protection of civilians. After all, uniformed forces of host govern-
ments are supposed to be the primary protectors of the citizens. Without 
making this a priority, physical protection is likely to remain an illusion 
for the vast majority of civilians, even where the UN is present with its 
blue helmets. And even worse, if the UN continues its rather hesitant 
approach to support comprehensive security sector reform, it will be 
at risk of failing in its overall mandate in the achievement of peace and 
security.
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In the last decade or so, terrorism and violent extremism have moved 
centre stage on the international policy agenda. Consequently, also the 
question of the United Nations peace operations’ role vis-à-vis these 
threats has gained strength.
Historically, UN peace operations have been deployed in theatres 
where such threats have been present, but they have so far not confronted 
these threats directly. The UN stabilisation mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 
deployed in 2013, marked the beginning of a new era in this respect. 
MINUSMA has been the target of terrorist attacks from a number of 
 different groups, and had at the time of writing suffered 95 fatalities and 
a number of injuries as a result (UN 2017a). But MINUSMA is also a 
notable case study because it has been mandated by the UN Security 
Council to take “direct action” to mitigate and respond to the asymmet-
ric threats that the terrorist groups represent (UN 2016a, p. 8).
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This chapter will first look at the evolving discussion on terrorism 
and violent extremism, seen from the perspective of UN peace opera-
tions. It will then use the case of MINUSMA to discern some arguments 
for and against giving UN peace operations a larger role in mitigating 
and responding to these threats. In conclusion, the chapter argues that 
although there may be good financial and political reasons to give UN 
peace operations a larger role in the global war on terrorism and violent 
extremism, this will be close to impossible to do in practice. Indeed, it 
will have unintended and negative consequences for the role the UN has 
in the humanitarian and political domains in countries emerging from 
conflict and the future role of UN peace operations in general.
A new erA oF terrorism And Violent extremism?
The number of fatalities caused by terrorism has been rising steadily since 
2000, from 3329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014 (IEP 2015, p. 2). A par-
ticularly dramatic increase was noted in 2014, with an 80% increase com-
pared to 2013, largely because of the rise of the so-called Islamic State 
(IS) as well as Boko Haram (ibid.). 2015 was the second deadliest year 
on record with 29,376 deaths (IEP 2016, p. 2).
Some of the key groups behind terrorist attacks are Al Qaeda  
(e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria), IS (e.g. Syria and Iraq), Boko Haram 
(Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad), Al Shabaab (Somalia), AQIM 
(Mali), Al Mourabitoun (Mali), and Macina Liberation Front (Mali).1 
Not only have the number of victims increased exponentially over the 
last 16 years, but the acts that these groups have committed are aimed to 
shock the conscience of humanity, and many constitute war crimes and 
crimes against humanity (see e.g. UNHRC 2015). Transnational terror-
ist groups such as the IS are qualitatively different from previous terrorist 
groups because they are not seeking recognition from the international 
community. Instead they are seeking to establish a new caliphate, irre-
spective of existing borders, and willing to use extreme violence to 
achieve this objective. Another key characteristic of these groups is the 
1 These groups are changing frequently. The al Mourabitoun, for example, emerged from 
the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa and the Masked Men Brigade, and, 
in the beginning of 2017, Ansar Dine, Al Mourabitoun, and al Qaeda in the Maghreb 
(AQIM) announced their merger. For more, see e.g. Raineri and Strazzari (2015) and 
Haugegaard (2017).
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use of modern tools of communication and technology to intimidate and 
communicate the atrocities they commit, and recruit and radicalise new 
followers on a global scale. The shockingly violent acts, including the 
use of rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage as tactics of terror against 
civilians (UN 2015a), have created a new sense of urgency to deal with 
these rapidly growing threats.
the united nAtions, terrorism And Violent extremism
Terrorism has for long been a controversial topic at the UN, and the 
member states have so far not been able to agree on a definition of ter-
rorism. Nevertheless, violent extremism and terrorism have been ris-
ing on the international agenda since the 9/11-attacks in 2001. The 
UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by the General 
Assembly in 2006 (UN 2006), and had four pillars:
a.  tackling conditions conducive to terrorism;
b.  preventing and combating terrorism;
c.  building countries’ capacity to combat terrorism and to strengthen 
the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and
d.  ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while 
countering terrorism. (UN 2015b, p. 3)
In the following years, the strategy was revisited at regular intervals, but 
with limited coordination and integration with the rest of the tools in 
the UN peace and security toolbox. This gradually started to change in 
parallel with a discursive move from “terrorism” to countering and pre-
venting violent extremism (PVE and CVE, here grouped together as 
‘PCVE’). Realising that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) initiated 
after the 9/11-attacks proved controversial, the US administration under 
former US President George W. Bush made a discursive move from 
GWOT to “Struggle against Violent Extremism” or SAVE (Fox 2005). 
This reconceptualisation, subsuming the counter-terrorist agenda under 
less ominous sounding concepts, proved less divisive and in the follow-
ing years, in parallel with the rapid increase in incidents labelled terrorist 
attacks, preventing and countering violent extremism have become main-
stream concepts and agendas.
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This was evidenced when Ban Ki-moon, the former UN Secretary-
General launched a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
beginning of 2016. He stated that
[t]here is no single pathway to violent extremism. But we know that extrem-
ism flourishes when human rights are violated, political space is shrunk, aspi-
rations for inclusion are ignored, and too many people – especially young 
people – lack prospects and meaning in their lives. (UN 2016b)
In the action plan, he lamented the fact that so far there has been “a 
strong emphasis on the implementation of measures under pillar II of the 
Global Strategy, while pillars I and IV have often been overlooked” (UN 
2015b, p. 3). In the plan, the terms “extremism”, “violent extremism,” 
and “terrorism” were used interchangeably (Modirzadeh 2016).
In the above-mentioned pillar II, we find counter-terrorism oper-
ations. Currently, the UN is neither principally nor operationally set 
up to fight terrorist groups by force. Operationally, the High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report drew a red line 
with counter-terrorism operations, saying that “UN peacekeeping mis-
sions, due to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in 
military counter-terrorism operations. They lack the specific equipment, 
intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation 
required, among other aspects” (UN 2015c, p. 31). However, this quote 
could be interpreted as to say that if these shortcomings were amended, 
UN peace operations would be able to take on such operations. 
However, the main message of the report is the primacy of a political 
engagement—a UN peace operation should always seek to be part of a 
“robust political process” and “continuously seek to build consent to the 
UN role and presence through an impartial posture” (ibid., p. 33). The 
ability to facilitate a political dialogue, often in tandem with key members 
of the Security Council, is argued to be the comparative advantage of the 
UN. By becoming a party to the conflict, this advantage is in peril.
Terrorism and violent extremism are part of the same spectrum, but 
they are not the same thing. Both are willing to use violence to pur-
sue political goals, but to different degrees. If the objective is to limit, 
counter, and prevent violent extremism it follows that a primary objec-
tive would be not to further alienate those that may have legitimate 
governance and development concerns, and who are yet not fully radi-
calised. Characterising all groups and individuals as terrorists, no matter 
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where they are located on the spectrum, risks further radicalisation and 
strengthening the most extreme groups.
There is thus a need to appropriately nuance the understanding of 
and strategies for dealing with violent extremism. Violent extremism 
can stem from a variety of root causes—including injustice, marginali-
sation, under-development, governance structures undermined by cor-
ruption, lack of responsive governments and social cohesion, weak and 
limited state-society relations, and externally supported religious rad-
icalisation. The UN Secretary-General has warned against a securitised 
approach to countering violent extremism, and has outlined a prevention 
agenda where the main goals must be to better understand the moti-
vations for joining groups such as the IS; avoid using “terrorism” as a 
label to eliminate political opposition; and deal with root causes through 
strengthening governance, the respect for human rights, more account-
able institutions, service delivery, and political participation (UN News 
Centre 2015). The multitude of root causes to violent extremism must 
be reflected in the register of tools and approaches of member states and 
global and regional institutions to deal with these challenges.
The UN is a state-centric organisation. In the states it is seeking to 
support, however, the governments often enjoy weak legitimacy among 
large parts of the population. Material and ideational resources are con-
centrated among the elites, and access to education and other basic ser-
vices is often limited to urban centres, leaving room for radicalisation and 
recruitment to violent extremist groups to fester. Adding to this vulnera-
ble starting point, weak governments are often pursuing militarised solu-
tions to the challenges it is facing, perpetuating, fuelling, and becoming 
an ever more intrinsic part of the problem. Being a state-centric organ-
isation, the UN is in risk of following the same pattern by supporting 
member states in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism.
Since 9/11, the UN has unfortunately also increasingly become the 
target of terrorist attacks. The attacks in Baghdad in 2003, Algiers in 
2007, Kabul in 2009, Mazar-i-Sharif in 2011, Abuja in 2011, Mogadishu 
in 2013, a number of attacks in Mali from 2013 until today, in addition 
to a high number of smaller attacks have all made it clear that the UN is 
increasingly considered a participant in the global war on terror. With the 
increase in attacks, the UN has been adapting its risk posture, taking pre-
cautions on movement and deployment of staff in high-risk zones.
Member states and multilateral organisations have developed var-
ious doctrines and guidelines for countering and preventing violent 
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extremism, ranging from military-oriented counter-insurgency and coun-
ter-terrorism guidance such as the US Counterterrorism doctrine and 
NATO’s military concept for defence against terrorism (United States 
Department of the Army 2014; NATO 2011). The UN is currently 
in a state of flux when it comes to policy development on the issue of 
counter-terrorism and countering and preventing violent extremism, and 
there is increasing pressure from member states on the UN to take on 
a greater share of these challenges (Boutellis and Fink 2016; Karlsrud 
2017, 2018). These member states request that UN peace operations 
should be more relevant to what are seen as challenges of the twenty-first 
century, and MINUSMA has become the laboratory for testing whether 
UN peace operations actually are able to take on these challenges.
minusmA: between A rock And A hArd PlAce
Although the UN has been the target for spectacular attacks previously, 
the frequency and consistency of attacks on the UN have increased with 
the more active role that the organisation has been given in for exam-
ple Somalia and Mali. Until now, it has been special political missions 
and UN development presences that have been the main targets for these 
attacks, but with the deployment of MINUSMA to Mali a UN multidi-
mensional peacekeeping mission has been given a direct role in stabilis-
ing a country that had been destabilised by inter alia violent extremist 
and terrorist groups (Karlsrud 2015). It is also the first time a multidi-
mensional peacekeeping mission has been deployed in parallel with an 
ongoing counter-terrorism operation, the French Opération Serval, 
later transitioned into the current Opération Barkhane (Ministère de la 
Défense 2015).
In 2014, one year after deployment, the Force Commander of 
MINUSMA briefed the UN Security Council, saying that “MINUSMA 
is in a terrorist-fighting situation without an anti-terrorist mandate 
or adequate training, equipment, logistics or intelligence to deal with 
such a situation” (UN 2014, p. 4). MINUSMA was suffering from 
repeated attacks, and in 2014 alone, MINUSMA suffered 41 fatali-
ties—“one of the highest one-year fatality rates for any peacekeeping 
operation in UN history” according to the Ban Ki-moon, the for-
mer UN Secretary-General (UN 2015d). However, at that juncture, 
MINUSMA had still not been tasked to take ‘direct action’ against 
asymmetric threats.
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MINUSMA has e.g. had a task force on counter-terrorism and organ-
ised crime, with a mandate to “provide recommendations on the delivery 
of a common and comprehensive strategy to support the Government 
of Mali in counter-terrorism and in combating organized crime” (UN 
2015e, p. 23). In the more robust end of the spectrum, the MINUSMA 
military troops have been preparing “targeting packs […] on groups 
and individuals considered a threat to the mission,” (Karlsrud 2017, 
p. 1224) and has been sharing information with the parallel French 
counter-terrorism mission Opération Barkhane (ibid.). Taken together, 
these practices suggest that MINUSMA may already have crossed the red 
line drawn by the HIPPO.
What, then, should be the way forward? When deployed to coun-
tries like Mali, the UN must be equipped to mitigate and prevent attacks 
against itself and the local population. In practice, this means militarily 
engaging violent extremists and terrorists. As I have already noted, this 
takes UN peace operations across the line drawn by the HIPPO-report. 
For MINUSMA, this is already the reality it is struggling to deal with. 
Future missions may be deployed to Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, 
and find similar mission environments and threats.
use oF Force: burden-shAring with regionAl 
orgAnisAtions
Since similar ongoing operations are shouldered by the African Union 
(AU) and sub-regional organisations on the African continent, and that 
likely future operations of this kind will be in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, it 
may make more sense to undertake such operations in coalitions of the 
willing. This would give the lead regional organisation/group of states 
the space to decide on a range of issues that might be more constrained 
in a UN setting. Such missions should be sequenced to not further 
undermine traditional UN peace operations. Coalitions of the will-
ing, and in some instances regional organisations, will remain the only 
options with the requisite political will, capabilities, doctrines, and stay-
ing power to conduct counter-terrorism operations, equipped with a UN 
mandate.
The AU and sub-regional organisations have proven that they are 
enhancing their competency and ability to conduct peace support 
operations, although the potential for improvement is still significant. 
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The AU has been either mandating or directly implementing coun-
ter-terrorist operations in a number of theatres—with for example its AU 
Regional Task Force for the elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda, the AMISOM mission in Somalia, the African-led International 
Support Mission to Mali, the Multinational Joint Task Force established 
to fight Boko Haram, and the Group of Five Sahel Joint Force com-
posed of troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.
AU peace enforcement missions also have the comparative advantage of 
participating states’ strong political will and the ability to sustain significant 
losses over time, something UN peace operations simply cannot or will 
not be able to match. However, the funding, capability, and capacity issues 
remain unresolved. The initiative of the AU to increase the self-funding of 
AU peace operations to 25% over a five-year period (AU 2015), alongside 
strengthened accountability and human rights due diligence mechanisms 
and the development of a mission support concept, could unlock fur-
ther support. However, also the AU is still suffering from weak capacity 
in many areas, with frequent reports on human rights violations commit-
ted by troops in Somalia as one example (see e.g. UN 2017b). Member 
states thus need to continue to build the capacity of the AU, sub-regional 
organisations, and African member states to counter and prevent violent 
extremism in a holistic manner, including a stronger emphasis on early 
peacebuilding and recovery programmes that can provide real opportuni-
ties and stop the recruitment into terrorist organisations.
towArds A holistic APProAch
The comparative advantage of the UN lies in its convening power and 
impartiality as well as in its ability to provide and coordinate compre-
hensive support across the peace and security, development, and human 
rights pillars. This gives the UN unique legitimacy from which it draws 
its strength. However, each of these elements are vulnerable to mission 
creep, overstretch, and inefficacy in implementation. The state-centric 
nature of the UN is both its advantage and its Achilles’ heel.
Using force limits the ability of the UN to provide good offices, 
engage with armed groups, and be a legitimate actor in early peacebuild-
ing, recovery, and development efforts. Taking active part in a conflict 
also significantly increases the risks of attacks against the soft targets of 
the UN—international and local staff, as well as contractors and other 
actors with real or perceived ties to the organisation.
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Fortified UN compounds with Hesco barriers, barbed wire and 
 limited freedom of movement are often apt responses to increased 
threats from violent extremists and terrorists. However, while increased 
security measures may be necessary, more limited engagement with local 
populations may lead to a weaker understanding of underlying political, 
economic, and social dynamics and increased vulnerability for attacks, 
perpetuating and increasing the gap between local populations and UN 
staff. The risk avoidance of troop contributing countries in hostile thea-
tres will also contribute to weakening the legitimacy of UN peace opera-
tions, as seen in Mali.
A militarised strategy does not only risk fuelling further radicalisa-
tion, but also draws funding from potential prevention activities, leading 
to a negative spiral on local, national, regional, and global levels. A pre-
vention agenda must engage national elites in a rethink of state-society 
relations that should include more and deeper dialogue with civil society 
and lead to more inclusive, participatory, and representative societies (de 
Coning et al. 2015). The UN thus needs to maintain an impartial stance 
vis-à-vis the government in power and counter efforts of instrumental-
isation of the UN peace operation to fight political opposition labelled 
“terrorists”.
To tackle the root causes of violent extremism and terrorism, UN 
peace operations and the UN system can partner with national govern-
ments, multilateral organisations, religious organisations, and NGOs to 
promote holistic approaches. There is a need to generate new platforms 
for political dialogue, inclusion, and community engagement. In view of 
the rapidly increasing interconnectedness and transnational character of 
the challenges the world faces, strategies must not only be national, but 
regional and global in scope. New partnerships are needed—particularly 
at the sub-regional and regional levels—that are holistic, comprehensive, 
integrated and based on a deep analysis of the societal challenges that 
the violent extremism stems from. Unfortunately, the responses are often 
frustrated by limited acknowledgment of underlying societal drivers and 
root causes, lack of cooperation, competition, and rivalry among mem-
ber states on the sub-regional and regional level.
Due concern must also be given to the impact on women of violent 
extremism and militarised responses to these threats. “The rise of vio-
lent extremism, which is given much importance in the report, threat-
ens women’s lives and leads to a cycle of militarisation of societies” 
(Stamnes and Osland 2016, p. 17). Violent extremism, terrorism, and 
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counter-terrorism put vulnerable groups between a rock and a hard 
place, narrows the space for engagement by women peacebuilders, and 
limits the funding for basic services and peacebuilding activities.
The religious dimension of radicalisation also deserves scrutiny. Gulf 
states have been exporting their particular kind of Islam to the rest of the 
world for many decades, fomenting and driving radicalisation. In Mali 
for example, Muslims are traditionally Maliki Sunnis and Sufis, but the 
more radical Wahhabi strand of Islam has rapidly taken hold with the 
financial support of key Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. In this con-
text, it is also curious to notice that Saudi Arabia is the main sponsor 
of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), part of the Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) (UN 2016c), endorsed 
by member states of the UN General Assembly through the Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006 (UN 2006). The UNCCT 
and CTITF are both part of the UN Department of Political Affairs 
(DPA), also responsible for special political missions. The UNCCT 
received in 2014 a donation from Saudi-Arabia of $100 million to 
strengthen its “tools, technologies and methods to confront and elimi-
nate the threat of terrorism” (UNCCT 2015). It is also partially funded 
by Germany, the UK, and the US. According to one UN official, the 
CTITF/UNCCT accounted for roughly half of the operational part of 
the DPA budget funding projects and activities in the field in 2015, and 
UNCCT has for example reached out to the UN mission in Mali, UN 
agencies, and others to develop projects, counting 31 projects at the 
beginning of 2016 (UN 2016c).
This apparent oxymoron points to an important point—the preven-
tion and deradicalisation agenda is fairly well known, but implementation 
is either limited or ineffective. This shows the limited political will to deal 
with clear-cut and well-known challenges, such as the continued financ-
ing of the export of radical Islam by Gulf states. The thin and at times 
non-existent legitimacy of the regimes that are facing violent extremists 
is another clear challenge, severely limiting the will to engage in political 
dialogue.
The UN Security Council should maintain a central role for the UN in 
the mediation of conflict even where the UN is a party or considered to 
be a party to the conflict. Therefore it should nominate a separate Special 
Envoy to lead the negotiations to create the necessary space for engage-
ment. The UN should not be barred from talking with any of the actors, 
even those beyond the pale, but keep communication channels open.
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More capacity is needed to uncover and address linkages between 
organised crime, terrorist groups, and national elites (UN 2015a). For 
the UN, this is a particularly sensitive area, as a focus on corruption may 
lead to significant resistance and increase the hurdles the UN peace oper-
ation and the UN Country Team are facing. However, only continued 
emphasis on this is likely to make leaders accountable to their popula-
tions, and enable representative, inclusive, and legitimate regimes.
A UN peace operation should be working closely with the UN 
Country Team to devise peacebuilding and early recovery plans that 
use a combination of development data and intelligence to target par-
ticularly vulnerable populations such as youth and marginalised com-
munities or ethnicities. Community violence reduction programmes 
have proved useful in for example Haiti, and are being tested in Mali 
“to address recruitment into the armed movements present in the coun-
try, including those allied to Al-Qaida” (UN 2015e, p. 22). UN peace 
operations should also consider limiting their military presence and focus 
on civilian activities in areas where they are seen as party to the conflict 
(Di Razza 2017).
conclusions And recommendAtions
The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations report empha-
sised the primacy of political solutions. It stated, “there is a clear sense of 
a widening gap between what is being asked of [UN] peace operations 
today and what they are able to deliver” (UN 2015c, p. 9). Jean-Marie 
Guéhenno, the former head of UN peacekeeping, argues that robust 
peacekeeping has to be supported by a robust political strategy (2015). 
UN peace operations are operating in increasingly difficult theatres, fac-
ing the threats of violent extremism and transnational terrorist networks. 
This is partly due to the UN Security Council asking for deployment of 
missions long before the conditions are ripe, such as in Mali, and partly 
because of a structural development in technology and communication 
also propelling the nature of terrorist threats, with violent extremists and 
terrorists becoming far more interconnected and media-savvy.
These threats are likely to intensify, and in order to continue to 
operate in difficult and at times hostile environments, the UN will 
have to improve at all levels, even if it is not explicitly being asked to 
undertake counter-terrorism tasks. As it is likely that the UN will con-
tinue to be deployed in parallel with regional organisations that have a 
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counter-terrorism mandate, the UN should be wary of the security, rep-
utational, and legitimacy risks it will be facing in parallel deployments. 
It must mitigate increasing security risks by limiting engagement in mili-
tary and substantive tasks where it is in parallel deployment with a coun-
ter-terrorism operation, intensify its efforts to establish a functioning and 
integrated intelligence concept for UN missions, strengthen its conflict 
prevention agenda, with particular emphasis on the engagement with 
those in risk of being radicalised. As borders are only lines in the sand, 
intermission cooperation must be intensified, with sharing of informa-
tion, analysis, and capabilities on a regular basis.
While the UN can and should prepare for and be able to better 
respond to transnational terrorist threats, I have shown the limits of what 
UN peace operations are able to do operationally, principally, and polit-
ically. The growing capacity of regional and sub-regional organisations 
to deal with these threats should be supported by the UN and member 
states in the South and the North.
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introduction
Two and a half years after the initial deployment of the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 
the UN Secretary-General noted in his report to the Security Council 
that “while positive steps were taken towards the implementation of the 
peace agreement by the signatory parties, there was an increase in the 
number and geographical spread of activities by extremist and terrorist 
groups and organized crime networks” and that “MINUSMA convoys 
remained the primary target of extremist and terrorist groups and trans-
national drug traffickers on the main supply routes” (UN 2015a). The 
Council, when it first authorised MINUSMA in June 2013, had fore-
seen the “serious threats posed by transnational organized crime in the 
Sahel region, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism” and 
© The Author(s) 2019 
C. de Coning and M. Peter (eds.), United Nations 
Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99106-1_9
A. Boutellis (*) 
International Peace Institute (IPI), New York, NY, USA
S. Tiélès 
Central Directorate of Judicial Police (International Relations Division), Nanterre 
France
170  A. boutellis And s. tiÉlÈs
underscored “the urgent need to address these issues.” Yet, it did not give 
any specific tasks or guidance to the UN stabilisation mission in terms 
of organised crime and has instead encouraged “Member States of the 
Sahel region to improve coordination to combat recurrent threats in the 
Sahel, including terrorism, together with transnational organized crime 
and other illicit activities such as drug trafficking” (UN 2015b) or wel-
comed initiatives and “efforts of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5) 
… to strengthen regional security cooperation …. and to establish a new 
counterterrorist centre” (UN 2016).
This reflects the increasing disconnect between the growing recog-
nition by the UN system and Member States over the past decade that 
organised crime (OC) is a problem that cannot be ignored where the 
UN has peace operations on the ground. It also reflects the fact that the 
UN system and Member States are still uncertain about how to approach 
a phenomenon that lacks a precise definition1 and, more importantly, 
refers to various criminal activities or threats understood differently 
based on contexts and perceptions. Although organised crime and traf-
ficking are now considered a threat to security and stability in post-con-
flict countries in their own right, they also continue to be most often 
considered in their relation to terrorism and violent extremism (UN 
2015c), which is not always helpful for developing realistic peace opera-
tions approaches to OC.
In recent years, the Sahel region witnessed the proliferation of 
international forces and regional ones2 resulting in a securitisation of 
approaches when a number of experts called for more nuanced human 
security-based approaches to addressing the organised crime-terrorism 
threat: “States and regional organizations [need] to pause and reexamine 
their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures, which by mili-
tarizing the region are exacerbating the problems and fail to address the 
fundamental issues that affect the region” (Kfir 2016). There is also a 
1 The 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines OC as “a 
structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert 
with the aim of committing one of more serious crimes or offenses established in accordance 
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit.”
2 International forces include the French counterterrorism force Barkhane and the UN 
mission MINUSMA and regional ones include the joint force of the Group of Five for the 
Sahel (G5 Sahel) which was just established and includes an explicit mandate to combat 
transational crime in addition to terrorism.
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growing body of literature suggesting that OC may not always be the 
enemy of peace operations, and can indeed benefit from the minimal 
level of stability and both licit and illicit business opportunities provided 
by the presence of peacekeepers—themselves not immune—and/or sanc-
tions regimes and embargoes.
Nowadays, almost three-quarter of UN peace operations—rang-
ing from small political missions without armed components in Guinea 
Bissau, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, and most recently Colombia (includ-
ing unarmed military observers) to large multidimensional peacekeeping 
operations like the ones in Haiti, Kosovo, the Democratic republic of 
Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic and Mali—operate in envi-
ronments that are considered significantly affected by organised crime 
(OC). It was, however, only in 2010 that the UN Security Council 
invited the Secretary-General to consider the threats posed by organised 
crime in mission planning and reporting (UN 2010). Yet, of current UN 
peace operations, less than half have explicit mandates related to organ-
ised crime, fewer have mandates to tackle criminal groups spoilers directly, 
and those that do are still not well-prepared to face this threat in terms 
of policy, doctrine, strategic and operational guidance, and capacities  
(Kemp et al. 2013).
This chapter first looks back at how and why organised crime has 
increasingly become recognised as a threat to international peace and 
security and as a UN peace operations problem. It then reviews the dom-
inant law enforcement and capacity-building approaches adopted so far 
for UN peace operations to deal with organised crime and their limits. It 
finally explores the way forward for how the UN could deal more real-
istically and effectively with transnational organised crime in the future. 
While taking a historical approach, the chapter focuses particularly on the 
Mali/Sahel example as the latest laboratory for (re-)defining the relation-
ship between UN peace operations and organised crime.
the growing recognition oF orgAnised crime As A 
strAtegic threAt
A number of studies and United Nations reports have over the past two 
decades demonstrated how armed groups—including terrorist groups—
resort to illicit trafficking to finance their activities, and how organised 
crime can be an important driver of conflict and instability in some 
post-conflict and fragile states, particularly when it penetrates and/
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or co-opts States institutions at the local and national levels. The 2004 
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recog-
nised transnational organised crime as one of the six clusters of threats 
with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead, 
because it facilitates many of the most serious threats to international 
peace and security. The Panel’s recommendation at the time, however, 
solely focused on the need for better international regulatory frame-
works and building State capacity in the area of the rule of law. The 
2011 World Development Report also emphasised that the penetration 
by organised crime of the already vulnerable socio-political, judicial, and 
security structures in developing countries can be a serious obstacle to 
peacebuilding and economic development, and made the case for longer-
term approaches to building effective state institutions.
The United Nations initially approached criminal activity and traf-
ficking issues in relation to conflict situations already on the Security 
Council’s agenda, particularly where UN peace operations were 
deployed in the Balkans, Central America, the DRC, Haiti, Somali, and 
West Africa. And while the link between drug trafficking and terrorism 
contributed to moving the issue up the Council’s agenda in the 2000s, 
particularly in the context of Afghanistan, the Council later started con-
sidering whether drug trafficking and organised crime could constitute 
in themselves a threat to international peace and security. This was illus-
trated by a series of thematic debates, presidential statements and reso-
lutions since 2009, and in December 2015, the Council added human 
trafficking to the list of criminal activities whose impact on conflict it has 
considered. The Council also “moved furthest, fastest, where the crim-
inal activity in question threatened permanent members’ interests, the 
country was already on the Council’s agenda, and no state with influence 
in the Council had a particular reason to limit such experimentation” 
(Cockayne 2015).
These developments culminated with the 24 February 2010 Security 
Council Presidential Statement (PRST) noting the “serious threats” 
posed by drug trafficking and transnational organised crime and the 
financing of terrorism to international security, and noted that these 
“may threaten the security of countries on its agenda” and expressed its 
intention to “consider such threats, as appropriate.” In the same state-
ment, the Council also invited the Secretary-General “to consider these 
threats as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, inte-
grated missions’ assessment and planning and to consider including in 
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his reports, as appropriate, analysis on the role played by these threats 
in situations on its agenda” (UN 2010).
This was the basis for the establishment a year later of an internal 
UN System Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug 
Trafficking, co-led by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
and the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to develop an 
effective and comprehensive approach to the challenge of transnational 
organised crime (TOC) and drug trafficking and coordinate UN actions 
in these areas, primarily through assistance to states. While this task force 
has had a slow start and produced little guidance, it may have contrib-
uted to raising the profile of organised crime (traditionally a UNODC 
‘turf’) more broadly within the organisation, as illustrated by the recent 
development of a UN “Transnational Organized Crime and Security 
Sector Reform” guidance note by the UN Inter-Agency Security Sector 
Reform Task Force. In 2013 the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee 
requested the Task Force (in Decision 2013/3) to “share experiences 
across regions on what it means in practice to adopt ‘comprehensive UN 
approaches’ to drugs and crime, including lessons learned/good prac-
tices notes on thematic issues such as crime-sensitive … peacebuilding, 
and conflict prevention policies,” and to “produce a guidance note on 
how to include issues related to drug trafficking and organized crime 
in conflict analysis and integrated assessment processes” but at the 
time of the writing of this chapter, the guidance note had still not been 
produced.
Persistent hesitAncy on how to APProAch orgAnised 
crime in un PeAce oPerAtions
Organised crime is present in almost three quarter of the countries where 
the Security Council has authorised the deployment of UN peace oper-
ations—ranging from small political missions without uniformed com-
ponents to large multidimensional peacekeeping operations. OC does, 
moreover, present a threat, sometimes direct (in terms of safety and 
security of UN personnel as in the case of Mali); but most of the time 
indirect, in that it hampers the implementation of the mandate and bol-
sters the spoiling capacity of certain groups in places like Guinea Bissau, 
Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, the DRC, etc. But despite 
the above-mentioned 2010 PRST, the Security Council has so far been 
hesitant to give specific mandates to its peace operations, with less than 
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half of the resolutions mandating these operations to make reference to 
organised crime and fewer mandating UN operations to tackle criminal 
groups spoilers directly (Kemp et al. 2013).
While a number of reasons explain the Council’s hesitation, it has 
led to a “chicken and egg” situation. The lack of a clear mandate (most 
references to organised crime are in the preamble of Council resolu-
tions rather than in operative paragraphs) limits the ability of UN oper-
ations to focus and devote resources to analysing and possibly starting 
to address organised crime beyond limited capacity building efforts (in 
security sector, rule of law reform, and border management). And, in 
turn, it limits their ability to shed light on the issue and its far-reach-
ing implications when reporting to the Council. That said, the lack of 
specific reference to organised crime in the mandate did not stop past 
leaderships from at certain times being proactive in the UN missions in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) and Timor-Leste (UNTAET)—notably under rare 
so-called “executive” mandates which have not been reiterated since—
or Haiti (MINUSTAH, see below). Conversely, despite having a specific 
crime fighting mandate, the mission in Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS) has 
had little success in implementing it in part due to the lack of political 
will from the successive host governments and the limited leverage and 
capacities of the small UN political mission. The latest Security Council 
resolution 2343 (2017) on Guinea Bissau nonetheless reemphasised 
the issue of organised crime and the need to support the West Africa 
Coastal Initiative (WACI)—a regional programme co-led by UNODC, 
DPA/UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and INTERPOL.
Generally, UN peace operations have been largely “flying blind” 
when it comes to transnational organised crime, particularly the UN 
Special Political Missions (SPMs) with the least resources and presence 
on the ground. A particular limitation has been that (host country) con-
sent-based peace operations have not been mandated to “address the 
nexus between organized crime and national political or power dynam-
ics, which increasingly constitute the driving force behind instability in 
various regions” (Cockayne and Kavanagh 2011). But while organised 
crime is obviously a challenge that goes far beyond the mandate and life-
time of a peace operation, the failure to look into the problem at an early 
stage arguably risks making it even more difficult to deal with later when 
it has further infiltrated the very government and state institutions that 
the UN seeks to strengthen. As Mats Berdal notes, many post conflict 
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settings are characterised by the “ability of organized crime to take root 
and flourish in periods of transition from war to peace, to develop sym-
biotic relationships with local political elites and strengthen ties to trans-
national criminal networks” (Berdal 2009, p. 62). A recent review of 
the literature commissioned by the UK government’s Stabilisation Unit 
indeed concluded to an emerging consensus among scholars that in con-
flict and post-conflict settings political and criminal actors are not nec-
essarily adversarial, but may in fact collaborate and even merge (Scheye 
2015, pp. 3–7). The traditional peace operations distinction between 
political and criminal actors would therefore be largely misleading.
Some of the more innovative UN approaches to organised crime 
may have come from the DPA regional offices, particularly the UN 
Office for West Africa (UNOWA)—recently renamed UN Office for 
West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)—which has helped raise aware-
ness on the threat represented by organised crime and drug traffick-
ing in West Africa, including through its June 2011 reporting to the 
Security Council that the “corrupting effects [which] have further weak-
ened already fragile State institutions and may finance armed or terror-
ist groups operating across West Africa and the Sahel.” The West Africa 
Coastal Initiative (WACI) has also been praised for its regional approach 
combining a political level (with a High-Level Policy Committee chaired 
by the UNOWA head)—to encourage the political will of regional heads 
of states—and an operational level consisting of building Transnational 
Crime Units (TCUs) in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, and Guinea.
Initially launched in 2009 to support the implementation of the 
Economic Community of West African States’ Action Plan to Address the 
Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug 
Abuse in West Africa, the WACI was extended until 2017 with a pos-
sible enlargement to Benin and Togo. WACI contributed to enhancing 
both operational law enforcement capacities and inter-agency coopera-
tion at the national level and international coordination by strengthening 
intelligence-based investigations. Since 2014, the first fully operational 
TCUs in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau carried out joint oper-
ations and have been using INTERPOL tools and services. Notably, 
these TCUs continued operating during the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak 
with UNODC’s operational and logistical support. The strength of the 
model, which is its national ownership and empowerment, has, however, 
also become a challenge where host states are less supportive and even 
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resistant of international involvement in some cases. Another major con-
cern has been the vetting of TCUs personnel and the risk that they may 
not be immune from corruption by powerful criminal networks. The 
sustainability of such an onerous project is also at risk of a funding gap, 
which may be the result of donors refocusing their efforts on emerging 
threats on terrorism, violent extremism, and illegal migrations from the 
region.
Despite this growing recognition that criminal groups can act as 
a spoiler to peace processes and represent a strategic threat to the suc-
cessful implementation of a mission’s mandate and of the fact that peace 
operations could play a role in managing or disrupting organised crime, 
the question of whether peace operations are the right instrument to 
deal with organised crime at the operational level, and if so how they 
should deal with the problem, remains largely unanswered since the first 
major publication on peace operations and organised crime (Cockayne 
and Lupel 2011). The lack of UN success stories and so-called “best 
practices” in this specific area has also surely played a part. While some 
lessons could have been identified from earlier crime-fighting European 
missions such as EU Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (2003) or 
the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, these contexts are very different 
from the ones UN missions now face on the African continent.
Amid this confusion and competing priorities, the UN has so far not 
invested in developing system-wide policy and strategic guidance that 
factors in organised crime. The most recent UN peacekeeping strate-
gic documents, the 2008 Capstone Doctrine—which introduced the 
concept “robust peacekeeping” as a recognition that force may be used 
at the tactical level against spoilers in some cases—and the 2009 New 
Horizon—announcing that the UN is “working to identify essential 
early tasks as the first step to a coherent post-conflict stabilization strat-
egy”—only make few passing references to organised crime, and have yet 
to result in a UN stabilisation doctrine which would factor in the dest-
abilisation impact of such threats. Similarly, while the DPA 2016–2019 
Strategic Plan mentioned TOC upfront alongside “violent extremism” as 
a major issue, no concrete policy responses are mentioned beyond the 
need for strengthening partnerships within the organisation to address 
such transnational and cross-cutting challenges.
The best illustration of such disconnect between the diagnosis and 
the prescription is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The issue of peace 
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operations and organised crime has arguably never before been as rele-
vant as in the Mali/Sahel context, with the 2012 Mali crisis illustrating 
the potentially destabilising impact of criminal networks in the region, 
not only because illegal trafficking became the dominant economy of 
Northern Mali overtime and contributed to financing activities of armed 
groups, but also because the increasing profits from drug trafficking and 
kidnapping-for-ransom activities led to the corroding of State institutions 
eventually leading to the collapse of the Malian State (Lacher 2012). Yet, 
despite broad recognition among member states and UN Secretariat that 
organised crime is a problem in Mali, the mandate given to MINUSMA 
was not different from that of other UN missions. Three years into the 
mission, Resolution 2295 of June 2016 (UN 2016), although it author-
ised a more “proactive and robust posture” in an attempt to prevent 
asymmetric attacks, did not give any specific instructions to MINUSMA 
as to what to do about trafficking in weapons, drugs and humans, which 
at least in some cases are linked to terrorist networks. With most of the 
mission’s military assets dedicated to self-protection, and no obvious 
solution to trafficking in areas beyond the government’s control, organ-
ised crime easily falls down the agenda.
the limitAtions oF consent-bAsed PeAce oPerAtions
Beyond the lack of mandate and strategic guidance, one must acknowl-
edge the many risks and inherent limitations for peace operations to 
address the issue of organised crime effectively. First of all, this is because 
organised crime takes very different shapes and forms from one place to 
another and evolve over time to adapt to changing realities. UN peace 
operations, on the other hand, are deployed for a finite period of time 
which limits its ability to adapt and adopt effective longer-term strate-
gies (that in many cases would imply the transformation of economic and 
power structures) against organised crime. This is rendered even more 
complex by the fact that the leadership of UN operations are faced with 
many competing tasks and priorities—for instance supporting the polit-
ical process and the restoration of state authority—with urgent issues 
often prioritized over the important OC issues.
Haiti is a good example. Here, the UN Stabilization mission 
(MINUSTAH) carried out robust intelligence-led operations against 
gangs in 2006 and 2007 in support of the government, which have 
largely been successful in taming the challenge to stability posed by 
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political violence and armed gangs. The UN mission later refocused 
its efforts away from enforcement towards the development of the 
capacities of the Haitian National Police but without addressing the 
underlying causes of organised crime and trafficking. As a result, while 
the UN may have been a strong deterrent for violence since, it has not 
been a deterrent for illicit activities and the UN risks now withdrawing 
MINUSTAH and leaving a country where organised crime has become 
further embedded in state institutions, including security forces that may 
be profiting from crime rather than fighting it.3
The fact that most UN peace operations (with the notable exception 
of regional offices) are geographically limited to one country is also a 
serious limitation to analysing organised crime and trafficking that profit 
from operating across borders and regions. A further concern has been 
the limited resources, tools, and expertise available to date to peacekeep-
ers in terms of criminal intelligence and political economy analysis but 
also the lack of a legal framework for developing such “supranational” 
capacities. In many cases, the host government may not consent to the 
UN mission investigating criminal networks, which in many cases would 
lead to uncovering links—support, penetration, or co-optation—to both 
armed groups and the government itself, which would naturally strain 
relations with the host State. This may partly explain why until now the 
Security Council has preferred mandating independent Panels/Groups 
of Experts monitoring sanctions regime to look into issue of illegal arms 
and minerals trafficking. The recent resolution 2374 creating a sanctions 
regime in Mali targeting actors derailing the peace process actually lists 
organized crime and traffics as possible sources of financing for spoilers.4
Another recurrent challenge raised by both troop and police 
 contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) is the safety and security of the 
personnel in UN peace operations. Indeed, in most cases organised crime 
does not represent a direct threat to peacekeepers until peacekeepers 
either get involved, or attempt to expose, contain, or disrupt its illegal 
activities. While in some cases UN missions may have the ability to deal 
3 See Haiti case study in Kemp et al. (2013, p. 32).
4 “supporting or financing individuals and entities … including through the proceeds 
from organized crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their 
precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the 
smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in 
cultural property” (UN 2017).
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militarily with some spoilers (the local gangs in Haiti or armed groups 
in the eastern DRC), in other cases, “going on the offensive” against 
powerful organised crime and trafficking networks with links to armed 
groups would likely result in direct retaliations against the UN mission 
and personnel on the ground. Similarly, UN police starting to investigate 
organised crime—even in support of their national counterparts—could 
present potentially serious security concerns for UN personnel. Some 
may even themselves become involved or complicit of powerful OC and 
trafficking networks when UN operations still have no security clearance 
and/or counter-intelligence systems in place.
A constrAined Police cAPAcity-building APProAch
In the midst of this quasi absence of UN strategic guidance for peace 
operations on organised crime and in light of the challenges above, the 
UN Police Division has taken the lead in promoting a law enforcement 
capacity-building approach. Its February 2014 DPKO/DFS Policy on 
United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political 
Missions states that “addressing organized crime and strengthening the 
rule of law have taken on greater importance in most peacekeeping oper-
ations and special political missions and is an important entry point for 
engaging with national authorities to take action.” Activities suggested 
include to “support the planning and implementation of host State and 
regional operational and analytical capacity-building activities” in part-
nership with UNODC, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), INTERPOL and other relevant actors, as well as “anti- 
corruption initiatives; assessments and engagement with the public […] 
and strengthen the capacity of the criminal justice system” (UN Police 
2014). The 2016 External Review of the UN Police Division confirmed 
this tendency by suggesting the better factoring of OC at headquarters 
in order to better support missions in the field in an exhaustive manner.
The Security Council endorsed this approach in November 2014 
when “highlighting the important role that United Nations Police 
Components can play in building the capacity of host-State policing and 
other law enforcement institutions, as mandated, to address organized 
crime, particularly through support in the areas of border, immigration 
and maritime security and crime prevention, response and investiga-
tion.” It however also encouraged information sharing between Special 
Representatives of the Secretary-General, DPKO including the Police 
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Division, DPA, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, 
UNODC, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and UNDP 
“within existing mandates and resources, when considering means 
to address, in a comprehensive and integrated manner, transnational 
organized crime, terrorism and violent extremism which can be condu-
cive to terrorism” (UN 2014a), thereby emphasising the need for a UN 
system-wide approach.
The following month, the Council issued a resolution calling on 
 “relevant entities of the UN and other relevant international and 
regional organizations to support the development and strengthening of 
the capacities of national and regional institutions to address terrorism 
benefitting from transnational organized crime, in particular law enforce-
ment and counter-terrorism agencies” and reiterated that peace opera-
tions “may, if mandated by the Council, assist in capacity-building for 
host governments, as requested, to implement commitments under 
existing global and regional instruments and to address the illicit traf-
ficking of weapons” (UN 2014b, paras. 16 and 18). While that same res-
olution reaffirmed the lead role of the UN in coordinating international 
efforts in combating “international peace and security caused by terror-
ists profiting from involvement in transnational organized crime,” this 
continues to be a challenge in practice with many international actors—
bilateral, regional, and international—often driving competing agendas 
through capacity building projects in support of national authorities.
One of the challenges will indeed be for UN peace operations to 
reconcile a fairly narrow law enforcement capacity-building police 
approach with the need for a UN system-wide approach to preventing 
and addressing organised crime—and its links to terrorism and violent 
extremism—that remains to be defined. In Mali for instance, the UN 
Police component played a leading role and developed unprecedented 
initiatives. It created a twenty-five people Serious and Organized Crime 
unit dedicated to supporting Malian authorities with counterterrorism 
and TOC training and equipping, including the newly developed Malian 
Judicial Division specialised in the fight against terrorism and trans-
national crime. The UN Police has been considering and appealing to 
PCCs for some years already for the deployment of readily formed spe-
cialised team. With the increasing consideration given recently to Serious 
and Organized Crime, the UN aims at fostering the recruitment of 
specialised teams of law enforcement practitioners in peace  operations. 
The specific nature of such police work requires specific expertise and 
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specialisation. The lack of international standards on how to tackle 
organised crime groups might, however, challenge the pressing need of 
supporting host state security forces when threatened by complex crim-
inal organisations. In Mali, by dedicating specialised crime advisers cov-
ering a wide range of police technics against illegal activities, the United 
Nations Police increased its ability to provide an in-depth expertise in 
the complex fields of forensics, criminal intelligence and large scale inves-
tigation. The UN Police also established a MINUSMA Task Force on 
Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime in Mali in mid-2014—which 
includes representatives from UNODC and a number of MINUSMA 
Sections, as well as UNDP. The Action Plan it designed, however, disre-
garded the linkage between security and development by focusing only 
on supporting the Malian law enforcement agencies, judiciary, and cor-
rections sectors, and does not in itself constitute a UN system-wide strat-
egy to organised crime in Mali.
A study by the international non-government organisation 
Transparency International (TI) submitted that “International involve-
ment in defense operations that doesn’t take corruption into account can 
exacerbate the problem, and security assistance can make a country less 
secure if it isn’t accountable […] In Mali, security assistance was focused 
on tactical training and equipping troops, but didn’t address structural 
and institutional weaknesses like corruption” (TI 2015). Indeed, in addi-
tion to the need for the UN to adopt a more integrated approach to 
justice and security sector reform, any strategy to prevent and combat 
transnational organised crime should consider the fight against state cor-
ruption as a foremost concern to be first addressed at the macro level, 
before any action is taken at the operational level to strengthen the 
capacity of local law enforcement agencies. Short of this, the UN risks 
strengthening security and political institutions that are part of the prob-
lem rather than the solution because they are already corrupted by crim-
inal groups. Meanwhile, the UN could do more at the micro/local level 
to mitigate factors bolstering OC and trafficking and to build local com-
munities’ resilience particularly where and when the state is absent.
Academic research advises refocusing security sector reform on the 
needs of individuals and communities in order to avoid building the 
capacity of government structures which can inadvertently supports 
officials connected to crime (Jesperson 2016). Furthermore, such an 
approach would reinforce the confidence of the local population in their 
national institutions and deter them from relying on alternatives provided 
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by criminal or armed groups. In cases where the host country authorities 
may be part of the problem or lack political will, some research has also 
suggested to better acknowledge the penetration of organised crime by 
encouraging development actors to make smarter use of a range of tools 
to determine when to engage and where to prioritise efforts. A detailed 
assessment of interests and stakeholders would enable development actors 
to determine political obstacles to engagement (Kavanagh et al. 2013). 
Nevertheless, the high turnover in mission leadership and lack of longer 
term strategies (partly due to mandates that are renewed every year) also 
affects the ability of the mission to make a difference.
The fairly narrow police capacity building and law enforcement 
approach to organised crime adopted so far, however, seems to be more 
of a default position resulting from both the complexity of the issue at 
stake and the lack of clarity and strategic guidance from Member States 
and the UN Secretariat on what the role and approach of peace opera-
tions could and should be beyond policing. The deployment of a UN 
stabilisation mission in Mali with unprecedented analytical and uni-
formed capacities has brought the issue of organised crime back on the 
radar of UN peace operations and made MINUSMA a new laboratory. 
Already in an October 2013 report, the UN Secretary-General men-
tioned “the fight against corruption and organized crime” as an equally 
important governance challenge to the effective functioning of the 
Malian state, alongside security sector reforms, national dialogue, and 
reconciliation and justice (UN 2013, para. 82). So if the UN were seri-
ous about organised crime, what could/would it do?
the wAy ForwArd: A more strAtegic And holistic 
APProAch to orgAnised crime in PeAce oPerAtions?
First and foremost, the UN needs to develop better information collec-
tion and analysis capacities when it comes to organised crime. In Mali, the 
NATO-standard All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) brought 
unprecedented analytical capabilities to the UN mission but informa-
tion collection itself was not well integrated into the mission’s exist-
ing information and intelligence infrastructure.5 Similarly, the military 
5 In the course of 2017, ASIFU was merged with the Military Intelligence Unit (U2) in an 
attempt to better integrate the mission’s various information collection and analysis capacities.
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intelligence subscribes to a different methodology and purpose that can 
be incompatible with the kind of criminal intelligence and political econ-
omy analysis required for analysing criminal networks and their impact 
and better understand the political, criminal, and terrorist nature of 
diverse armed groups. A more effective approach may be to develop mis-
sion-wide OC analytical capacities so that various staff within the mis-
sion (political affairs/mediation, civil affairs, Joint Mission Analysis 
Center (JMAC), police, justice, Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR), etc.) are able to detect, collect and analyse relevant 
information on an ongoing basis, in liaison with regional UN offices— 
such as UNOWAS and UNODC in the case of MINUSMA—and the 
Panel of Experts when they exist, to factor in cross-border regional 
issues. Such information should then be centralised—Ideally within 
the JMAC, which combines civilian, police and military personnel— 
to produce forward-looking strategic analysis identifying opportunities and 
suggesting both strategic and operational responses to prevent, avert, or 
mitigate threats to mandate implementation for mission leadership. In April 
2017, DPKO released a Peacekeeping Intelligence policy meant to address 
some of these systemic challenges and is envisaging creating Criminal 
Intelligence Unit (CIU) comprised of specialised intelligence police officers 
within missions, but member states remain divided on even the use of the 
term intelligence.
A number of assessment tools already exists—such as the one used 
by UNODC-DPA for regional TOC Threat Assessment (UNODC 
2010) and Spotting the Spoilers: A Guide to Analyzing Organized Crime 
in Fragile States (Shaw and Kemp 2012)—that can be used to train 
and sensitise relevant mission staff. Early literature on peace operations 
and OC suggested that peacekeeping missions should adopt a “spoiler 
management” approach to avoid excluding certain actors or reverting 
to a law enforcement approach by labelling them as criminal. Instead, 
one ought to focus on the mission’s attention on “managing” spoil-
ing behaviour and activities rather than the impossible task of fighting 
OC in general (Cockayne and Lupel 2011). The problem of course is 
that, often, OC may not produce violence in the short term—and may 
even contribute to stability. But in the medium to longer run, however, 
organised crime can effectively undermine the very objective of stability 
and the building of functioning state institutions.
In the first comprehensive review of UN peace operations since the 
2000 “Brahimi report,” the 2015 High Level Independent Panel on 
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Peace Operations (HIPPO) may have overlooked the issue of the impact 
of criminal agendas on the work of peace operations, but nonetheless 
made three recommendations that can be helpful in adopting crime-sen-
sitive approaches in the future: First, it recommends to strengthen the 
underlying analysis towards designing better and more effective politi-
cal strategies, mandate sequencing to allow for better informed strategic 
planning, and more “people-centric” operations. The UN Secretary-
General subsequently established a small centralised analysis and plan-
ning capacity in his office, which could play an important role on 
mainstreaming organised crime into analysis and planning before pre-
paring strategic considerations and options for possible UN responses 
(UN 2015d). For example, the presence of violent criminal actors may 
suggest the need for a uniformed component with more qualified police 
over military. Second, the HIPPO recommends a sequencing approach 
that could, for instance, allow a better “tailoring” of a mission as the 
UN develops a better understanding of the impact of organised crime 
but also of the political will and capacities of the host government—
which in some cases may be part of the problem—with whom the UN 
could establish “Compacts.”6 Third, it recommends a “people-centric” 
approaches to peace operations, in that it could help adopt measures to 
address and prevent OC that risk alienating communities—including by 
depriving them of economic opportunities and hurting their livelihood—
and instead help peace operations strengthen resiliency (UN 2015e).
Amid lots of attention on the OC issue in Mali and the Sahel, the 
HIPPO report also recognised that transnational organised crime “is a 
mission-wide concern and a strategic risk to sustaining peace” but its 
only recommendations was that the UN acquire police expertise in this 
area “when requested and in partnership with others to support national 
police capacity” (UN 2015e, para. 160).
Beyond technical fixes, research points to a more fundamental shift in 
addressing organised crime in fragile state by moving away from the tra-
ditional dominance of security and law enforcement approaches—so far 
6 The idea of “Compacts” was put forward by the 2015 HIPPO Report suggesting that 
UN “mission leadership should be empowered and supported to assess- through broad 
consultations with national actors, the UN Country Team and other international actors as 
required—the context and the most appropriate package of measures to help sustain peace, 
to be reviewed together with mandate renewal. This package should form the basis of a 
compact between the UN and the host government” (UN 2015e, para. 146).
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used by the UN—to a greater role for development actors and partner-
ships. Instead of solely reforming the security sector, capacity building 
programmes should involve more civil society to monitor the practices of 
the security sector, and focus more on citizen security rather than state 
security (Jesperson 2016). The development response to drug trafficking 
in West Africa studied by the US Agency for International Development 
(Dininio 2015), has tabled suggestions in that sense for how develop-
ment actors can better assess when and where to provide support in 
countries where trafficking is prevalent. USAID suggests that develop-
ment programmes should include adequate flexibility to be able to adapt 
to emerging threats by closing activities, shifting locations, or introduc-
ing complementary programming activities especially in areas where gov-
ernment counterparts are identified as complicit. This flexibility would 
require the UN missions to undertake a continuous and meaningful 
analysis of the impact of organised crime and less bureaucratic rules to 
have a nimble ability to support accordingly.
Some existing peace operations activities could, however, bene-
fit from adapting some of the “traditional” UN peace operations tools. 
For instance, James Cockayne (2013) has suggested the strengthening 
of mediation to deal with criminal agendas and armed groups involved 
in illicit activities, which if ignored could spoil peace processes. In Mali 
for instance, the parallel “business deals” between politico-military lead-
ers and businessmen at the head of armed groups seen in late 2015, tak-
ing place outside the formal international mediation process, carry the 
risk of the reestablishment of a militarised political-economic system 
that was the source of much of the violence in the first place in north-
ern Mali (International Crisis Group 2015). But conversely, if such deals 
come in support of a national peace process—as seems to have been the 
case in November 2017—they could also contribute to stability. DDR 
and Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programmes could also 
be used in innovative ways to provide at least short-term alternatives to 
illicit economies. Indeed, while UN peace operations cannot transform 
the political economy of a country, incentive-based, more people-cen-
tric, and non-repressive approaches are essential complements to the law 
enforcement capacity building approaches described above.
Recent research by the United Nations University (UNU) suggests peace 
operations should adopt a more holistic “Crime-Proofing Peace-Making” 
approach. It gives practical but ambitious pointers on what the UN could do 
to protect electoral processes from penetration by criminal financiers, how 
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it could tailor the use of sanctions to address crime-politics connections and 
avoid unintended consequences, make use of strategic communications to 
disrupt and degrade criminal legitimacy, and use gender smart approaches 
(Bosetti et al. 2016). Naturally, the issue of OC goes beyond the mandate, 
capacities, and time span of peace operations, and require better Member 
State cooperation as well as longer-term and system-wide approaches 
both within the UN (including the UN development system) and beyond 
(INTERPOL, International Financial Institutions, etc.).
Some have, however, also highlighted the limitations of current State-
based bilateral and multilateral law enforcement approaches and of the 
tools to fight transnational and multidimensional networks. Notably, the 
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime initiated in 
2011, which brings together senior law enforcement officials, representa-
tives of multilateral organisations, development practitioners, and policy-
makers in a “network to counter networks,” has been calling for a more 
strategic and proactive global approach to counter transnational crime 
and trafficking (The Global Initiative 2011). UN operations, in the rela-
tively short time they are deployed, could benefit from closer collabora-
tion with such networks of experts. Whenever faced with a new issue, the 
tendency of the UN has too often been to expand the bureaucracy by 
creating new specialised units and posts when sometimes it may be best 
to partner with others or bring temporary thematic (political economy, 
criminal intelligence etc.) and region/country-specific (with necessary 
language skills) expertise on board for shorter periods of time.
conclusion
In conclusion, despite the recognition by the UN system and Member 
States that organised crime is a threat to peace and stability, particularly 
when in conjunction with terrorism and violent extremism, there is still 
much uncertainty about how to address it, and even more uncertainty 
about what UN peace operations could and should do about it. The field 
of peace operations and organised crime remains relatively new, with lit-
erature on the issue dating less than a decade. Moreover, the UN started 
officially considering the threats posed by organised crime in mission 
planning and reporting on it only in 2010. And the issue has become 
front and centre, with almost three quarters of UN peace operations now 
operating in environments significantly affected by organised crime, par-
ticularly in the West Africa and Sahel contexts.
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Much of the debate until now, however, has remained at the 
 conceptual level around the fact that OC could represent a strategic 
threat to the successful implementation of a mission’s mandate, and 
little has been experimented at the operational level on how a peace 
operation could practically deal with the problem. Yet, the story of 
UN peace operations is one of trial and error at the field level lead-
ing to lessons that eventually make it into policy through a bottom-up 
approach rather than the reverse. In that sense, recent experiments 
with the regional WACI project, a specialised Serious and Organized 
Crime police unit in MINUSMA, and the increasing acceptation of the 
need for UN missions to collect and analyse ‘intelligence’ (including 
criminal intelligence) are useful developments that will generate fur-
ther lessons. Much can also be achieved through adapting some of the 
existing UN tools (such as mediation and DDR but also assessments, 
elections, strategic communication etc.) and generate greater coher-
ence between missions, UN Country Teams, Regional Offices, UNDP, 
and UNODC, to ensure that the mission’s efforts are part of a longer-
term strategy.
Such developments at the operational level however need to be 
accompanied by a broader strategic thinking on when and where to 
engage, based on a thorough analysis of opportunities and risks that 
should factor in the political economy of the country, corruption of 
state institutions, and the political will of the host government (or lack 
thereof) so that the mission’s efforts do not become part of the problem 
rather than of the solution. UN peace operations also need to become 
more people-centric and focus more on prevention—rather that the 
elusive goal of countering OC—by mitigating factors bolstering traf-
ficking and facilitating the strengthening of communities’ resiliency 
through partnerships with UN development actors and international and 
local non-governmental organisations. This chapter does not suggest 
that every mission deployed in an environment significantly affected by 
organised crime should make it one of the mission’s top priority, and it 
certainly does not suggest that UN peace operations can tackle the issue 
on their own. However, whether and what to do about it, and whom to 
partner with in this endeavour, should be a deliberate decision based on 
an informed analysis.
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UN Policing: The Security–Trust Challenge
Kari M. Osland
introduction1
Despite few success stories (Osland 2014), international police reform 
is considered increasingly important in contemporary conflict resolution 
(UN 2014, 2015a, b, 2016a, b).2 While the breakdown of law and order 
may trigger the deployment of a UN peace operation, it is often the 
(re-)establishment of the rule of law institutions, including policing, that 
indicates a mission is completed and allows for an exit.3
The more robust mandates in UN operations, such as in Mali, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and 
South Sudan, require the international police contribution to not only 
perform its “traditional” tasks, such as mentoring and training, but also 
© The Author(s) 2019 
C. de Coning and M. Peter (eds.), United Nations 
Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order, 
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K. M. Osland (*) 
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1 This chapter was prepared as part of the Community-Based Policing and Post-Conflict 
Police Reform Project (ICT4COP), which has received funding from the European Union’s 
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 653909.
2 Also reflected in investments by the EU and the UN (Peake and Marenin 2008, p. 61; 
Devon 2016, p. 1).
3 Exemplified in Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (UN 2016b, pp. 4 and 9–10).
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to take on new tasks, such as protecting civilians, promoting reform, 
and providing operational support, in addition to an increased focus 
on developing host-state capacity in countering transnational organised 
crime, sexual and gender-based violence, and violent extremism (UN 
2016b, p. 4). The fact that most UN missions operate amid on-going 
war and conflict, appears to have hardened the UN Police’s (UNPOL) 
“shell.” Today, Formed Police Units (FPU) constitute 66% of UNPOL. 
They do not respond to military threats as such, but well-trained FPUs 
are supposed to operate in high-risk environments and have become the 
main unit responsible for protection of civilians (UN Police 2017a; UN 
2016c, p. 3; Sebastian 2015).4
However, the 2016 report on the “External Review of the Functions, 
Structure and Capacity of the UN Police Division” (henceforth the 
External UN Police Division Review) calls for a paradigm shift in 
UNPOL’s operating model in order to have a better chance of achieving 
results (UN 2016a). This is partly based on an understanding that, while 
there has been a steady escalation of tasks to be performed by the police 
(UN 2000a, 2015a), this has not been matched by a change in the oper-
ating model of UNPOL, resulting in a large expectation-implementation 
gap (2016b, pp. 2 and 12).5 For instance, while some of the tasks are 
short-term, such as the protection tasks, others focus more on the res-
toration of trust, requiring a transformed behaviour if not attitude, and 
thus asks for a long-term perspective. There seems to be a delicate bal-
ance between enforcing security on the one hand and establishing trust 
on the other. Is the UN set up to achieve both?
In this chapter, I start by looking closer at the role of the police in 
society with a particular focus on trust, before exploring the role of 
UNPOL, its history, and toolbox. I will then investigate principal reform 
initiatives in and doctrinal development on UN Policing during the last 
decades, before I analyse closer what I call the ‘security–trust challenge’. 
I will end by reflecting on whether the UN is indeed able to both pro-
vide security and build trust.
4 UNPOL homepage on FPU, see https://police.un.org/en/formed-police-units-fpus. 
See also UN (2016c, p. 3; Sebastian 2015).
5 For more on the contextual-conceptual divide, see Chana (2002), Sedra (2010), and 
Osland (2014, p. 4).
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the role oF the Police in society
Most definitions on policing recognise the police as having a responsibility 
to prevent and detect crime, to keep public order, and to protect the peo-
ple. The police can be used as a tool of power; it can also be perceived as a 
projector of power “with the ability to constrain freedom as well as protect 
it under its capacity as both a political and a social institution” (Devon 
2016). As a projector of power, the police empower individuals and 
groups through its practices—intended and unintended. Police reform is, 
therefore, a very political endeavour, challenging the most sensitive sector 
of the state, namely its instrument of power (Osland 2014, p. 28).
The police are supposed to serve the people—as a police service—and 
at the same time, they are meant to protect the interests of the state—as 
a police force (i.e. service vs coercion). Mawby (2008) argues that police 
systems at the control-dominated end of the spectrum tend to be cen-
tralised nationally and have a military-like approach, hardly providing 
public services that address communities. In contrast, at the other end 
of the spectrum are community-oriented police (COP) systems, whose 
main function is to provide a service that addresses the wider needs of 
the community.6 In this latter system, although maintaining order is 
important, crime is seen as symptomatic of wider social problems and 
the police service enjoys a high level of legitimacy. In the control-domi-
nated system, the legitimacy of the police force fails to be recognised by 
the general population. In all types of systems, the police are part of the 
interface between state and society and constitute an important compo-
nent of the social contract between the state and its people. In numerous 
authoritarian states, and in particular in countries experiencing war and 
conflict, there is no recognised contract between the state and the soci-
ety, and the police are used by the ruling elite to protect its own inter-
ests, habitually violating international human rights. Whether the police 
are perceived as a projector of power or as a tool of power, and whether 
there is a recognised contract between state and society, is to a large 
extent a matter of trust between the people and their governors.
According to most research on trust between the police and the cit-
izens, people’s trust in the police is related to the legitimacy of police 
6 The concept of community-oriented policing is somewhat vaguely defined. For more, 
see Rosenbaum (1994), Brogden and Nijhar (2005), Reisig (2010). See also the EU2020-
funded project, Community Based Policing and Post-Conflict Police Reform (ICT4COP).
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actions and ultimately, to the effectiveness of the police (Lea and Young 
1984; Lyons 2002; Sunshine and Tyler 2003); if the citizens view the 
police as legitimate—or trustworthy—cooperation with the police in 
ways that assist effectiveness is more likely (Goldsmith 2005, p. 444). 
However, trust in the police is ultimately linked to trust in govern-
ment—these should be considered interdependent. In cases with strong 
indicators of social disorganisation and socio-economic inequality, public 
trust in the police tends to be lacking (Goldsmith 2005, p. 444). This 
is the case in most post-conflict societies, where the police have served 
the rulers and not the people, and where its practices in dealing with the 
people has not served the purpose of establishing trust, but rather fear 
(del Frate 1998; Mishler and Rose 1998).7
The UN defines “policing” as
…a function of governance responsible for the prevention, detection and 
investigation of crime; the protection of persons and property; and the 
maintenance of public order and safety. Policing must be entrusted to civil 
servants who are members of police and other law enforcement agencies 
of national, regional or local governments, within a legal framework that 
is based on the rule of law. Police and law enforcement officials have the 
obligation to respect and protect human rights. (UN 2016b, pp. 5–6)
Further, in the same document, the UN Secretary-General states that the 
aim of UN police is to “…enhance international peace and security by 
supporting Member States in conflict, post-conflict and other crisis situa-
tions to realise effective, efficient, representative, responsive and account-
able police services that serve and protect the population” (ibid.).
Per both quotes, the police’s two key responsibilities seem to be trust 
and civilian service. One would maybe then assume that (re-)establish-
ing trust in civilian police would be a key task for UNPOL. Nonetheless, 
the context in which the international police officers are to perform their 
duties is very often one characterised by fear and distrust between the 
people and its police—with longstanding histories of abuse and neglect 
by the police—and where parts of the country may still suffer from war. 
Since the international police forces most often are perceived as the 
7 I use the concept ‘post-conflict’ in this chapter, reflecting not only those countries 
where war has stopped, but also those where there has been a relapse of conflict in parts of 
the country and the UN has a policing presence.
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prolonged arm of the state, given that their main role is to assist the 
national police, there is reason to believe that these forces are perceived 
with negative connotations by the people.
unPol: A hArdening shell?
The first international civilian police officer was deployed from 1960 
to 1964 to the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) (UN 2003a, 
p. 84).8 In 1964, the first police component was deployed to the UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Over the next 25 years, 
civilian police were used in UN peacekeeping operations to monitor and 
report on local police activities. This started to change following the 
deployment of police to Namibia in 1989, as part of the UN Transition 
Assistance Group (UNTAG). In 1995, the Centre for Human Rights in 
cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
Training Unit introduced the ‘SMART’ concept—an acronym describing 
the core of civilian police tasks in peace operations: supporting human 
rights and humanitarian assistance; monitoring the performance of the 
local law enforcement agencies, prisons, courts, and implementing agree-
ments; advising the local police on humane effective law enforcement, 
according to the international standards laid down in the conventions, 
covenants, and treaties on human rights; reporting on situations and 
incidents; and training the local law enforcement in the best practice for 
policing and human rights (Hartz 2000, p. 31).
While civilian police officers continued to monitor, mentor and advise 
local police, they also started to assist in the development and restruc-
turing of law-enforcement structures. In the cases of Kosovo and Timor-
Leste, and more recently, to a limited degree, in the Central African 
Republic, they also acted as the authority for law enforcement.9 In addi-
tion, in some missions there have been blurred lines between political 
actors, violent extremist groups, and transnational criminal networks, 
and the UN has been involved in strengthening host-state capacities to 
combat violent extremism, and transnational organised crime, as well as, 
8 From its first deployment in 1960 and for 45 years following, the UN police forces were 
termed CivPol (Civilian Police). In 2005, the name was changed to UN Police (UNPOL).
9 EULEX, the EU’s mission in Kosovo, also has executive policing authority under 
UNSC Resolution 1244 (UN 1999).
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sexual and gender-based violence, for instance in Cote-d’Ivoire, Haiti, 
Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo (UN 2016b, p. 5). Further, 
and as mentioned above, the UN plays an increasingly important role 
in protecting civilians (Sebastian 2015). Hence, there has been a steady 
increase, in the numbers of police officers, the complexity of police tasks, 
and in the number of operations where the police form an integrated 
part, reflecting the general growth in peace operation but also the rela-
tive importance of policing within these missions.
Furthermore, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
has an important advisory role in the planning and implementation of 
police reform around the world and has a more long-term focus com-
pared to DPKO. Since 2012, UNDP is designated together with DPKO 
as the joint Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections 
Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations 
(GFP). Other key partners are the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN 
Women.
It is not only the mandates that have changed, but also the policing 
toolbox of the UN has transformed during the last decades. Today, UN 
police teams range in size from just a few officers to more than 3500. At 
the time of writing, there are 11,034 officers, of whom 10% are women, 
coming from 87 UN Member States and deployed in 16 out of 23 UN 
operations (UN 2017a, b). The main policing instruments of the UN 
are: Formed Police Units (FPUs), currently 66%, and individual police 
officers, currently 34%, including specialised police teams, contracted 
seconded police, and civilian experts. In addition, comes the Standing 
Police Capacity.
Individual Police Officers are normally police officers but can also 
be other law enforcement personnel of various ranks and experience 
assigned to serve with the UN on secondment by governments of 
Member States.10 Individual Police Officers mentor and train national 
police officers; they provide specialisation in different types of inves-
tigations and in several countries, they help law enforcement agents to 
address transnational crime. In some cases, they develop community-ori-
ented policing in refugee or internally displaced persons camps.
10 As of November 2017, the five largest police contributing countries are (in decreasing 
order): Senegal, Rwanda, Egypt, Bangladesh and Jordan (UN Police 2017b).
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Most police officers serving in UN peacekeeping operations are 
deployed as part of a Formed Police Unit.11 These consist of approxi-
mately 140 police officers who are trained to operate in high-risk environ-
ments. The core responsibilities of FPUs are public order management, 
protection of UN personnel and facilities, and support to police opera-
tions requiring a concerted response (ibid.). The FPUs are normally more 
heavily equipped in contrast to individual UN police officers, who are 
unarmed (Hansen 2011, p. 2). The UN deployed its first modern FPU in 
1999, to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).12 The numbers of FPUs 
has increased from 9 units in 2000 to 71 in 2016.13
The Standing Police Capacity is the rapid deployment unit of the UN, 
based in Brindisi, Italy. It has an approved operational capacity of 40 staff 
members and its core task is to provide technical assistance and start-up 
capacity to field missions, as well as in non-mission settings through the 
Global Focal Point arrangement (UN 2016b, p. 7). The Standing Police 
Capacity consists of people with specialised knowledge and leadership 
experience, and is to assist in the fulfilment of the strategic mission of the 
UN Police.
Increasingly, UN Member States have established specialised police 
teams that are deployed in peacekeeping operations. For instance, since 
2010 Norway has a specialised police team on investigating sexual 
and gender-based violence (SGBV) assisting the UN mission in Haiti 
(Caparini and Osland 2016a, b). Furthermore, some UN Member States 
have other instruments available, such as the Spanish Guardia Civil, the 
French Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri, the Portuguese National 
Republican Guard, and the Dutch Royal Marechaussee, all of which 
form part of the European Gendarmerie Force, established in 2006.14 
Several UN Member States also have a growing private industry offer-
ing policing and security services across the globe, including towards UN 
11 As of November 2017, FPUs are deployed in 7 missions. The FPU contributors 
include Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, China, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Mauritania, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda, Senegal and Togo. See UN (2017a).
12 The first FPU (from Ghana) was deployed as part of the UN Operation in the Congo 
(ONUC) from 1960 to 1964 and a similar unit was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1998, called Multinational Specialised Unit (Hansen 2011, p. 1).
13 UNPOL https://police.un.org/en/formed-police-units-fpus (accessed 21 April 2017).
14 For more, see Treaty of Velsen (2007), Arcudi and Smith (2013).
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peacekeeping operations. For instance, in the UK the private  security 
industry offering such services overseas, is now valued at £1 billion 
(Ellison and Sinclair 2013, p. 3).
It seems like the shell of UNPOL has hardened. This is an expected 
development given the more insecure situations the UN faces. One 
would assume this is to promote the security of both the UNPOL itself 
and the people it is there to assist, but what impact can this have on the 
(re)-establishment of trust? Before going into that discussion, let us now 
turn to the different reform initiatives and doctrinal developments par-
ticularly relevant for UN Police.
reForm initiAtiVes And doctrinAl deVeloPment
The most important reform initiatives the last decades in the field of 
policing have come with the Brahimi Report (UN 2000a), the Secretary-
General’s two reports on UN Police (UN 2011, 2016b), the report 
of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) 
(UN 2015a), the subsequent Secretary-General report (2015b), and the 
External UN Police Division Review (UN 2016a). In addition, as for 
doctrinal development, the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 
2185 (UN 2014) and 2382 (2017c) as well as the Strategic Guidance 
Framework for International Police Peacekeeping (SGF) should be men-
tioned. These will be briefly explored in chronological order.
The 2000 Brahimi Report called for a doctrinal shift in the use 
of police and other rule of law elements to support a greater focus on 
reform and restructuring activities. Following the Brahimi Report, the 
General Assembly created the UN Standing Police Capacity, whose pur-
pose was to initiate police components in new missions and assist such in 
existing missions.15
Given the growth in scale and scope for UN Police peacekeeping, 
the need for more strategic thinking was stressed by the UN Secretary-
General in his first report on UN Police in 2011 (UN 2011). On 20 
November 2014, the UNSC unanimously voted for Resolution 2185, 
the first ever dedicated to policing in peace operations (UN 2014). The 
discussion showed an overwhelming engagement where every member 
of the Security Council took the floor (Feller 2014). In this resolution, 
15 Operational in October 2007 with the UN Mission in Chad (MINURCAT).
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the Security Council stressed the importance of international policing in 
peace operations and requested that the Secretary-General further pro-
mote professionalism, effectiveness, and system-wide coherence in the 
policing-related work of the UN, including through the development 
and implementation of standards and guidance through the SGF.
The work on the SGF, started in 2009 by the UN Police Division, 
has consisted of the elaboration of a set of policies, associated guidelines, 
and manuals that are to provide a cohesive and coherent framework for 
UN Police. With the SGF, effective as of February 2014, “…for the first 
time in the history of United Nations police peacekeeping, the mission 
of the United Nations police and what core functions and organizational 
structure should comprise police peacekeeping have been defined” (UN 
Police 2014).16 In addition to an overarching policy, the SGF consists 
of four guidelines on police administration, police capacity building and 
development, police command, and police operations. Mainstreaming 
the UN’s approach towards international policing should, needless to 
say, not be confused with applying the same blueprint for all missions.
While the HIPPO report in 2015 promoted the police components as 
one of the areas to improve sustainable peacebuilding, it also noted that 
“United Nations police officers are not usually trained to deliver police 
reform, and the United Nations model of short-term police deployments 
is supply-driven and unsuited for capacity development. A significant 
change in approach is needed” (UN 2015a, para. 162). It recommends 
that police strategies should be based on capacity assessment in the coun-
try, reflected in mission planning, staffing and recruitment, including 
specialised teams and long-term civilian experts. It also focuses on com-
pleting the SGF, consistent monitoring and evaluation of police devel-
opment efforts, and an increased availability and effectiveness of FPU’s 
(ibid., para. 54–56 and para. 161–168). On the FPU’s, there are dis-
turbing stories being told from several missions that many of these units 
cannot be used for policing purposes because they are too militarised in 
their approach, often coming from countries where regulations for the 
treatment of the general public are close to non-existent.17
16 Earlier documents with a comparable function were the UN Civilian Police Principles 
and Guidelines (2000b), the UN Police Handbook (2005), and the UN Criminal Justice 
Standards for UN Police (2009).
17 Interview May 2016 in New York with two Police Commissioners in ongoing UN mis-
sions in Africa.
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An external review of the UN Police Division was recommended by 
both the HIPPO report and the subsequent Secretary-General imple-
mentation report, on how to improve UN police contributions. In 
January 2016, a seven-member independent team was assigned to con-
duct this review and in May, the External UN Police Division Review 
was delivered.18 One of the challenges identified in the report, is that 
the current model relies on having a high number of Individual Police 
Officers deployed on a short-term rotation to fulfil a capacity- and insti-
tution-building mandate that they are not trained to perform and that is 
complex and long-term in nature (UN 2016a, para. 34a).
The need to strengthen the gender focus and the number of female 
police officers in UN peace operations is another challenge mentioned 
in the HIPPO report (UN 2015a, para. 165), in the 2015 Global Study 
on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 (UN Women 2015), 
and in the 2015 review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (UN 2015c). 
Police officers are more efficient when the different needs, concerns and 
experiences of women and men are taken into account when assisting 
in rebuilding the police in post-conflict societies; it increases the overall 
trust in the police, and presents opportunities to promote gender equal-
ity by, for example, establishing more inclusive national police services 
(Osland 2017a, b). As of November 2017, there are 1081 or 10% female 
police officers deployed, hence, there is still a long way to go (UN 2017a).
In 2016, the UN Secretary-General’s second report on policing was 
launched.19 There, a vision for a “…people-centred, modern, agile, mobile 
and flexible, rights-based and norm-driven” UN police was presented, 
and 14 recommendations were put forward to realise that vision (UN 
2016b, pp. 2–3). These recommendations were further emphasised with 
the UNSC Resolution 2382, adopted in November 2017. The resolution 
stressed the role of UN policing in peace operations throughout the con-
flict cycle. It further recognises that improved performance of UN polic-
ing can contribute to the success of exit strategies and to the protection of 
18 The Under-Secretary General of Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, appointed 
the team, consisting of Hilde Fraf jord Johnson, Norway (co-chair); Abdallah Wafy, Niger 
(co-chair); Ahmad Alsayaydeh, Jordan; Benazir Ahmed, Bangladesh; Janine Rauch, South 
Africa; Serge Rumin, France; and Mark Kroeker, United States.
19 This report was a response to the External Review (2016a) as well as to Security 
Council Resolution 2185 (UN 2014).
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civilians, including in preventing and addressing sexual and gender-based 
violence. Also, it supports implementation of the SGF, the need to give 
clear, credible, achievable, appropriately resourced mandates for polic-
ing-related activities, and emphasise the need to ensure a UN system-wide 
approach to the rule of law, including through the Global Focal Point. It 
also urges police-contributing countries to ensure comprehensive training 
for deployed police and to substantially increase the numbers of women 
officers and their representation in leadership positions.
Through all of these reports and resolutions, much knowledge about 
challenges and best practices has been put on the table. However, there 
is still a large gap between this and what is being implemented.
why is it so hArd?
One of the main reasons why it is so difficult to succeed is simple: UN 
policing is an enormously challenging endeavour. It was never easy, but 
the increase in tasks to be carried out, combined with a system that is not 
set up to manage the new reality of tasks, mandates, and problems, only 
adds to the challenge.
If looking at what is being done in UN missions on policing, one might 
get the impression that the main purpose is to strengthen the existing police, 
whatever type of police that may be. This is because a large part of the activ-
ity consists of rebuilding, equipping, and training the police forces. UNSC 
resolutions occasionally state that peacekeepers will assist in reforming the 
national police in line with the principles of democratic policing but more 
often, they mandate peacekeepers to train police forces. In the original man-
date for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) it is stated that the mission 
shall do both “…assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitor-
ing and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic 
policing, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise 
assist in the training of civilian police…” (UN 2003b, para. 3n). However, 
the implementation of these mandates seems to focus on the more “techni-
cal” parts, stressing the training, rebuilding, and equipping of the national 
police forces, and less on the more long-term issues that will contribute to 
(re-)establishing trust (Osland 2014). There are several reasons why this is 
the case (ibid.).
First, it is not uncommon that the most basic of police equipment 
is lacking, that there are none or devastated police stations or training 
centres, and that the war has lasted so long that it is imperative to start 
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afresh, establishing a new force with updated training etc. Second, the 
mandates are normally not long-term, and the training, rebuilding, and 
equipping of the police can be expected to show relatively quick and tan-
gible results. On the other hand, the reforms to make the police more 
accountable, in accordance with democratic standards, and increasing the 
trust of the people, demand a long-term perspective. The progress and 
results of this latter work is almost by definition very difficult to meas-
ure. Third, while there may be much disagreement between the national 
government and international actors on the goal and strategies for the 
way ahead, it is frequently the case that national and international actors 
would concur on the need for new equipment and buildings—they are 
not perceived as very sensitive. Fourth, the changes can be performed 
relatively independent of other reform initiatives.
While all of these activities may contribute to a necessary re-building 
and investment, if this is the only thing that is done, it mainly contributes 
to one part of what seems to be the main goal for the international inter-
vention; it contributes to increasing the security part but it does very lit-
tle as for the trust-building part, except for the fundamental fact that if 
people do not experience basic security, trust will not prevail. This leads 
us to what I will call the security–trust challenge.
Simplified, I would argue that there are two main challenges for 
international police forces who are to assist in peace operations: on the 
one hand, increase the sense of security of the people and, on the other 
hand, assist in increasing the trust between the police and the people. 
Both challenges would normally require a long-term perspective, but 
while (re-)establishing trust could require a generational perspective, in 
cases where it is non-existent (re-)establishing a sense of security is some-
what more short term—albeit that these two goals are clearly related. 
Democratic countries, who have a police service understanding of polic-
ing, would tend to be both high on the trust and the security end of the 
scale. More authoritarian countries would be high on security but low 
on trust, while post-conflict countries and countries where conflict is still 
ongoing, would be low on both security and trust. This can be exempli-
fied in the following Model 10.1:
The UN and other international actors such as the EU and the AU, take 
a Weberian state-centric understanding as its point of departure. This does 
not necessarily imply that the only way forward is to pursue a top-down 
approach to police reform. Research has proven that this is not very suc-
cessful (Osland 2014). For the international community to succeed in 
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assisting in also building trust between the local police and its people, a 
bottom-up approach would be an important contribution and communi-
ty-oriented policing holds promise in this regard. This is intertwined with 
one of the most difficult areas for international interveners, to establish 
national ownership. National ownership in this setting represents a para-
dox: we only talk about national ownership when there are external actors 
as part of the equation—as such, national ownership is a utopia. In an ideal 
world, national ownership is locally initiated and externally supported—
external actors are supposed to assist and complement national actors, to 
provide options and not answers. In reality, most plans and strategies are 
created by outside actors, and then afterwards one tries to make local gov-
ernmental actors agree to those plans and implement them. In order to 
answer the External UN Police Divisions Review in their call for a para-
digm shift, I would argue that to start focussing on community-oriented 
policing would be a change in the right direction—towards a more bot-
tom-up approach, towards more local ownership—and in the end, towards 
more trust between the people and their police; and increased sense of 
security for the people. Some recent internal reviews have started endorsing 
this approach (UN 2014, para. 49; UN Police 2016, para. 22). According 
to the SGF Guidelines on Police Operations of 2016, there are four corner-
stones of community-oriented policing (UN Police 2016, para. 30):
• consulting with communities,
• responding to communities,
Model 10.1 The 
 security–trust challenge
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• mobilizing communities, and
• solving recurring problems.
While this is promising, it should not be forgotten that the launching of 
reports and strategies are only the mid-point of a reform path; if it is to 
be implemented, you need strong and consistent champions to follow 
it through (Thakur 2016). The needed reforms and their accompanying 
initiatives will not fly unless some dedicated Member States make a real 
effort in promoting them, over time.20
If the purpose for the UN work on policing does not include (re-)
establishing such trust, then that needs to be made clear from the begin-
ning. The HIPPO report echoes the need for realism as for what can be 
achieved within its lifespan (UN 2015a, para. 161). Also, the External 
UN Police Division Review is clear in its criticism in this regard: “a 
paradox exists between the supply of a large number of regularly rotat-
ing personnel, usually police generalists, who are deployed to United 
Nations missions, and the long-term qualitative and structural challenges 
they are expected to address” (2016a, p. 8).
concluding remArks
Compared to 20 years ago, there has been considerable progress in some 
areas, for instance, a larger focus on local ownership as imperative for 
sustainable reforms (Donais 2015); an understanding that more technical 
reforms are also highly political through the empowering of some and 
disempowering of others (Osland 2014); as well as an increased under-
standing that police reform, like reform of the larger security sector, 
implies a changed way of thinking about reforms rather than a given set 
of actions (Osland 2015, pp. 31–33). Nevertheless, the ongoing chang-
ing landscape of conflicts merits a continuous process of change in our 
understanding of how to handle these new challenges. During the last 
two decades, both the mandates and the tools of the UNPOL have 
changed: with nine Formed Police Unites (FPUs) in 2000, to 71 author-
ised FPU’s in 2016. This development has happened in a context of a 
constant lack of resources; more robust mandates focusing more on pro-
tection of civilians and combatting violent extremists’ groups, on which 
20 Norway has been one of the driving forces behind the SGF-process, as one such 
example.
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the police officers often have received little specific training; UNPOL 
officers from 87 countries, all with their own principles and structures, 
not to forget the context that is often characterised by distrust between 
the general public and the police in the host-state. It goes without saying 
that assisting in the restoration of state authority in such a context, rep-
resents a very serious challenge; in particular seen from the perspective 
of those citizens who are not represented by the political elite at a given 
time, but also seen from the perspective of the UN, that not assisting in 
restoring state authority is not perceived as an option since the alterna-
tive is that non-state and often criminal actors will take advantage of any 
security and governance vacuum. What may represent an even greater 
challenge is the restoration or establishment of trust between the host-
state police and its people. In order to achieve this, a different timeframe 
is needed and probably also a different approach—less top-down and 
more bottom-up. An increased focus on community-oriented policing is 
a step in the right direction. The extent to which external actors, such as 
the UN, can indeed contribute towards increased trust between people 
and its police, is a different matter.
So, is UNPOL fit for purpose? At first glance, it is tempting to make 
a connection between the equipment used by the police—and argue that 
its hardened shell represented by its increasing number of FPUs—will be 
counterproductive to establishing trust. Yet, this is a simplified argument; 
it is about how the police behave, not how they are equipped. If the 
operational situation requires a more robust set-up, it will not contribute 
to establishing trust if the police is neither equipped nor organised to 
handle the challenges, quite the contrary. For the police to be perceived 
as legitimate, it needs to simultaneously be perceived as efficient. Trust 
is first and foremost connected to attitudes and behaviour and how the 
police treat the people it is set to serve. However, if UNPOL is supposed 
to be a community-oriented service, as stated in the SGF, something 
that could in fact contribute towards increased national ownership and 
hence, add to the security–trust challenge, then UNPOL is not fit for 
purpose. While the strategies are there, saying that community-oriented 
policing should be an overarching approach for international assistance 
in post-conflict countries, the implementation of a community-oriented 
policing strategy is lacking.
We live in an era where there is a lot of scepticism about the UN and 
its ability to perform in the peace and security arena. While the UN often 
gets blamed for the failures, the ultimate responsibility lies with Member 
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States. The UN Secretariat can support Member States, but they cannot 
replace them or make up for the lack of political will among them.
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CHAPTER 11
Africa and UN Peace Operations: 




Over the past decade and a half, Africa has developed a significant peace 
operations capacity. This is reflected in the number of peacekeepers 
African countries contribute to African-led and United Nations (UN) 
peace operations. African countries contributed only 10,000 troops to 
UN peacekeeping operations in 2000, when the African Union (AU) 
was established (Lotze 2013). Today, African countries contribute about 
50% of the UN’s approximately 100,000 peacekeepers.1 This means that 
Africa has now replaced South East Asia as the largest regional contribu-
tor to UN peace operations. Since the AU was launched, it has deployed 
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eight peace operations of its own, including to Burundi (AMIB), 
the Central African Republic (MISCA), the Comoros (AMISEC and 
MAES), Mali (AFISMA), Somalia (AMISOM) and Sudan (AMIS I 
and II). In addition, it has provided support to ad hoc regional secu-
rity coalitions against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Boko Haram 
and instability in the Sahel region. In total, African countries contrib-
uted approximately 85,000 military, police and civilian personnel to UN 
and African-led peace operations in 2018. The main reason why Africa’s 
peace operations capacity has significantly increased over the past decade 
and a half is because the AU and the sub-regional organisations in Africa, 
with significant support from international partners, have invested in 
establishing and developing the African Standby Force. This project has 
generated political support in Africa and internationally for a significantly 
scaled-up African role in peace operations on the African continent. It 
has been successful in focussing the support of international partners, 
including the UN, on building African peace operations capacities. The 
success of this project to date has boosted the confidence of the AU and 
the sub-regional organisations, and today they are playing a much more 
prominent role in conflict management in Africa than ever before.
One of the implications of this more assertive African posture is that 
the UN has less freedom to manoeuvre than it enjoyed in the past. 
A decade and half ago the UN was the most important actor when it 
came to the deployment of peace operations in Africa. Today, it is 
unthinkable that the UN would consider deploying a new peace oper-
ation in Africa without close consultation with the AU and relevant 
African countries and sub-regional organisations. In fact, the UN would 
probably only consider deploying a peace operation in Africa if the AU 
or the relevant sub-region is unable to take the lead itself, and even then 
the UN mission is likely to have a significant African character. Africa 
is thus no longer only the recipient or host of UN peace operations, 
the AU and the sub-regional organisations in Africa have now become 
an integral part of the global peace and security architecture. This has 
changed the role of UN peace operations in Africa. As approximately 
75% of UN peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, and approximately the 
same amount of the UN peacekeeping budget is spent on peace oper-
ations in Africa, this means that these changes are likely to profoundly 
affect UN peace operations in the years ahead.
This chapter will explore the future direction that AU and African-
led peace operations may take, and consider its impact on the strategic 
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relationship between the UN and the AU. We will assess the capacities 
the AU has developed to date, and are likely to continue to develop, 
as well as several decisions the AU has taken recently regarding re- 
organising the Union and improving the way its peace operations are 
financed. Based on these considerations we will assess the implications 
of these developments for the relationship between the UN and regional 
organisations.
AFricAn-led PeAce oPerAtions
The peace operations led by the AU, the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs) or African-led ad 
hoc coalitions, are all deployed under the legal framework of the AU 
Constitutive Act and the UN Charter. The AU’s Peace and Security 
Protocol have established a comprehensive African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), which include elements such as the Continental 
Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the Peace Fund, and the 
African Standby Force (ASF). Three RECs, namely the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and two RMs, namely the East 
African Standby Force (EASF) and the North African Regional Capacity 
(NARC), make up the five regional standby arrangements of the ASF.
The practice that has emerged over the past decade and a half is that 
there are three main types of African-led peace operations, namely those 
deployed by the AU, those deployed by RECs/RM and those under-
taken by an ad hoc coalition (de Coning 2017). The AU-led operations 
include the operations in Burundi (AMIB, 2003), Darfur (AMIS, 2004), 
Comoros (MAES, 2007), Somalia (AMISOM, 2007–), Mali (AFISMA, 
2012), and the Central African Republic (CAR) (MISCA, 2013). The 
AU has also deployed a mission to West Africa to stop the spread of 
Ebola in 2014 (ASEOWA).
Examples of REC/RM-led operations include ECOWAS’ ECOMOG 
missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, the ECCAS missions 
in CAR, such as FOMUC (2002–2008) and MICOPAX (2008–2013), 
and the more recent ECOWAS missions to Guinea-Bissau and the 
Gambia (2017) and the SADC mission to Lesotho (2017).
Examples of African-led ad hoc security coalitions operations include 
the Regional Cooperative Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army 
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(RCI-LRA), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) that is com-
batting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, and the G5 Sahel Force 
that combats violent extremism and organised crime in the Sahel. These 
coalitions differ significantly from the traditional notion of a peace oper-
ation. The MNJTF is essentially a counter-insurgency and counter- 
terrorism operation where countries from the region, including 
Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria undertake their own national oper-
ations—mostly within their own borders, and occasionally in hot pursuit 
across their borders—but in a coordinated manner with a shared politi-
cal-strategic mandate and a joint multinational headquarters that coordi-
nate the overall effort. The G-5 Sahel Force follows the same logic and is 
a regional initiative consisting of Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, 
and Niger. Together they counter transnational organised crime and vio-
lent extremism in the Sahel region. The AU’s role is to provide strate-
gic-political direction and authority, via mandates from the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC), to coordinate international backing, including 
financial contributions, and to provide technical support for the multina-
tional headquarters.
The observations and recommendations of the UN’s Independent 
High-level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) regarding the primacy 
of politics is also highly relevant for African-led peace operations. These 
African-led peace operations are meant to be part of a larger political 
intervention where the role of the military operation is to contain vio-
lence and generate stability, so that political solutions can be pursued. In 
reality, however, the security effort is often not matched sufficiently with 
political and development efforts. It often takes a few years for those 
responsible for deploying such operations to realise that the military or 
security dimension is insufficient to bring about and end to hostilities, 
and that a much more comprehensive approach is needed to sustain the 
peace. In Somalia, for instance, where AMISOM is engaged in stabilisa-
tion, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism operations, it took the 
AU and the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) approximately a 
decade to understand that whilst AMISOM may be able to temporarily 
stabilise a situation by winning selected battles and by controlling some 
towns, it cannot ultimately defeat Al Shabaab militarily. They can only be 
defeated in the long-term if the Government of Somalia can provide bet-
ter security, governance, and social-economic opportunities than what Al 
Shabaab can offer. As a result of these lessons, there are initiatives under-
way in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin to embed the G5 force and the 
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MNJTF into larger regional stabilisation strategies that are politically-led 
and that include development, socio-economic, governance and rule of 
law dimensions. It also means that these African-led operations would 
need to be part of larger international networked stabilisation and devel-
opment strategies, because they would not be able to achieve their mis-
sions on their own. The UN plays a leading role in coordinating these 
regional strategies and networks.
Most AU- and REC-led peace operations to date have included political 
and civilian components that have the task of providing the mission leader-
ship with advice and support on the roles these missions should play in the 
political and civilian realms, as well as in participating in the larger regional 
and international networks that are needed to achieve their missions’ man-
date. The ASF has had a dedicated effort to develop the civilian dimension 
of African peace operations since 2006 (de Coning and Kasumba 2010). 
However, these efforts have lagged behind the investment in the military 
capabilities of the ASF, and will need to be significantly scaled-up if they 
are going to have an impact on the way AU- and REC-led peace opera-
tions are planned and managed (de Coning et al. 2017). The UN has been 
slow to grasp the importance of the civilian dimension of African peace 
operations. Initially the UN has discouraged the AU from developing a 
civilian component for, for instance AMISOM. It saw AMISOM as a mili-
tary operation and it wanted the UN political mission to provide the civil-
ian expertise. Eventually the UN accepted that the AU needed to have its 
own political and civilian expertise in order for it to meaningfully engage in 
a larger comprehensive strategic framework (de Coning et al. 2017).
Two other operations deserve to be mentioned, because the first 
reflects how African-led capabilities have also augmented UN peace 
operations and the second reflects on the level of maturity the African 
peace and security architecture. The first is the Force Intervention 
Brigade (FIB) that was deployed to enhance the UN Stabilization 
Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 
2013. The FIB was given the mandate to neutralise the M23 and other 
rebel groups, and is a rare example of a UN peace operation that has 
been tasked to do peace enforcement (Karlsrud 2015). The International 
Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), SADC, and the AU 
concluded that MONUSCO was not effective enough in countering the 
M23 and other rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and proposed to establish 
an AU or SADC force. Once the UN Security Council was convinced 
that such a force had clear political support from all the stakeholders in 
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the region, the UN suggested that such a force should be incorporated 
into the existing UN mission. This was agreeable to the countries in the 
region because it resolved the complications that would arise from hav-
ing two different forces operating in the same area of operations, and it 
also solved the challenge of financing and supporting the FIB if it was an 
AU or SADC operation.
The FIB is widely regarded as having been effective in supporting 
the Congolese armed forces in containing the M23 rebel group (Peter 
2015). This success was due to a number of factors. All the FIB’s 
TCCs—Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania—as well as the host nation 
DRC, are members of SADC. They have participated in joint training 
exercises under the auspices of the SADC Standby Arrangement of the 
ASF, which meant that they had a common understanding of the doc-
trine and command and control. The FIB was deployed with a clear 
political will to use force. With the full support of the DRC, TCCs, 
SADC, ICGLR and the AU, the UN Security Council deployed the FIB 
with a clear mandate to use offensive force, if necessary, to contain the 
rebel groups. Finally, the FIB was deployed with its own enablers and 
force multipliers including artillery, attack helicopters, and specially 
trained troops. It is the combination of these factors that enabled the 
FIB to undertake the kind of offensive enforcement actions that it did 
initially take against the M23. When some of these factors waned, for 
instance when the DRC, TCCS, ICGLR, SADC, the AU and the UN 
failed to reach a similar common understanding on how best to deal with 
some of the other rebel groups, the FIB became less effective.
As a result of the early successes of the FIB in the DRC, the AU and 
UN also considered deploying an African FIB-type mission to Northern 
Mali, and a Regional Protection Force in Juba, South Sudan, which 
would be tasked with protecting civilians to support the UN Mission 
in South Sudan. The protection force was authorised in August 2016, 
but deployment began first in August 2017 because the government of 
South Sudan objected to its composition and deployment modalities 
(Williams 2016). The plan for a FIB-type mission for Northern Mali 
morphed into what is now the G-5 Sahel Force. These developments 
may indicate the start of two news trends, namely on the one hand 
where regionally led and composed forces are used to augment UN 
peacekeeping operations, and on the other hand, where UN peacekeep-
ing or dedicated support missions are used to support regional forces, 
such as in the case of AMISOM and the G5-Sahel force.
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The second operation is the January 2017 intervention of ECOWAS 
in The Gambia. In this case a constitutional crisis developed when 
the then President Yahya Jammeh, first recognised and then later dis-
puted the victory of Adama Barrow in the 2016 presidential elec-
tion. ECOWAS, the AU, and the international community recognised 
the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. A constitutional crisis 
loomed as President Jammeh refused to step down and hand over power 
on 19 January 2017 (Al Jazeera 2017). To avert a crisis, several heads 
of state from the ECOWAS region travelled to The Gambia to convince 
Jammeh to hand over power. When he continued to refuse, ECOWAS 
prepared for a military intervention. On 19 January, Adama Barrow 
was inaugurated as President in the Gambian Embassy in Senegal. His 
first act at President was to request ECOWAS to help ensure that the 
constitutional order is preserved in The Gambia. On the same day 
the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2337, which expressed 
support for ECOWAS’ efforts to find a political solution to the crisis 
in The Gambia. Shortly before the ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia 
(ECOMIG) started to enter The Gambia from neighbouring Senegal, 
the Gambian army chief pledged allegiance to President Barrow and 
declared that the Gambian army will not resist the ECOWAS interven-
tion. Before ECOMIG reached the capital Banjul, it halted its advance 
to give more time to find a negotiated solution. After further diplomatic 
interventions by the Presidents of Mauritania and Guinea, Jammeh 
finally agreed to step down, and he left the country on 21 January 
(Cocks and Jahateh 2017).
As President Barrow requested help from fellow ECOWAS coun-
tries, ECOMIG was not a non-consensual intervention, and thus did not 
require UN Security Council authorisation. The Gambian experience 
reflects how far ECOWAS and the AU has come in the development 
and application of the APSA. Firstly, ECOWAS and the AU followed the 
election in The Gambia closely, including through election observation 
missions, and thus had their own information that led them to cred-
ibly recognise the outcome of the elections. Secondly, both ECOWAS 
and the AU took several decisions that signalled very clearly to Jammeh 
and the international community their intent to recognise the election 
and thus Barrow as the elected President. ECOWAS signalled early that 
it would pursue a peaceful transfer of power, but use force if necessary. 
The AU also clearly signalled that it would no longer regard Jammeh as 
President after 19 January. The AU has a long-standing policy to reject 
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unconstitutional changes of government, and the consistent applica-
tion of this norm further helped to create a political context in which it 
was clear to all, and finally also to Jammeh, that he had no option other 
than to hand over power to newly elected President Barrow. Thirdly, 
the mustering of ECOMIG signalled to Jammeh, the Gambian army, 
and all others involved that ECOWAS was serious in its intent to use 
force if necessary. Fourthly, ECOWAS was careful to ensure that it acted 
according to international law and the constitution of The Gambia, fur-
ther ensuring that the mission was seen by all as legitimate and credi-
ble. Lastly, ECOMIG managed to intervene with a credible mustering of 
force and firm resolve, carefully synchronised with clear political support 
and direction, and this enabled it to achieve its mission without the need 
to use force. The Gambia case demonstrated how ECOWAS and the AU 
used its political, diplomatic, and military tools in a sophisticated and 
coordinated way to prevent and manage a significant crisis. The alter-
native could have been a costly civil war that could have destabilised an 
already fragile region.
The AU and the sub-regional organisations have thus developed a sig-
nificant peace operations capacity over the last decade and a half. This 
capacity has been used to deploy AU, sub-regional and ad hoc coalition 
operations, and it has contributed significantly to UN peace operations. 
At the same time, as the Gambia case show, African institutions have 
developed the ability to coordinate sophisticated international, regional 
and sub-regional networks, as well as to align its political, diplomatic 
and peace operations efforts, to prevent and manage crisis and conflicts. 
African is thus no longer only a recipient or host of UN peace opera-
tions, but it has now become a strategic partner and enabler for the UN.
Au reForms
There are three aspects that will have a significant impact on the future 
direction of African-led peace operations. Firstly, the AU should adapt 
its current Peace Support Operations (PSO) doctrine, as well as the ASF 
concept, to better reflect the kind of operations the AU and RECs have 
undertaken over the past decade, and is likely to undertake in future. 
The AU PSO doctrine and ASF concept was developed between 2003 
and 2008, when the AU had little experience of its own. As a result, 
its PSO doctrine and ASF concept largely reflect the doctrinal and pol-
icy assumptions of NATO, EU, and the UN at the time. Since then, a 
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unique African model of peace operations has emerged (de Coning et al. 
2016), and NATO, EU, and UN approaches to peace operations have 
also undergone considerable adaptations (de Coning et al. 2017). The 
AU should thus review and update its doctrine, concepts and policy 
frameworks to reflect the changes in the global system and its own expe-
riences and lessons.
Secondly, another important aspect that needs to be addressed is the 
ambiguous relationship between the AU and the RECs. Various AU 
reports and decisions have highlighted the need to clarify the relationship 
between the AU and the RECs (African Union 2017; Assogbavi 2017). 
Should the relationship be based on the principle of subsidiarity, where 
the RECs have the primary responsibility for peace and security in their 
regions? There are two issues that complicate this question. Firstly, how 
should the AU and RECs deal with crises that lie on the border of two 
regions? Secondly, how should the response account for the fact that not 
all regions are equally developed?
The AU operation in Mali has highlighted the challenges when a 
REC, in this case ECOWAS, has to manage a crisis on its border, when 
key neighbours and stakeholders, for instance Algeria and Chad, are not 
part of the REC. In such instances the role of the AU can be a key factor 
in ensuring regional coherence and synergy. The operation in Mali also 
highlighted that in the absence of a functioning REC in North Africa, 
the AU had to go beyond the regional building block model and find 
innovative ways to engage all the stakeholders. The planning for the 
2016 MAPROBU mission in Burundi also showed that although the 
Eastern African Standby Arrangement should have been the appropri-
ate regional mechanism to carry out the mission, various political factors 
resulted in the AU having to look beyond the regional building block 
model for TCCs. These cases show that the AU cannot always depend 
on the subsidiarity-based REC regional building-block model of the 
ASF. In fact, despite the progress made with the ASF, most African-led 
operations to date have been ad hoc coalitions of the willing (de Coning 
et al. 2016, p. 120). The AU-REC/RM experiences in Burundi, CAR, 
Mali and Somalia have thus shown that each situation is unique and that 
no one model of subsidiarity can accommodate each situation. Instead, 
in each case, a particular division of work emerged based on the actual 
relations and comparative advantages of the different actors on the 
ground. Instead of trying to find one predictable model, the AU and 
RECs/RMs should invest in institutionalising predictable coordination 
222  c. de coning
and cooperation mechanisms and processes, including regular informa-
tion exchanges, joint assessment missions, joint analysis, joint planning, 
joint deployments, co-location, and joint evaluations.
Thirdly, the AU has decided to embark on a significant structural 
reform process during its January 2017 Summit, based on a set of pro-
posals submitted by a team led by President Paul Kagame of Rwanda 
(Assogbavi 2017). The reform proposals require that the AU refocus 
itself around fewer priorities, of which peace and security is recognised to 
be at the core of the AU’s mandate and role. Another important dimen-
sion is the financing of the African Union and specifically the funding of 
peace operations.
The AU has become reliant on partners for approximately 98% of its 
programme budget and 99% of its peace and security expenditure (African 
Union 2016a). This is problematic, because the AU’s dependency on 
external resources denies it the freedom to independently take deci-
sions on the strategic, operational, and even tactical aspects of the PSO 
it is responsible for. Any action that has cost implications requires prior 
negotiation with partners to mobilise the resources necessary for it to be 
implemented. As a result, the AU has only been able to undertake those 
operations where there was a convergence of interests with its partners.
The financial problems of the AU reached a critical stage in 2015, 
and that year the AU Member States, at both the January and July AU 
Summits, committed themselves to self-finance 100% of the AU’s regular 
budget, 75% of its programme budget, and 25% of its peace and security 
budget, in particular the cost of its peace operations, by the year 2020 
(African Union 2016a). This commitment was followed-up at the AU 
Summit in Kigali in June 2016, where a historic decision was reached 
to implement a 0.2% levy on eligible imports into all AU member states 
(African Union 2016b, para. 5b). In addition to the decision to intro-
duce an import levy, the July 2016 Summit also approved recommenda-
tions for the revitalisation of the Peace Fund.
If successful, this new funding arrangement will significantly 
strengthen the ability of the AU to take ownership of its own operations. 
It will also result in a more balanced relationship between the AU and 
the UN, because the AU will be able to co-fund—with at least 25% of 
its operations—those peace operations the UN Security Council author-
ises it to undertake. The funding generated by the import levy may ena-
ble the AU to shift its relations with partners away from one defined by 
financial necessity, to one informed by strategic choice.
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There are thus reforms underway at the level of the AU and the RECs 
that has the potential to further strengthen the capacity of the AU and 
RECS/RMs to undertake peace operations. The AU-UN relationship is 
thus likely to be characterised by a further strengthening of African capa-
bilities and a willingness of African institutions to take up an even greater 
share of responsibility for African peace and security.
imPlicAtions For the strAtegic PArtnershiP  
with the united nAtions
The AU–UN relationship used to be more like a donor-recipient rela-
tionship where the UN’s role was to build the capacity of the AU. The 
AU took a conscious decision to change that a decade and a half ago, 
and have since succeeded in transforming the AU–UN relationship into a 
functioning strategic partnership.
The peace operations that the AU undertakes under UN authorisa-
tion needs to be understood as regional responses to global problems. 
Most African conflicts are global in the sense that they are heavily influ-
enced by external factors like the global war on terror; fall-out and spill-
over from the interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria; the 
exploitation of natural resources by multinational companies; capital 
flight facilitated and solicited by the international financial system; and 
transnational organised crime, driven by markets in the West and Asia 
for narcotics, human trafficking, timber, and illegally caught fish (Africa 
Progress Report 2013). African peace operations thus represent a signifi-
cant contribution to the global common good.
For this reason, the AU has been arguing consistently for many years 
that, together with other regional organisations, it is effectively part of 
a collective global peace and security architecture. Therefore, when the 
AU is asked to help the UN maintain international peace and security 
in Africa, the UN should use its assessed contribution system to support 
the peace operations that the AU is undertaking on behalf of the UN 
(African Union 2016a). From an AU perspective, the UN assessed con-
tribution budget for peace operations is the most effective and efficient 
global burden-sharing arrangement for peace operations, as all mem-
bers of the international system contribute to the budget against a pre-
agreed scale of assessment. However, to date, the prevailing view in the 
UN Security Council is that the UN should assist the AU to mobilise 
resources by encouraging partners and by facilitating the establishment 
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of Trust Fund arrangements, but that its obligation does not extend to 
directly financing AU operations. However, in Sudan, Mali, CAR and 
Somalia the UN Security Council has authorised, on a case-by-case basis, 
the UN to assist AU peace operations with various form of direct and 
indirect support, utilising the UN’s assessed contribution budget. The 
issue that is currently being considered is whether the UN Security 
Council should make an in-principle commitment to finance AU peace 
operations.
In this debate a number of pre-conditions have been identified, 
namely that the AU take steps to ensure that its peace operations adhere 
to international human rights, international humanitarian law, and 
related conduct and discipline standards, that the AU provide access to 
UN auditors, and that the AU finances at least 25% of the cost of its 
peace operations itself. The AU has taken steps towards meeting these 
pre-conditions, and the UN Secretariat and a number of UN Member 
States have expressed satisfaction with the progress made. It is likely 
that the AU, the UN Secretary-General and several UN Member States 
will keep this issue on the agenda of the UN Security Council, but it 
is unlikely that the Council will commit itself in-principle, to directly 
financing AU peace operations authorised by the UN Security Council in 
the short- to medium term.
At the UN a number of reforms are also underway, and there is thus 
a need for the AU and UN to remain closely coordinated, at all levels, 
to ensure that both can adapt their relations to their respective reform 
processes, as well as in response to the existing and emerging operational 
challenges they face.
Meanwhile, at the operational level, a symbiotic division of work 
has developed between the AU and the UN, and this has been further 
strengthened in a strategic partnership agreement between the AU and 
UN that was signed in 2017. The UN is good at implementing peace 
agreements and consolidating peace processes, but it is not well suited 
for enforcement actions. The AU has demonstrated that it is willing and 
able to undertake stabilisation and counter-terrorism operations, but it 
lacks the broad sets of capacities necessary to implement comprehensive 
peace agreements. The UN and AU thus have mutually reinforcing capa-
bilities that serve as the basis for a strategic partnership in which the UN 
and AU complement and augment each other. The AU and sub-regional 
organisations have acted as first responders in Burundi, CAR and Mali. 
When these situations have been sufficiently stabilised, the UN has taken 
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over with a peacekeeping operation to consolidate the peace. In Burundi, 
CAR, and Mali, the African military and police personnel that served 
in the AU operations were re-hatted and became UN peacekeepers. In 
other cases, like Somalia, where the UN Security Council has authorised 
enforcement, the AU has deployed and managed the operations, but 
with financial and logistical support from the UN and other partners.
At the strategic level, the UN and the AU need to foster a common 
narrative that is mutually re-enforcing and respectful of each other’s roles 
and comparative advantages. The members of the UN Security Council 
and the AU’s PSC have started to meet regularly. However, these kinds 
of meetings need to be further deepened so as to ensure even greater 
coherence between the approaches of the UN Security Council and the 
AU PSC on the many conflicts that are on their mutual agenda.
At the operational level, the UN and AU have been meeting regularly 
at the desk-to-desk level, but these meetings now need to start delivering 
specific outcomes, such as developing guidelines for joint assessments, 
shared analysis, joint planning, AU–UN inter-mission coordination and 
cooperation, mission support, best practices, join evaluations, and joint 
Standard Operating Procedures for transitions between AU and UN 
operations.
Almost all AU peace operations will be accompanied by UN special 
political missions, similar to the way UNSOM and AMISOM have oper-
ated side-by-side in Somalia. At the same time, most UN peacekeeping 
operations in Africa will be accompanied by AU special political missions, 
such as has been the case with MINUSMA and African Union Mission 
for Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL) in Mali and MINUSCA and AU Mission 
for the CAR and Central Africa (MISCA) in CAR. A set of pre-agreed 
joint guidelines will make it easier for both organisations to involve each 
other from the earliest stages in assessments, planning, coordination 
mechanisms, mission support, benchmarks, and evaluation. This is espe-
cially important in those cases where AU peace operations transition into 
UN peacekeeping operations, or vice versa.
One of the AU’s serious challenges is the capacity to support its own 
operations. The AU lacks a mission support concept and the staff/ 
personnel, systems, and resources necessary to implement such a con-
cept. The AU, with the support of the UN, has embarked on a pro-
cess to develop a mission support policy. It will take several years for 
the AU to develop and refine its missions support capacity, and in the 
meantime it will rely on the UN and partners to support its operations. 
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This is especially challenging when the AU needs support for stability, 
counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism operations—all peace enforce-
ment operations in UN context—whilst its main partner in this regard, 
the UN, is geared to provide support to peacekeeping operations. Both 
institutions will need to develop fixes to cover this gap, until the AU has 
developed its own capacity in this area.
The AU and the UN has developed a functioning strategic partner-
ship. This partnership plays out at the political, policy and operational 
levels, and reflect the reality that neither the AU nor the UN will deploy 
peace operations in Africa without close consultations and some form of 
cooperation with each other.
conclusion
In this chapter, we explored the major factors that are likely to influ-
ence the future direction that African-led PSO may take, and considered 
what the impact may be of these developments for the strategic partner-
ship between the UN and the AU. We argued that Africa’s peace oper-
ations capacity has significantly increased over the past decade and a half 
because the AU, with significant support from the UN and its other 
partners, have invested in establishing and developing the ASF. As a 
result of this investment, Africa is now the largest regional contributor to 
UN peace operations.
When the ASF was designed, the AU had little peace operations expe-
rience of its own. Over the last decade the AU has undertaken eight 
operations of its own and has supported several others. In addition to 
contributing troops and police officers to UN peacekeeping missions, 
African countries are also likely to continue to provide African-led stabi-
lisation brigades to augment UN peacekeeping missions in contexts like 
Mali and South Sudan, drawing on the success of the FIB model used in 
the DRC.
One of the implications of the significant capabilities that the AU and 
African sub-regional organisations have developed, is that the UN can no 
longer deploy peace operations of its own in Africa, without at least close 
consultations with the AU and sub-regional bodies. This is, however, not 
seen as a negative development. The increased capacity and willingness of 
the AU and other African regional bodies and coalitions to play an even 
greater role in African peace and security is seen as a positive develop-
ment that opens the door for more specialisation, based on comparative 
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advantage, as well as greater burden sharing. As discussed in several other 
chapters in this book, many of the challenges facing UN peace opera-
tions relate to the fact that the UN peacekeeping model is not well 
suited to enforcement or counter-terrorism type operations. Nor is the 
UN peacekeeping model well suited to deal with transnational challenges 
such as organised crime or regional manifestations of, for instance, vio-
lent extremism. The AU and other African bodies, such as the MNJTF 
in the Lake Chad Basin or the G5 force in the Sahel seem to be bet-
ter suited to address these kinds of challenges. These African capabilities 
thus help to relieve the pressure on the UN on some fronts, which ena-
ble it to re-focus its efforts in other areas.
In the context of the larger shifts underway in the global order, the 
emerging role of African-led peace operations in Africa—where it has 
taken on a significant portion of the peace and security burden that the 
UN would otherwise have had to carry on its own—raises the question 
whether a new global peace and security architecture is emerging? In the 
past, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, that deals with regional arrange-
ments, was understood as providing for exceptional cases where the UN 
may need to turn to a regional organisation for help. As a result of the 
role the AU plays in Africa—and the European Union (EU) plays in 
Europe—the question arises whether the UN and regional organisations 
should establish a more formal global peace and security architecture 
that is based on burden-sharing and the principle of subsidiarity. This 
means that threats to international peace and security should be dealt 
with at the most immediate (or local) level that is consistent with their 
resolution.
At the moment, the relationships between the UN and regional 
organisations are undefined. Although the primary responsibility of the 
UN Security Council is not questioned, this does not amount to a hier-
archal system where regional organisations such as the AU or the EU 
are subsidiary parts of a global peace and security architecture. Such an 
architecture would have a pre-agreed division of roles and responsibili-
ties, where regional organisations are responsible for maintaining peace 
and security in their own regions, and where the UN is responsible for 
those aspects of international peace and security that the regional organ-
isations are not able to address, or that is trans-regional. Rather, at pres-
ent, the UN and regional organisations co-exist in a loosely defined 
manner that requires voluntary coordination and causes both tension 
and competition. A global peace and security architecture approach 
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would imply that the UN and regional organisations, like the AU, 
agree to a more clearly defined division of roles under a burden-sharing 
arrangement. Such predictability would enhance cooperation, coordina-
tion, and efficiency and significantly alter the way we understand the role 
of the UN and regional organisations like the AU in the global peace 
and security architecture.
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The European Union and UN Peace 




The European Union entered the world of crisis management in 2003 
when it launched its first police mission—in Bosnia and Herzegovina—
and, a few months later, its first military operations—in Macedonia 
and then in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This came 
after a five-year period of conceptualisation of what was then called the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which aimed to give 
the EU an autonomous capacity in the broad area of crisis management. 
ESDP was partly an answer to the EU’s inability to respond meaningfully 
to the Yugoslav conflicts and to implement the ambitious goal of an EU 
Common Foreign Policy (defined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty).
Over the last fifteen years, more than 30 EU operations have reflected 
and shaped a certain “EU approach” to respond to crises that is in various 
manners distinct from other international organisations’ approaches. But the 
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EU’s approach also features typical crisis management activities and is there-
fore in many ways similar to the United Nations’ crisis management style.
In fact, analysing the EU crisis management policy cannot be done 
while ignoring parallel developments at the UN level or simply ignoring 
the UN as a reference point for evaluating/assessing the EU’s incremen-
tal engagement in crisis management. Indeed the very first EU opera-
tions in Bosnia and the DRC were sequential with (Bosnia) or in support 
of (DRC) UN operations, and, since then, most EU missions have in 
some ways cooperated with UN operations, most recently in Mali and in 
the Central African Republic (CAR). Furthermore, field cooperation was 
from the start accompanied by a parallel process of institutionalisation of 
the UN-EU relationship that has not been observed to the same extent 
between the UN and any other regional organisation.
This being said, the EU and the UN sometimes diverge on policy, and 
may find themselves as competing crisis management actors. Differences 
in capacities (financial and military), structure (membership and man-
date) and political culture can also create asymmetries and hamper full 
reciprocity between the two actors. In the field over the last twenty years, 
UN operations have also suffered from a quasi-absence of European 
states as troop contributors. EU member states significantly finance UN 
peacekeeping, and have operated a comeback to UN operations in Mali, 
yet they have largely preferred other institutional frameworks for their 
own crisis management activities.
One of the four “essential shifts” identified by the 2015 High-Level 
Panel on Peace Operations is the need for a “stronger, more inclu-
sive peace and security partnership” (UN 2015a, p. viii). Likewise, the 
Secretary-General’s report in response to the High-Level Panel makes 
“global-regional partnerships” one of three pillars of the UN action 
plan on strengthening peace operations (UN 2015b, paras. 28–32). In 
response, the 2016 EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy 
defines four categories of “vital interests” for the EU, the fourth one 
being a “rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle 
and the United Nations at its core” (European Union 2016, p. 15).
This chapter aims at locating the EU’s crisis management role in the 
broader framework of the UN’s general mandate of “maintaining inter-
national peace and security.” What is the EU’s approach to manag-
ing crises? To what extent does the EU converge with and support the 
UN peacekeeping agenda? How are EU member states’ own institu-
tional choices being shaped and what do these choices tell us about the 
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UN-EU relationship or, in other words, about the global-regional peace 
and security partnership?
This chapter starts by providing an overview of EU crisis management 
operations, including their objectives and specific character. It then looks 
at how EU operations relate to the UN in legal, political, and opera-
tional terms, and presents similarities and differences between EU and 
UN operations. Third, the chapter sheds light on why the two insti-
tutions started cooperating and how this cooperation has shaped their 
relationship. Finally, the chapter looks at the issue of EU member states’ 
contribution to UN peacekeeping; it takes stock of the European par-
ticipation in the UN mission in Mali as of 2014, and it assesses how EU 
member states’ institutional preferences may evolve in the coming years.
the eu crisis mAnAgement APProAch
The development of the EU crisis management policy came as a response 
to a need, expressed in the midst of the Kosovo conflict in the late 1990s 
and in the broader framework of the post-Cold War systemic evolutions, 
to provide the EU with the means to contribute to international secu-
rity governance (Howorth 2007; Grevi et al. 2009; Biscop and Whitman 
2012). In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty—that formally created the 
European Union and replaced the European Economic Community—
had already laid the ground for a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). Yet the EU foreign policy stumbled over the Balkan conflicts in 
Croatia and then Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the US’ (and NATO’s) 
role in unblocking the situations both in Bosnia (in 1995) and Kosovo 
(in 1999) confirmed the limitations of the EU political and security 
ambitions. For European leaders—most prominently the French and 
the British—the EU was to be given a “capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them 
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” 
(Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998, art. 2). This commitment 
led to the design of a ESDP. In essence, ESDP has developed as a pol-
icy to manage crises occurring outside the EU, and excluding any collec-
tive defence mandate which should remain the prerogative of NATO for 
European states that are members of the Alliance (European Union 2007, 
art. 42.7). In practice, ESDP pushed the deployments of military and 
civilian assets in the management of crises in the Balkans, in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and to a lesser extent in the Middle East and Asia. ESDP was then 
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renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the Lisbon 
Treaty (European Union 2007).
In 2017, CSDP operations are the most visible activity of the EU 
in the international security domain, and have been the most tangible 
examples of the coming to age of CSDP as well as EU security “actor-
ness” (Tardy 2015, p. 51). In EU parlance, CSDP military activities 
are called “operations” while civilian activities are called “missions.” By 
design, EU crisis management operations are either of a military or of 
a civilian nature. Although the Treaty on European Union (TEU) does 
not preclude the establishment of operations that could combine military 
and civilian elements, the EU planning and conduct structures, together 
with the relevant financial regulations, have so far prevented the creation 
of integrated military-civilian operations.
According to the Lisbon Treaty (European Union 2007, art. 42.1), 
CSDP shall provide the Union with an “operational capacity drawing on 
civilian and military assets” that can be used on “missions outside the 
Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening interna-
tional security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.” CSDP operations are further defined in Article 43.1 in the 
TEU (European Union 2007), which proposes a list of tasks to be car-
ried out that includes “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and 
peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, includ-
ing peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.” The article adds that 
all these tasks “may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including 
by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”
Since 2003, the EU has launched and run 35 operations and mis-
sions, 23 of which were civilian and 12 military (Howorth 2014, 
Chapter 5; European Parliament 2012; Bund et al. 2017). In total, there 
are 16 on-going CSDP operations as of November 2017, ten civilian 
and six military. Civilian missions include the Kosovo rule of law mis-
sion (EULEX Kosovo), the monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM 
Georgia), and capacity-building missions in Niger (EUCAP Sahel 
Niger), Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) and the 
Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor). Two of the military operations are 
maritime operations (Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia and 
Operation EUNAVFOR Med-Sophia in the south Mediterranean), and 
three are training missions (EU Training Missions in Somalia, Mali, 
and the Central African Republic) (Table 12.1).
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In the civilian domain, EU crisis management focuses on the rule of 
law, good governance, and security sector reform; it proceeds through 
capacity-building and advisory tasks, often in cooperation with other 
crisis management actors.1 Civilian missions fall within the three broad 
categories of strengthening missions, monitoring missions, and exec-
utive missions, although this latter category counts only one operation. 
Strengthening missions are mainly about capacity-building in the field 
of rule of law. They aim at assisting the recipient state in the reform 
and strengthening of its judicial and law enforcement institutions. This 
is done through monitoring, mentoring, and advising, as well as train-
ing and in some cases the provision of equipment. All civilian missions 
established since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 are 
categorised as strengthening missions. Monitoring missions provide 
third-party observation of an activity or a process, be it the performance 
of a given sector (police, justice, border, etc.) or the implementation of 
an agreement (cease-fire line, peace agreement, etc.). The third category 
Table 12.1 On-going CSDP operations and missions as of November 2017
Civilian missions Date of launching
EUBAM Rafah Nov. 2005
EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories Nov. 2005
EUMM Georgia Oct. 2008
EULEX Kosovo Dec. 2008
EUBAM Libya May 2013
EUCAP Nestor—Horn of Africa July 2012
EUCAP Sahel Niger July 2012
EUCAP Sahel Mali Jan. 2015
EUAM Ukraine Dec. 2014
EUAM Iraq Nov. 2017
Military Operations Date of launching
Althea—Bosnia and Herzegovina Dec. 2004
EUNAVFOR Atalanta—Gulf of Aden Dec. 2008
EUTM Somalia April 2010
EUTM Mali Feb. 2013
EUTM RCA July 2016
EUNAVFOR Med—Sophia June 2015
1 For a presentation of past and on-going EU civilian missions, see the European External 
Action Service (2017) at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/
area/security-and-defence_en.
236  t. tArdy
of civilian missions is that of executive missions, i.e. operations that can 
exert certain functions on behalf of the recipient state. The only example 
is EULEX Kosovo that has executive responsibilities in the areas of war 
crimes, organised crime and high-level corruption, as well as property 
and privatisation cases.
In the military domain, CSDP operations fit into the definition of cri-
sis management in the sense that they fall short of war-fighting or openly 
coercive operations.2 Maybe with the exception of the newly-created 
mission in the South Mediterranean Sea (EUNAVFOR Med-Sophia), 
EU operations are third-party interventions that are not supposed to 
take sides, or identify and militarily defeat an enemy. Some operations, 
like Atalanta, contain a coercive dimension to defeat pirates operating in 
the Gulf of Aden. Yet these operations do not have peace enforcement 
mandates, which makes them conceptually distinct from operations such 
as the NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011 or the French-led oper-
ation in Mali since 2013. The operation against migrants smugglers 
(Operation Sophia) is potentially different in the sense that it is the first 
EU operation that could theoretically lead to peace enforcement-type 
activities. The operation’s mandate provides for the possibility of resort-
ing to force against “spoilers” in a way that had never been contemplated 
in previous CSDP military operations. More precisely, the authorisa-
tion to “take all necessary measures” against a vessel and related assets, 
including through “disposing of them or rendering them inoperable” 
(Council of the European Union 2015a, art. 2.2.c)—and this after a 
phase of intelligence gathering—implies that the operation can proac-
tively chase the smugglers and possibly resort to force against them in 
cases other than self-defence. Yet its implementation is conditioned upon 
either the consent of the Libyan state or the blessing of the UN Security 
Council, none of which had been obtained as of November 2017. In any 
case, given EU member states’ general risk aversion, even the full imple-
mentation of EUNAVFOR Med’s mandate would not make the mission 
a peace enforcement operation similar to the ones deployed in the last 
decade by states or by NATO.
Thirty-five CSDP operations attest to the existence of a certain EU 
conception of security policy that is distinct from any other institution’s 
2 For a presentation of past and on-going EU military operations, see the European 
External Action Service website (2017) at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/
missions-and-operations/index_en.htm.
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conception. This refers to a specific EU security culture—defined in 
terms of shared ideas and beliefs in the security domain that would lead 
the organisation to act in a specific manner and of which CSDP oper-
ations and missions are an expression. This security culture reflects 
a certain way to handle crises, through a mix of civilian and military 
responses, a focus on rather short-term and consensual activities, almost 
always in support of existing state authorities, and in accordance with 
international legal instruments and a set of values and principles.
CSDP is about projecting security outside of the EU area in order to 
contribute to the stabilisation of states or regions that may potentially be 
the source of further destabilisation or more directly threaten EU socie-
ties. Such a security culture has been developed by design as much as by 
default; it results both from the difficulty to embrace a broader spectrum 
and from the desire to act at a particular level and through EU-specific 
tools or methods.
In this broad context, CSDP has over the last years evolved to more 
clearly respond to direct threats to European security, be it with opera-
tion Sophia and its migration-focused mandate or missions in the Sahel 
that also partly embrace an EU anti-terrorism or migration agenda.
eu Vs. un oPerAtions: how similAr? how diFFerent?
The EU has—more or less intentionally—developed its crisis manage-
ment policy in reference to other international organisations, most nota-
bly NATO and the United Nations. The EU political-military structure 
(with the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, and 
the Military Staff) was copied from NATO’s, while the NATO opera-
tions in Bosnia (IFOR then SFOR) in the implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement and the NATO operation in Kosovo (KFOR) follow-
ing the spring 1999 air campaign provided templates of what the EU 
should be able to do in the security domain.
Similarly, the UN was early on a source of inspiration and a point 
of reference for the EU’s ESDP. At the legal level, all EU docu-
ments explicitly refer to the necessity for the EU to act in accordance 
with the UN Charter. Moreover, CSDP operations are established 
on the basis of a combination of a decision of the Council of ministers 
of the EU and either an invitation by the host state or a UN Security 
Council (UNSC) resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(that allows for some sort of coercion). In practice, all civilian missions 
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(with the exception of EULEX Kosovo) have been established on the 
basis of an invitation of the recipient state.
Military operations, for their part, fall into two categories. The first 
category includes those created with UNSC Resolutions referring 
to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These include Althea in Bosnia, 
Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden, EUFOR RCA, as well as in the past 
the two operations in the DRC (2003 and 2006) or the one in Chad  
(2008–2009). The second category includes those created on the basis 
of an invitation, such as EUTMs in Mali, Somalia, and CAR.
Quite a few of the military operations not created on the basis of a 
UNSC resolution, as well as some civilian missions, are nonetheless 
referred to in UNSC resolutions. Such reference provides a degree of 
legitimacy to the EU endeavours. It also helps in future coordination 
with other international and local actors as various EU entities can draw 
on the UNSC text to justify their presence. In all cases, the host govern-
ment has consented to the EU deployment.
In the field, EU and UN operations exhibit some similarities across 
levels. First, both EU and UN peace operations are consent-based and 
support rather than substitute local authorities. Although the EU’s 
approach towards the use of force can be more robust than the UN’s, 
both institutions are risk-averse and resent peace enforcement. Indeed, 
the three key principles of UN peacekeeping—impartiality, limited 
resort to force, and consent—by and large apply to EU-led operations. 
Interestingly, the EU and the UN are closer on the issue of the use of 
force than either organisation is to NATO or even the AU, which are 
both more comfortable with the idea of “enforcing peace” through mili-
tary operations.
The scope of activities is equally large in both institutions that 
embrace the whole conflict spectrum, encompassing prevention, peace-
keeping, peacebuilding, and stabilisation. Within this framework, the 
type of activities carried out are conceptually close. Both institutions seek 
to bring stability to a given place by using similar tools, i.e. a mix of mili-
tary and civilian instruments that aim at providing security, strengthening 
the rule of law and governance institutions, reforming the security sec-
tor, facilitating economic recovery, supporting mediation and reconcil-
iation, promoting human rights, etc. In doing so, the EU and the UN 
follow the “liberal peace” agenda by which the overall objective of their 
presence is the establishment of sustainable peace that should result from 
the combination of a democratic system and a market economy.
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Finally, the UN and the EU are confronted with the same type of 
difficulties, ranging from a weak political support from their own 
member states to the difficulty to embed their operations in a broader 
political/strategic framework, the faltering consent of the host state 
and local actors, or the difficulty to operate and produce an impact 
in highly volatile environments (where there is no peace to keep) 
(Koops et al. 2015; UN 2014). The parallel UN and EU debates on 
the necessity to be “more strategic,” the effectiveness and impact of 
the operations, the imperative of “delivering as one” or acting through 
a “comprehensive/integrated approach,” and the insistence on local 
ownership and the critique of “imposing the liberal peace” all attest 
to similarities in the UN and EU’s respective agendas and associated 
challenges.
In this context though, UN and EU operations also differ in certain 
ways. First, the UN global and universal mandate creates an expecta-
tion to respond to crises, an expectation that exists in no other regional 
organisation. The UN does not always intervene, but it certainly inter-
venes less selectively than the EU.
More practically, UN peace operations are significantly larger than 
EU operations. As an example, the latest two UN operations in Mali 
and CAR have over 10,000 uniformed personnel, which is more than 
the total strength of the 16 EU operations. The largest EU operation to 
date, operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, counted 7000 troops 
at its deployment in 2004, which would represent a modest size for any 
UN peacekeeping operation. Also, most EU civilian missions count less 
than 200 personnel, which makes them comparable to UN political mis-
sions rather than to peacekeeping operations.
Third, UN operations tend to be longer than EU operations, 
although recent trends indicate that EU operations’ duration is increas-
ing. While a few EU operations have indeed lasted a decade or more, 
most operations last less than five years. In contrast, UN operations often 
exceed a decade, for both good (the long-term needs of the host coun-
tries) and bad (structural difficulties to terminate them) reasons. This 
difference also accounts for variations in the two institutions’ crisis man-
agement policies: a more crisis response-oriented for the EU vs. a longer-
term structural approach for the UN.
Fourth, the combination of size and length creates a difference in the 
level of ambition and expected impact. Although CSDP operations can 
be quite ambitious, because of their format and duration, they can hardly 
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be expected to generate the kind of strategic impact that UN operations 
may produce or aspire to have (Tardy 2015, pp. 32–33). The type of 
political, economic, and social engineering that characterises quite a few 
of the multidimensional UN operations is seldom at play within EU 
operations.
Fifth, the degree of political control is tighter over EU missions than 
over UN operations. Member states play a much more central role in the 
EU decision-making and planning processes than within the UN. This 
relates to the decision-making structure itself: while the UN Security 
Council is composed of a very limited number of states, and few with 
veto power, the EU Political and Security Committee comprises 28 
members states with make decisions unanimously. In terms of planning, 
but also of command and control, the level of interference by or scrutiny 
of the political level is also more evident on the EU side. This implies 
a more politicised—and also more selective—EU approach, while UN 
operations can have a life on their own without much interference from 
the member states.
Sixth, as mentioned earlier, UN operations are more integrated than 
EU missions. For various reasons, it is not possible for EU operations 
to be of a civil-military nature; hence the typology of military oper-
ations vs. civilian missions. Following the release in 2016 of the EU 
Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, the concept of an “inte-
grated approach to conflicts and crises” has been framed within the EU 
to replace that of a “comprehensive approach.” The EU “integrated 
approach” aims to further ensure the coherence and coordination of EU 
activities through a “multi-phased,” “multi-dimensional,” “multi-level,” 
and “multi-lateral approach” (European Union 2016, p. 18). However, 
the civil-military caesura is there to stay within the EU and the type of 
integration of the military and civilian components within UN opera-
tions will remain unmatched in the EU.
Finally, the nature of troop contributors shapes the type of capa-
bilities that are made available to the two organisations. Theoretically, 
UN operations could benefit from the military capabilities of European 
states if these states were contributing to UN operations. However, 
the quasi-absence of Europe—and as a matter of fact of most countries 
with high-tech military equipment—from UN operations deprives these 
operations from the equipment that EU or NATO operations benefit 
from.
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the eu And the un: nAturAl PArtners?
In many ways, the relationship between the United Nations and the 
European Union has during the last decade developed into the most 
closed-knit institutionalised partnership between two independent 
organisations.
From a UN perspective, the EU aspiration to become a fully-fledged 
crisis management actor was initially perceived with cautious optimism 
and mixed feelings. On the one hand, it was hoped that this new capac-
ity could be harnessed for supporting the UN with desperately needed 
resources and expertise; on the other hand, it was feared that the devel-
opment of CSDP could further estrange Europeans from engaging 
directly in UN peacekeeping (Koops 2011, pp. 246–250). Both hopes 
and concerns turned out to be true.
In addition to civilian missions taking over or operating alongside 
the UN in Bosnia and Kosovo, the EU has launched four military oper-
ations directly in support of UN peacekeeping missions: Artemis and 
EUFOR RD Congo in support of MONUC in both 2003 and 2006, 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA in support of MINURCAT in 2008–2009, and 
EUFOR RCA as a bridging operation to the UN Mission in the Central 
African Republic in 2014.3 In all four instances, the EU demonstrated 
that it could provide key resources and support to UN-led peacekeeping 
at critical junctures. Particularly operation Artemis, which was deployed 
less than two weeks after the UN Security Council’s authorisation, high-
lighted the EU’s (and most notably France’s) willingness to support 
UN peacekeeping in a robust manner, although for a very short period 
of time and on strict EU terms (Gegout 2005). In 2006, EUFOR RD 
Congo once again reinforced MONUC’s presence and posture during 
the DRC’s first democratic elections. While posing a far more difficult 
logistical and political challenge, EUFOR Tchad/RCA marked a further 
step in EU-UN inter-organisational peacekeeping cooperation through 
the co-deployment during the first year and substantial re-hatting of EU 
troops to MINURCAT in 2009. More recently, EUFOR RCA acted as 
3 Artemis was a French-led EU mission, deployed from June to September 2003 to pro-
vide robust support to MONUC in Ituri. See United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practice 
Unit (2004). On EUFOR Tchad/RCA, see Mattelaer (2008).
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a bridging operation before the MINUSCA took over. In addition, 
 EU civilian missions (such as EUPOL and EUSEC RD Congo) 
supported MONUC through small-scale security sector reform 
and police reform, while the EU’s largest civilian mission—EULEX 
Kosovo—has been working closely with UNMIK. In Mali, the two EU 
operations also play a role of burden-sharing with the UN operation 
(MINUSMA).
Second, interaction in the field has led to the formalisation and 
institutionalisation between the two Secretariats. Two UN-EU Joint 
Declarations signed in 2003 and 2007 respectively have laid the basis 
for this institutionalisation (Council of the European Union 2003, 
2007). While the 2003 Declaration was a direct follow-up to the coop-
eration experience in the context of the EU Operation Artemis, the 
2007 Joint statement reiterated the EU’s commitment to UN peace-
keeping and linked the partnership to joint capacity-building efforts 
vis-à-vis the African Union. Both documents advanced joint commu-
nication and coordination channels, such as desk-to-desk dialogue 
and regular video conferences on thematic issues and emerging secu-
rity threats. The 2003 Declaration also called for a ‘UN-EU Steering 
Committee’ to convene twice a year in order to bring together key 
officials from both organisations with a view to strengthen inter-or-
ganisational relations. In 2011, the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) 
opened a joint UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security (UNLOPS), 
establishing a permanent presence in Brussels and an additional layer of 
the UN’s institutionalised cooperation with the European Union and to 
a lesser extent with NATO.
In the same vein, the EU issued in 2012 an “Action Plan on CSDP 
support to UN peacekeeping” (Council of the European Union 2012) 
that helped revitalise the partnership at a moment of rather low CSDP 
activity. The Action Plan defined a series of actions to move the rela-
tionship forward, with the hope on the UN side that the partner-
ship would also take the form of national European contributions 
to UN peacekeeping operations. In 2014–2015, the deployment of 
EUFOR RCA as well as EUCAP Sahel Mali, in both cases in paral-
lel with UN operations, allowed for renewed cooperation between the 
two institutions. In parallel, in 2015 a new framework on the “UN-
EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management” 
covering the period 2015–2018 was being elaborated. The new plan 
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identifies six priority areas: rapid response; support to the African 
Peace and Security Architecture; Facilitating EU member states’ con-
tributions to UN peacekeeping; Cooperation in Rule of Law and 
Security Sector Reform (SSR); Cooperation in Support and Logistics; 
Enhanced information and analysis exchange (Council of the European 
Union 2015b).
On the UN side, both the UN Secretary-General report “Partnering 
for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping” (UN 2015c), 
the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (UN 2015a), 
and the Secretary-General’s report in response to the High-Level Panel 
(UN 2015b) emphasise the necessity to strengthen the “global-regional 
partnerships,” in which the European Union, together with the African 
Union, play an important role.
Yet expectations are not always met and the initial concern about 
CSDP developing at the expense of UN operations has partly been vindi-
cated. The UN Secretariat regularly calls for European national contribu-
tions to UN operations, in particular through “strategic enablers” such 
as helicopters, intelligence assets, or medical units. The possibility for the 
UN to rely in a semi-automatic manner on the deployment of the EU 
Battle Groups as a “first response capacity” that could serve as a “bridg-
ing force” until “the UN can mobilise and deploy a follow-on UN peace 
operation” is also regularly put forward (UN 2015b, para. 192). So far, 
however, this has been to no avail.
Indeed, before a come-back in Mali as of 2014–2015 (see below), the 
development of CSDP was also to an extent accompanied by a certain 
disengagement of European states from UN operations. In parallel, the 
evolution of crisis management and the respective roles of the UN and 
the EU in this field raised the issue of complementarity of these different 
frameworks, and even of competition between them.
Competition has been observed in areas where both organisations 
have a comparative advantage or where they both need to demonstrate 
their relevance. Parallel operations in the DRC, Chad, Kosovo, and Mali 
have shown how the organisations are eager to preserve their autonomy, 
access to information, or relation with the local actors, sometimes to the 
detriment of inter-organisational cooperation. UN-EU relations are also 
hindered by political divergences in their strategic assessments of particu-
lar crises as well as their conception of their own role or of peace oper-
ations. They are also mirrors of member states’ priorities or institutional 
preferences. Finally, technical differences can be obstacles to smooth 
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cooperation between institutions that have difficulties to interact for 
administrative or human resources reasons.4
Overall, while the UN-EU partnership has delivered tangible results, 
the two institutions are also fora and instruments of international poli-
tics, which carries incentives for cooperation as much as for defection.
time For euroPe to return to un PeAcekeePing?
Stricto sensu, EU-UN cooperation does not include the issue of EU 
member states’ contributions to UN operations. States participate in UN 
operations in their national capacity, and the idea that the EU as an insti-
tution could contribute to a UN-led operation has so far not happened.
However, the EU-UN relationship is in many ways dependent on EU 
member states’ policies, their institutional preferences, and their perception 
of complementarity between UN and EU crisis management. As a matter 
of fact, while the 2012 EU-UN Action Plan, as well as the latest 2015 doc-
ument, mention “national contributions” to UN peacekeeping operations 
as a key element of the partnership, this seems not to reflect reality. Indeed, 
European countries have largely moved away from UN peacekeeping as a 
result of the lessons drawn from their commitment to such operations in 
the early 1990s, mainly in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia.
In 2017, EU states collectively financed between 35 and 40% of the 
UN peacekeeping budget, and played a central role in UN operations’ 
mandate design, most notably through the two European permanent 
members of the Security Council (Tardy and Zaum 2016). But before 
the situation changed in 2014, when some European countries started to 
participate in the UN operation in Mali, European troop contributions 
had over the last twenty years remained minimal, oscillating between 
four and eight percent of the total.
As of December 2013, prior to the comeback of some European 
states to UN peacekeeping in Mali, the 28 EU member states were 
contributing 4819 military personnel and police—i.e. 4.9%—out of 
the 98,200 uniformed personnel deployed in the 16 UN peacekeeping 
operations. The bulk of the European contribution was deployed in the 
operation in Lebanon (UNIFIL). As of May 2017, that figure had raised 
to 6577 out of 96,617 uniformed personnel, that is 6.8%, as a result 
4 See for example Richard Gowan (2009).
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of the contribution of Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden to the 
MINUSMA in Mali (UN 2017).
 European states have remained by and large committed to peace 
operations, but have favoured frameworks—such as the EU, NATO, or 
coalitions of states—that better suit their political and military require-
ments in terms of strategic cultures, command and control structures, or 
interoperability among troop contributors. For most of them, the UN 
has lost the trust placed in it right after the end of the Cold War, and is 
perceived as ill-equipped for complex crisis management. The command 
and control structure has received the most criticism and distrust. From 
a military point of view, the diversity of military cultures combined with 
the weak authority of Force commanders over the contingents deployed 
could only weaken the credibility of the UN chain of command and 
therefore the trust placed in it by units on the ground.
Since the mid-1990s, efforts have been made to try to reform the 
UN, with the hope that by making it more efficient, one could entice 
countries that formerly distanced themselves from the institution to 
reconsider their position and possibly return to UN operations. Lately, 
the argument has often been that “a lot has changed” within the UN 
and that the flaws of the early 1990s were now fixed, therefore allow-
ing reticent countries to consider coming back to UN peacekeeping. 
The debate was particularly prominent in 2013–2014 in the context of 
the termination of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan around the idea that some of the Western or European states 
present in ISAF might switch to UN operations once they pulled out 
their troops from Afghanistan (Johnson 2014, pp. 85–96; Smith 2014; 
Byers 2012). And indeed, a few of them approached the UN DPKO  to 
explore further this option.
It is in this context that the Netherlands, and then Sweden and 
Germany, announced their participation in the UN operation in 
Mali (MINUSMA), mainly through Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance units. In parallel, a few European countries—among 
them the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Finland, 
and Estonia—have contributed personnel to an intelligence fusion cell 
integrated into the MINUSMA (Karlsrud and Smith 2015). As of May 
2017, the Dutch, German and Swedish contributions to the MINUSMA 
were 273, 618, and 199 respectively (UN 2017).
This shows to an extent a return of European states to UN peacekeep-
ing, or at least openness towards the UN as a political and operational 
246  t. tArdy
crisis management actor.5 Indeed the UN displays comparative advan-
tages that may trigger renewed interest given the complexity of contem-
porary threats. Most prominently, the UN provides a unique framework 
for cooperation between Western and non-Western states at a time when 
the former may want to reach out to the latter in their security policies 
(Gowan 2015). UN operations may also be seen as operational responses 
to states’ fragility and this fragility’s possible consequences in terms of 
political destabilisation or youth’s radicalisation. In the case of Mali, con-
tributing to the UN operation can be a way to participate in the broad 
international stabilisation efforts of the Sahel without being involved in 
the direct military confrontation with the armed groups operating in 
Northern Mali.
Whether this comeback is a prelude to a more significant return to 
UN peacekeeping remains to be seen; at least three obstacles exist.
First, mistrust vis-à-vis the UN still tends to prevail within European 
ministries of defence where the thinking is still influenced by the 1990 
engagements in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia. The idea that the UN 
has, through several processes of reform, become a more effective crisis 
management actor is up for debate. Ministries of foreign affairs might 
be more agnostic on the virtues of the UN in peacekeeping, but military 
officials by and large still see the organisation as unfit to the task of com-
plex crisis management. The UN institutional culture and the command 
and control structure are recurrently invoked as obstacles to a renewed 
European commitment. As a matter of fact, the Report of the High-
level Independent Panel on Peace Operations acknowledges that the UN 
still suffers from “weak command and control” and has not sufficiently 
invested in this field (UN 2015a, paras. 35, 115).
Second, a comparative analysis of the various existing institutional 
channels does not portray the UN in the most favourable manner, as 
institutions such as NATO or the EU would in most cases be seen as 
more appropriate. The Mali situation—with a significant contribution 
from two European countries—provides an exception to this rule. The 
analysis in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany was that the UN, 
because of the nature of its operation in Mali, was the most appropriate 
recipient for the type of assets that they were willing to deploy. Such a 
5 See on this the Special Issue of International Peacekeeping by the editors Joachim 
Koops and Giulia Tercovich (2016), with chapters on Germany (Joachim Koops), the 
Netherlands (Niels van Willigen), and Sweden (Claes Nilsson and Kristina Zetterlund).
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scenario can be replicated elsewhere with other European States. Yet the 
incentives to opt for the UN rather than the EU, NATO, or multilateral 
operations are not obvious and in reality, European states are likely to 
prefer the more restricted clubs, both as a path dependency choice and 
for political reasons.
The EU itself may not always come up as the best option, and 
recent EU operations have shown that the EU could also suffer from a 
certain level of disaffection. How this may incentivise European states 
to look at the UN in a more positive way is very uncertain. In this 
context, the type of lessons that the Europeans will draw from their 
experience in the MINUSMA will in part determine both their own 
long-term commitments and a possible come back for other European 
states. The literature that is appearing on these issues, often based on 
the Mali situation, seems to indicate that the European states that have 
contributed to the MINUSMA are more vindicated in their mistrust 
vis-à-vis the UN than reassured that the UN is one option amongst 
several. What the MINUSMA has also revealed is the emergence of a 
two-tier operation in which the Europeans and the non-European con-
tingents hardly communicate with one another, and where the African 
and Asian contingents benefit very little from the intelligence gath-
ered by the Europeans (Albrecht et al. 2017). This is in itself an inter-
esting conclusion as it tends to undermine the assumption by which 
Europeans are needed in UN operations because of the enablers that 
they bring.
Finally, a possible European “comeback to UN operations” is also to 
be analysed for what it would imply for the EU CSDP. Given the gen-
eral restrictions on force projection resources, any scenario that would 
mean a significant European contribution to UN operations would most 
likely play to the detriment of the political and operational prominence 
of CSDP, as much as CSDP can develop at the expense of the UN. 
European states commit assets to UN or EU operations, but probably 
not to both at the same time. The last fifteen years have indeed shown 
that assets provided to the EU (troops, enablers, etc.) were de facto 
not provided to the UN. Typically, the principle of bridging operations 
means that EU member states decide not to participate in UN opera-
tions but rather to support them through EU operations. Paradoxically, 
it is possibly precisely because European states are not in the UN mission 
that the bridging operation becomes necessary.
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conclusion
As highlighted by the various studies or reports on UN peace operations 
released in 2015, the crisis management landscape has evolved into a 
multi-actors endeavour that calls for an inclusive “global-regional part-
nership”6 (UN 2015a, p. viii; 2015b, paras. 28–32).
The United Nations has a key role to play in materialising such part-
nerships and building coherence out of the various institutions’ priorities 
and activities. Similarly, the European Union is one of the main pillars 
of this effort, and the latest EU Global Strategy clearly reasserts the 
European commitment to promote a “rules-based global order” with the 
“United Nations at its core” (European Union 2016, p. 10). Indeed, the 
EU has become an autonomous crisis management actor that in most 
cases operates alongside the UN and potentially can support UN opera-
tions in different ways.
Yet the degree of compatibility between the UN and the EU is to be 
evaluated in light of the two institutions’ respective agendas and con-
straints. The EU has embraced a conception of crisis management that is 
close to the UN’s and is a priori willing to support the “global-regional 
peace and security partnership”; also, EU operations need the UN for 
legitimacy and in their transition strategies, in particular when the UN 
takes over from the EU and practically enables the EU to withdraw.
But the EU is also a highly politicised and state-dominated organisa-
tion that aspires to ensure its own visibility and independence. Besides, 
despite recent developments in Mali with significant European contribu-
tions to the UN operation, EU member states continue to view the UN 
with a certain level of suspicion and are overall reluctant to participate 
directly in UN operations. In this context, this chapter poses the follow-
ing two questions for further research and strategic policy deliberation: 
(1) how long can the absence of European states from UN peacekeeping 
be prolonged without truly undermining the UN-EU peace and security 
partnership, and beyond it the North-South dialogue? and (2) do UN 
peace operations respond to evolving security threats in a way that makes 
European states want to re-investing in them?
6 See ibid., p. viii, and ‘The future of UN peace operations: implementation of the rec-
ommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’, Report of the 
Secretary-General, A/70/357, 2 September 2015, paras. 28–32.
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China Rising and Its Changing Policy 
on UN Peacekeeping
Yin He
The1,2 past four decades we have witnessed China’s increasingly active 
participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). The 
existing literature on this issue has an obvious feature: many writers have 
focused on policy analysis or review (Stahle 2008; Gill and Huang 2009; 
International Crisis Group 2009; Lanteigne 2014). According to those 
analysts, China’s active participation in PKOs is largely driven by a long 
list of pragmatic needs or interests ranging from belief in multilateralism 
and image building to more traditional concerns such as isolating sep-
aratist forces in Taiwan and securing its overseas investments (Gill and 
Huang 2009). Hence, it has been very difficult for different writers to 
agree on the core reason behind China’s changing attitude towards UN 
peacekeeping. Some writers have applied theoretical analysis to their 
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research in China’s peacekeeping behaviour (Sicurelli 2010), but they 
have failed to find the most important variable driving China’s changing 
peacekeeping behaviour. In the 1970s, China opposed PKOs; today, it 
is a major supporter of UN peacekeeping. Is there any fundamental var-
iable shaping this significant change? If there is, what is it, and how has 
it affected China’s attitude towards the UN peacekeeping regime? This 
chapter explores the cause and effect of China’s changing policy on UN 
peacekeeping, and argues that changes in China’s national identity have 
led to changes in the country’s foreign policy, including that on UN 
peacekeeping.
The first section of this chapter presents an analytical framework, and 
proposes the hypothesis that China’s national identity is the most impor-
tant factor shaping its behaviour within the UN peacekeeping regime. 
The second section discusses how China’s international identities have 
affected its policy on UN peacekeeping during the period from 1971 to 
2000. The third section analyses China’s national identity and policy on 
UN peacekeeping in the twenty-first century. The last section concludes 
by raising questions for further research.
AnAlyticAl FrAmework
Many researchers believe that China’s current policy of increasingly 
active participation in UN peacekeeping is largely driven by a long list of 
pragmatic needs or interests (Lynch 2014; Lanteigne 2014; Fung 2016). 
According to them, China’s policy on peacekeeping is the result of a 
reactive response to those pragmatic needs or interests.
One cannot deny that national interests, especially the immediate 
ones, can affect a state’s policy on international affairs. However, one 
will also find it hard to believe that a realism-oriented policy analysis can 
show the full picture of China as an active peacekeeper, especially given 
China’s rise over the past four decades. In fact, many arguments based 
on policy analysis are easy to falsify. For example, some point to South 
Sudan and argue that China’s participation in UN peacekeeping is driven 
by its increasing need for natural resources, such as oil (Lynch 2014). 
However, the deployment of substantial numbers of peacekeeping troops 
to places like Darfur, Lebanon, and Haiti—which lack significant stocks 
of natural resources—surely limits the strength of this argument. For 
another example, some analysts argue that Beijing’s One China pol-
icy is the most important factor affecting the country’s peacekeeping 
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behaviour (International Crisis Group 2009). This might have been true 
in the 1980s and 1990s. However, as shown in its continuous support 
for the UN peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, a poverty-stricken Caribbean 
state which has long adopted a pro-Taiwan policy, geopolitical factors are 
not the most significant variable affecting present-day China’s peacekeep-
ing behaviour.
Any state’s interests in international affairs are subject to change 
over time. This has been the case with China’s interests in UN peace-
keeping. In the 1970s, China stayed away from UN peacekeeping due 
to its normative stance on state sovereignty and non-intervention. From 
the 1980s to the 1990s, China’s gradual adjustment of its attitude 
towards UN peacekeeping was mainly due to its need for a favourable 
international environment that could benefit its own economic devel-
opment-oriented reform and opening up strategy. In the new century, 
China’s increasingly active participation in UN peacekeeping serves three 
major interests: being a responsive power, strengthening the UN, and 
sharing common concerns for peace and security (He 2007).
To explore the fundamental reason behind China’s changing pol-
icy on UN peacekeeping, one needs to look beyond China’s pragmatic 
interests and answer the following question: Why has China shown dif-
ferent interests in UN peacekeeping affairs over the past four decades? 
Constructivism provides an insightful perspective for answering the ques-
tion. According to this theoretical perspective, identity defines inter-
ests (Wendt 1999; Finnemore 1996). Applying this idea to the case of 
China’s engagement in UN peacekeeping, the changing policies in this 
area derive from key shifts in China’s national identity. Moreover, as con-
structivism also holds that interests define behaviour, there are causal 
relations between identity and behaviour. This chapter analyses the link 
between China’s evolving national identity and its changing policy on 
UN peacekeeping in terms of causal relations.
However, in this chapter, the concept of “identity” is based on, but 
not limited to, the way in which it appears within the constructivist liter-
ature. Rather than the idea of a shared culture that is largely unaffected 
by material factors, here identity is conceptualised as being affected by 
both ideational and material factors (Kratochwill 1989; Ruggie 1998). 
Although the chapter does not take a purely theoretical stance, it adopts 
an eclectic analytical framework which draws theoretical support from 
mainstream international relations meta-theoretical approaches, includ-
ing realism, institutionalism, and constructivism. To be more specific, 
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China’s national identity is mainly constructed by three factors: the 
country’s increasing comprehensive national strength, its increasingly 
active participation in the international institutions, and its increasing 
socialisation within the international community (Johnston 2008).
chinA’s chAnging nAtionAl identity And Policies  
on un PeAcekeePing beFore the twenty-First century
Significant political, military, and social changes tend to generate shifts 
in a state’s national identity (Qin 2005). During the period from 1971 
to the end of the twentieth century, China’s national identity has under-
gone two distinctive phases: from a semi-revolutionist state largely staying 
out of the international community dominated by the Western powers in 
1970s, to an integrated member of the international community in 1980s 
and 1990s. Each of these phases had led China to develop different poli-
cies on UN peacekeeping. These two identities were later on replaced by 
a third and current one; that of a rising power, which also brought with it 
stronger Chinese engagement with UN peacekeeping operations.
A Semi-revolutionist State in 1970s
In the 1970s, China was to some degree a revolutionary state, or a 
semi-revolutionary state, in that it kept a sceptical eye on the existing 
international community dominated by the Western powers. Despite 
having returned to the UN in 1971 and gradually improved relations 
with the Western powers, especially after Richard Nixon’s historic visit 
in 1972, China’s international outlook had not changed significantly. It 
continued to regard itself as a victim of the imperialist behaviour of the 
two superpowers—the United States (along with other Western capital-
ist powers) and the Soviet Union—as it did in the 1960s, and identified 
itself with the Third World (Choedon 2005). During this period, revo-
lution and struggle were still the banners of China’s diplomacy. China 
wished to fulfil its international moral responsibility towards other Third 
World countries by strictly adhering to the Westphalian norms of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention. As a state which to a great extent 
remained outside the international community dominated by the West, 
China did not have much interest in accepting the rules and norms of 
the international system. As a result, it condemned and opposed the cre-
ation of new PKOs and the continuation of the existing missions, refused 
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to share the burden of the peacekeeping budget or contribute person-
nel to ongoing operations, and abstained from UNSC voting (He 2007). 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was preoccupied with its traditional 
task of safeguarding China’s territorial integrity and had no interest in 
international operations like peacekeeping. As a result, throughout in the 
1970s China remained opposed to UN peacekeeping.
An Integrated Member in 1980s and 1990s
In the 1980s and 1990s, as China sought to become an integrated mem-
ber of the international community, it began to selectively embrace the 
UN peacekeeping regime. Beijing’s adoption of economic reform and 
opening up policy, starting at the end of the 1970s, shifted its focus from 
domestic as well as international revolution to development, especially 
economic development. After re-establishing diplomatic relations with the 
major Western states, especially the United States, China found its interna-
tional security environment greatly improved (Kim 1987), which enabled 
it to allocate limited resources towards development-oriented reform and 
to its opening-up strategy. This in turn improved China’s international 
status and self-confidence as a participant in international affairs. During 
the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held 
in 1982, an “independent foreign policy of peace” (duli zizhu de heping 
waijiao zhengce) was formulated, marking China’s new willingness to play 
down its ideological disagreement with the West and its determination to 
seek peaceful coexistence (He 2007). China’s adoption of the independ-
ent foreign policy of peace reflected its pragmatic strategy of integrating 
into the international community. Despite changes in both the interna-
tional and domestic environment, Beijing largely stuck to this strategy 
throughout 1980s and 1990s. To this end, China needed to make good 
use of its limited domestic and international resources. As a veto-wield-
ing permanent member in the UNSC, China found that its policy on UN 
peacekeeping, if well designed, could generate precious diplomatic capital, 
especially to break the isolation imposed by the Western states after 1989. 
As a result, Beijing gradually became engaged in UN peacekeeping.
This shift entailed several measures. First, China adjusted its attitude 
towards UN peacekeeping by providing financial support for PKOs and 
by participating in UNSC voting. In 1981, China voted in the UNSC for 
the first time, in favour of Resolution 495, which extended the ongoing 
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In 1982, China began 
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to pay its dues for peacekeeping. Then, it began to show interest in par-
ticipating in UN peacekeeping. In November 1988, China joined the UN 
Special Peacekeeping Committee. Five months later, in an unprecedented 
move, China’s ambassador to the UN, Yu Mengjia, called on the interna-
tional community to give powerful support to UN peacekeeping. Finally, 
in 1990, China became a peacekeeper by deploying five military observers 
to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East.
China’s policy on UN peacekeeping in 1980s and 1990s largely 
reflected a balance between its traditional normative position and prag-
matic concerns for its national interests, in particular those regarding its 
strategy of becoming an integrated member of the international commu-
nity. During this period, especially in the 1990s, China had shown a cer-
tain degree of flexibility in its policy on UN Peacekeeping, in particular on 
the principle of use of force. Thirty-six PKOs were established between 
1988 and 1998. China voted in favour of all operations that carried out 
traditional peacekeeping tasks as well as the continuation of all ongoing 
traditional PKOs that were established during the Cold War era. At the 
same time, it had not vetoed any PKOs mandated under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Most notably, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, in November 
1990 China chose abstention rather than a veto during the voting on 
UNSC Resolution 678, which authorised Member States to use all neces-
sary means to restore international peace and security in Kuwait.
Being eager to get integrated into the international community, China 
would often react to deeds of other countries that challenged its mem-
bership. In 1997, China vetoed a UNSC draft resolution to deploy mil-
itary observers to verify the implementation of ceasefire agreements in 
Guatemala, which had been active in pushing for Taiwan’s membership 
in the UN. In 1999, Macedonia shifted its recognition from Beijing to 
Taipei 17 days before the UNSC intended to deliberate upon the exten-
sion of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). Beijing 
was enraged and vetoed the UNSC draft resolution.
chinA’s nAtionAl identity And Policy on un 
PeAcekeePing in the twenty-First century
The third and current Chinese identity is one of a rising power, which is 
coupled with a stronger engagement in UN peacekeeping operations. China, 
indeed, is a rising power in the twenty-first century (Ikenberry 2008). 
It needs a foreign policy fitting into its strategy for peaceful rise. This section 
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examines China’s new national identity and policy on UN peacekeeping in 
the new century. Key questions to be answered include: how has the new 
national identity come into been?, and how has it affected China’s policy on 
UN peacekeeping?
A Rising Power in the Twenty-First Century
China’s strategy of being an integrated member of the international 
community in 1980s and 1990s proved a success. Continuous adoption 
of the development-oriented policy and increasing socialisation into the 
international community have contributed to rapid growth of national 
strength. Entering the twenty-first century, China’s further integration 
into the global economy, marked by its participation in the World Trade 
Organization, among other things, secured the prospect of continuous 
high-speed economic growth. In the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, China’s national strength had reached a new height. As is shown 
in Chart 13.1, according to statistics provided by the United Nations 
Statistics Division (2016), China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) sur-
passed those of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom in around 




























Chart 13.1 China and Major Western Powers’ GDP (Source Author’s own cal-
culation based on data from United Nations Statistics Division 2016)
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Enhanced national strength encourages China to rethink its identity 
in the international arena. In 1999, after China successfully tided over 
the Asian Financial Crisis, then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji declared 
that China wanted to be a “responsible power” (fuzeren daguo). In late 
2003, Zheng Bijian, then executive vice-president of the Party School 
of the CPC Central Committee, introduced the term of “peaceful rise” 
(heping jueqi) at the Boao Forum for Asia (Xinhua 2004). The term 
was accepted by the Chinese leadership (Medeiros 2004). However, 
as a rising power concerned about its international image, China can-
not ignore the doubts and misgivings from outside such as the “China 
Threat” debate (Munro 1992; Yee and Storey 2002; Callahan 2005). 
The Chinese leadership might have recognised that the assertiveness 
reflected in “peaceful rise” could fuel perceptions that China was a threat 
to the established order dominated by the West. As a result, the concept 
“peaceful rise” gradually faded away in the Chinese political discourse 
and was replaced by the term “peaceful development” (heping fazhan). 
In May 2004, China’s President Hu Jintao used “peaceful development” 
in a speech at the Boao Forum for Asia. In December 2005, The State 
Council Information Office (2005) of People’s Republic of China issued 
a white paper titled China’s Peaceful Development Road.
After Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the CPC in 
November 2012, Beijing has become more confident in expressing its 
dissatisfaction at the gap between China’s growing national strength and 
its status in the international system. In a speech at the 27th collective 
study meeting of the CCP Central Politburo, President Xi stressed that 
China should participate in the international efforts to make the global 
governance system become more fair and reasonable and thereby create 
more favourable conditions for China’s development as well as the world 
peace (Xinhua 2015). To that end, China has shown willingness to play a 
more active role in international affairs, including UN peacekeeping.
China’s Active Policy on UN Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century
Being a rising power in the twenty-first century, China has adopted 
an active UN peacekeeping policy. The activeness is demonstrated not 
only in its strong support for UN peacekeeping operations and relevant 
affairs, but also in its evolving doctrine on UN peacekeeping.
As of 31 August 2017, China had 2654 peacekeepers, including 
2417 troops, 81 UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM) and staff 
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officers, and 156 police officers, in 9 of the 15 ongoing United Nations 
PKOs and one special political mission (see Table 13.1).3 It ranked 11th 
among the 124 troop and police-contributing countries and number one 
among the five UN Security Council permanent members (P5) in terms 
of the contribution of personnel (United Nations 2017b). So far China 
has contributed a total of more than 35,000 military and police peace-
keepers to the UN-commanded PKOs and special political missions. As 
is shown in Chart 13.2, back in 2000, China had the lowest number of 
UN peacekeepers among the permanent members. However, the last 
15 years, China’s contribution of UN peacekeepers has increased rapidly 
while contributions of all the other four P5 have either remained at a low 
level or significantly decreased.
China’s assessment rate in contribution to UN peacekeeping in the 
2016–2018 fiscal years is 10.28% (United Nations 2015). As is shown in 
Chart 13.3, back in 2001, its assessment rate was merely about two per-
cent. However, since then, China’s assessment rate has rapidly increased 
Table 13.1 China’s contribution of peacekeeping personnel to ongoing UN 
PKOs, as of 31 March 2017
Source Author’s own calculation based on data from United Nations (2017a)










MINURSO West Sahara 11 11
MINUSMA Mali 8 395 403
MONUSCO The DRC 16 218 234




UNIFIL Lebanon 8 410 418
UNFICYP Cyprus 7 7
UNMIL Liberia 1 140 1 142
UNMISS South Sudan 7 23 1029 1059
UNTSO Middle East 4 4
Total 16 140 81 2417 2654
3 It should be noted that uniformed personnel, including military observers, and police 
officers on political missions commanded by the UN Department of Political Affairs are 
UN peacekeepers too.




















Chart 13.2 UNSC permanent members’ contribution of UN Peacekeepers 

























Chart 13.3 Major Power’s assessment rate in contribution to UN 
Peacekeeping (2001–2016) (Source Author’s own calculation based on data from 
United Nations 2015)
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while most other major power’s assessment rates have declined. China 
is now the second largest UN peacekeeping budget contributor among 
all the 193 UN Member States, and the largest among the developing 
countries (United Nations 2015).
China also attaches great importance to peacekeeping personnel train-
ing. It has invested heavily in setting up peacekeeping training facilities 
and uses them, among other things, as institutions for relevant inter-
national cooperation. China established China Peacekeeping Police 
Training Center in 2000 and the Ministry of Defense Peacekeeping 
Center in 2009. Both training centres have advanced facilities, which 
showcases China’s increased material capabilities as well as strong politi-
cal will of participating in UN peacekeeping.
Since 1990s China has been to learn the field of peacekeeping. It 
often sends delegates to participate in training courses, academic work-
shops and seminars held in other UN Member States, including those 
held in Western states such as the United Kingdom, France, Australia, 
the United States as well as in Nordic countries. It has also received 
peacekeeping training assistance from United Kingdom, France, and 
other states. However, in recent years, as China gradually gained more 
and more experience in peacekeeping, it is no longer merely a “partic-
ipant” or “learner” of various peacekeeping-related international activ-
ities, but also an increasingly active organiser. Both the Chinese police 
and military peacekeeping training institutions often host international 
training courses and academic exchange activities.
China’s strong support for UN peacekeeping is also reflected in its 
active engagement in hotspot issues that affect international peace and 
security. Working together with their international colleagues including 
those from the United States and Europe, the Chinese special represent-
atives and minister of foreign affairs have made significant contributions 
to the peace process in South Sudan, Darfur in Sudan, the eastern part of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Afghanistan, and 
the Middle East.4 Besides, China has given strong support for the UNSC 
Resolution 1816 (UN 2008), which calls for international efforts to 
fight pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden. It has deployed the PLA Navy 
ships to conduct escort missions in the region’s international waters 
since 2008. On 4 January 2014, one Chinese frigate Yancheng joined 
4 Interview with an official from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 18 June 
2014.
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the international escort mission for the disposal of Syrian chemical weap-
ons in response to appeals from the UNSC and the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Xinhua 2014a).
The PLA, China’s armed forces, has included peacekeeping as one of 
its major missions. In March 2013, the MND issued a white paper called 
The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, which for the 
first time systematically explained the PLA’s missions in the twenty-first 
century (State Council Information Office 2013). The white paper states 
that the PLA has diversified its missions to include defending national 
sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, supporting national eco-
nomic and social development, and safeguarding world peace and 
regional stability. It explains that the PLA should assume its due interna-
tional responsibilities, and play an active role in maintaining world peace, 
security, and stability (State Council Information Office 2013).
Most significantly, on 28 September 2015, in his statement at the 
General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly and 
remarks at the UN Peacekeeping Summit, Chinese president Xi Jinping 
(2015a, b) announced six important commitments to support the 
improvement and strengthening of UN peacekeeping:
First, China will join the new UN peacekeeping Capability Readiness 
System and set up a permanent peacekeeping police squad and build 
a peacekeeping standby force of 8000 troops. Second, China will give 
favorable consideration to UN requests for more Chinese engineering 
soldiers and transportation and medical staff to take part in UN PKOs. 
Third, in the coming five years, China will train 2000 peacekeepers from 
other countries, and carry out 10 demining assistance programs which 
will include training and equipment provision. Fourth, in the coming 
five years, China will provide free military aid of US$100 million to the 
African Union to support the building of the African Standby Force and 
the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis. Fifth, China 
will send the first peacekeeping helicopter squad to UN PKOs in Africa. 
Sixth, China will establish a 10-year, US$1 billion China-UN peace and 
development fund to support the UN’s work, advance multilateral coop-
eration and contribute more to world peace and development. Part of 
the fund will be used to support UN PKOs.
These six Chinese measures show that China has decided to expand 
its contribution to UN peacekeeping and relevant international efforts of 
maintaining peace and security. Considering its rising power identity as 
well as being a key UN Member State, China’s huge support package is 
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of special significance. Although during the 2015 UN Summit and after-
wards, many other Member States have also made similar promises to 
support the UN peacekeeping, so far none of them have given support as 
significant as that of China.
As most of the ongoing PKOs are operating in volatile places, 
increasing contribution of peacekeepers can mean increasing possibilities of 
fatalities and injuries. On 1 June 2016, terrorists attacked the barracks of 
the Chinese peacekeeping security unit located in Gao, Mali with a vehi-
cle bomb, leading to the death of one Chinese peacekeeper and four inju-
ries. A few weeks later, on 10 July, another two Chinese peacekeepers were 
killed and five more injured in a mortar exchange between the government 
forces and the rebel army in Juba, South Sudan. Although both accidents 
have aroused heated discussion among the Chinese public on security of 
peacekeepers, Beijing has not shown any signs of withdrawing troops from 
Mali or South Sudan or intention to reduce its contribution of peacekeep-
ing personnel. In October 2016, China announced that the equipment of 
a 140-person PLA air unit with four multifunctional helicopters was been 
transported to the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID). In September 2016, a 150-person Chinese police 
unit passed the UN selection process to serve as the first standby Formed 
Police Unit in the organisation’s history. By November 2017, PLA has 
organized a standby peacekeeping force of 19 units with 8000 troops. 
Apparently, a rising China is determined to be an active UN peacekeeper 
despite increasing fatalities and injuries of Chinese peacekeepers.
chinA’s PeAcekeePing doctrine in the twenty-First 
century
China’s new identity of a rising power in the twenty-first century also 
shapes its peacekeeping doctrine. An analysis of China’s interpretation 
and practice of basic UN peacekeeping doctrine, such as the three funda-
mental peacekeeping principles and the concept of responsibility to pro-
tect (R2P), helps understand this country’s UN peacekeeping policy.
Three Fundamental Peacekeeping Principles
UN peacekeeping has three core principles—consent, impartiality, and 
non-use of force—which China believes are fundamental to winning the 
confidence and support of Member States for peacekeeping operations 
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and ensuring their smooth conduct (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2014). Although today’s China still insists that peacekeeping should 
adhere to these principles, it’s approach to and practice of them have 
undergone some changes.
While insisting that the consent of a host country is a prerequisite to 
establishing a PKO, Beijing also agrees that sometimes consent cannot 
be obtained without efforts of the international community. In recent 
years, China has become increasingly willing to participate in those 
efforts. For example, it is believed to have joined the international com-
munity in persuading Sudan, South Sudan, the DRC, and Syria to accept 
UN peacekeeping or cooperate with the UN in recent years.5
Regarding impartiality, although China maintains this principle 
should be abided by in peace efforts by the international community, 
it does not practice the principle in a rigid way. For example, Beijing 
insists that the internal affairs of any state should not be interfered 
with by outside forces. However, it is willing to play an active role 
in many conflict-affected countries’ peace processes through differ-
ent means, including engaging with opposition parties under special 
circumstances.
In early June 2011, China confirmed that its ambassador to Qatar, 
Zhang Zhiliang, had met with the chairman of Libya’s National 
Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdel Jalil (Xinhua 2011). One retired 
Chinese diplomat noted that China’s engagement with the Libyan 
opposition leader before the fall of Gaddafi’s government showed flex-
ibility in its principle of non-intervention.6 The special representative 
of the Chinese government on African affairs has had talks with South 
Sudan’s conflicting parties since 2012.7 On 5 February 2013, the 
Chinese ambassador to Egypt, Song Aiguo, met with Syrian National 
Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces chairman Ahmed 
Moaz Al-khatib in Cairo (Xinhua 2013). Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Hua Chunying noted during a press conference: “What is 
the core is that we should push both sides in Syria to blaze a ‘middle 
5 Interview with a Chinese diplomat, Beijing, 18 June 2014.
6 Interview with a Chinese retired diplomat, Langfang, China, 25 May 2016.
7 Interview with a Chinese retired diplomat, Beijing, 12 June 2014.
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way’ by keeping in mind Syria’s national conditions and the interests of 
all parties” (Xinhua 2014b). When asked to confirm the report about 
an Afghan Taliban delegation’s visit to Beijing in late November 2014, 
another Chinese foreign spokesperson, Hong Lei, said:
As a friendly neighbor of Afghanistan, China attaches great importance to 
developing relations with Afghanistan, hopes to see Afghanistan achieve last-
ing peace, stability and development at an early date, supports the ‘Afghan-
owned’ process towards peace and reconciliation and wishes to play a 
constructive role to that end. (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015)
China maintains that peaceful settlement of international disputes and 
non-use of force in international relations is an important principle of the 
UN Charter and a basic norm of international law (Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2005). Nevertheless, Beijing does not rule out the neces-
sity of using force under exceptional circumstances. When use of force is 
necessary, Beijing insists that use of force should meet two basic require-
ments: “one is the authorization of the UNSC, the other for the purpose 
of self-defense or defense of the mandate” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2005).
China’s changing attitude towards the principle of use of force is well 
reflected in its contribution of security troops to PKOs in recent years. 
The international community has long expected China to contribute 
“combat troops” to PKOs (International Crisis Group 2009; Gill and 
Huang 2009). Since the early 1990s, China had for a long period of 
time refrained from contributing security troops to PKOs. However, this 
stance has gradually changed in the twenty-first century. In 2004, China 
deployed a 125-person peacekeeping Formed Police Unit to the United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In December 
2013, China for the first time deployed a security company to a PKO, 
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (MINUSMA). More significantly, in 2015 China deployed 
a 700-person infantry battalion to the UN Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS) (Xinhua 2014c). In the new millennium, although China 
still has concerns regarding the use of force, it no longer minds being 
directly engaged in use of force in UN-commanded PKOs when there is 
UNSC authorisation and the situation on the ground deems it necessary 
to use force.
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R2P
Entering the twenty-first century, the post-Westphalian interventionist con-
cept of responsibility to protect (R2P) has begun to challenge Westphalian 
norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. Although Beijing has in princi-
ple endorsed R2P by supporting the 2005 World Summit Outcome, it has 
never embraced the interventionism embodied in the concept. According 
to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, R2P has three pillars:
Pillar One: Each individual state has a responsibility to protect its popula-
tion from mass atrocities.
Pillar Two: The international community has a responsibility to assist the 
state to protect its population.
Pillar Three: If the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and 
peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the respon-
sibility to intervene through coercive measures. But military intervention is 
the last resort (UN 2005).
China insists that most of the weight of R2P should fall on Pillar One. 
It is concerned that R2P may serve as a sharp tool for the West, which 
prefers Pillars Two and Three, to skip the consent of host countries and 
penetrate the wall of traditional sovereignty (He 2014a). On 24 July 
2009, the Chinese ambassador to the UN, Liu Zhenmin, made a state-
ment at the plenary session of the General Assembly on the question of 
R2P, insisting that
The government of a given state bears the primary responsibility for protect-
ing its citizens. The international community can provide assistance, but the 
protection of the citizens ultimately depends on the government of the state 
concerned…there must not be any wavering over the principles of respecting 
state sovereignty and non-interference of internal affairs.…it is necessary to 
prevent ‘R2P’ from becoming another version of ‘humanitarian intervention. 
(Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 2009)
According to one retired Chinese diplomat, the government largely 
regards R2P as a concept or a good wish, which solely has significance 
as political morality.8 Nevertheless, China has not adopted a rigid policy 
8 Interview with a Chinese retired diplomat, Langfang, China, 13 December 2012.
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on R2P that would rule out international intervention under special cir-
cumstances. It does recognise that the concept of R2P can apply to the 
four international crimes of “genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity” (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic 
of China to the UN 2009).
One major concern of the supporters of R2P is with the concept of 
protection of civilians (PoC). As is shown in China’s support for the UN 
guiding principles on the use of force, which makes it clear that force can 
be used only as a last resort in implementing UNSC authorisation, China 
basically agrees to the concept PoC. Chinese peacekeepers in places like 
Mali and South Sudan are carrying on PoC tasks according to their mis-
sion mandates.
In recent years, the Chinese academic community is becoming 
increasingly interested in discussing R2P. In 2012, Ruan Zongze, a sen-
ior researcher at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), 
a top Chinese think tank affiliated to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), coined the concept of responsible protection (RP) vis-á-
vis R2P (Ruan 2012a). RP has six elements:
1.  Any intervention should protect innocent civilians in the country 
concerned as well as regional peace and stability, rather than spe-
cific political factions or armed forces;
2.  The UN Security Council is the only body with the legitimacy to 
implement “humanitarian intervention”;
3.  The necessary precondition for the implementation of force must 
be that all diplomatic and political means of settlement have been 
exhausted;
4.  The goal of protection should be to prevent or alleviate a humani-
tarian disaster, rather than the overthrow of a government;
5.  National reconstruction after intervention and protection should 
be given sustained support;
6.  The UN should establish a monitoring mechanism, and an effec-
tive evaluation and accountability system (Ruan 2012b).
Although the concept of RP has not been officially endorsed by the Chinese 
Government, it has attracted great international attention. As the six ele-
ments of RP are basically in line with China’s official discourse regarding 
R2P, some international academics regard RP as expressing the Chinese 
protection approach in relation to R2P (Evans 2014; Thakur 2013).
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RP was coined and discussed under the background that a rising 
China seeks to be an international norm contributor. Since 2014, the 
Chinese leadership has begun to introduce a concept called “Chinese 
Approach” (zhongguo fangan), which advocates that China has both the 
capabilities and willingness to help improve global governance by provid-
ing solutions with Chinese characteristics.
Some Chinese academics have also done research in China’s normative 
contribution to UN peacebuilding. For example, since the beginning of 
the new century, many Western academics have criticised “liberal peace,” 
the paradigm of international peacebuilding efforts. Liberal peace as a 
peacebuilding norm has two pillars, one is Western liberal democracy-ori-
ented institution building, and the other liberal market economy. Critics 
point out that liberal peace-dominated peacebuilding has created “virtual 
peace” in many post-conflict states (Paris 2004; Richmond 2006; Taylor 
2007; Richmond and Franks 2009; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2009; 
Mac Ginty 2010; Salih 2010; Campbell et al. 2011). He Yin coined 
“developmental peace”, claiming that both China’s peaceful rise as well 
as its international aid practice demonstrates a peace norm significantly 
different from liberal peace. Developmental peace advocates political and 
social stability supported by strong institutions and an economic devel-
opment-oriented national development strategy. Liberal peace and devel-
opmental peace are two peace norms differing widely in their ways and 
contents. One seems to be a contrast to the other, competing for atten-
tion and resources in peacebuilding as well as legitimacy in international 
norm system. However, a comparison study of the peacebuilding practice 
in Haiti and Liberia shows that when the two peace norms are promoted 
at the same time, they can not only co-exist peacefully, but also improve 
the effect of peacebuilding efforts (He 2014b).
Both RP and developmental peace are coined by Chinese academics, 
which symbolises a turn of China’s attitude towards international norms, 
from passive acceptance or rigid rejection in the past to today’s increas-
ingly active participation in debate. Being a rising power in the twenty-first 
century, China “increasingly sees itself as a norm-shaper and norm-maker 
with the international system” (Garwood-Gowers 2016; He 2014b).
conclusion
Since China’s return to the UN, great changes have taken place to 
the country’s national identity, from a semi-revolutionary state in the 
1970s and an integrated member of the international community in 
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the 1980s and 1990s, to a rising power in the twenty-first century. The 
country’s policy on UN peacekeeping has changed accordingly, from 
opposition in the 1970s to gradually expanded reactive participation in 
the 1980s and 1990s, to increasingly active participation in the twen-
ty-first century. China’s new identity of a rising power in the twen-
ty-first century also shapes its doctrine on peacekeeping. It can show 
certain degree of flexibility or be creative in practicing the three fun-
damental principles of peacekeeping and the concept of R2P in order 
to play a constructive role in UN peacekeeping affairs, especially when 
the authority of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can 
be secured or when Beijing considers the specific circumstances to be 
exceptional.
As a rising power as well as one of the P5, China’s support for UN 
peacekeeping benefits not only the country’s peaceful rise strategy, 
but also the UN peacekeeping efforts and global security governance. 
However, although the UN and international community have rea-
sons for applauding China’s active policy on UN peacekeeping, some 
challenges should not be ignored. The first and foremost of these chal-
lenges is about China’s role in the UN peacekeeping regime in the 
new millennium. Today’s China is the second largest UN peacekeep-
ing budget contributor among all UN Member States and the most 
active UN peacekeeper among the P5. However, research shows that 
China’s discursive power in the UN peacekeeping affairs is in great 
deficit when compared to that of other major powers (He 2016). As 
a veto-wielding Member State in the UNSC, China has big influence 
in the high politics of UN peacekeeping affairs. However, when it 
comes to the bureaucratic or operational level, China is lagging behind 
many other major powers, including some non-P5 Member States. 
For example, China only ranks number 14 among all the 193 Member 
States in terms of number of civilian employees in the UN Secretariat 
(He 2016). Moreover, there are only 11 Chinese nationals occupying 
D1 or above level posts in the UN Secretariat, whereas the numbers 
of the United States, United Kingdom, and France are 50, 24 and 17 
respectively (He 2016). China is also under-represented in all kinds 
of policy consultation activities initiated by the UN (Prodi 2014). For 
example, since 2000, the UN has nominated six important expert pan-
els to review and advise on UN peacekeeping affairs. China has only 
been invited to participate in two of them (He 2016). Back in 2000, 
there was no Chinese representative in the Panel on the United Nations 
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Peace Operations (United Nations 2000). In 2015, China was almost 
once again excluded from the High Independent Panel for United 
Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO).9
Being a rising power as well as an active supporter for UN peacekeep-
ing, China will never be satisfied at being regarded as merely a peace-
keeping personnel and budget contributor. Through actively supporting 
UN peacekeeping, China wishes to share with the rest of the world its 
material success, but also intellectual achievement accumulated in its 
peaceful rising, including as they relate governance. China is ready to 
contribute with a “Chinese Approach” to global governance, includ-
ing UN peacekeeping. To further this establish China’s role in the 
international peacekeeping regime, two questions ought to be asked, 
researched, and finally tackled: How to improve China’s representation 
in the UN peacekeeping regime so that more Chinese experts can partic-
ipate in advising, designing, and running PKOs? And, how to welcome 
China’s enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping and find it a comfortable posi-
tion in the UN peacekeeping regime, which is undergoing critical reform 
and transformation?
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introduction
The July 2011 independence of the new Republic of South Sudan 
marks the successful outcome of a long-time struggle, encompassing 
a wide spectrum of local and international activities. Included among 
them is a variety of UN-supported peace and relief operations like the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led peace pro-
cess, the UN-led Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the UN Advance 
Mission, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and, following inde-
pendence, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Nevertheless, 
deep-rooted Southern animosities quickly upended the internal peace 
on which secession relied, troubling both international and local efforts 
toward sustainable peace and security. Early post-independence erup-
tions of violence exposed the precariousness of the new state. By 2014, 
the potential of a South Sudanese civil war came to fruition with the 
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defection of senior figures from the South Sudanese parliament and its 
subsequent dissolution. Factional and interethnic violence have with-
stood various peace accords from 2015 to 2017, leading to widespread 
human rights abuses, devastating humanitarian crises, famine, and per-
vasive threats to human security. Amid widespread bi- and multilateral 
support, questioning how South Sudan become a newly independ-
ent state plagued by violence and contestation speaks to the intended 
and unintended consequences of peacebuilding in Africa, the impact 
of peace-seeking activities that parallel and overlap UN peace pro-
cesses, and the wide range of non-state actors critical to securing peace 
outcomes.
This chapter highlights practices in the wider peacebuilding field 
that seek similar outcomes as UN peace operations or otherwise affect 
the background conditions necessary for their success. It treats South 
Sudan as an illustrative case study that uniquely reflects processes 
that shape and regulate sites of conflict, chronic emergency, and lim-
ited statehood across postcolonial sub-Saharan states. I argue that, 
despite the ‘view from above’, South Sudan’s independence ultimately 
depended on two interconnected peacebuilding frameworks: a well-rec-
ognised top-down and centralised approach based on peacekeeping and 
diplomacy, and a lesser-known diffuse and multi-dimensional approach 
rooted in a nexus of religion, humanitarianism, and networked wartime 
governance. Focusing on the latter, I illustrate how the incorporation 
of religious institutions into postcolonial global and regional aid-based 
governance networks enables church-based actors to pursue political, 
social, and structural interventions critical to UN peace operations. In 
doing so, I emphasise the impact of religion, aid, and governance on 
peacebuilding in Africa, with a view toward contributing to discussions 
about holistic, integrated, and people-centered approaches to sustaina-
ble peace.
Recent literature on religion and peacebuilding increasingly empha-
sises the positive impact of religious actors, ideas, and institutions on 
international peace. Numerous religiously-identified activities in areas 
of wartime governance, aid, refugee and displaced persons assistance, 
track-two diplomacy, and civil mobilisation parallel UN operations 
across sub-Saharan Africa. Well known examples include Sudan, Uganda, 
Nigeria, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and 
Liberia. Throughout the second Sudanese civil war (1983–2005) and 
into South Sudan’s independence (2005–2011), local and international 
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Christian groups utilised their roles within regional and international 
aid networks to conduct multi-track peace diplomacy, conflict manage-
ment, and local governance. They helped minimise internal fragmenta-
tion, establish the viability of a southern state, and secure the conditions 
necessary to advance the South toward secession. Considering recent 
critiques of state-centric approaches and emphases on ‘people-power,’ 
these activities demonstrate the importance of parallel peace processes 
undertaken by non-state actors, and, notably, religious actors, in securing 
peace outcomes.
Religious actors and institutions are often uniquely situated to 
 provide social services to populations in crisis and publicly legitimate 
governing parties. I argue this reflects modes of postcolonial govern-
ance, envisioned here as constituting a ‘religion–governance interface’: 
a context in which religious groupings are relied upon to perform 
sovereign functions, encompassing local and transnational actors and 
institutions responsible for the delivery of public goods and the provi-
sion of civilian livelihood. At the same time, these activities encompass 
their own sets of problems. In the case of South Sudan, issues included 
problematic tradeoffs and spillover effects as the church became 
increasingly undercut by overly instrumentalised relationships with the 
principal South Sudanese rebel group, the subsequent Government of 
South Sudan, and the international community. Attention to how the 
‘religion–governance interface’ enables activities in times of war and 
crisis, therefore, uncovers sites in which external coordination across 
long-term peacebuilding efforts should be strengthened in ways that 
better reflect the political and institutional realities of postcolonial 
sub-Saharan states and, more specifically, the institutional arrangements 
of religion in the region.
This chapter has three sections. First, I discuss practices of interna-
tional peace against the backdrop of human security, multidimensional 
peacebuilding, and calls for ‘people-centered’ approaches. Second, I out-
line the central roles played by the Church and Christian NGOs in post-
colonial governance and statehood. Third, I illustrate the importance of 
a ‘religion–governance interface’ for the successes and failures of peace-
building in South Sudan. More than simply a matter of South Sudanese 
politics, this history lays bare the heterogeneity of peacebuilding in Africa 
and the religious institutions and practices that overflow mainstream dis-
courses and centralised operations.
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beyond stAte-centric APProAches to internAtionAl PeAce
Considerable scholarship addresses changes in twenty-first century global 
security and the role of the UN in protecting international peace, secur-
ing welfare, and promoting human development. A principal theme con-
cerns state failure in the global South and the struggle for control by 
opposing non-state groups. Across sub-Saharan Africa (and elsewhere), 
political violence occurs in societies that have limited state power, lack 
political stability and effective political institutions, and are unable to 
establish authority over large portions of territory (for example Somalia, 
Angola, DRC, Mali, Nigeria, and Sudan). Conflicts are driven by a com-
plex interaction of private interests, group identities (i.e. ethno-national 
and ethno-religious sectarianism), and large-scale social cleavages (i.e. 
social, political, economic, and cultural). They tend to be protracted, 
blurring the boundaries between civilians and combatants, resulting in 
mass civilian death and displacement.
Although international actors historically intervened into war-affected 
societies in postcolonial Africa (for example Congo, Nigeria, and Sudan), 
only in the post-Cold War period were themes of medium- and long-
term peacebuilding placed on the international policy agenda, reflecting 
an institutional shift toward multilateral solutions for international peace. 
Over this period, a ‘protection of civilians’ agenda emerged making civil-
ian security in post-conflict environments “critical to the legitimacy and 
credibility of UN peacekeeping missions, the peace agreements they are 
deployed to help implement, and the institution of the United Nations 
itself” (UN 2009, p. 1). This is now part of an overarching human secu-
rity framework subject to a diverse policy and implementation environ-
ment composed of states, multilateral organisations, and humanitarian 
and other non-state actors, with UN peace operations at the center. In 
contrast to state-centric security, human security requires effective civil-
ian protection, inclusive political institutions, and a functional civil soci-
ety, fostering complex relations between security providers.
As global security regimes focus on the wellbeing of populations 
and the conditions underlying ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states, they dispro-
portionately concentrate on postcolonial settings, especially in Africa. 
Beginning with the 1999 UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UN 
peacekeeping missions across the continent have intensified their inter-
actions with host states, humanitarians, and other non-state actors (for 
example MONUC in DRC; UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire; and UNMIS 
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and UNAMID in Sudan). Peacekeepers are now authorised to pursue 
actions beyond monitoring the implementation of peace agreements, 
becoming increasingly networked with various other actors to achieve 
specific political outcomes (for example operations in the Central African 
Republic and DRC). UN peacekeeping intersects political missions and 
peacebuilding operations, deploying offensive force and state-building 
mandates that push “the scope of activities beyond what the UN peace-
keepers are accustomed to” (Peter 2015, p. 350). It has become part of a 
broader attempt to identify and support structures capable of strength-
ening peace and prevent relapse into conflict by balancing the interests of 
states and societies.
UN peace operations are now “multidimensional, addressing the full 
spectrum of peacebuilding activities, from providing secure environments 
to monitoring human rights and rebuilding the capacity of the state” 
(UN 2009, p. 2). Traditionally distinct practices intermingle, necessitat-
ing effective platforms to synergise across sectors and manage transitions 
from conflict to post-conflict settings. However, UN peace operations 
exhibit a ‘coherence and coordination deficit’. Despite recognition that 
various “dimensions of peacebuilding systems are interlinked,” practical 
integration has proven difficult (de Coning 2007, pp. 1–2). Accordingly, 
a range of policy recommendations seeks to strengthen both inter-
nal and external coherence among UN clusters and non-UN interven-
tions and establish common strategic plans and shared priorities. This is 
most recently reflected by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace 
Operations (HIPPO), which advocates “innovative approaches that inte-
grate conflict prevention, governance, development and human rights” 
(UN 2015, p. 21).
However, sustainable peace also requires local engagement and exper-
tise as well as deepened commitment to safeguarding the lives of those 
in conflict-affected countries. There is a need to eschew ‘white SUV 
culture’ in favor of “a more human face that prioritizes closer interac-
tion with local people to better understand their concerns, needs and 
aspirations” (UN 2015, p. 15). To that end, HIPPO promotes a ‘peo-
ple-centered’ approach, aiming to link UN field-based personnel 
and local communities for improved mandate implementation and a 
stronger culture of protection. HIPPO suggests ‘UN peace operations’ 
be conceptualised as a “single spectrum of peace and security missions 
and other initiatives” and that the UN itself “become a more field-ori-
ented and people-centered organization in its peace operations” (ibid.). 
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The 2016 UN ‘Peace Promise’ echoes these ideas by emphasising the 
need to “work together across silos and at the peace-humanitarian-de-
velopment nexus in addressing the drivers of violent conflict, delivering 
humanitarian assistance and developing institutions, resilience and capaci-
ties simultaneously in a complementary and synergetic way” (UN 2016).
Calls for stronger field-oriented and ‘people-centered’ capabilities 
focus on utilising a wider range of international, regional, and local 
actors across a wider range of activities. These policy developments also 
echo recent scholarship on strategic and sustainable peacebuilding that 
emphasises the importance of integrating ideas, institutions, and ‘peo-
ple-power’, for which religious actors are considered a principal resource 
(Philpott and Powers 2010). Although policy orthodoxy convention-
ally treats religion as a problem rather than solution for international 
crises, the participation of religious actors, organisations, and insti-
tutions is increasingly recognised as a significant part of international 
aid and peace, crosscutting what UN Peacebuilding calls the ‘Peace-
Humanitarian-Development Nexus.’ Peacebuilding now encompasses aid 
and development efforts not automatically associated with peacebuilding 
by actors with considerable social capital to transform conflict dynam-
ics. This is especially the case for religious actors in Southern states who 
are often deeply invested in these activities and embedded within over-
lapping networks. The question here is the extent to which these actors 
have been and could be effectively incorporated into strategic peace-
building designs.
church, goVernAnce, And the PostcoloniAl stAte
Religion is central to contemporary discussions about democratisation, 
aid, and security across the African continent (Ranger 2008, pp. 4–5; 
Commission for Africa 2005, p. 27). As mechanisms of peace and 
international order increasingly rely on religious organisations to 
manage episodes of crisis, these discussions harmonise with broader 
‘post-secular’ framings that highlight the social and political roles of 
religion and new accommodations between the secular state and reli-
gious actors in the post-Cold War period (de Vries and Sullivan 2006; 
Habermas 2008). With respect to contemporary peacebuilding, for 
example, Powers (2010, p. 328) argues that religious leaders at the local, 
national, and international level uniquely exemplify the potential of ‘peo-
ple power,’ embodying a degree of moral credibility that “allows them 
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to be effective advocates for peaceful social change, to mediate between 
conflicting parties, and to provide new visions for the future in soci-
eties torn by conflict.” More generally, religious actors and institutions 
are widely acknowledged to be densely networked at local, regional, and 
global levels and to possess valuable material, social, cultural, and ethical 
resources. For those concerned with strategic approaches to sustainable 
peace, they represent an underutilised resource.
For sub-Saharan states, the public power of religion stems from a long 
trajectory of postcolonial governance in areas of security, aid, and devel-
opment. Differences notwithstanding, religiously identified interventions 
are common features of postcolonial struggles and overlap the regional 
presence of international NGOs following decolonisation. Liberal inter-
nationalism has long depended on religious groupings to perform sover-
eign functions in colonial and postcolonial settings, encompassing local 
and transnational actors and institutions responsible for public goods and 
civilian livelihood. Postcolonial states defy ‘Weberian’ ideals of statehood 
modeled on European polities that cement public authority entirely 
within the secular state. They comprise multiple order-producing systems 
coterminous with state power (Mampilly 2011, p. 239). Across contexts 
(for example Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Sierra Leone, and Sudan), 
control over violence and provision of law, order, security, and health is 
subject to “dispersed, fragmented and overlapping structures that sub-
stitute for the weakness of the central and legally constituted state” 
(Podder 2014, p. 215). This pattern is exemplified by the sub-Saharan 
Church, which, as a broadly construed social, religious, and political 
institution, is embedded in overlapping regional and international net-
works, both religious and governmental. The global peacebuilding field 
needs to be reconceptualised in ways that reflect these political and insti-
tutional realities and, more specifically, the institutional arrangements of 
religion in the region.
Following decolonisation, the Church entrenched itself as a prin-
cipal source of social service, advocating on behalf of economic and 
political inclusion and providing services to needy populations. This con-
stituted a pattern across the continent, seen in Sudan, Kenya, Malawi, 
Zimbabwe, Congo, Mozambique, and elsewhere. Examples include the 
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission established by the Sudan Council 
of Churches; rural education administered by the National Christian 
Council of Kenya; and agricultural development by the Zimbabwe 
Council of Churches—to name a few (Gifford 2009, p. 50). The Church 
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accrued widespread credibility and moral authority, contrasting the ram-
pant patrimonialism, corruption, and ‘politics of the belly’ that character-
ised many postcolonial African states (Bayart 1993, p. 21).
Decolonisation, uneven development, and violent conflict also led 
to an intensified international NGO presence. By the 1980s, numer-
ous African governments were unable to fulfill basic governance. 
International NGOs took their place, many of which were Christian 
identified and evolved from church-based relief and development struc-
tures. Western donors, adopting neoliberal approaches to foreign aid 
and weary of limited state capacity, channeled aid through NGOs and 
local churches. In South Sudan, for example, bi- and multilateral devel-
opment aid organisations like the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the British Department for International 
Development (DfID), and the World Food Programme funded a variety 
of international partners to provide services from water, sanitation, and 
hygiene to healthcare and education. In Mozambique, religious and sec-
ular NGOs were at times more powerful than the state. Church-affiliated 
NGOs like World Vision International and Christian Care entered 
Zimbabwe as relief organisations in the early 1970s, coming to play cen-
tral roles in the development of the postcolonial state.
The interpenetration of religion, governance, and aid created an envi-
ronment conducive to religiously identified public activity. It vested 
Christian-identified organisations with local credibility, authority, and 
social capital, strategically positioning the Church within overlapping net-
works of security, aid, and governance. For international stakeholders, the 
NGO sector was crucial for the democratisation of African countries and 
the creation of a pluralistic civil society, for which Christian NGOs were 
especially well-positioned. This overlapped and informed the Church’s 
role in providing social service and local governance; its increasing orien-
tation toward relief and development; and its growing entanglements in 
global aid regimes. Religious and secular NGOs thus became implicated 
in sustaining state power and economic development while also creating 
conditions enabling governments to streamline and limit their own role 
in civil services. Paradoxically, this both supported and undercut state 
legitimacy while also jeopardising the independence and autonomy of the 
Church and expending its own social and political capital.
Reconceptualising political order within postcolonial spaces is there-
fore critical for understanding how religious institutional configurations 
impact peace outcomes. The interface between religion and governance 
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encompasses three dimensions relevant to peacebuilding Africa. First, 
there is a governance–brokerage dimension in which religious organisa-
tions subcontract social services, infrastructure, social capital, and legit-
imacy. Second, there is a political–strategic dimension in which they 
formulate their own organisational and strategic mandates and conduct 
various forms of political entrepreneurship and mobilisation. Third, there 
is an instrumental–organisational dimension in which the selective and 
limited engagement of these organisations by state, rebel, and interna-
tional actors leads to potential trade-offs and spillover effects that can 
negatively impact both long-term peace outcomes and organisational 
integrity.
PoliticAl FrAgmentAtion, Violence, And the new  
rePublic oF south sudAn
Prior to South Sudan’s independence, conflict between Sudan’s 
Khartoum-based government (the ‘North’) and southern insurgent 
groups (the ‘South’) produced two civil wars. These wars were part of 
a broader conflict system that displaced millions of people, intensifying 
the effects of environmental crisis and famine. The second Sudanese 
civil war between the North and South began in 1983. It was fought 
mainly between the North and what had become the primary southern 
rebel group, the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A). It was also fought among various southern factions, often 
through northern support. The war formally ended in 2005 with the 9 
January signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The 
principal signatories were the Sudanese state and the SPLM/A. The CPA 
formalised a series of protocols established through a peace process led 
by IGAD (comprised of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, 
and Uganda), ‘Troika’ states (USA, UK, and Norway), and the African 
Union. At its core was the possibility of southern secession through ref-
erendum following a six-year interim period of southern autonomy and 
national power sharing. It also afforded the bulk of southern politi-
cal representation to the SPLM/A, which transitioned into the interim 
southern government and, after independence, has dominated the 
Government of South Sudan.
South Sudan’s independence depended on two interconnected peace-
building frameworks. The first, exemplified by the CPA, reflects a top-
down centralised approach based on peacekeeping and diplomacy. It 
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facilitated the negotiated settlement between Khartoum and the South 
and established the formal parameters for an internationally recognised 
secession. This framework became the principal referent for pre-inde-
pendence peace operations, like UNMIS, which focused mainly on CPA 
protocols and the ceasefire between North and South. The second frame-
work, exemplified by reconciliation among rebel factions and local sup-
port for the SPLA, reflects a more diffuse and multi-dimensional approach 
rooted in a nexus of religion, global humanitarianism, and networked 
wartime governance. It unified the southern insurgency; undercut the 
Khartoum-sponsored proxy war in the South; and constituted the SPLA 
as the legitimate political voice of South Sudan. Importantly, this frame-
work secured the conditions necessary for both the negotiated settlement 
as well as secession itself. However, it also allowed the SPLA to channel 
funds derived through oil revenue and bilateral arrangements into security 
and military expenditures; unintentionally enabled the formation of local 
patron–client networks; and contributed to widespread corruption.
Violence between principal parties escalated following the referen-
dum, propelled by the incomplete implementation of core CPA mile-
stones. However, violence also escalated within the South. The CPA 
did not include all relevant parties (i.e. civil society and political and 
military factions) other than Khartoum’s National Congress Party and 
the SPLM. At least 36 militias under the umbrella of the South Sudan 
Defense Forces) were excluded from the peace process. Nor did the 
CPA address the broader conflict system active throughout both the 
North and the South, leaving unresolved many core issues with respect 
to power sharing, equity, human rights, and security. Armed south-
ern factions protested the SPLM- and Dinka-dominated government. 
Disgruntled politicians and political entrepreneurs traded on their abil-
ities to mobilise, if by force, large militias to extract political conces-
sions from the Government of South Sudan. Government efforts to 
resolve these issues through political concessions and ministerial posts, 
disarmament campaigns, immunity programs, and assassinations were 
unsuccessful. Violence was, and continues to be, fuelled by an admix-
ture of political interests and entrepreneurship on the one hand, and 
tribal and ethnic rivalries, on the other—exacerbated by chronic under-
development, abject marginalisation, and war. The push to end the con-
flict and secede suppressed these issues. They forcefully resurfaced in 
the absence of a unified enemy and competition for post-independence 
dispensation.
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Conflict, Aid, and Development
Outbreaks of large-scale violence and fragmentation expose multi-layered 
and multi-scalar tensions that have historically impeded peace and secu-
rity in South Sudan. Throughout the second civil war and post-conflict 
period, these tensions crystalised into an increasingly autonomous local 
conflict system driven by rent-seeking, political entrepreneurship, and 
tribal and ethnic rivalries. Much of the death and displacement ascribed 
to Sudan’s second civil war stemmed from factional fighting and mobilisa-
tion within the south, exploited by Khartoum through a sustained proxy 
war. The SPLA relied on international patronage to secure itself as the de 
facto governing entity of South Sudan, a status formalised through the 
CPA. It was far from the unproblematic political and military expression 
of the people’s will, against which it often found itself. In order to achieve 
recognition and position itself as a quasi-sovereign actor in the interna-
tional system, the SPLA required various means to manage factional 
struggles, suppress rival claimants, and establish political authority.
Although southern groups faced and resisted marginalisation, isolation, 
and exclusion by the northern elite, they also faced challenges from each 
other. The South always lacked a coherent ethnic or political basis from 
which its own polity could easily be formed, despite its representation in 
colonial materials, international treaties, local and regional peace-accords, 
and missionary cartography. South Sudan continues to encompass diverse 
ethno-national and ethno-social identities. Sudan’s civil wars demon-
strate this, fuelled by differing intersubjective cartographies, primordi-
alist appeals, instrumental agendas, and emancipatory politics (Jok and 
Hutchinson 1999; Hilhorst and van Leeuwen 2005; Maitre 2009; Branch 
and Mampilly 2005, p. 4). Despite varying degrees of political auton-
omy and multiple civil wars, South Sudan remains an internally contested 
space, organised around interethnic lines that, in turn, create precarious 
boundaries traversed by raiders, pillagers, and militias that recruit men 
and boys at gunpoint. Considerable efforts on the part of local and inter-
national groups attempted to address these matters, but ended up only 
deferring them in favor of promoting independence.
Church, Aid, and Wartime Governance in South Sudan
Many international, regional, and local actors and agendas shaped the 
peacebuilding field in South Sudan. In the final phases of the IGAD-
led peace negotiations, the UN authorised the Advance Mission in 
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Sudan (UNAMIS) to support peace talks and prepare for a subsequent 
UN peace operation. After the signing of the CPA, the United Nations 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was mandated as an observer and verifica-
tion force to assist principal parties with implementation of the agree-
ment in cooperation with the AU and international partners. Following 
independence, UNMIS was replaced by the UN Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS), focused on supporting South Sudan’s new government as 
well as protecting civilians and promoting development, peacebuilding, 
and recovery.
During the conflict, UN relief and development activities also incor-
porated peacebuilding objectives. In addition to repatriation of internally 
displaced persons, area development, and civil society support, for exam-
ple, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) disseminated information 
on peacebuilding and engaged in community-level conflict transforma-
tion. UNICEF provided support for social services, infrastructure, local 
NGOs, and civic education while implementing peacebuilding programs 
and promoting humanitarian principles and human rights compliance. In 
partnership with the World Food Programme, UNICEF also established 
OLS, an umbrella organisation for a consortium of UN agencies and 
NGOs that created an organised framework for international aid and relief. 
OLS included most of the aid agencies working in Sudan, many of whom 
developed peacebuilding programs offering “peace education and training 
in conflict analysis, facilitating dialogue between warring parties, or pro-
moting reconciliation and preventing conflict through reconstruction or 
economic development” (Bradbury et al. 2006, p. 23).
UN activities both supported and intersected grassroots peacebuild-
ing initiatives, addressing ‘second-tier’ conflicts indirectly related to 
war between Khartoum and the SPLM/A. At the center of these initi-
atives were local and international Christian groups like the New Sudan 
Council of Churches (NSCC), the Presbyterian Church of Sudan, and 
various international Christian NGOs. Through its humanitarian man-
date, this constellation of actors supported the IGAD peace process by 
conducting public messaging and awareness campaigns and commu-
nity-level peacebuilding, pioneering a ‘people-to-people’ approach to 
peace. From 2000 to 2002, the NSCC took part in ‘strategic linkages 
conferences’ in South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda that paralleled IGAD 
meetings. Based on their success, several large secular organisations 
adopted the people-to-people approach, including Pact Sudan, USAID’s 
Sudan Peace Fund, UNDP, and UNICEF.
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According to a Rift Valley Institute report, church-driven 
 peacebuilding took place within a ‘governance gap,’ “on the periphery of 
the state, where local forms of governance exist, but central government 
and the opposition movements have little or no formal administrative 
capacity and limited control” (Bradbury et al. 2006, p. 22). However, 
this would be better conceptualised within a framework of postcolo-
nial statehood, which has traditionally relied on a religion-governance 
interface. Accordingly, various church-based organisations utilised their 
positions within global and local governance networks to conduct aid, 
advocacy, and peacebuilding. They worked closely with the SPLM/A 
and the Government of South Sudan, international relief organisations, 
and various international churches and para-church groups. Globally, 
their labours reinforced the SPLM/A’s standing as the central political 
voice of the South, effacing internal fragmentation and establishing the 
viability of a potentially independent southern state. Locally, they facili-
tated and fulfilled governance, delivered aid, and conducted peacebuild-
ing initiatives that held the South together. From this perspective, the 
SPLA demonstrates patterns common to postcolonial insurgencies (and 
states) with respect to subcontracting legitimacy, drawing on religious 
structures, and mobilising both grassroots and transnational support.
I argue the peacebuilding field in South Sudan cannot be fully under-
stood without attention to these activities, their embeddedness in a 
global and regional nexus of religion, aid, and governance, and the role 
of religious organisations in establishing order and authority throughout 
the conflict. In the remainder of this chapter, I provide three empirical 
snapshots that flesh this out, focusing on the crystallisation of the reli-
gion–governance in South Sudan following the first Sudanese civil war, 
the role of the church in wartime governance, and post-CPA struggles.
First, during Sudan’s first civil war (1955–1972), the World Council 
of Churches (WCC), All Africa Conference of Churches, and the inter-
denominational American humanitarian agency Church World Service 
provided relief aid and financial support for southern Sudanese refu-
gees in Uganda, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, and Zaire/
Congo. Having previously conducted aid and advocacy targeting 
Biafra’s secession, they negotiated with Khartoum to create human-
itarian space for aid delivery in the South. A decade into the conflict, 
they expanded their activities to more actively encompass peacebuild-
ing and political advocacy. With support from the Khartoum-based 
Sudan Council of Churches, officials toured neighboring refugee camps 
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seeking endorsement of a draft peace proposal that would ultimately 
form the basis of the final settlement. With much success, churches and 
relief agencies lobbied for support across Europe, including the WCC, 
Lutheran World Federation, and Norwegian Church Aid.
These activities cemented a nascent religiously identified humanitar-
ian–peacebuilding nexus, for which the 1973 Addis Ababa peace agree-
ment was a milestone (Collins 2008, p. 108; Howell 1978, pp. 430–435; 
Werner et al. 2000, pp. 391–394). They demonstrated the ability of 
the international Church to intervene into the postcolonial politics of 
sub-Saharan African states; to do so in conjunction with the delivery of 
aid and within an overarching humanitarian framework; and to success-
fully secure political outcomes. In conjunction with the agreement’s pro-
visions, they also facilitated an influx of new international groups into 
southern Sudan, both religious and secular, creating the conditions 
through which the Sudanese Church became implicated in the provision 
and implementation of international aid and governance.
Second, church-based actors became central to wartime governance, 
aid, and local peacebuilding in the post-Cold War phase of Sudan’s sec-
ond civil war. A hub for international aid and peacebuilding, the NSCC 
was established by the major Christian denominations to build govern-
ance capacity, provide social services, and manage international funds 
secured through the UN-sponsored OLS humanitarian initiative. The 
NSCC was part of the WCC ecumenical framework, deriving funding 
from European, North American, and regional ecumenical bodies. It 
was also operationally and financially supported by a group of church-
based aid organisations, exemplifying the institutional effects of regional 
humanitarian governance and its overlap with the wider peacebuilding 
field. The NSCC became increasingly central to governance and institu-
tional reform in the South. It was tasked with resolving internal southern 
violence and facilitating peace and reconciliation by the SPLA’s newly 
created political wing, the SPLM, which strategically revised its relation-
ship with the Church in the attempt to establish effective civil adminis-
tration in areas liberated from the North.
This new relationship was exemplified by the 1997 joint SPLM and 
NSCC conference at the Kajiko parish center of the Episcopal Church 
of Sudan. The Kajiko conference utilised the NSCC’s social capital 
to mitigate tensions between ethnic groupings and help resolve a dev-
astating SPLA split that had been exploited by Khartoum and became 
responsible for the bulk of death and destruction during the war. 
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It also strengthened links between the SPLM/A and the Church, 
endorsing a set of common objectives on local peace and liberation (the 
‘Yei Declaration’). Kajiko reaffirmed the Church’s commitment to the 
insurgency and mandated the NSCC with facilitating southern reconcili-
ation. It laid the foundation for the Church-led ‘Person-to-Person’ peace 
process, which culminated in the 1999 Wunlit agreement that reunited 
the SPLA—paving the way for the IGAD-led peace negotiations between 
North and South.
Third, in the post-CPA period, as UNMIS and its international 
 partners focused on CPA protocols, local and international Christian 
groups provided civic education and grassroots peacebuilding, help-
ing advance the South through a timely and organised referendum 
and independence. Christian humanitarian NGOs like World Vision 
International, Tearfund UK, Norwegian Church Aid, and Catholic Relief 
Services incorporated longer-term developmental frameworks that cen-
tered on matters of governance—including supporting local govern-
ments through decentralisation. In terms of local peacebuilding, their 
efforts included the establishment of conflict early warning and response 
systems and a civil society track empowered to monitor and respond to 
internal southern violence. However, these organisations faced ‘cold’ 
relations with South Sudan government, as the SPLM asserted its polit-
ical autonomy. They also faced unresolved southern grievances and the 
absence of an effective South Sudanese national identity. Throughout the 
war, social reassurances in the face of repressive tactics by Khartoum, the 
SPLA, and other rebel militias were not found in the certitudes of ethnic 
or national identification typically associated with civil or secessionist war. 
Instead, they were partly provided by a religion–governance interface, 
for which internal fragmentation was an enduring problem.
After its long history of providing aid, governance, and social  services 
to the southern population, these issues symbolised the Church’s 
broader struggle to find its public and private footing amid the impend-
ing normalisation and formalisation of southern governance. Indicating 
the importance of humanitarianism and governance to its institutional 
identity, the local Church reaffirmed its commitments to four key areas 
of activity: (1) repatriation and resettlement of internally displaced 
 persons, through its social wing of the Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation 
and Development Agency; (2) peacebuilding and reconciliation, by 
establishing forums across the South at various levels; (3) advocacy 
and lobbying, by targeting various national, regional, and international 
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partners with which it was already engaged; and (4) civic and voter 
 education, by conducting campaigns at the grassroots and other levels, as 
well as engaging international observers and monitors (Sudan Council of 
Churches 2010). Despite their immediate successes, however, they failed 
to achieve much beyond secession.
After a prolonged history of productive entanglements, Church, aid, 
and the future of South Sudan had become inextricable. They created 
a nexus infused with complex global social dynamics, mixed mandates, 
and relations of dependency. The organisational capacity and compe-
tence of the principal ecumenical body weakened and it experienced 
issues with management and leadership. In many ways, internal Church 
dynamics mirrored social and institutional development across the 
South. Socially, the Church had become fragmented. Institutionally, 
it had become prone to corruption. Consequently, it faced a crisis of 
legitimacy. Humanitarian-centered ministry played a large role in the 
Church’s vision of the future but the Church faced a double struggle. 
First, it was concerned not to be beholden to the guidelines and objec-
tives of the common donor platform of bi- and multilateral agencies that 
were releasing new funds oriented to longer term, development goals in 
the South. Second, it struggled with being, and being perceived to be, 
impartial and independent of the government. Both struggles affected 
the public legitimacy and trust of the Church, exemplifying longer-term 
societal and institutional effects of the religion governance interface.
conclusion
This chapter located South Sudan’s precarious peace within an aid-
based postcolonial order crystallised across sub-Saharan states. By calling 
attention to South Sudan’s humanitarian past, it emphasised the histor-
ical importance of religious agency within this order for regulating and 
producing international spaces. Empirically, this paper questioned how 
South Sudan became a newly independent state plagued by violence and 
contestation, facing a prolonged and intractable civil war. Conceptually, 
it questioned how we think about the wider peacebuilding field with 
respect to intersections of religion, aid, and governance. Emphasising 
how these activities encompassed problematic tradeoffs and spillover 
effects, it pinpointed sites in which external coordination across long-
term peacebuilding efforts should be both strengthened and more effec-
tively utilised. Attention to how these relationships take shape is critical 
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for discovering ways to strategically incorporate the full-spectrum of rele-
vant actors into peacebuilding frameworks.
Military and humanitarian action alone are insufficient for achieving 
international peace in the absence of effective governing and political 
institutions. The HIPPO advocates better coordination between missions 
and humanitarian actors as well as deeper engagement of communities 
and non-governmental organisations. Calls for stronger field-oriented and 
‘people-centered’ capabilities address this by focusing on how to utilise a 
wider range of actors across a wider range of activities. I have suggested 
that thinking about these questions from the perspective of a postcolo-
nial ‘religion–governance interface’ calls attention to the unique ways reli-
gious agency impacts the ‘Peace-Humanitarian-Development Nexus’ in 
Africa. This lays bare the limits of state-centric—and secular—approaches 
to peacebuilding. Attending to the political and institutional realities of 
statehood in postcolonial spaces is critical for stabilising South Sudan and 
better utilising ‘people-power’ in support of UNMISS and related oper-
ations. It is also relevant for empowering other contemporary operations 
across the continent and beyond, with respect to multidimensional inte-
grated missions mandated to protect civilians, extend state authority, and 
stabilize governments (e.g. MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, 
MINUSMA in Mali, and MONUSCO in DRC).
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UN Peace Operations and Changes  




At the end of the twentieth century, most peacekeepers were engaged 
in implementing comprehensive peace agreements. Today, only a decade 
and half into the twenty-first century, most UN peace operations have 
undergone a significant phase-shift and are now focused on stabilisation 
and protection of civilian roles. Why have peace operations changed its 
core role from conflict resolution to conflict management, and what fur-
ther changes may be likely in the coming years? With this volume we 
wanted to understand how peace operations have been adapting, espe-
cially since the turn of the century, in response to macro-level systemic 
changes, and we wanted to explore if we can detect any trajectories that 
help us anticipate how peace operations are likely to continue to evolve 
over the coming decades.
C. de Coning (*) 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway
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We have brought together a multidisciplinary and geographically 
diverse group of scholars and practitioners—some established authorities, 
others rising stars—to analyse the challenges and opportunities that UN 
peace operations are facing as a result of the uncertainty and turbulence 
of a global order in transition. Our ambition was to use this diversity of 
contributors to generate a variety of perspectives on the influences that 
shape peace operations. Together we have covered a range of topics that 
we thought are most critical to the evolution of peace operations in the 
twenty-first century.
Many of the contributing authors were engaged in some or other way 
with the UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) 
appointed by then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in 2014, to assess 
the state of peace operations. Ban Ki Moon tasked the Panel with making 
recommendations that would ensure that UN peacekeeping became fit 
for purpose again. The Panel produced its report in 2015, during a period 
when there was a sense in the diplomatic and research communities that the 
UN, and in particular its peace operations, was struggling to live up to its 
expectations (Peter 2015). The prevailing view was that the scope and com-
plexity of the challenges that have emerged have outgrown the capabilities 
of the UN (van der Lijn and Smit 2015).
The HIPPO Panel published its report in 2015 with far reaching rec-
ommendations for strengthening and revitalising the UN’s approach 
to peace and security, and especially UN peace operations (UN 2015; 
Boutellis and Connolly 2016). At the same time as the HIPPO Panel 
undertook its review of UN peace operations, a ten-year review of the 
UN peacebuilding architecture took place (de Coning and Stamnes 
2016), as well as a review of the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.1 When these three 
reviews are read together, they provide a comprehensive overview and 
analysis of the key challenges facing UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding 
and the women, peace and security agenda a decade and half into the 
twenty-first century. Among others, they clearly show how inter-con-
nected these agendas and approaches are, despite the fact that each is 
driven by its own political, bureaucratic, and scholarly interest groups.
In January 2017, a new Secretary-General, António Guterres, assumed 
office. The new UN Secretary-General immediately introduced a number 
1 For a summary of the major issues that these three reviews addressed, see Eli Stamnes 
and Kari Osland (2016).
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of changes to the way the UN is managed and coordinated. He opted for 
a cabinet-style executive committee to oversee the day-to-day manage-
ment of the UN. He has appointed a special advisor on prevention and 
re-organised the executive office of the Secretary-General so that it can 
better serve as a central coordinating hub for the UN system. He has also 
instructed the geographical desks of the departments that deal with pre-
vention, mediation, and peacekeeping, as well as the department that sup-
ports such operations and missions, to co-locate. The Secretary-General 
followed-up on these initial changes a few months later with three signif-
icant reform packages, one each on management, development, and peace 
and security. Many of these changes have been inspired by the recommen-
dations of the peace operations, peacebuilding, and 1325 reviews, and is 
meant to make the UN more resilient in its ability to respond to some of 
the key challenges that have been highlighted and analysed in this volume.
Taken together, these reforms represent a significant system-wide effort 
to adapt the UN to both changes in the global order as well as the new 
emerging challenges facing the UN, and to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the United Nations. It is unlikely that António Guterres would 
have been able to introduce such sweeping changes to the way the UN sys-
tem is managed and coordinated, if the ground work was not already done 
through the peace operations, peacebuilding and 1325 reviews, and the 
subsequent political direction from UN member states, which is reflected 
in, for instance, the sustaining peace resolutions that was approved by the 
Security Council and General Assembly in 2016 (UN 2016a, b). It is not 
certain, however, that these reforms will all be implemented. Several aspects 
of the reforms are experiencing push-back from certain member states or 
interest groups within the UN system. The degree to which the UN system 
will thus be able to adapt to both the challenges it faces in the short- to 
medium-term, and the changes underway over the medium- to long-term, 
is thus still very much an open question.
The various chapters in this volume explain why the UN system in 
general, and peace operations in particular, is under significant strain at 
this point in its evolution. We identify and analyse the scope and com-
plexity of a number of the most significant drivers that place the UN sys-
tem under stress. The preceding chapters explain how a combination of 
several interlinked factors—including the destabilising effects of violent 
extremism and the emergence of transnational organised crime as a con-
flict driver in areas such as the Sahel—meant that the UN, and its peace 
operations, had to manage increasingly complex conflict environments. If 
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we add to these additional factors such as the impact of climate change, 
the increase in large-scale humanitarian emergencies, and the unprece-
dented high numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons they 
have generated, then the challenges the UN system as a whole has to 
deal with increase even further in scope and complexity.
These challenges have been compounded by internal UN stressors, 
such as the UN’s failure to prevent the sexual abuse and exploitation 
committed by some of its peacekeepers; its inability to prevent South 
Sudan from relapsing into violent conflict despite the presence of a UN 
peacekeeping operation; its powerlessness to help consolidate the peace 
processes in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo despite a 
decade long sustained effort by two of the largest operations in the his-
tory of the UN, and especially its mixed track record when it comes to 
protecting civilians in these conflicts.
There are also a number of deep structural tensions that undermine 
the credibility and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. The most signifi-
cant of these is the North–South divide between those who contribute 
the bulk of the peacekeepers, those that contribute most of the funding, 
and the patterns this creates when it comes to the kind of capabilities the 
UN has at its disposal, and those it cannot ever seem to get enough of, 
such as air assets and other force multipliers. Among others, these pat-
terns—both those that influence the stock and flow of peacekeepers and 
those that restrict the resources necessary to enable them to achieve their 
mandates, and safeguard them while doing so—determine which coun-
tries bear the brunt of the burden when it comes to peacekeepers losing 
their lives in the interest of protecting the lives of others, and in main-
taining international peace and security on behalf of all of us.
All these developments, and the new reforms introduced by Secretary-
General António Guterres, are taking place in the context of significant 
changes—what Adriana Abdenur refers to in her chapter in this volume 
as ‘tectonic shifts’—that are underway at the global systems level. These 
changes are transforming the balance of power in the global order. In the 
last hundred years, we have seen the global order transform from a multipo-
lar system into a bipolar order after the Second World War. At the end of 
the Cold War the global system changed again from a bipolar to a unipo-
lar system, dominated by the United States and its allies. For the system of 
international governance, this meant that one ideology—neo-liberalism—
became the global norm, and global institutions like the UN became agents 
for the dissemination, implementation, and enforcers of this ideology.
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Currently we are witnessing yet another phase-shift. The unipolar 
era is waning in the face of a significant increase in the economic and 
political influence of countries like China and India in the global system. 
It is still uncertain what may replace it, but the next stage in the tran-
sition seems to be another multipolar era, in which several states—the 
United States, China, Germany, India, and Russia, to name a few—each 
have access to networks and forms of power sufficient to prevent any of 
the others from dominating the global order (de Coning et al. 2015). 
Another emerging characteristic of the transition is that several non-state 
actors, including some international and regional organisations, several 
large companies, and some non-governmental agencies, can exert signif-
icant influence on the global system on selected issues where they have a 
substantial capacity or competency. These changes at the global systems 
level have implications for the UN and for peace operations, and it is 
these implications that we set out to study in this edited volume.
mAin Findings
In the Introduction we identified four developments at the global system 
level that are influencing the transformation of the global order, and we 
set out to study their implications for United Nations peace operations. 
The four transformational questions we asked, were:
• How is the rebalancing of relations between states of the global North 
and the global South impacting the UN’s decision-making, financing 
and ability to design operations that go beyond the minimum com-
mon denominator;
• How is the rise of regional organisations as providers of peace impact-
ing the primacy of UN peace operations and how and whether the 
UN can remain relevant in this era of partnership and competition;
• How have violent extremism and fundamentalist non-state actors 
changed the nature of international responses and what does this 
mean for previously advanced longer-term approaches to conflict 
resolution; and
• How are demands from non-state actors for greater emphasis on human 
security impacting UN’s credibility and whether in light of the first 
three transformations the UN is even able to prioritise people-centred 
approaches over state-centred ones?
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The various contributors to this volume have analysed each of these 
trends in depth, and in the following section we will briefly consider 
some of their key observations and findings, and the implications for the 
future directions that UN peace operations may evolve towards.
Relations Between the Global North and the Global South
As Mateja Peter and Adam Day explored in their chapters, previous 
phase-shifts in the global order, such as from a bipolar to a unipolar world 
order at the end of the Cold War, have had a significant impact on UN 
approaches to peace. As Peter details, during the Cold War, UN peace 
operations were mostly limited to unarmed or lightly armed peacekeep-
ing operations observing and monitoring cease-fires in the Middle-
East, Cyprus, and Kashmir. The UN operation in the Congo (ONUC), 
deployed from 1960 to 1964, was an exception, but it resulted in a fur-
ther consolidation of the dominant trend of the period. Between 1948 
and 1988, the UN deployed only 13 peacekeeping operations. During this 
period, peacekeeping was a military affair, and troops were mostly from 
countries that had no strategic interest in these conflict, such as Canada, 
India, Ghana, the Nordics, and Ireland. UN peacekeeping was clearly 
defined by its three principles—consent, impartiality, and the use of force 
only in self-defence—and enjoyed the support of the West, the Soviet-bloc 
and the Non-Aligned countries (see Mats Berdal in this volume).
The end of the Cold War saw a dramatic increase in the number of 
peacekeeping operations. Since 1988, the UN has deployed 57 peace-
keeping operations, and the number of military and police peacekeep-
ers increased from 11,000 in 1988 to a high point of 107,805 in 2015. 
By 2018, this has decreased slightly, to 92,511 (Rappa 2018). The 
number of troop contributing countries also increased and changed 
significantly. Traditional peacekeeping contributors like Canada and 
the Nordics have reduced their defence budgets and they have shifted 
their contributions to NATO, to the extent that there are no longer 
any Western countries among the top 10 troop contributors. Africa and 
South East Asia now contribute the bulk of the peacekeepers. At the 
beginning of 2018, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Rwanda 
made up the top five contributors, and China was the largest contributor 
among the permanent members of the Security Council.
One of the significant changes that occurred since the end of the Cold 
War is the transformation of peacekeeping from being mostly engaged 
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in cease-fire monitoring in inter-state conflicts, to being mostly involved 
in supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements 
in intra-state conflicts in the 1990s. The emergence of a unipolar world 
order resulted in the UN becoming an important instrument in assisting 
state formation and state-building according to the dominant neo-liberal 
ideology of the time (Richmond 2004).
As a result of the dominance of this Western-led liberal consensus 
approach to international conflict management, the task of UN peace-
keeping operations expanded significantly from cease-fire monitoring to 
the managing political transitions, which included disarming, demobilis-
ing and reintegrating ex-combatants, supporting constitutional writing 
processes, organising elections, supporting reconciliation processes, and 
helping to establish new state institutions. These new tasks resulted in 
another significant transformation, namely changing peacekeeping from 
mostly military into multidimensional operations that consisted of civil-
ian, police, and military personnel (see Kari M. Osland in this volume).
Over time, notions of state security gave way to the concept of human 
security and in the 2000s this resulted in a change in the core role of 
UN peace operations, namely a new focus on containing and mitigat-
ing the effects of intra-state conflicts on individuals, through new policy 
approaches to protection of civilians and stabilisation operations (Hilde 
F. Johnson in this volume and de Coning et al. 2017).
The current shift in the global order from a unipolar to a multipolar 
world order is thus likely to, once again, have significant effects on how 
UN peace operations evolve. It is still unclear what form these changes 
may take, but we can identify three drivers that are likely to inform the 
future direction of UN peace operations.
Firstly, it seems that some of the traditional North-South roles, that 
have been fixed into a predictable pattern since the end of the Cold War, 
may now start to change. Some of the countries that are likely to have 
a significant impact on the new global order, such as China and India, 
have been significant contributors of military and police personnel to 
UN peacekeeping operations, and they are likely to continue to support 
UN peacekeeping as an important instrument for managing global peace 
and security (see He Yin in this volume). China is now also the 2nd larg-
est financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, and India’s 
financial contribution will likely increase over time in proportion to its 
economic growth. The other major powers in the new multi-polar world 
order, such as the United States, Japan, the European Union, and Russia 
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are all significant financial contributors to UN peacekeeping, but with 
the exception of a few European countries like Italy, they do not contrib-
ute significant number of troops. This is unlikely to change.
The US and the European countries have dominated the research and 
knowledge management dimensions and have played the leading role in 
determining the policy directions that UN peace operations have taken 
during the unipolar era. China and the other rising powers and emerging 
economies are increasingly signalling their intent to play a more prom-
inent role in the policy and decision-making domain when it comes to 
UN peace operations (He Yin in this volume and de Coning and Prakash 
2016). These countries are thus likely to contribute more financially, and 
are likely to become more assertive in influencing the future policy direc-
tion of UN peace operations.
Secondly, in light of the uncertainty that the turbulence of a changing 
global order generates, and the lack of global trust that other security 
regimes like NATO suffer from, the UN Security Council and UN peace 
operations, despite their shortcomings, are likely to remain the most 
credible and reliable international instruments for maintaining interna-
tional peace and security. As such, peace operations are likely to remain 
in high demand, and they are likely to remain under pressure to provide 
stability in conflicts characterised by violent extremism, organised crime 
and other forms of instability and conflict.
Thirdly, as the influence of the rising powers and the countries from 
the Global South more generally grow, the dominant neo-liberal ideol-
ogy of the unipolar era will be increasingly challenged. As it is unlikely 
in a multipolar global order that agreement on an alternative globally 
endorsed common normative approach will emerge, one result is likely 
to be that UN peace operations would become less normative and less 
intrusive.2 In other words, UN peace operations are likely to stop pre-
scribing the neo-liberal peace- and state-building models that were the 
norm during the unipolar era. In its place, peace operations are more 
likely to encourage home-grown or self-determined models for peace- 
and state-building, and are likely to concentrate on the more technical 
2 de Coning et al. (2015) argue that the Rising Powers are seeking to bring about an 
alternative global order that is based on a new pluralistic normative framework, which they 
refer to as coexistence, where different normative approaches are allowed to coexist and 
where the global order is designed to prevent the hegemony of any one ideology or norma-
tive approach over others.
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aspects of state-building (Call and de Coning 2017). Such technical 
solutions have not provided desired outcomes, and as Adam Day points 
out in his chapter, the UN would often achieve more with a light and 
nimble presence on the ground. This, according to Day, starts with the 
conflict prevention work.
It is also likely that UN peace operations will be tasked to concen-
trate more on physical security, law and order and the political dimen-
sions of conflict management. However, this does not necessarily imply 
that peace operations are likely to become more robust or that the trend 
towards limited enforcement mandates will continue. The rising powers 
that are also major troop contributing countries, including China and 
India, are firm believers in the core principles of peacekeeping and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes (de Coning and Prakash 2016). Future 
UN peace operations are also likely to shift away from expansive man-
dates that include a broad range of capacity-building, peacebuilding, and 
state-building tasks (see Mateja Peter in this volume). The UN may still 
remain active in some of these areas, but more so via its development 
instruments, and more in support of nationally driven initiatives, rather 
than as an internationally driven normative agenda. Non-state actors are 
likely to play a greater role in this process (see Jonathan C. Agensky in 
this volume).
The Rise of Regional Organisations
One of the paradoxes of increasing globalisation is that it simultane-
ously seems to have stimulated the need for people to invest more in 
local and regional identities. In this volume, Thierry Tardy has addressed 
the impact of these developments in Europe, and I have addressed some 
of the developments in Africa. In my chapter, I describe how this trend 
manifested in a significant effort over the last two decades to develop 
Africa’s peace and security architecture. Both the African Union and 
the European Union have invested in strengthening their early warning 
and prevention capacities, their ability to deploy mediators and special 
envoys, their ability to support countries emerging from conflict, and 
their ability to deploy peace support or crisis-management  operations. 
The African Union has invested in establishing a peace  operations 
standby capacity, the African Standby Force, and it has deployed and 
supported a dozen Africa-led operations over the past decade and a half. 
The EU has similarly invested in the EU Battle Group model and has 
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deployed several missions of its own. In the process, both African-led 
peace operations and EU crisis-management missions have evolved 
beyond the UN peacekeeping model.
Over the last five years another type of security arrangement has 
emerged in Africa, what the AU now refers to as ad hoc security arrange-
ments. In response to the threat posed by Boko Haram, a violent 
extremist group operating in northern Nigeria and neighbouring ter-
ritories, the countries that make up the Lake Chad Basin Commission 
established the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Following this 
model and faced with international terrorism and transnational organ-
ised crime in the Sahel region, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, 
and Niger formed the Group of Five (G5) Sahel joint force in 2017. 
The MNJTF and the G5 Sahel forces represent the latest generation 
of regional security arrangements that started with the AU’s regional 
arrangement against the Lord’s Resistance Army. It also drew inspira-
tion from the early successes of the Force Intervention Brigade in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, where countries from the SADC region 
(Southern African Development Community) came together to establish 
a robust brigade capable of containing and neutralising rebel groups such 
as the M23.
The trends that seem to be emerging from these experiences, at least 
in Africa, seem to be that where there is a need to counter a determined 
insurgency with force, the most effective response that can be mustered 
is to mobilise countries from the region that have a national security 
interest in the stability of the region, and whom are thus more willing to 
use force to counter terrorist or other violent threats, than forces organ-
ised via the UN peacekeeping model. And secondly, that by mobilising 
national forces to operate in their own border regions, and as necessary 
beyond their own borders in hot pursuit operations or in joint opera-
tions, these arrangements solve many of the force generation and use of 
force type challenges the UN faced elsewhere (see Mats Berdal in this 
volume).
As I argue in my chapter about Africa’s role in peace operations, these 
adaptations of the UN peacekeeping model in Africa may contribute to 
an evolution of the international peace and security architecture. In the 
past, the UN was the sole internationally recognised actor when it came 
to maintaining international peace and security. In the future, regional 
organisations like the African Union and European Union are likely to 
take primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security in their 
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own regions and immediate neighbourhood. The implication is that a 
new global peace and security architecture is emerging, where the UN, 
together with regional organisations, where they exist and are capable, 
are co-managing international peace and security. Thierry Tardy, in his 
chapter about the role of the European Union, argues that the European 
Union has embraced a conception of crisis management that is close to 
the UN’s, and is willing to support such a global-regional peace and 
security partnership. Likewise, the Africa Union has signalled its willing-
ness to increasingly take responsibility for peace and security in Africa. 
A new global peace and security architecture, based on the principle of 
regional subsidiarity, may thus be emerging. In the mean-time the AU, 
EU and UN are cooperating closely in what the HIPPO has referred to 
as a new era of peacekeeping partnership (UN 2015).
Violent Extremism and Fundamentalist Non-state Actors
The previous Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon, 
referred to peacekeeping as the flagship enterprise of the UN (2016a, b). 
However, he also recognised that UN peacekeeping is under severe pres-
sure. UN peacekeepers are operating in very complex and dangerous 
environments (van der Lijn and Smit 2015; Karlsrud 2018). The UN 
mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is a good example of the kind of chal-
lenges UN peace operations face today, and by early 2018, it has suffered 
the highest number of casualties in a UN operation in 20 years. The high 
number of fatalities and injuries is largely due to asymmetric terrorist 
attacks on the UN, including the use of improvised explosive devices.
As John Karlsrud argues in this volume, the threats the UN is facing 
are closely linked to the fact that it is not viewed as an impartial actor 
by the militant opposition groups, because its mandate involves help-
ing the government in Bamako to extend its authority and control over 
the North of Mali. This puts the UN in direct confrontation with those 
armed groups and political factions campaigning for more autonomy for 
the North, and increasingly now also in the central region of Mali.
Scholars of armed conflict have long noted structural changes in the 
nature of conflicts, such as the proliferation of so-called new or hybrid 
war. In the post-Cold War period there is increasingly a blurring of 
war and crime. Arthur Boutellis and Stephanie Tiélès, in this volume, 
conclude that despite the recognition by the UN system and Member 
States that organised crime is a threat to peace and stability, particularly 
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when in conjunction with terrorism and violent extremism, there is still 
much uncertainty about what the role of a multilateral organisation like 
the UN should be. In particular, the UN is uncertain about what UN 
peace operations could and should do about it. The issue has, however, 
become front and centre with almost three quarter of UN peace opera-
tions now operating in environments considered significantly affected by 
organised crime, particularly in the West Africa and Sahel contexts.
John Karlsrud in his chapter argues that the UN is neither principally 
nor operationally set up to fight terrorist groups by force. The HIPPO 
report drew a red line against a role for UN peace operations in coun-
ter-terrorism operations, saying that “UN peacekeeping missions, due 
to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in military 
counter-terrorism operations. They lack the specific equipment, intelli-
gence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation required, 
among other aspects” (UN 2015, p. 31). Karlsrud also points out that 
the Secretary-General has warned against a securitised approach to coun-
tering violent extremism, and has outlined a prevention agenda where 
the main goals must be to better understand the motivations for join-
ing groups such as the IS; avoid using ‘terrorism’ as a label to eliminate 
political opposition; and deal with root causes through strengthening 
governance, the respect for human rights, more accountable institutions, 
service delivery and political participation. Kari Osland also points out in 
her chapter that the UN may be better served with a greater emphasis 
on trust-building in the local police rather than continued focus on the 
security aspects of their task.
Karlsrud, de Coning and others in this volume point out that coali-
tions of the willing, and in some instances regional organisations, seem 
to be the only mechanisms with the requisite political will, capabilities 
and staying power to conduct counter-terrorism operations. They point 
out however, that defeating violent extremism is not ultimately about 
military strength. Rather, it needs a holistic approach that addresses the 
root causes and drivers of the conflict. The comparative advantage of the 
UN lies in its convening power and impartiality, and its ability to pro-
vide and coordinate comprehensive support across the spectrum from its 
peace and security, development, and human rights pillars.
The implications for the future of UN peace operations are that UN 
peace operations are likely to be deployed in countries and regions where 
violent extremism and transnational organised crimes are dominant fea-
tures of the security landscape (Williams 2016). However, it is unlikely 
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that UN peace operations will be mandated to undertake counter-terror 
operations. It is more likely that they will accompany, or coexist along-
side, other forces that do have such a role. In such contexts UN peace 
operations are likely to focus on seeking political solutions while using its 
development and peacebuilding pillars to support state and social institu-
tions and civil society.
Greater Emphasis on People-Centred Peace Operations
UN peace operations have long been criticised for being too state- 
centric. They are deployed by a multilateral body of states, their mili-
tary and police officers and units are contributed by states, and they 
are reliant on an international legal framework that enable their pres-
ence through formal status of forces and status of mission agreements 
between the UN and the host state. Since especially the end of the Cold 
War, many individual Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
and other mission leaders have taken steps to reach out to civil society 
and community leaders, and since the late 1990s UN peace operations 
have a civilian component—Civil Affairs—dedicated to sub-national 
outreach. However, these efforts were not enough to counter the many 
other drivers and incentives that ensured that UN peace operations were 
more sensitive to the needs of the host state, and other states in the 
international system, than to the people they were ultimately there to 
protect and serve.
As Youssef Mahmoud points out in his chapter in this volume, 
reaching out to people and engaging with local communities and ordi-
nary citizens are common practices in many peace operations. However, 
these practices tended to take the form of ad hoc activities, without suf-
ficient strategic focus or intent. Many community engagement activities 
remain mission-centric (e.g. winning hearts and minds of local popula-
tions) or as appendices to various state-centric goals such as restoring 
and extending state authority.
As emphasised in the HIPPO, the peacebuilding review, and the 
twin sustaining peace resolutions, for peace to be self-sustainable, it has 
to emerge from local social processes and it has to build on the social 
resilience that is already present in societies and communities (see also 
Jonathan Agensky in this volume). The implications for UN peace oper-
ations are that they should find new ways to contribute to broader inter-
national and local efforts that facilitate the re-emergence of the informal 
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norms of behaviour and shared beliefs of societies and communities that 
are essential for institutions to be locally owned and embedded.
To sustain peace, UN peace operations thus have to develop new tools 
and capacities to engage not only with the state, but also with societies, 
communities and individual people. These need to include strong prin-
cipled leadership, supported by the capacity to monitor the missions’ 
actions and the effect they have on local communities and the everyday 
lives of the people they are meant to assist (Autesserre 2014). Missions 
should involve representatives of the societies they are working with 
when undertaking assessments, analysis, planning, programming, and 
evaluation. The nature of the involvement will depend on the context, 
but the principle of giving society maximum agency to influence the 
work of the mission, should be a general principle that guide people- 
centred peace operations. Missions should identify people that are 
generally perceived to be credible voices for their communities, such as 
traditional, civil society, religious and academic leaders, and involve them 
in the mission’s engagement with its host society in a variety of ways.
Two groups that require special attention are women and youth. 
The HIPPO, the peacebuilding review, the Women, Peace and Security 
review, and the twin sustaining peace resolutions, all reaffirm the indis-
pensable role of women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In particular 
they recognize the substantial link between women’s full and meaningful 
involvement in efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, and those efforts’ 
effectiveness and long-term sustainability. The larger the gender gap 
between the treatment of men and women in a society, the more likely 
it is that a country will experience conflict (United Nations and World 
Bank 2018, p. 30).
In recognition of the critical role that women play in all peace and 
security efforts, including in the UN, the new Secretary-General, 
António Guterres, has launched an initiative to encourage troop and 
police contributing countries to increase the number of women deployed 
in military and police contingents. At the same time, he recognizes that 
it is not just about the number of women in peacekeeping but also the 
role they play. He has set the example by, for the first time, achieving 
gender parity in all his senior appointments. The Secretariat has launched 
a senior women talent pipeline initiative to increase the number of 
women in senior peacekeeping positions.
The HIPPO and other reviews also recognizes the important role 
youth can play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and as key 
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driver of sustainability and inclusiveness. The Independent Progress 
Study on Youth and Peace and Security (United Nations 2018) pro-
vides a framework for partnering with and investing in young people to 
prevent violence, to promote their inclusion and to translate the demo-
graphic dividend into a peace dividend. The report recommends three 
mutually reinforcing strategies: First, it is critical to invest in young peo-
ple’s capacities, agency and leadership through substantial funding sup-
port, network-building and capacity-strengthening, recognizing the full 
diversity of youth and the ways young people organise. Second, sys-
tems that reinforce exclusion must be transformed in order to address 
the structural barriers limiting youth participation in peace and security. 
Third, partnerships and collaborative action where young people are 
viewed as equal and essential partners for peace must be prioritised.
The literature on the “local turn”’ in peace operations has highlighted 
the importance of local voices, but it has also presented a powerful cri-
tique of the potential challenges of focusing on the local (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond 2013; Mahmoud and Agensky in this volume). Peace oper-
ations should not be naïve about the potentially challenging features of 
traditional forms of authority that can represent persistent structures of 
inequality. Local culture is important, but can also be a limiting factor 
or an element used to perpetuate systems of domination: “local actors 
and contexts can be partisan, discriminatory, exclusive and violent (as can 
international actors)” (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, p. 770).
There is still disagreement among some member states whether 
peace operations should be engaging directly with societies and people, 
grounded in concerns about how this could potentially undermine the 
authority of the host government. Few member states disagree that UN 
peace operations should continue to have the government as its prin-
cipal partner. However, as the HIPPO pointed out, if sustainable and 
durable peace remains the main goal of peace operations, then enhanc-
ing state-society relations must be front and centre among the tasks that 
peace operations are supposed to carry out (UN 2015, p. 66). While, 
as pointed out above, many of the rising powers and emerging econo-
mies are likely to favour state-centric peace operations that do not pre-
scribe a specific set of internationally agreed norms, most will likely agree 
that the ultimate aim of the UN should be to foster and support resilient 
societies.
At the same time, global civil society is also increasing in influence, 
and taken together with the spread of mobile phones and access to social 
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media, the implications of the picture that is emerging is that UN peace 
operations will also increasingly be under pressure to be relevant and 
accountable to ordinary people, both in the countries where they are 
deployed, and in the rest of the world.
The pressure on UN peace operations to become more people-cen-
tred are thus likely to be irreversible and relentless. There are many ways 
in which UN peace operations can become more people-centred, includ-
ing by involving representative advisory groups from civil society and 
local communities in assessments, analysis, planning, implementation, 
and evaluation, so as to ensure continuous direct input and feedback 
from the society on the work of the peace operation.
conclusion: eVolution, AdAPtAtion, And resilience
Our core finding is that the increasing influence of China and several 
other new actors from the global South in the global governance sys-
tem, has already started too, and is likely to continue to, generate a more 
pragmatic era of UN peace operations. This implies a shift away from 
using peace operations to help countries adopt neo-liberal-style institu-
tions. In its place, peace operations are likely to become less intrusive 
and to become more supportive of locally-led and bottom-up solutions. 
At the same time, UN peace operations as an institution and a form of 
international conflict resolution is under increasing pressure. It needs 
to adapt its operations to a rise in violent conflict characterised by vio-
lent extremism and transnational organised crime. It must also reduce 
expenditures, improve effectiveness, and find new ways to improve inter-
nal accountability, in order to prevent scandals such as some of its peace-
keepers sexually abusing the very people the UN is meant to protect. 
These internal or technical pressures, together with turbulence intro-
duced by the transitions underway in the global order, has introduced a 
period of flux during which significant innovation and experimentation, 
including with new forms of peace operations, is possible.
In the various contributions to this edited volume, three main themes 
stand out. These—strategic political coherence, the employment of 
force, and the limits of peace operations—will drive the evolution of UN 
peace operations in the coming decades.
First, strategic political coherence relates to the HIPPO’s emphasis 
on the primacy of politics, that is the recognition that peace operations 
always serve a political purpose, and that there is rarely a sustainable 
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solution that does not boil down ultimately to a negotiated political 
agreement (see Adam Day in this volume). However, strategic coherence 
also refers to the new reality that the UN, and UN peace operations, will 
rarely, if ever, operate on its own in the future. In every theatre it will 
operate alongside other international and regional actors, each with its 
own mandate, responsibility, and comparative advantages. The HIPPO 
framed it as a new era of networked peace operations. The UN system, 
and UN peace operations, now need to adapt to this new reality and 
develop the capacity to play its role, which may often include the con-
vening role, in a network of national and international efforts.
In this new system-of-systems reality, several international actors, 
including the World Bank and other regional development banks, bilat-
eral donors, the EU, and other regional organisations each play an 
important role alongside national and local actors. It is the combined 
and cumulative role of all of these national and international actors 
together that constitute the larger political project. UN peace operations 
need to understand its role in this larger political project, and it needs to 
have the capacity to support the effort necessary to coordinate, track and 
take stock of this larger political project. The complexity of maintaining 
overall strategic political coherence among these various systems-with-
in-systems should not be underestimated. Nor can it be avoided as it is 
the organising feature of global governance in the twenty-first century. 
The performance of UN peace operations will thus not be judged only 
on the ability of the mission to carry out its own civilian, police, and mil-
itary tasks. Nor will it be enough to be integrated with the rest of the 
UN system. In future, effectiveness will also depend on the degree to 
which a UN peace operation contributes to the strategic political coher-
ence of the larger national and international effort to sustain the peace in 
a given country or region.
Second, the employment of force seems to remain one of the key 
defining challenges of UN peace operations. How force is employed in 
UN peace operations is one of the key features that distinguishes it from 
AU, EU and NATO peace support operations. As Mateja Peter points 
out in this volume, the principled approach to the use of force in UN 
peace operations has been one of its most resilient features. Whenever 
the UN has deviated from this norm, for instance in the 1960s dur-
ing the ONUC mission in the Congo, or more recently in the Central 
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali, the 
norm seems to be validated and reinforced. This does not mean that the 
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Security Council is unlikely to continue to task UN peace operations, 
as a last resort, with enforcement or stabilisation operations (de Coning 
et al. 2017). It does imply, however, that the principled approach to UN 
peace operations, including the minimum use of force principle, is likely 
to remain one of the defining features of UN peace operations (Mats 
Berdal in this volume and Karlsrud 2018). As discussed earlier in this 
concluding chapter, not only are rising powers like China and India in 
favour of maintaining this principled approach, but the HIPPO has also 
argued against utilising peace operations in counter-terrorism and other 
enforcement roles, on the basis that the inherent features of UN peace 
operations, including its globally diverse force generation structure, its 
civilian logistics chain, its multilateral financing system and its political 
command and control mechanism, make it unfit for combat operations.
Third, debates about what the outer limits of UN peace operations 
should be, seems to be one of the features of UN peace operations that 
is constantly adapting to changing requirements. When peacekeep-
ing started it was mostly unarmed or lightly armed military observers 
or units that implemented and monitored cease-fire agreements. More 
complex tasks were added over time, including supporting the imple-
mentation of comprehensive peace agreements, facilitating the birth of 
new states, and the protection of civilians. Police and civilian experts 
were added and peacekeeping became multi-dimensional. During the 
unipolar era, UN peace operations became a key facilitator for the adop-
tion of neo-liberal state institutions. UN peace operations organised elec-
tions, oversaw the writing of new constitutions, helped to develop rule 
of law and promoted western-style multiparty democratic models. While 
several peacekeeping missions ended successfully during this period in 
places like Angola, Cambodia, Guatemala, Mozambique and Namibia, 
criticism started mounting in the 2000s against the seeming inability of 
mission like the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and the joint AU and UN mission in Darfur to reach a fitting end.
Together with increasing pressure on the funding of peace oper-
ations questions are increasingly being raised about the scope of peace 
operations. Why do some contemporary peacekeeping missions have 
responsibility for justice, police and corrections and other governance 
functions? Should they have human rights mandates? Why is the support 
for elections part of UN peace operation missions, why should it not be 
the role of, for instance, the UN Development Programme (UNDP)? 
Thus far the reasons why many of these functions were included in UN 
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peace operations seem to have more to do with the assessed contribu-
tion funding model of UN peace operations than with any theory of 
change model. Many of these efforts are simultaneously also supported 
by UN agencies, funds, and programmes, as well as other bilateral 
donors, regional organisations, and international and national NGOs. 
This debate seems to be leaning towards the side that argues for a new 
era of limited UN peace operations, where these operations should be 
focused on fewer priority areas, mainly protection, stability, and poli-
tics, organised around functions unique to UN peace operations, or at 
least functions that UN peace operations have a comparative advantage 
in. This debate will be one of the most important debates for UN peace 
operations in the years to come. It is also likely to be one of the most 
contentious, because it has financial implications, it involves the roles of 
other UN agencies, and also because member states have widely diver-
gent opinions about what the role of UN peace operations should be.
While one of the characteristics of UN peace operations has been the 
resilience of the idea, defined by its three core principles, another has 
been the continuous evolution of the specific manifestations of that idea 
into practice. UN peace operations have shown a proven capacity to con-
tinuously adapt to new challenges. If there is one thing we can predict 
with a fair amount of certainty, then it is that UN peace operations will 
continue to adapt and evolve in response to changes in the global order, 
to the way the nature of conflict develops, and to the internal reforms in 
the UN system, and yet it will also remain resiliently identifiable as UN 
peace operations.
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